DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 793
File number(s):
MLG 1717 of 2018
Judgment of:
JUDGE RILEY
Date of judgment:
29 August 2024
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – protection visa – whether the Tribunal erred by requiring the applicant to provide corroborative evidence – whether the Tribunal erred by failing to assess the applicant’s credibility having regard to her having been in an abusive relationship – whether the Tribunal erred by not taking into account the Tribunal’s Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons – whether the Tribunal erred by not inviting the applicant to comment on the five year delay between her arrival in Australia and her application for a protection visa.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
DDK18 Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE RILEY
DATE OF ORDER:
29 AUGUST 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application filed on 18 June 2018 and amended on 8 May 2024 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE RILEY:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
BACKGROUND
In his written submissions filed on 20 May 2024, the Minister provided the following background to this matter:
10. In her protection visa application, the applicant claimed to be at risk of harm from her husband…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the matter of DDK18 v Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, DDK18, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had affirmed a decision by a delegate of the Minister to deny the applicant a protection visa. The applicant claimed to be at risk of harm from her ex-husband, who lived in Malaysia, and that she had been beaten and tortured by him. The legal issues for the court to determine included whether the AAT erred by requiring the applicant to provide corroborative evidence, whether it failed to assess her credibility in light of her history of abusive relationships, whether it neglected to apply the Tribunal's Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons, and whether it failed to invite the applicant to comment on the five-year delay between her arrival in Australia and her application for a protection visa.
The court examined the AAT's decision to require corroborative evidence and concluded that there was no legal necessity for the applicant to provide such evidence. The court referred to previous cases such as MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, which established that an applicant's own statements and testimony constitute evidence and that there is no requirement as a matter of law for the applicant to provide corroboration. The court held that while the AAT's reasoning might have suggested a desire for independent information, its overall reasons were consistent with the principle that an applicant's statements are sufficient evidence unless there is a compelling reason to doubt their credibility. Regarding the applicant's credibility, the AAT found that the applicant's claims were not credible based on the significant period of time she had no contact with her ex-husband and the delay in applying for the visa. The court found that the AAT's assessment of the applicant's credibility was reasonable given the evidence presented. The court also noted that the AAT did not err by not specifically referencing the Guidelines on Vulnerable Persons, as the overall assessment of the applicant's credibility was sound. Finally, the court concluded that the AAT's failure to invite the applicant to comment on the delay did not constitute a jurisdictional error, as the AAT's decision was based on the credibility of the applicant's claims and the evidence provided.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the AAT's decision was not tainted by jurisdictional error. The court upheld the AAT's finding that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.BACKGROUND In his written submissions filed on 20 May 2024, the Minister provided the following background to this matter: 10. In her protection visa application, the applicant claimed to be at risk of harm from her husband and father of her two children, who lived in Malaysia: CB 39-41. She claimed that he had beaten her and the children, and that she was mentally and physically tortured by him. She claimed that he had threatened to sell the children, and to prostitute the applicant to his friends. The applicant claimed that her husband had once beaten her unconscious and fractured her arm, and that she was admitted to the hospital, but that her husband lied to the doctor and told them that she had fallen down.11. At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant gave evidence that she had separated from her husband 4 years prior to coming to Australia in 2010, that they were now divorced, and that she did not have any trouble or contact from him during the four years they were separated: CB 100, [22]. She gave evidence that her children live with her mother and older sister in Penang and that her ex-husband sees the children once a month: CB 101, [23]. The applicant maintained her claims that her ex-husband beat her and her children and that she had been admitted to hospital: CB 101, [23]-[25]. She claimed that her ex-husband would prevent her seeing her children: CB 101, [27].12. At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant also claimed that she had also been in an abusive relationship in Australia with a Malaysian national: CB 99, [12]; CB 101, [29]. She gave evidence that this man was now deceased and provided the Tribunal a death certificate: CB 84; CB 101, [29]. She also provided a debt notice issued to the man with whom she had been in a relationship: CB 85.13. Two friends of the applicant gave oral evidence about their friendship with the applicant and their hope that she would be granted a visa: CB 89; CB 101, [30]. The applicant also provided a statement from one of these friends as to the financial support he had provided her in Australia, a letter from her employer about her employment in Australia, and documents regarding the financial support she was receiving: CB 82-88.14. She said the reason she came to Australia was to make money: CB101, [28]. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In his written submissions, the Minister provided the following summary of the Authority’s decision: 15.The Tribunal set out principles relating to credibility assessments: [16] – [20].16. The Tribunal noted the applicant’s claim that she was living with a Malaysian man in Australia who was abusive and controlling. The Tribunal accepted that this was certainly possible, but that it was unrelated to her claims for protection: [29].17. The Tribunal then set out a number of concerns with the applicant’s credibility and her claims to fear harm from her ex-husband, her now deceased ex-partner and her fear of returning to Malaysia: [31].18.The Tribunal noted the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that she was separated from her ex-husband from 2006 to 2010 when she arrived in Australia, that she had no contact with him during those four years, and he had not caused any trouble for her or her children during those four years. The Tribunal also noted the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that she had not had contact with her ex-husband since her arrival in Australia. The Tribunal found that this was a significant period of time in which the applicant had not had any contact with her ex-husband, and that her claimed fear that she or her children would be sold or harmed by her ex-husband was unfounded given the children had remained in Malaysia without her for almost eight years and nothing had happened: [32].19.The Tribunal found that the applicant had been in Australia for five years before she applied for the visa, and that if the applicant had really felt threatened and fearful of her ex-husband and came to Australia to seek refuge she would have applied for protection much earlier. The Tribunal found that the delay led it to consider that her claims were not genuine: [33].20. