Darby v Police

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

DARBY v POLICE

[2009] SASC 394

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray

22 December 2009

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS - GENERALLY

MAGISTRATES - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY - PROCEDURE - ORDERS AND CONVICTIONS - SENTENCING - IMPRISONMENT - SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Appeal against sentence - defendant and appellant pleaded guilty to charge of assault causing harm contrary to section 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) - following disputed facts hearing, defendant sentenced to term of three months’ imprisonment - sentence not suspended - whether sentence of imprisonment manifestly excessive - whether good reason existed to suspend sentence of imprisonment - whether Magistrate erred in finding that disputed facts hearing "compounded" defendant's offending - whether Magistrate erred in finding that victim suffered permanent injury.

Held: appeal allowed - Magistrate erred in finding that disputed facts hearing "compounded" defendant's offending - Magistrate erred in finding that victim suffered permanent injury - defendant resentenced - sentence of three months’ imprisonment appropriate in circumstances - sentence suspended on entry into bond.

Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656; R v Gray [1977] VR 225; Harris v R [1967] SASR 316; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; Wood v Samuels (1974) 8 SASR 465; R v O’Keefe [1969] 2 QB 29; Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277; R v Weaver (1973) 6 SASR 265; Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65, considered.

DARBY v POLICE
[2009] SASC 394

Magistrates Appeal

GRAY J.

  1. This is an appeal against sentence. 

    Introduction

  2. The defendant and appellant, Ryan Lennie Darby, was charged with assault causing harm contrary to section 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).[1]  On 16 April 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty to that charge in the Port Augusta Magistrates Court

    [1]    20—Assault

    (1)A person commits an assault if the person, without the consent of another person (the victim)—

    (a)     intentionally applies force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or

    (b)intentionally makes physical contact (directly or indirectly) with the victim, knowing that the victim might reasonably object to the contact in the circumstances (whether or not the victim was at the time aware of the contact); or

    (c)threatens (by words or conduct) to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim and there are reasonable grounds for the victim to believe that—

    (i)the person who makes the threat is in a position to carry out the threat and intends to do so; or

    (ii)     there is a real possibility that the person will carry out the threat; or

    (d)does an act of which the intended purpose is to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or

    (e)accosts or impedes another in…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 394
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Darby v Police, the defendant, Darby, appealed against the sentence imposed by the Magistrate. Darby pleaded guilty to a charge of assault causing harm contrary to section 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). Following a disputed facts hearing, the Magistrate sentenced Darby to a term of three months’ imprisonment. The sentence was not suspended. The appeal raised several legal issues, including whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, if there was good reason to suspend the sentence, and if the Magistrate erred in finding that the disputed facts hearing "compounded" Darby's offending and that the victim suffered permanent injury.

The court found that the Magistrate erred in finding that the disputed facts hearing "compounded" Darby's offending and that the victim suffered permanent injury. The court held that the principle established in Siganto applied, which held that a person who pleads not guilty may not be penalised for the manner in which their defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence greater than would otherwise be imposed. The court emphasised the difference between the mitigatory effect of a guilty plea and the notion of a plea of not guilty as a circumstance of aggravation. The court held that the applicable principle was that stated in Gray, which held that a sentencing judge is punishing an offender for the crime, not for the conduct of the defence case.

The appeal was allowed. The term of imprisonment of three months imposed by the Magistrate was confirmed. However, that term was suspended on entry by the defendant into a good behaviour bond on the terms outlined above. The defendant was to be supervised for the first six months and undertake anger management and alcohol and drug abuse courses, and such further courses as may be directed. The court held that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion to suspend the sentence of imprisonment of three months on the defendant’s entry into a good behaviour bond.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 4 September 2009, following a disputed facts hearing, the defendant was sentenced to a term of three months imprisonment. That sentence was not suspended. On 7 September 2009, the defendant was granted bail pending appeal, after having spent three days in goal.Background The offence occurred at Whyalla on 26 July 2008. At or about 3.00 am, the defendant and his friend, Matt Copeland, were near a taxi rank close to a hotel. Both men were intoxicated. The victim passed the area of the taxi rank in the near proximity of the two men and it was in these circumstances that the assault took place. According to the defendant, the victim approached the vicinity of the taxi rank and made remarks to the defendant’s friend amounting to slurs concerning obesity. The defendant claimed that these remarks provoked the assault. In the course of evidence, the defendant said:I heard him say something to Matt and it sounded like he called him fat and Mat [sic], sort of was just like okay, and said ‘F you’ or ‘F off’ and then he said something again and I have taken a swing at him and punched him with my right hand and then he stumbled … and he got up and had a swing at me and I hit him again. The victim claimed that the attack was unprovoked. According to the victim, having escorted a number of female friends to their taxi some distance away from the hotel, he approached the area of the taxi rank near the hotel. He claimed that he was stopped by a young man who yelled something unintelligible. He described attempting to walk past this man before being attacked by the defendant without any provocation. The statement of the victim before the Magistrate described how the defendant punched him with a clenched fist in the region of the eye with enough force to knock him to the ground. This was followed by two more punches to the face. Following the assault, the victim attended at the emergency department of the Whyalla Hospital. Some days later, he was assessed by his General Practitioner. He has subsequently been examined by a number of specialist medical practitioners. The victim initially presented with a suspected orbital fracture on the right side of his skull and a suspected fracture of the mandible. A cat scan and several X-rays confirmed the orbital fracture. Later scans found no evidence of a mandibular fracture and no fractures of the remaining facial bones were identified. The orbital fracture required surgery to reduce the herniated orbital contents and elevation of fracture. However, no post-operative problems have been identified. The victim experienced some vision impairment associated with the blow to his eye-socket following the assault, which has subsequently resolved. He has made a full recovery from his injuries. In addition to the injuries outlined, two teeth were damaged, requiring dental work at a modest cost. A dental report indicated the possibility of future root canal treatment. Following the disputed facts hearing, the Magistrate summarised the circumstances of the offence as follows:In this case, I have no doubt at all that[The defendant’s friend] made an [sic] drunken remark as a result of his desire to have taken the taxi;The victim approached [the defendant’s friend] trying to understand what he was talking about;The defendant, in his drunken state, believed the victim had caused his friend to feel hard done by; andThe defendant then punched the victim.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
In my view, the circumstances of the defendant are such as to give rise to good reason to suspend. In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate to exercise my discretion to suspend the sentence of imprisonment of three months on the defendant’s entry into a good behaviour bond.[18] That bond is to be for a period of two years and the defendant is to be supervised for the first six months. It is a condition of the bond that the defendant undertakes anger management and alcohol and drug abuse courses, and such further courses as may be directed.[18] Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) section 38.Conclusion The appeal is allowed. The term of imprisonment of three months imposed by the Magistrate is confirmed. However, that term is suspended on entry by the defendant into a good behaviour bond on the terms outlined above.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

