SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
DARBY v POLICE
[2009] SASC 394
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
22 December 2009
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS - GENERALLY
MAGISTRATES - JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE GENERALLY - PROCEDURE - ORDERS AND CONVICTIONS - SENTENCING - IMPRISONMENT - SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - NON-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - SUSPENDED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Appeal against sentence - defendant and appellant pleaded guilty to charge of assault causing harm contrary to section 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) - following disputed facts hearing, defendant sentenced to term of three months’ imprisonment - sentence not suspended - whether sentence of imprisonment manifestly excessive - whether good reason existed to suspend sentence of imprisonment - whether Magistrate erred in finding that disputed facts hearing "compounded" defendant's offending - whether Magistrate erred in finding that victim suffered permanent injury.
Held: appeal allowed - Magistrate erred in finding that disputed facts hearing "compounded" defendant's offending - Magistrate erred in finding that victim suffered permanent injury - defendant resentenced - sentence of three months’ imprisonment appropriate in circumstances - sentence suspended on entry into bond.
Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656; R v Gray [1977] VR 225; Harris v R [1967] SASR 316; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357; Dinsdale v The Queen (2000) 202 CLR 321; Wood v Samuels (1974) 8 SASR 465; R v O’Keefe [1969] 2 QB 29; Vartzokas v Zanker (1989) 51 SASR 277; R v Weaver (1973) 6 SASR 265; Webb v O'Sullivan [1952] SASR 65, considered.
DARBY v POLICE
[2009] SASC 394Magistrates Appeal
GRAY J.
This is an appeal against sentence.
Introduction
The defendant and appellant, Ryan Lennie Darby, was charged with assault causing harm contrary to section 20(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA).[1] On 16 April 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty to that charge in the Port Augusta Magistrates Court
[1] 20—Assault
(1)A person commits an assault if the person, without the consent of another person (the victim)—
(a) intentionally applies force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or
(b)intentionally makes physical contact (directly or indirectly) with the victim, knowing that the victim might reasonably object to the contact in the circumstances (whether or not the victim was at the time aware of the contact); or
(c)threatens (by words or conduct) to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim and there are reasonable grounds for the victim to believe that—
(i)the person who makes the threat is in a position to carry out the threat and intends to do so; or
(ii) there is a real possibility that the person will carry out the threat; or
(d)does an act of which the intended purpose is to apply force (directly or indirectly) to the victim; or
(e)accosts or impedes another in…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Darby v Police and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] SASC 394
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Magistrate erred in finding that the disputed facts hearing "compounded" Darby's offending and that the victim suffered permanent injury. The court held that the principle established in Siganto applied, which held that a person who pleads not guilty may not be penalised for the manner in which their defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence greater than would otherwise be imposed. The court emphasised the difference between the mitigatory effect of a guilty plea and the notion of a plea of not guilty as a circumstance of aggravation. The court held that the applicable principle was that stated in Gray, which held that a sentencing judge is punishing an offender for the crime, not for the conduct of the defence case.
The appeal was allowed. The term of imprisonment of three months imposed by the Magistrate was confirmed. However, that term was suspended on entry by the defendant into a good behaviour bond on the terms outlined above. The defendant was to be supervised for the first six months and undertake anger management and alcohol and drug abuse courses, and such further courses as may be directed. The court held that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion to suspend the sentence of imprisonment of three months on the defendant’s entry into a good behaviour bond.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAY J
It was further submitted that in light of the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence, no good reason existed to suspend the sentence of imprisonment imposed. However, counsel for the Crown conceded that if error on the part of the Magistrate was identified, it would be open to this Court when resentencing to suspend any sentence of imprisonment. Consideration of the Appeal As earlier observed, the Magistrate when sentencing, considered that the defendant’s “avoidance of responsibility compounded the appalling behaviour on the night in question”. The Magistrate noted:…In addition to being punched for no good reason the victim was required to give evidence and subjected to cross examination seeking to both minimise the defendant’s conduct and exaggerate the victim’s role in the events. Counsel for the defendant contended that the Magistrate impermissibly took into consideration as a matter of aggravation the defendant’s unsuccessful dispute as to facts. In Siganto[3] the High Court held that a person who pleads not guilty may not be penalised for the manner in which their defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence greater than would otherwise be imposed. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ adopted the reasoning of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in Gray:[4]It is impermissible to increase what is a proper sentence for the offence committed, in order to mark the court's disapproval of the accused's having put the issues to proof or having presented a time-wasting or even scurrilous defence. [3] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [22].[4] R v Gray [1977] VR 225 at 231 as cited in Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [21]. Their Honours went on to emphasise the difference between the mitigatory effect of a guilty plea and the notion of a plea of not guilty as a circumstance of aggravation: [5][5] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [22].A person charged with a criminal offence is entitled to plead not guilty, and defend himself or herself, without thereby attracting the risk of the imposition of a penalty more serious than would otherwise have been imposed. On the other hand, a plea of guilty is ordinarily a matter to be taken into account in mitigation; first, because it is usually evidence of some remorse on the part of the offender, and second, on the pragmatic ground that the community is spared the expense of a contested trial. The extent of the mitigation may vary depending on the circumstances of the case. It is also sometimes relevant to the aspect of remorse that a victim has been spared the necessity of undergoing the painful procedure of giving evidence.Later in the joint judgment, their Honours confirmed that the applicable principle is that in Gray as excerpted above:[6]Equally well established is the proposition enunciated in Gray, above. The same proposition is expressed in Thomas, Principles of Sentencing, as follows: "A plea of guilty may properly be treated as a mitigating factor, indicating remorse, and will justify a reduction in the sentence below the level appropriate to the facts of the offence; but the defendant who contests the case against him, while not entitled to that mitigation, may not be penalised for the manner in which his defence has been conducted by the imposition of a sentence above the ceiling fixed by the gravity of the offence." In R v Richmond, Cussen J explained why a sentencing judge is not entitled to treat, as a circumstance of aggravation, the fact that an offender's testimony has been disbelieved. One reason is that even an innocent person may be deterred from seeking to defend himself or herself if it were the case that rejection of the defence case by a jury may result in an increased sentence. Similar considerations apply to the argument presently under consideration. A sentencing judge is punishing an offender for the crime, not for the conduct of the defence case. There are a number of aspects of the process of criminal investigation, and of the administration of criminal justice, that are likely to cause distress to many victims of crime. Being subjected to cross-examination by defence counsel is one of them; but there are others as well. The very denial of guilt by a person charged may be distressing to a victim, especially if, as not infrequently occurs, it is accompanied by a version of events which is offensive. Distinguishing between a plea of not guilty and the manner of conduct of the defence case is difficult, both in terms of principle and in a practical sense.……The applicable principle is that stated in Gray. To some, it may appear a matter of semantics to distinguish between denying the existence of circumstances of mitigation and asserting the existence of circumstances of aggravation; and judicial statements intended as the former may sometimes be misunderstood as intending the latter. However, the distinction can be important.[6] Siganto v R (1998) 194 CLR 656 at [30]-[32], [34].