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s evidence at the hearing that she was concerned about finding a job if she returned to Malaysia led it to the view that this was her concern, and not her ex-husband: [34].21. The Tribunal acknowledged the applicant’s evidence that she had been in an abusive relationship with a Malaysian man while living in Australia, but found that since the man was deceased this was “unrelated” to the applicant’s claims for protection: [35].22. The Tribunal noted that it had requested specific documents from the applicant, and that she had not responded to the request: [36]-[37]. It found that without these documents it could not be satisfied that the applicant actually had any children given they are not listed as family members in her visa application and she did not provide any specific details about them. Nor could the Tribunal be satisfied that the applicant was married and divorced as claimed: [37].23. On the basis of the concerns summarised above, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not a credible witness and did not accept that her ex-husband had abused her and beaten her and her children. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant feared that she or her children would be sold, or that she would be prostituted, by her ex-husband: [38]. The Tribunal found that the applicant’s claims had been fabricated or embellished solely for migration purposes: [39].24. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance of persecution, or a real risk of significant harm, in Malaysia and that she did not satisfy ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act: [38]-[41]. The Tribunal accordingly affirmed the decision under review: [45].MATERIAL RELIED UPON
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
The first ground of review in the application is: The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in its decision of 18 May 2018 (Decision) by requiring that the Applicant provide corroborating documentary evidence to substantiate her claims that she had children, had been married and divorced, and had been beaten by her ex-husband.Particulars(a)At [36] of the Decision (CB102), the Tribunal referred to requesting that the Applicant provide, within seven days, birth certificates for both her children, a marriage certificate and divorce certificate for her ex-husband, documentation related to her hospitalisation after her husband’s beatings, and police reports related to her husband’s beatings.(b)At [37] of the Decision (CB102), the Tribunal stated “The applicant did not respond to the Tribunal on this request. Without these documents the Tribunal cannot be certain that the applicant has any children as they were not listed in her visa application nor did the applicant provide any details such as names and dates of birth for her children. Nor can the Tribunal be certain she was married, divorced and beaten by her ex-husband. The applicant did not provide any documentation of any kind.”(c)The reasoning at [36]-[37] of the Decision is infected with jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal wrongly imposed the requirement of documentary corroboration with respect to foundational aspects of the Applicant’s claims which were described in the Applicant’s visa application, and as to which the Applicant gave evidence before the Tribunal.(d)The error was material. In relation to ground 1, the parties relied on MZYHT v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 659, where the Federal Court said as follows: 42.In Eshetu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 46 ALD 203, Hill J stated that the Tribunal must not approach its task on the basis that an applicant’s claim to refugee status will not be accepted without some independent corroboration. 43. It is clear that the applicant’s own statements and testimony constitute evidence and there is no requirement as a matter of law that the applicant provide corroboration. In Machmud (a case on which the appellant particularly relied) Hill J reiterated (at [16]):There is also the suggestion on the part of the tribunal that there is some necessity for an applicant to the tribunal to “substantiate” claims. If that is intended to suggest that there must be some corroboration given by an applicant, it clearly is erroneous. The word “substantiate” is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary 3rd ed as follows “1. to establish by proof or competent evidence … 2. to give substantial existence to. 3. To present as having substance”. The ordinary English use might suggest that the tribunal member did not regard the applicant’s statement as being evidence at all but rather required some other evidence to be provided. The sense in which it is used may perhaps also suggest that the tribunal thought that there was a need for corroboration. If corroboration were necessary there was the country information. But, be this as it may, there certainly is no necessity as a matter of law that an applicant to the tribunal corroborate, if that is what the tribunal meant, a statement made.44.In Machmud, Hill J held that error on the above basis was not established, as the Tribunal’s reasons should not be construed pedantically and, although it lacked precision, the Tribunal’s reference to there being “meagre evidence available to [it]” indicated that it had treated the appellant’s statement as evidence (at [17]) 45.In MZXSA, the Full Court applied the reasoning in Warnakulasuriya in rejecting a very similar ground of appeal to that in the present case, which alleged that “the tribunal impermissibly insisted that the appellant’s claims would not be accepted without corroboration by “independent third party evidence’” (at [87]). 46. The Full Court observed that, as in the present case, the Tribunal was clearly troubled by a number of aspects of the appellant’s account, considered some parts “were unhelpfully general in nature” and aspects of it implausible (at [89]). The Full Court stated that some of the Tribunal’s statements about the need for third-party independent evidence might, when taken in isolation, suggest that it was required as a matter of legal standard, but “[p]roperly understood in its context” conveyed “no more than an expressed desire to be furnished with independent information to support an aspect of the appellant’s account that, on present material, the tribunal found to be unconvincing” (at [90]).…52.As the appellant conceded, in the present case the Tribunal gave extremely comprehensive, lengthy and detailed reasons. It also (at [106] to [108] of its reasons) set out relevant principles and authorities recognising that there was no onus of proof, that the Tribunal should accord the benefit of a doubt to asylum seekers who were generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims, and that if the Tribunal could not make an adverse finding on a material claim with confidence, it must assess it on the basis that the claim might possibly be true.53.While the Tribunal did not expressly state the principle articulated in Machmud, on a fair reading, the reasons as a whole were consistent with it and with the related principles the Tribunal expressly acknowledged at various points throughout the judgment. There was, in my opinion, no indication that in practice the Tribunal imposed an onus of proof on the appellant and insisted upon corroboration and substantiation of his claims by documentary or other independent evidence