FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DHK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1353
Appeal from: DHK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3228 File number: NSD 2214 of 2017 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 6 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) judge erred in dismissing application for review of Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision to refuse appellant protection visa – whether no evidence to support Authority’s finding that otherwise impecunious appellant could obtain financial assistance from mother to fund internal relocation in Sri Lanka – where Authority and FCCA judge’s reasoning based on unfounded assumption that the appellant’s mother was able and willing to provide her home as collateral, and erroneous interpretation of appellant’s statements at entry interview – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J(1), 36(2), 36(2B) Cases cited: ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825
DHK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3228
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 26; (2013) 93 ATR 775
Date of hearing: 15 June 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 39 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 2214 of 2017 BETWEEN: DHK16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
6 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, made on 22 November 2017, be set aside.
3.The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for determination according to law.
4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”) that dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (“IAA”) made on 4 October 2016: DHK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3228. The IAA had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) refusing to grant the appellant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa.
The appellant’s notice of appeal contains the following single ground of appeal:
The [FCCA judge] committed legal errors jurisdictional when dismissing proceedings. The Judge failed to consider all of the grounds raised in a proper manner.
The appellant did not file written submissions in support of his appeal. He represented himself at the hearing of the appeal with the assistance of a Singhalese interpreter.
The matter was initially listed for hearing on 21 May 2018. On that occasion the appellant requested…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court considered whether the FCCA judge erred in dismissing the application for review. The Court explained that the “no evidence” ground of review requires the finding to be unsupported by any probative evidence, and the finding must not be reasonably open on the evidence. The Court held that the IAA's finding was not supported by any evidence and was based on an erroneous interpretation of the appellant's statements at the entry interview. The Court found that the IAA incorrectly assumed that the appellant’s mother was willing and able to provide her home as collateral for a loan, which was not supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the FCCA, and remitted the matter to the IAA for determination according to law. The Court also ordered the Minister to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and the proceeding in the FCCA.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, made on 22 November 2017, be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Immigration Assessment Authority for determination according to law.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that:(1)the appellant’s notice of appeal fails to identify any appellable error in the reasons for judgment of the FCCA judge;(2)the FCCA judge correctly identified evidence that was capable of supporting the IAA’s disputed finding; and(3)the ground of review before the FCCA judge was the very narrow “no evidence” ground.CONSIDERATION The “no evidence” ground of review was explained in Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Taxation [2013] FCAFC 26; (2013) 93 ATR 775, as the FCCA judge identified. In that decision, Jessup J explained the relevant principles in relation to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal as follows, at [62]:The Tribunal … must … proceed by reference to “rationally probative evidence” rather than on mere “suspicion or speculation”: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi [1980] FCA 85; (1980) 31 ALR 666 at 685. If it does so, its finding on a question of fact will not be assailable in a proceeding under s 44 of the AAT Act unless that finding was not reasonably open on the evidence. Where the finding has been made by inference, no error of law will have been made so long as there was some basis for the inference: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 326. The nature and limits of the Tribunal’s function in these and allied respects were described in detail by Greenwood J (Weinberg J agreeing) in Wecker v Secretary, Department of Education, Science and Training [2008] FCAFC 108; (2008) 168 FCR 272 at 294-299. At [83]-[84], Jagot J said:Whether a fact is supported by any evidence is a question of law; so too is the question as to what amounts to material that could support a factual finding (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 355, Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32 at [91]). The latter is a question of law because, before a fact may be found, “there is the preliminary question whether the evidence reasonably admits of different conclusions” (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond at 355 citing Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Broken Hill South Ltd [1941] HCA 33; (1941) 65 CLR 150 at 155, 157 and 160). As the reasons in Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Broken Hill South Ltd at 155, 157 and 160 disclose if there is some evidence which reasonably admits of different conclusions as to the existence of a fact or not, the finding of that fact or the failure to find that fact does not involve a question of law. Hence, it is only whether the evidence could have supported the factual finding which constitutes a question of law. By contrast, the question whether evidence should or should not have led to a finding of fact is not a question of law. In the present context “evidence”, a term used in civil litigation, means the whole of the material before the Tribunal.The distinction between evidence or material which could support a factual finding and evidence or material which should or should not have supported such a finding is fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction which is limited to questions of law. When courts refer to there being “no probative” evidence to support a finding or a finding not being “reasonably open” or “open” on the evidence (as in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond at 359-360) or it being necessary that a finding be based on “some probative material or logical grounds” and that a finding not be “completely arbitrary” (as in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond at 366 and 367, Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd at [16], Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [145] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224; [2004] HCA 32 at [38]) the courts are not inviting consideration of whether a finding should or should not have been made. They are considering the anterior question whether the evidence reasonably admitted the making of the finding; that is, whether the evidence could support the finding. Hence, if there is no probative evidence of a fact and no logical grounds to support the fact, the finding of that fact will involve error of law. But where there is some probative evidence of a fact and some logical ground to support the fact, the finding of that fact will not involve error of law. The formula “some probative material or logical grounds” does not convert questions of fact into questions of law.