DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION: Croft v. Francis & Anor [2000] QDC 109 PARTIES: SANDRA CLAIRE CROFT (Plaintiff)
v.
MICHAEL NICHOLAS FRANCIS (First defendant)
And
FAI GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED (Second defendant)FILE NO/S: Plaint 2393 of 1999 DIVISION: PROCEEDING: Determination of questions before trial ORIGINATING COURT: District Court Brisbane DELIVERED ON: 6 June 2000 DELIVERED AT: Brisbane HEARING DATE: 22 May 2000 JUDGE: McGill D.C.J. ORDER: Questions answered as follows:
Whether the plaintiff’s action is statute barred by operation of s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974: Yes.
Whether the defendants are estopped from relying on s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974:No.
Order that the plaintiff’s action be dismissed. Order the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the action, including the costs of the trial of the separate questions and the costs of the applications filed 25 January and 8 March 2000, to be assessed. Leave reserved to the defendants to seek an order that some or all of those costs be paid by the solicitors for the plaintiff. Leave reserved to the plaintiff to seek an order that her costs, including costs ordered to be paid to the defendants, be paid by the solicitors for the plaintiff.
CATCHWORDS: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – personal injury – whether admission of liability allows action out of time by estoppel or contract
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 ss. 37, 39, 41, 57
Morris v. FAI General Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 Qd.R. 495 – distinguished
The Commonwealth v. Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394 – applied
Newton v. SGIO (Queensland) [1986] 1 Qd.R. 431 – distinguished
Till v. The Nominal Defendant [1999] QCA 490 – followed
COUNSEL: K.B. Varley for the plaintiff
K F Holyoak for the defendantSOLICITORS: Colwell Wright Solicitors for the plaintiff
McInnes Wilson Lawyers for the defendants
The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 24 December 1995. On 15 June 1999 a plaint was filed in the District Court at Brisbane seeking damages for injuries suffered by her in that accident. By a defence filed on 21 October 1999, the defendants alleged that the claim is statute barred by s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The issue I have to decide is whether that is correct.
The plaintiff pleaded by way of reply that the defendants were estopped from relying on the Limitation Act, or that the effect of s.57 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 was that the action had not been commenced outside the limitation period as extended by that section. On 13 March 2000, I ordered pursuant to r.483 that the following questions be decided separately before the trial:
(a) whether the plaintiff’s action is statute barred by operation of s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974;
(b) whether the defendants are estopped from relying on s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
I also gave directions for the decision of those questions. When that hearing came on…
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- AGLC
- Croft v Francis [2000] QDC 109
- Case
- [2000] QDC 109
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the plaintiff’s action was statute-barred by the operation of section 11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974, and whether the defendants could be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations. The court considered whether the admission of liability by the defendants' solicitors constituted a waiver or estoppel that would prevent the defendants from asserting the limitation period. Additionally, the court examined if the admission constituted a contract or if it could be interpreted as an equitable estoppel preventing the defendants from relying on the limitation period.
The court held that while the defendants' solicitors had indeed made an admission of liability, this did not suffice to estop the defendants from relying on the statutory limitation period. The court found that such admissions do not automatically create an estoppel or contractual obligation preventing reliance on statutory periods. Furthermore, the court held that the admission did not amount to a contractual agreement or create an equitable estoppel. Consequently, the plaintiff's action was deemed statute-barred, and the court dismissed the action. The court ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendants' costs of and incidental to the action, including the costs of the trial of the separate questions and the costs of the applications filed on 25 January and 8 March 2000, to be assessed. The court also reserved leave to the defendants to seek an order that some or all of those costs be paid by the plaintiff's solicitors, and to the plaintiff to seek an order that her costs, including costs ordered to be paid to the defendants, be paid by the solicitors for the plaintiff.
Orders
Orders of the court
Questions answered as follows:
Whether the plaintiff’s action is statute barred by operation of s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974: Yes.
Whether the defendants are estopped from relying on s.11 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974:No.
Order that the plaintiff’s action be dismissed. Order the plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs of and incidental to the action, including the costs of the trial of the separate questions and the costs of the applications filed 25 January and 8 March 2000, to be assessed. Leave reserved to the defendants to seek an order that some or all of those costs be paid by the solicitors for the plaintiff. Leave reserved to the plaintiff to seek an order that her costs, including costs ordered to be paid to the defendants, be paid by the solicitors for the plaintiff.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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