Director of Public Prosecutions v Gibson

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND APPEALS LIST

No. SCI 2011 06399

BETWEEN:

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
(ON BEHALF OF GEORGIA EDYVANE)
Appellant
v
JULIE GIBSON Respondent

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JUDGE:

Emerton J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

26 June 2012

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

9 July 2012

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Gibson

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2012] VSC 297

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Appeal from a decision in the Magistrates’ Court – Respondent acquitted of charge under s 49(1)(f) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) – Magistrate accepted the respondent’s uncorroborated evidence about the timing of her drinking - Whether the requirement in s 48(1A) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) that evidence be corroborated by the material evidence of another person has been displaced by s 164(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) – Whether s 164(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) impliedly repeals part of s 48(1A) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) - Whether s 8 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) preserves the operation of corroboration requirements in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) – Application of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant - Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), ss 48(1A), 49(1)(f) – Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), ss 8, 164(1) – Appeal allowed.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Mr J D McArdle QC Solicitor for Public Prosecutions
For the Respondent Mr P G Priest QC with Mr A G Burns Michael Kelly & Co

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

  1. On 17 February 2011, the respondent, Ms Gibson, was charged with offences under s 49(1)(b) and s 49(1)(f) the Road Safety Act1986 (Vic) (the ‘Road Safety Act’). The offences related to the concentration of alcohol in her breath while driving or within three hours of driving a car. The alleged concentration was 0.182 per cent, well above the prescribed limit of 0.05 per cent.

  1. The charge under s 49(1)(f) is the subject of this appeal. Section 49(1) provides that a person is guilty of an offence if he or she –

(f)within 3 hours after driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle furnishes a sample of breath for analysis by a breath analysing instrument under section 55 and –

(i)the result of the analysis as recorded or shown by the breath analysing instrument indicates that the prescribed concentration of alcohol or more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol is present in his or her breath;  and

(ii)the concentration of alcohol indicated by the analysis to be present in his or her breath was not due solely to the consumption of alcohol after driving or being in charge of the motor vehicle;

  1. Section 49(1)(f) must be read in conjunction with s 48(1A). Section 48(1A) provides:

For the purposes of an alleged offence against paragraph (f) or (g) of section 49(1) it must be presumed that the concentration of alcohol indicated by an analysis to be present in the breath of…

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Details
Case
[2012] VSC 297
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Director of Public Prosecutions has appealed against the acquittal of Gibson, who was charged under section 49(1)(f) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) for driving with a blood alcohol concentration above the prescribed limit. The Magistrate accepted Gibson's uncorroborated evidence about the timing of her alcohol consumption, leading to her acquittal. The appeal focuses on the requirement in section 48(1A) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) that evidence be corroborated by material evidence from another person. The key legal issues were whether section 164(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) impliedly repeals part of section 48(1A) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), and whether section 8 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) preserves the operation of corroboration requirements in the Road Safety Act.

The court examined the relationship between the two statutes, considering whether the general provisions of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) impliedly repeal the specific corroboration requirement in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic). The court applied the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, holding that the general provisions of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) do not repeal the specific requirements of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic). The court concluded that section 8 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) preserves the operation of corroboration requirements in the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), meaning that uncorroborated evidence is insufficient to secure a conviction. The court held that the Magistrate erred in law by accepting Gibson's uncorroborated evidence.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was restored. The court quashed the acquittal and ordered that Gibson be convicted of the offence as charged. The case highlights the importance of understanding the interaction between general and specific statutory provisions, and the continued relevance of corroboration requirements in certain criminal offences.

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