SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Crawford v Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2025] QSC 148
PARTIES:
SCOTT ANDREW CRAWFORD
(plaintiff)
v
AINSWORTH INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
ACN 010 744 779(first defendant)
and
GILLIAN ALEXIS
(second defendant)
and
WARREN JAMES DAVIES
(third defendant)
FILE NO/S:
15348 of 2022
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Claim
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
25 June 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 May 2025 and further written submissions received on 18 June 2025
JUDGE:
Copley J
ORDERS:
I direct the parties to bring in Minutes of Orders that reflect these reasons.
CATCHWORDS:
EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS AND DEFENCE MATTERS – ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH CONTINUANCE OF CONTRACT – BREACH OF CONTRACT – where the plaintiff and defendants entered into a settlement agreement concerning the disposition of land – where the settlement agreement provided for a transfer of a half share to plaintiff as tenant in common in equal shares – whether the plaintiff’s breach by failing to pay rates and charges associated with the property under the agreement was a breach of an essential obligation – where specific performance is not precluded by the plaintiff’s breach, and damages are an inadequate remedy
EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – GENERALLY – where the defendants made substantial improvements to the property which increased its value – whether an order for specific performance should accommodate the current value of the property
EQUITY – TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES – IMPLIED TRUSTS – CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS – whether the first defendant held the property on trust and whether defendants breached the trust by executing mortgages – whether the first defendant held the property on trust for the plaintiff and itself
REAL PROPERTY – PARTITION OF LAND – STATUTORY TRUST FOR SALE OR PARTITION – GENERALLY – where s 38(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides that the Court may appoint trustees for sale of the property – whether upon sale, the amount the plaintiff can receive from the proceeds should be limited
ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – RES JUDICATA OR CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff previously instituted proceedings against the defendants – where the previous proceeding was dismissed for failure to comply with a self-executing order – whether a self-executing order was a determination on the merits of the previous proceeding
ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ANSHUN ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – whether claims made in the current proceeding could have been made in the previous proceeding – where the plaintiff became aware of facts after engaging with new legal representation – whether the claims are precluded by Anshun estoppel
PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS – TO PREVENT ABUSE OF PROCESS – ATTEMPTS TO RELITIGATE – where the plaintiff previously instituted proceedings against the defendants – where the previous proceeding was dismissed for failure to comply…
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- Case
- [2025] QSC 148
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the plaintiff's breach of the agreement did not preclude him from seeking specific performance. The court held that the plaintiff's breach was not of an essential obligation and that damages were an inadequate remedy. The court also found that an order for specific performance should accommodate the current value of the property, as the defendants had made substantial improvements to the property which increased its value. The court held that the first defendant did not hold the property on trust for the plaintiff and that there was no breach of fiduciary duty by executing mortgages. The court found that the previous proceeding was not a determination on the merits and that the claims made in the current proceeding could not have been made in the previous proceeding. The court held that the current proceeding was not an abuse of process and that permitting the current proceeding to continue to a determination on the merits was not unjustifiably oppressive.
The court ordered specific performance conditional upon the plaintiff first paying the sum presently owing for the outgoings the subject of clause 4 of the agreement to the first defendant and the costs of the transfer. The court also ordered the appointment of statutory trustees for sale upon the parties bringing in minutes of orders which reflect the reasons below. The court did not make any declarations.
Orders
Orders of the court
I direct the parties to bring in Minutes of Orders that reflect these reasons.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In due course there shall be an order for specific performance conditional upon the plaintiff first paying (1) the sum presently owing for the outgoings the subject of clause 4 of the agreement to the first defendant, and (2) the costs of the transfer. The order shall include the term set out in the paragraph above.Declarations The plaintiff seeks a number of declarations: a declaration that prior to the first defendant granting mortgages over the property to the second and third defendants, the first defendant held the property on trust for him and the first defendant as tenants in common in equal shares; alternatively, a declaration that in granting the mortgages the first defendant breached its fiduciary duty to him. In the event either of these declarations is made, further declarations are sought concerning the alleged accessorial liability of the second and third defendants and their liability to indemnify the plaintiff against the consequences of the breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff’s evidence was he did not consent to the second and third defendants lodging the mortgages and did not know of them until his solicitors informed him about them. He had not received any benefit from the mortgages. This evidence was not challenged. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence about these matters. The plaintiff argues the effect of clause 1 was that the first defendant held the property on trust for it and him as tenants in common in equal shares. The trust was a constructive trust arising from the first defendant’s role as vendor or because clause 1 was specifically performable at the time of the agreement. He submits that at the moment of entry into a valid contract for the sale of land the vendor becomes in equity a naked or bare trustee for the purchaser[28] and at that point the purchaser acquires equitable ownership of the land. The plaintiff relies on PSAL Pty Ltd v Raja where it was stated:[29]“As counsel for PSAL submitted, the High Court in Tanwar (a case concerning relief from forfeiture) emphasised that the source of the parties’ rights is the contract for the sale of the land, rather than the existence of a relationship of trustee and beneficiary. Nevertheless, the Court has not overturned, nor cast doubt on, its many previous decisions which establish that once the contract of sale becomes specifically enforceable (in the manner described above), the vendor holds the land as a bare trustee for the purchaser, pursuant to a constructive trust, and the purchaser acquires equitable ownership of the land.” (Footnotes omitted) [28]Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 237 at [98] (Golden Mile).[29][2016] WASC 295 at [69]. He submits that the first defendant breached the trust when it entered into the two mortgages because it burdened the property it held on trust for the plaintiff. The defendants argue that the claim for a declaration must fail because the first defendant did not hold the property on trust for it and the plaintiff from the date of the agreement. In reliance upon Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi[30] the defendants submit that even if the plaintiff was to be regarded as a purchaser of an interest in the property, it is not correct to regard the vendor (first defendant) as holding land on trust for the purchaser. In Tanwar, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said:[31][30](2003) 217 CLR 315 (Tanwar).[31]At [53].“At all events, the analogies drawn over a century ago in Lysaght with the trust and the mortgage are no longer accepted. Jacobs J observed in Chang v Registrar of Titles that:‘[w]here there are rights outstanding on both sides, the description of the vendor as a trustee tends to conceal the essentially contractual relationship which, rather than the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, governs the rights and duties of the respective parties.’Subsequently, in Kern Corporation Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd, Deane J said:‘[I]t is both inaccurate and misleading to speak of the unpaid vendor under an uncompleted contract as a trustee for the purchaser’.In Stern, Gaudron J points out, consistently with authority in this Court, that the ‘interest’ of the purchaser is commensurate with the availability of specific performance. That availability is the very question in issue where there has been a termination by the vendor for failure to complete as required by the essential stipulation. Reliance upon the ‘interest’ therefore does not assist; it is bedevilled by circularity.” (Footnotes omitted)