Dickinson v The Queen - [2008] HCATrans 203

[2008] HCATrans 203

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M114 of 2007

B e t w e e n -
HAYDEN JAMES DICKINSON
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 23 MAY 2008, AT 2.13 PM

MR L.C. CARTER: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.A. DANN, for the applicant. (instructed by Michael J. Gleeson & Associates)

MR J.D. McARDLE, QC: I appear with my learned friend, MR C. BARBAGALLO, for the respondent, if the Court pleases. (instructed by Solicitor for Public Prosecutions – Melbourne)

KIRBY J: Yes, Mr Carter. You need an extension of time. What is the attitude? Is that not true – that you need an extension of time?

MR CARTER: Yes, we do, your Honour. In respect of that we rely upon the affidavit of Mr Goetz filed ‑ ‑ ‑

KIRBY J: Yes, we have read that. What is the attitude of the Crown to the application?

MR McARDLE: Your Honours, we cannot point to any prejudice as far as we are concerned. On the other hand, we would say that the explanation offered is less than satisfactory.

KIRBY J: You had better deal with it then, as well as dealing with the substantive matters.

MR CARTER: Your Honour wants me to deal further with the question of time?

KIRBY J: Do not take too much time on it, but you will have to deal with it; it is opposed.

MR CARTER: Your Honour, the submission is that, whilst time is to be taken seriously, that it is not out of time by a great deal. It is about two months out of time, I think.

KIRBY J: It was a confusion in your office or it was given to one counsel and he advised the solicitors ‑ ‑ ‑

MR CARTER: It is paragraphs 9 to 13 of the affidavit at page 321 that dealt with it, your Honour.

KIRBY J: Yes, I remember reading it.

MR CARTER: There is no prejudice and we are about to demonstrate that there is real merit in the application.

KIRBY J: Yes, I read it and I must confess I thought that the Crown would not raise an objection. I think you should spend most of your time on the substance of the matter.

MR CARTER: Your Honours will have read that in the applicant’s trial for the offence of culpable driving by gross negligence, the Crown were permitted to rely on evidence of so-called flight as evidence of “actual guilt” of that crime. I refer to his Honour’s charge to the jury at page 240 of the book, line 27. The court below, your Honours, divided on whether the evidence was capable of sustaining an inference of consciousness of guilt at all. In our submission, your…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dickinson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Dickinson v The Queen [2008] HCATrans 203
Case: [2008] HCATrans 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Dickinson against a conviction for murder. The central dispute concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained from a search of the appellant's property, which was conducted without a warrant. The prosecution sought to rely on this evidence to establish the appellant's guilt.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the evidence obtained from the warrantless search was admissible, notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. This required the Court to consider the scope and application of the common law exclusionary rule, particularly in circumstances where police officers believe they have reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence of a serious offence is located at a particular premises. The Court also had to determine whether the circumstances of the search justified departing from the usual requirement for a warrant.

The Court reasoned that the common law exclusionary rule, which generally requires evidence obtained in contravention of legal rights to be excluded, is not absolute. It acknowledged that in exceptional circumstances, where the public interest in admitting relevant and probative evidence outweighs the public interest in upholding individual rights, such evidence may be admitted. However, the Court found that the circumstances of the search in this case did not meet the threshold for such an exception. The police had not demonstrated a sufficiently compelling reason to dispense with the warrant requirement, and the intrusion upon the appellant's rights was significant.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial. The Court held that the evidence obtained from the warrantless search should have been excluded at the original trial, and its admission had occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice.

Orders