Del Borrello v Friedman and Lurie (a firm)

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   DEL BORRELLO -v- FRIEDMAN AND LURIE (A FIRM) & ANOR [2001] WASCA 348

CORAM:   KENNEDY J

WALLWORK J
MURRAY J

HEARD:   21 MARCH 2000

DELIVERED          :   6 NOVEMBER 2001

FILE NO/S:   FUL 69 of 1999

BETWEEN:   PETER DEL BORRELLO

Appellant (Plaintiff)

AND

FRIEDMAN AND LURIE (A FIRM)
First Respondent (First Defendant)

KEN JAMES MARTIN
Second Respondent (Second Defendant)

Catchwords:

Legal practitioners - Negligence - Barrister - Immunity -Whether liable for not pleading that stipulation in contract a penalty - Instructing solicitor not acting as an advocate - Liability of solicitor

Summary judgment - Onus - Need for caution in exercising power - Plaintiff's version of facts to be accepted if not inherently incredible

Agreement - Compromise of dispute regarding costs - Whether extending beyond compromise of costs dispute to a compromise of all claims between the parties

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal allowed as against first respondent
Appeal dismissed as against second respondent

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant (Plaintiff)  :        Mr G A Lacerenza

First Respondent (First Defendant)          :        Mr J D Allanson

Second Respondent (Second Defendant)  :        Mr E M Corboy

Solicitors:

Appellant (Plaintiff)  :        G A Lacerenza & Associates

First Respondent (First Defendant)          :        Blake Dawson Waldron

Second Respondent (Second Defendant)  :        Jackson McDonald

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] 3 WLR 543

Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (1999) 74 ALJR 209

Butler v Fairclough (1917) 23 CLR 78

Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447

Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40

Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 87

Gamlen Chemical Co (UK) Ltd v Rochem Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 614

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125

Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543

Harris v Osbourn (1834) 2 Cr & M 629

Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896

Keefe v Marks (1989) 16 NSWLR 713

Lindon v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) (1996) 136 ALR 251

Primary Building Co Pty Ltd v Beris Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA (Pidgeon J); Library No 7095; 19 April 1988

Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180

Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191

Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198

Swinfen v Lord Chelmsford (1860) 5 H&N 890; 157 ER 1436

Underwood, Son and Piper v Lewis [1894] 2 QB 306

Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598

Wenlock v Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238

Whitfeld v De Lauret & Co Ltd (1920) 29 CLR 71

Case(s) also cited:

Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104

Cockerill v Westpac Banking Corp (1996) 142 ALR 227

Edwards Karwacki Smith & Co Pty Ltd v Jacka Nominees Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1994) 15 ACSR 502

Fell v Brown (1791) Peake 131; 170 ER 104

Hospitals Contribution Fund of…

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Details
Case
[2001] WASCA 348
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Del Borrello, sued the defendants, Friedman and Lurie (a firm), for professional negligence in relation to legal advice provided in a property transaction. The case was heard by the New South Wales Supreme Court. The primary legal issues concerned the immunity of the defendants from liability for not pleading that a stipulation in a contract was a penalty, the liability of the solicitor who did not act as an advocate, and the enforceability of an agreement that purported to compromise the dispute regarding costs and all claims between the parties.

The court found that the defendants were not liable for not pleading the penalty stipulation because the issue was not raised in the pleadings and was not a matter of common knowledge. The court held that the plaintiff's solicitor was not acting as an advocate when he instructed the defendants not to plead the penalty stipulation, and therefore, the defendants were not vicariously liable for the solicitor's failure to do so. The court also found that the agreement was not enforceable because it was entered into under economic duress. The court accepted the plaintiff's version of the facts, which stated that the defendants exerted illegitimate pressure on the plaintiff to enter into the agreement by threatening to drop the case and by asserting a possessory lien over the plaintiff's documents.

The court made an order that the agreement was unenforceable and that the defendants were liable for the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding. The court also made an order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of a previous proceeding in the Local Court. The court declined to make an order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WALLWORK J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WALLWORK J

McHugh JA in Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40, at 45 – 46 discussed the principles applicable to a claim to set aside an agreement on the ground of duress:"A person who is the subject of duress usually knows only too well what he is doing. But he chooses to submit to the demand or pressure rather than take an alternative course of action. The proper approach in my opinion is to ask whether any applied pressure induced the victim to enter into the contract and then ask whether that pressure went beyond what the law is prepared to countenance as legitimate? Pressure will be illegitimate if it consists of unlawful threats or amounts to unconscionable conduct. But the categories are not closed. Even overwhelming pressure, not amounting to unconscionable or unlawful conduct, however, will not necessarily constitute economic duress.In their dissenting advice in Barton v Armstrong [1973] 2 NSWLR 598; [1976] AC 104, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon of Glaisdale pointed out (at 634; 121):'… in life, including the life of commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure, sometimes overwhelming pressure, so that one can say that the actor had no choice but to act. Absence of choice in this sense does not negate consent in law: for this the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as illegitimate. Thus, out of the various means by which consent may be obtained - advice, persuasion, influence, inducement, representation, commercial pressure - the law has come to select some which it will not accept as a reason for voluntary action: fraud, abuse of relation of confidence, undue influence, duress or coercion.'In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, the Judicial Committee accepted (at 635) that the observations of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon in Barton v Armstrong were consistent with the majority judgment in that case and represented the law relating to duress.It is unnecessary, however, for the victim to prove that the illegitimate pressure was the sole reason for him entering into the contract. It is sufficient that the illegitimate pressure was one of the reasons for the person entering into the agreement. Once the evidence establishes that the pressure exerted on the victim was illegitimate, the onus lies on the person applying the pressure to show that it made no contribution to the victim entering into the agreement: Barton v Armstrong (at 633; 120) per Lord Cross." Standing alone, the assertion of a solicitor's possessory lien would be neither wrongful nor illegitimate. It is necessary, however, to consider the general background, commencing with the somewhat enigmatic reference by Mr Friedman in his letter dated 11 September 1992 to the appellant with respect to the consequences of J‑Corp Pty Ltd becoming aware of the appellant's financial predicament. A claim was also made in the appellant's letter to the first respondent, dated 30 November 1992, that Mr Friedman had continually kept threatening him that the first respondent would drop the case at a critical stage, and after the first respondent had already been paid what the appellant claimed was the maximum amount of $25,000.