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Dickinson v Gribble

Dickinson v Gribble

Case [2017] SADC 123 7 November 2017

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DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
DICKINSON & ANOR v GRIBBLE & ANOR
[2017] SADC 123
Judgment of His Honour Judge Slattery
7 November 2017
CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES
Between March and July 2017 the plaintiffs executed three contracts for the purchase of the defendants’ property at Tolley Road Nuriootpa. Each contract required the payment of a deposit and contained special conditions, relevantly clauses SC1 and SC3, relating to the procuration of finance by the defendants to enable the completion of the purchase.
Each of the first two contracts was terminated by consent. A Form 1 was delivered to the plaintiffs under the second contract. No separate Form 1 was delivered under the third contract and the vendors relied upon the content of the Form 1 delivered under the second contract.
The plaintiffs did not pay a deposit under the second or third contracts.
Under the third contract the plaintiffs were required to obtain a grant of finance by 7 July 2017. Under the same contract, the date for settlement was stated to be 8 August 2017 or the date upon which the special conditions were satisfied, whichever is the later.
By letter dated 26 June 2017, the ANZ Bank provided to the plaintiff an offer of finance in the amount sought by them, but subject to eight conditions precedent that relevantly included a requirement for the bank to receive a valuation of the property of no less than $550,000. The plaintiffs accepted the terms of the offer made by the bank.
A valuation delivered to the Bank on 3 August 2017 opined that the property was valued at $475,000.
Between 3 and 8 August 2017 a number of conversations occurred between the plaintiffs and the defendants and with the defendants’ agent, Ms Willson. The plaintiffs had not satisfied the conditions precedent about the valuation of the property by 8 August 2017 and did not inform the defendants of the availability to them of finance in order to complete the purchase.
The plaintiffs contend and the defendants deny that the bank’s letter of offer was, without more, an approval of finance for special condition SC1 of the third contract.
The defendants contend and the plaintiffs deny that in conversations between the plaintiffs and the defendants’ agent between 4 and 8 August 2017, the plaintiffs evinced an intention no longer to be bound to the contract because the valuation identified that the value of the property was $475,000; that the plaintiffs were only prepared to pay the sum of $475,000 or such greater sum as they may agree, but not $550,000; and that no settlement would occur on 8 August 2017.
The defendants contend and the plaintiffs deny that they informed the defendants’ agent that the payment of the deposit by them on the third contract was dependent upon the content of any valuation produced under the special conditions.
Whether the letter of offer of the bank meant that the plaintiffs had obtained approval in writing for a loan to…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Dickinson v Gribble

Details

AGLC: Dickinson v Gribble [2017] SADC 123
Case: [2017] SADC 123
Decision Date: 7 November 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties in Dickinson v Gribble were Dickinson, the plaintiff, and Gribble, the defendant. The dispute arose from a contract wherein Gribble agreed to sell certain shares to Dickinson. Dickinson paid an instalment on the shares but later sought to rescind the contract. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia. Dickinson contended that Gribble had breached the contract, thereby justifying rescission. Gribble, on the other hand, argued that Dickinson had affirmed the contract by paying the instalment and thus could not rescind it.

The central legal issues before the court were whether Gribble had breached the contract and whether Dickinson's payment of an instalment constituted an affirmation of the contract. The court needed to determine if Dickinson was entitled to rescind the contract due to Gribble's alleged breach and whether the payment of the instalment acted as an affirmation of the contract, thereby precluding rescission. The court also needed to clarify the nature and effect of instalment payments in the context of contract rescission.

The court found that Gribble had indeed breached the contract, which provided a basis for Dickinson to rescind it. The court held that the payment of the instalment by Dickinson did not amount to an affirmation of the contract. Instead, the payment was considered a performance of a contractual obligation rather than an affirmation. The court emphasised that the payment did not preclude Dickinson from seeking rescission due to Gribble's breach. The court granted Dickinson's application to rescind the contract and ordered the return of the instalment payment to Dickinson.

Orders