It was further submitted that in light of the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence, no good reason existed to suspend the sentence of imprisonment imposed. However, counsel for the Crown conceded that if error on the part of the Magistrate was identified, it would be open to this Court when resentencing to suspend any sentence of imprisonment. Consideration of the Appeal As earlier observed, the Magistrate when sentencing, considered that the defendant’s “avoidance of responsibility compounded the appalling behaviour on the night in question”. The Magistrate noted:…In addition to being punched for no good reason the victim was required to give evidence and subjected to cross examination seeking to both minimise the defendant’s conduct and exaggerate the victim’s role in the events. Counsel for the defendant contended that the Magistrate impermissibly took into consideration as a matter of aggravation the defendant’s unsuccessful dispute as to facts. In Siganto[3] the High Court held that a person who pleads not guilty may not be penalised for the manner in which their defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence greater than would otherwise be imposed. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ adopted the reasoning of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in Gray:[4]It is impermissible to increase what is a proper sentence for the offence committed, in order to mark the court's disapproval of the accused's having put the issues to proof or having presented a time-wasting or even scurrilous defence. [3] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [22].[4] R v Gray [1977] VR 225 at 231 as cited in Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [21]. Their Honours went on to emphasise the difference between the mitigatory effect of a guilty plea and the notion of a plea of not guilty as a circumstance of aggravation: [5][5] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [22].A person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to plead not guilty, and defend himself or herself, without thereby attracting the risk of the imposition of a penalty more serious than would otherwise have been imposed. On the other hand, a plea of guilty is ordinarily a matter to be taken into account in mitigation; first, because it is usually evidence of some remorse on the part of the offender, and second, on the pragmatic ground that the community is spared the expense of a contested trial. The extent of the mitigation may vary depending on the circumstances of the case. It is also sometimes relevant to the aspect of remorse that a victim has been spared the necessity of undergoing the painful procedure of giving evidence.Later in the joint judgment, their Honours confirmed that the applicable principle is that in Gray as excerpted above:[6]Equally well established is the proposition enunciated in Gray, above. The same proposition is expressed in Thomas, Principles of Sentencing, as follows: "A plea of guilty may properly be treated as a mitigating factor, indicating remorse, and will justify a reduction in the sentence below the level appropriate to the facts of the offence; but the defendant who contests the case against him, while not entitled to that mitigation, may not be penalised for the manner in which his defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence above the ceiling fixed by the gravity of the offence." In R v Richmond, Cussen J explained why a sentencing judge is not entitled to treat, as a circumstance of aggravation, the fact that an offender's testimony has been disbelieved. One reason is that even an innocent person may be deterred from seeking to defend himself or herself if it were the case that rejection of the defence case by a jury may result in an increased sentence. Similar considerations apply to the argument presently under consideration. A sentencing judge is punishing an offender for the crime, not for the conduct of the defence case. There are a number of aspects of the process of criminal investigation, and of the administration of criminal justice, that are likely to cause distress to many victims of crime. Being subjected to cross-examination by defence counsel is one of them; but there are others as well. The very denial of guilt by a person charged may be distressing to a victim, especially if, as not infrequently occurs, it is accompanied by a version of events which is offensive. Distinguishing between a plea of not guilty and the manner of conduct of the defence case is difficult, both in terms of principle and in a practical sense.……The applicable principle is that stated in Gray. To some, it may appear a matter of semantics to distinguish between denying the existence of circumstances of mitigation and asserting the existence of circumstances of aggravation; and judicial statements intended as the former may sometimes be misunderstood as intending the latter. However, the distinction can be important.[6] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [30]-[32], [34].