FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DDK18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 712
Appeal from: DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 793 File number: VID 1026 of 2024 Judgment of: SNADEN J Date of judgment: 30 June 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where primary judge dismissed application for judicial review of decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether primary judge denied appellant procedural fairness and/or made incorrect assessment of materiality in drawing conclusion inconsistent with concession made by the respondent Minister – whether primary judge erred in not recognising jurisdictional error in Tribunal’s failure to take account of evidence in respect of appellant’s relationship with former partner – whether primary judge erred in failing to conclude Tribunal made jurisdictional error in requiring appellant to provide corroborating documentary evidence – appeal dismissed. Cases cited: DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedcFamC2G 793
Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 46 ALD 203
MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 659
Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 275 CLR 582
Qube Logistics (Rail) Pty Ltd v Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union [2025] FCAFC 73
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 54 Date of hearing: 3 June 2025 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms E Levine Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J P Lessing Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 1026 of 2024 BETWEEN: DDK18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
SNADEN J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SNADEN J:
The appellant is a Malaysian Tamil. She came to Australia in 2010 on a subclass 976 Electronic Travel Authority visa and has remained here since. In 2015, she applied for a protection visa, on multiple bases that are particularised in some detail below.
That application (the “Visa Application”) came before a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”), who, by a decision made on 20 July 2016, declined it. The appellant then sought to have that decision reviewed by the second respondent (the “Tribunal”). That application (the “
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 712
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the primary judge denied the appellant procedural fairness, incorrectly assessed the materiality of the evidence, failed to recognise the jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s handling of the evidence about the appellant’s relationship with their former partner, and erred in not concluding that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by requiring the appellant to provide corroborating documentary evidence. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s claims, the Tribunal’s recognition of the doubts surrounding these claims, and whether the Tribunal's approach in considering the need for corroborative evidence was appropriate.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in denying procedural fairness or in assessing the materiality of the evidence. It was concluded that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error by requiring corroborative evidence; rather, the Tribunal considered the absence of such evidence as a factor in their decision-making process. Therefore, the court found that the appeal was not substantiated on any of the grounds presented. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal.
ORDERS:
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement in accordance with the court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that I do not accept that the primary judge erred in the manner described by appeal ground 3.GROUND 4: THE DOCUMENTARY CORROBORATION ERROR Appeal ground 4 posits that the Tribunal impermissibly conditioned its determination of the Review Application upon production to it of documentary evidence that corroborated what the appellant had said about her children and her ex-husband (above, [12]). The Minister accepts that, if that is what the Tribunal should be understood to have done, then its decision will be tainted by jurisdictional error. That concession is consistent with authority: see Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 46 ALD 203, 214 (Hill J); MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 659, [42]-[43] (Dodds-Streeton J). Appeal ground 4 thus turns solely upon whether or not the Tribunal elevated the provision of that corroborating evidence to a requirement upon which the appellant’s success on the Review Application was conditioned. Appeal ground 4 may swiftly be addressed. It is plain beyond doubt that the Tribunal did not do what it now stands accused of doing. It is one thing to condition a visa applicant’s success upon the provision of corroborating documentary proof; quite another to take into account the absence of such proof as a circumstance that is apt to inform how a particular application might be determined. Here, the circumstances point without reasonable doubt to the latter. On any view, the Tribunal, upon hearing from her, came to recognise the considerable doubt that attended the appellant’s claims to protection. That doubt arose in several ways; but perhaps principally by reason of the fact that the appellant’s fears of subjection to harm upon return to Malaysia were linked solely to her ex-husband, from whom it emerged she had not heard for some nine or 10 years. It was, to state the obvious, a curious aspect of the appellant’s claim: she maintained that her ex-husband would harm her, despite apparently having left her alone entirely for the four years before she left Malysia and the several years that had transpired since. Had she been able to produce documentary evidence to corroborate what she had said, that might well have alleviated some of those doubts. But so to acknowledge is not to suggest that the Tribunal impermissibly elevated the provision of corroborating documentary proof to a condition of the appellant’s success. It did no such thing. Appeal ground 4 is not made good.DISPOSITION None of the appeal grounds that the appellant has advanced is substantiated. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. There is no reason not to make the usual order as to costs and I shall do so.