Crocker, in the matter of Crocker

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Crocker, in the matter of Crocker [2019] FCA 432

File number: QUD 118 of 2019
Judge: LOGAN J
Date of judgment: 29 March 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious proceedings order – application for leave to commence proceeding otherwise barred by vexatious proceedings order – where prospective applicant did not strictly comply with the requirements of s 37AR(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where prospective applicant alleges fraud against proposed respondent – standard of proof for serious allegations – whether prospective applicant has an arguable case.
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AM, 37AO, 37AR, 37AS, 37AT

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 39.05(b)

Uniform Civil Procedures 1999 (Qld) rr 667, 668

Cases cited:

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Britax Childcare Pty Ltd, in the matter of Infa Products Pty Ltd v Infa Products Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2016] FCA 848

Croker, in the matter of Croker [2019] FCA 359

Crocker v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 84

Fuller v Toms (2015) 234 FCR 535

Gargan, in the matter of Gargan [2018] FCA 871

James v WorkPower Inc [2018] FCA 2083

Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker [2016] FCA 1319

Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker (No 3) [2018] FCA 605

Rana v Department of Defence [2018] FCA 1642

Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Date of last submissions: 2 March 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Applicant: The Prospective Applicant was self-represented

ORDERS

QUD 118 of 2019

IN THE MATTER OF DEBRA CROCKER

DEBRA ANN CROCKER

Prospective Applicant

JUDGE:

LOGAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to institute proceedings be dismissed, pursuant to s 37AS(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

LOGAN J:

  1. On 16 February 2018, pursuant to s 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA), the Court made a vexatious proceedings order in respect of Ms Debra Ann Crocker: Crocker v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 84 (vexatious proceeding judgment).  The order was in these terms, Ms Crocker being the named respondent:

    1.Subject to the exception specified in Order 2, the respondent be prohibited, pursuant to section 37AO of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), from instituting proceedings in the Court.

    2.The prohibition specified in Order 1 not extend to any interlocutory application by the respondent in proceeding QUD 9 of 2015 in the Court subsequent to the delivery of judgement in respect of the substantive application in that proceeding or to any appeal by her from that judgement.

    3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to the application, to be taxed if not agreed.

  2. By s 37AR(2)…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 432
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Crocker, in the matter of Crocker involved an application by Ms Crocker for leave to commence proceedings against Infa-Secure and members of the Horsfall family. Ms Crocker was subject to a vexatious proceedings order, which barred her from commencing certain legal proceedings without first obtaining leave from the Federal Court of Australia. The primary legal issue was whether Ms Crocker's application for leave to commence proceedings was in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 37AR(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and whether her claims had an arguable case. The court also considered whether the proposed proceedings were vexatious and without reasonable ground.

The court held that Ms Crocker's application did not strictly comply with the requirements of section 37AR(3) of the Act, as she failed to list all the occasions on which she had applied for leave under section 37AR and all other proceedings she had instituted in any Australian court or tribunal. However, the court found that Ms Crocker had substantially complied with the requirements of the Act, as she only failed to mention one proceeding. The court noted that Ms Crocker's prior involvement in the earlier cases did not give rise to an apprehension of bias in relation to the determination of the leave application. The court further held that Ms Crocker's proposed proceedings were vexatious and without reasonable ground, as she had failed to provide new evidence or evidence that she might have obtained with due diligence. The court also noted that the proposed proceedings seemed to have the purpose of harassing or annoying the respondents or causing them detriment, which would make them vexatious proceedings.

