DDK18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DDK18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 712

Appeal from: DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 793
File number: VID 1026 of 2024
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 30 June 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where primary judge dismissed application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether primary judge denied appellant procedural fairness and/or made incorrect assessment of materiality in drawing conclusion inconsistent with concession made by the respondent Minister – whether primary judge erred in not recognising jurisdictional error in Tribunal’s failure to take account of evidence in respect of appellant’s relationship with former partner – whether primary judge erred in failing to conclude Tribunal made jurisdictional error in requiring appellant to provide corroborating documentary evidence – appeal dismissed.
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedcFamC2G 793

Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 46 ALD 203

MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 659

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582

Qube Logistics (Rail) Pty Ltd v Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union [2025] FCAFC 73

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of hearing: 3 June 2025
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms E Levine
Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J P Lessing
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1026 of 2024
BETWEEN:

DDK18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SNADEN J:

  1. The appellant is a Malaysian Tamil.  She came to Australia in 2010 on a subclass 976 Electronic Travel Authority visa and has remained here since.  In 2015, she applied for a protection visa, on multiple bases that are particularised in some detail below.

  2. That application (the “Visa Application”) came before a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”), who, by a decision made on 20 July 2016, declined it.  The appellant then sought to have that decision reviewed by the second respondent (the “Tribunal”).  That application (the “

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 712
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant in DDK18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship appeals against the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) which dismissed their application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The appellant's application for protection visa was denied, and the appellant contests the Tribunal's handling of their case, including whether the Tribunal's decision was influenced by a lack of procedural fairness and an incorrect assessment of material evidence. The central dispute revolves around the appellant's claims regarding their ex-husband's abusive behavior and threats, and the Tribunal's requirement for corroborating documentary evidence to support these claims.

The court had to determine whether the primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness, incorrectly assessed the materiality of the evidence, failed to recognise the jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s handling of the evidence about the appellant’s relationship with their former partner, and erred in not concluding that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by requiring the appellant to provide corroborating documentary evidence. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s claims, the Tribunal’s recognition of the doubts surrounding these claims, and whether the Tribunal's approach in considering the need for corroborative evidence was appropriate.

The court found that the primary judge did not err in denying procedural fairness or in assessing the materiality of the evidence. It was concluded that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error by requiring corroborative evidence; rather, the Tribunal considered the absence of such evidence as a factor in their decision-making process. Therefore, the court found that the appeal was not substantiated on any of the grounds presented. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.

ORDERS:
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

By a notice of appeal dated 26 September 2024, the appellant now appeals from the whole of the Primary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, that appeal should be dismissed and the appellant should pay the Minister’s costs.THE VISA APPLICATION AND THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The relevant background facts are summarised without controversy in the Primary Judgment, [2]-[3] and I gratefully adopt that summary. For present purposes, it is necessary only to highlight a small number of matters. The appellant’s claim to protection rested upon the appellant’s concerns about what her ex-husband might do to her were she to return to Malaysia. She claimed that, during their marriage, he had beaten her and their children, and that he had physically and mentally tortured her. Additionally, she maintained that he had made threats against her and their children. Before the Tribunal, it emerged that the appellant had separated from her ex-husband four years prior to her arrival in Australia and that, during that period, she had not had any contact with him. Their children now reside (and have long resided) with the appellant’s mother and sister in Penang. The appellant indicated to the Tribunal that she had come to Australia for financial reasons; and that she wished to stay so that (or that at least one of her reasons for wishing to stay was that) she might provide financial support to her daughter, who was then studying. In the course of her evidence, it emerged that the appellant had been in a relationship with a man in Australia, who had since passed away. The context in which that relationship came to be disclosed to the Tribunal is difficult to identify; but it appears from the hearing transcript and other documents that were before the Tribunal that it arose from documents that the appellant had put before the Tribunal (albeit for reasons that defy precise articulation). In particular, the Tribunal was shown a letter from a collection agency dated 15 November 2012, which referred to an amount of $12,740.00 that was said to be owing to the Hunter New England Local Health Network. Though not addressed to her, the appellant explained (via an interpreter) that the letter (and the amount to which it referred) related to a “…bill that was sent to me by the man who tortured me”. She explained that the man in question had “…used [her] passport saying that [she] was his wife”. Those observations were met with a measure of confusion by the Tribunal, no doubt because they were not obviously reconcilable with the claims that the appellant had advanced in support of her Visa Application (which asserted that she was owed protection solely by reason of her fears that a different man, namely her ex-husband, would harm her were she to return to Malaysia). Nonetheless, the appellant also supplied to the Tribunal a death certificate, which bore the same name as the addressee on the letter of 15 November 2012. Before the Tribunal, the appellant identified it as pertaining to the “man who tortured [her]”. Later during her oral evidence before the Tribunal, the appellant explained that, after arriving in Australia, she had entered into some kind of relationship with that same man. She reiterated that he (the man in Australia) had subjected her to “[l]ots of torture” and had “broke[n her] arm and [her] forehead”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that I do not accept that the primary judge erred in the manner described by appeal ground 3.GROUND 4: THE DOCUMENTARY CORROBORATION ERROR Appeal ground 4 posits that the Tribunal impermissibly conditioned its determination of the Review Application upon production to it of documentary evidence that corroborated what the appellant had said about her children and her ex-husband (above, [12]). The Minister accepts that, if that is what the Tribunal should be understood to have done, then its decision will be tainted by jurisdictional error. That concession is consistent with authority: see Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 46 ALD 203, 214 (Hill J); MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 659, [42]-[43] (Dodds-Streeton J). Appeal ground 4 thus turns solely upon whether or not the Tribunal elevated the provision of that corroborating evidence to a requirement upon which the appellant’s success on the Review Application was conditioned. Appeal ground 4 may swiftly be addressed. It is plain beyond doubt that the Tribunal did not do what it now stands accused of doing. It is one thing to condition a visa applicant’s success upon the provision of corroborating documentary proof; quite another to take into account the absence of such proof as a circumstance that is apt to inform how a particular application might be determined. Here, the circumstances point without reasonable doubt to the latter. On any view, the Tribunal, upon hearing from her, came to recognise the considerable doubt that attended the appellant’s claims to protection. That doubt arose in several ways; but perhaps principally by reason of the fact that the appellant’s fears of subjection to harm upon return to Malaysia were linked solely to her ex-husband, from whom it emerged she had not heard for some nine or 10 years. It was, to state the obvious, a curious aspect of the appellant’s claim: she maintained that her ex-husband would harm her, despite apparently having left her alone entirely for the four years before she left Malysia and the several years that had transpired since. Had she been able to produce documentary evidence to corroborate what she had said, that might well have alleviated some of those doubts. But so to acknowledge is not to suggest that the Tribunal impermissibly elevated the provision of corroborating documentary proof to a condition of the appellant’s success. It did no such thing. Appeal ground 4 is not made good.DISPOSITION None of the appeal grounds that the appellant has advanced is substantiated. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. There is no reason not to make the usual order as to costs and I shall do so.