Act Against Tumultuous Petitioning 1661 (13 Car 2, st 1, c 5); Bill of Rights 1688, article 5, article 9; Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp); Criminal Code (NT), s 1, s 31, s 34, s 61, s 61(a); Interpretation Act, s 59; Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 1992, s 3(3), s 5, s 6, s 25, s 26; Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth), Part III Division I (ss 6-12); Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth), s 16; Seditious Meetings Act 1817 (Imp) (Geo 3, cap XIX s 23); Sentencing Act (NT), s 40(6); Sources of Law Act 1985, s 2, s 3; Statute of Westminster 1931 (Imp), s 2(1);
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth); Strodes Act 1512 (4 Henry VIII, c 8); The Constitution of Australia, s 122

A C Castles, An Australian Legal History; Sydney, Law Book Company, 1982; Enid Campbell, Parliamentary Privilege, Sydney, Federation Press, 2003; Limon and McKay (eds), Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament, 22nd ed, London, Butterworths, 1997; McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, 2nd ed, Wellington New Zealand, GP Publications, 1994; Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, 9th ed, Canberra, Department of the Senate, 1999; Pettifer (ed), House of Representatives Practice, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981; Richard L Perry and John C Cooper, Sources of Our Liberties, Alabama, Legal Classics Library edition, 1990; Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol 6, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1937

R v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629; R v Wright; ex parte Klar (1971) 1 SASR 103; Wake and Anor v NTA and Anor (1996) 5 NTLR 170; (1996) 109 NTR 1; applied

The Queen v Richards; ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne (1955) 92 CLR 157; distinguished

Bradlaugh v Gossett (1883-1884) 12 QBD 271; followed

Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292; Erglis v Buckley (2004) 2 Qd R 599; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission (1997) 189 CLR 520; Laurance v Katter (2000) 1 Qd R 147; (1996) 141 ALR 447; Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579; Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321; R v Eliot, Hollis and Valentine (1629) 3 St Tr 293; Rowley v O’Chee (2000) 1 Qd R 207; (1997) 150 ALR 199; Johnson v Johnson (2000)…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DF v The Queen

Details

AGLC: DF v The Queen [2006] NTCCA 13
Case: [2006] NTCCA 13
Decision Date: 18 July 2006

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal considered an appeal by DF against a sentence imposed following his conviction for sexual offences. The dispute arose after the Crown did not accept an offer by DF to plead guilty to a lesser charge, leading to a fresh indictment and subsequent conviction.

The Court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, it had to assess the weight to be given to DF's previous offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge, particularly in the context of whether a plea was entered at the first reasonable opportunity. Secondly, the Court considered whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and whether sufficient weight had been given to DF's personal circumstances.

In its reasoning, the Court applied established principles regarding the sentencing of sexual offenders and the significance of early pleas. It referred to the High Court's decisions in *Cameron v The Queen* and *Markarian v The Queen*, as well as *R v Marshall* and *Spencer v R*, to guide its assessment of the weight to be afforded to the appellant's offer to plead guilty. The Court found that the sentencing judge had not adequately considered the mitigating factors presented by DF's personal circumstances and had not given sufficient weight to the early indication of remorse and willingness to accept responsibility. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied.

Orders