The court dismissed Ms Crocker's application for leave to institute proceedings, pursuant to section 37AS(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court held that the proposed proceedings were vexatious and without reasonable ground and that Ms Crocker had failed to provide new evidence or evidence that she might have obtained with due diligence. The court also noted that the proposed proceedings seemed to have the purpose of harassing or annoying the respondents or causing them detriment, which would make them vexatious proceedings. The court held that it was necessary to balance the right of one individual to access justice with other rights, namely, a correlative right on the part of the present respondents to finality and the separate right of other individuals also to access the court. The court held that dealing with an application made under section 37AR of the Federal Court Act was in furtherance of that same statutory purpose. The court held that a person subject to an order made under section 37AO of the Federal Court Act did not, on the making of such an order, forfeit the important civil right of being able to access the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Rather, for cause, the availing of that right was made subject to the requirement of first obtaining the leave of the court. The court held that the purpose of that was to ensure that the balance described in Fuller v Toms was maintained.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to institute proceedings be dismissed, pursuant to s 37AS(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In each of her proposed proceedings, the standard of proof of fraud warranting the setting aside of the judgments would be governed by s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act). Ms Crocker would not be obliged to prove her claimed fraud beyond reasonable doubt, only on the balance of probabilities. But in deciding whether her claim was so proved, the Court would take into account the considerations mentioned in s 140(2) of the Evidence Act. As to that, a grave allegation such as fraud would not be regarded as established by “inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect references”: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362. An examination of her affidavits discloses that, in truth, Ms Crocker has no new evidence or even evidence which she might with due diligence have earlier obtained. All that she has in her principal affidavit is an intemperate, confused, piecemeal collation drawn from the earlier cases. At most, and this is a considerable concession to her, she has in her collation “inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect references”. Moreover, she does not even present the prospect of ever having more than that. So I am quite unpersuaded that she has an arguable case for the setting aside on the basis of fraud either the vexatious proceeding order or that made in Infa-Secure v Crocker (No 3). It follows that the other relief which she claims, which includes “compensation” could not be granted. Instead, each proposed proceeding looks to me to be one which is “without reasonable ground”. As to what constitutes “without reasonable ground”, I respectfully agree with the observations made by Charlesworth J in Rana v Department of Defence [2018] FCA 1642 at [78], by reference to her Honour’s earlier judgment in Garrett, in the matter of Company One [2016] FCA 703. The phrase is equivalent to ‘without reasonable cause’ and whether so to conclude is a matter to be determined objectively, not by reference to the subjective belief of the applicant for leave. On this basis alone, I am obliged by s 37AS(2) of the FCA to dismiss Ms Crocker’s leave application. It may also be that each proposed proceeding has as its purpose to harass or annoy or to cause detriment to not only Infa-Secure but also to members of the Horsfall family. Such a conclusion would also make each proposed proceeding a vexatious proceeding and dictate a refusal of leave. It is unnecessary to reach that conclusion, because of my conclusion that each proposed proceeding is “without reasonable ground”. The latter conclusion would also bespeak a conclusion that each proposed proceeding would be an abuse of process. That, too, gives rise to an obligation to refuse leave. Having regard to the foregoing, it might seem a waste of judicial time to have to deal with applications such as the present. In truth, that is not so. In Fuller v Toms (2015) 234 FCR 535 (Fuller v Toms), at [31], the Full Court observed, of the purpose of s 37AO of the FCA:Section 37AO of the Federal Court Act empowers a court to balance the right of one individual of access to justice with other rights namely, a correlative right on the part of the present respondents to finality and the separate right of other individuals also to access this Court. It is for this Court, the present manifestation of a recognition by the Australian Parliament, the origins of which may be traced to an earlier recognition by the United Kingdom Parliament, via the Vexatious Actions Act 1896 (UK) (59 & 60 Vict. C. 51), of a need for a power to effect just such a balance.Dealing with an application made under s 37AR of the FCA is in furtherance of that same statutory purpose. A person subject to an order made under s 37AO of the FCA such as Ms Crocker does not, on the making of such an order, forfeit the important civil right of being able to access the judicial power of the Commonwealth. Rather, for cause, the availing of that right is made subject to the requirement of first obtaining the leave of the Court. Once again, the purpose of that is to ensure that the balance described in Fuller v Toms is maintained.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may be that the application could also be dismissed pursuant to s 37AS(1), on the basis that her affidavits do not substantially comply with s 37AR(3) of the FCA. That subsection requires that an applicant for leave must file an affidavit with the application that: (a)lists all the occasions on which the applicant has applied for leave under s 37AR; and (b)lists all other proceedings the applicant has instituted in any Australian court or tribunal, including proceedings instituted before the commencement of s 37AR; and (c)discloses all relevant facts about the application, whether supporting or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant.The requirements of s 37AR(3) could doubtless be met by the filing of more than one affidavit prior to the determination of the application for leave. I have therefore examined each of Ms Crocker’s affidavits to determine whether she has complied with s 37AR(3). She does not, in the text of her affidavits, mention her unsuccessful application to this Court for the review of a sequestration order made by a registrar, proceeding QUD 345 of 2016: Infa-Secure Pty Ltd v Crocker [2016] FCA 1319 (bankruptcy judgment). QUD 345 of 2016 was in terms of s 37AR(3)(b) of the FCA, a proceeding that Ms Crocker instituted in an Australian court. By coincidence, I was the trial judge in that proceeding. In a practical sense, there is therefore no embarrassment occasioned by the omission, because the existence of the proceeding is well known to me. To proceed on this basis is not to downplay the need for candour as to the past on the part of an applicant and the related relevance of past litigious behaviours and outcomes in deciding whether or not to grant leave, Gargan, in the matter of Gargan [2018] FCA 871, at [17] per Mortimer J and Croker, in the matter of Croker [2019] FCA 359, at [12] per Lee J. It is just to recognise that the requirement is meant to serve the interests of justice, not, in circumstances such as the present, yield an injustice. In any event, it appears that Ms Crocker did “substantially comply with subsection 37AR(3)” as she only failed to mention one proceeding. Related to my knowledge of and involvement in the earlier cases, I have expressly considered whether it is apt for me to determine whether to grant leave. That Ms Crocker is aware that consideration of whether to grant leave has fallen to me is apparent from her exchange of correspondence with the Registrar in relation to her application. She has raised no objection. That aside, I do not consider that my particular prior involvement could give rise to an apprehension of bias in relation to the determination of the leave application any more than it could be said that a judge could never entertain an application for leave to appeal from his or her interlocutory judgment. My task is to look to the proposed proceeding and Ms Crocker’s related affidavits and submissions and form a view as to whether each proposed proceeding is apt for a grant of leave or, on one or more of the bases specified in the definition in s 37AM(1) of the FCA, is a “vexatious proceeding”. That, necessarily, I formed a view in the past as a precursor to the making of a vexatious proceeding order does not mean that, on the current materials, I am or could be seen reasonably to be predisposed to form the same view.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established