Crawford v Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 44 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Crawford v Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2025] QSC 148

PARTIES:

SCOTT ANDREW CRAWFORD

(plaintiff)

v
AINSWORTH INVESTMENTS PTY LTD
ACN 010 744 779

(first defendant)

and

GILLIAN ALEXIS

(second defendant)

and

WARREN JAMES DAVIES

(third defendant)

FILE NO/S:

15348 of 2022

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Claim

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

25 June 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 May 2025 and further written submissions received on 18 June 2025

JUDGE:

Copley J

ORDERS:

I direct the parties to bring in Minutes of Orders that reflect these reasons.

CATCHWORDS:

EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS AND DEFENCE MATTERS – ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH CONTINUANCE OF CONTRACT – BREACH OF CONTRACT – where the plaintiff and defendants entered into a settlement agreement concerning the disposition of land – where the settlement agreement provided for a transfer of a half share to plaintiff as tenant in common in equal shares – whether the plaintiff’s breach by failing to pay rates and charges associated with the property under the agreement was a breach of an essential obligation – where specific performance is not precluded by the plaintiff’s breach, and damages are an inadequate remedy

EQUITY – EQUITABLE REMEDIES – SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – GENERALLY – where the defendants made substantial improvements to the property which increased its value – whether an order for specific performance should accommodate the current value of the property

EQUITY – TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES – IMPLIED TRUSTS – CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS – whether the first defendant held the property on trust and whether defendants breached the trust by executing mortgages – whether the first defendant held the property on trust for the plaintiff and itself

REAL PROPERTY – PARTITION OF LAND – STATUTORY TRUST FOR SALE OR PARTITION – GENERALLY – where s 38(1) of the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) provides that the Court may appoint trustees for sale of the property – whether upon sale, the amount the plaintiff can receive from the proceeds should be limited

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – RES JUDICATA OR CAUSE OF ACTION ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – where the plaintiff previously instituted proceedings against the defendants – where the previous proceeding was dismissed for failure to comply with a self-executing order – whether a self-executing order was a determination on the merits of the previous proceeding

ESTOPPEL – ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT – ANSHUN ESTOPPEL – GENERALLY – whether claims made in the current proceeding could have been made in the previous proceeding – where the plaintiff became aware of facts after engaging with new legal representation – whether the claims are precluded by Anshun estoppel

PROCEDURE – STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS: JURISDICTION, POWERS AND GENERALLY – INHERENT AND GENERAL STATUTORY POWERS – TO PREVENT ABUSE OF PROCESS – ATTEMPTS TO RELITIGATE – where the plaintiff previously instituted proceedings against the defendants – where the previous proceeding was dismissed for failure to comply…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Crawford v Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] QSC 148
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Crawford v Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd is a case involving a dispute over the disposition of land. The plaintiff, Scott Andrew Crawford, sought to enforce a settlement agreement that provided for a transfer of a half share in a property to him as tenant in common in equal shares with the first defendant, Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd. The plaintiff claimed that he was not paid an unencumbered interest in the property as agreed and sought specific performance. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's breach of the agreement by failing to pay rates and charges associated with the property precluded him from enforcing the agreement. The court had to decide whether the plaintiff's breach of the agreement precluded him from seeking specific performance, whether an order for specific performance should accommodate the current value of the property, and whether the first defendant held the property on trust for the plaintiff and whether the defendants breached the trust by executing mortgages.

The court found that the plaintiff's breach of the agreement did not preclude him from seeking specific performance. The court held that the plaintiff's breach was not of an essential obligation and that damages were an inadequate remedy. The court also found that an order for specific performance should accommodate the current value of the property, as the defendants had made substantial improvements to the property which increased its value. The court held that the first defendant did not hold the property on trust for the plaintiff and that there was no breach of fiduciary duty by executing mortgages. The court found that the previous proceeding was not a determination on the merits and that the claims made in the current proceeding could not have been made in the previous proceeding. The court held that the current proceeding was not an abuse of process and that permitting the current proceeding to continue to a determination on the merits was not unjustifiably oppressive.

The court ordered specific performance conditional upon the plaintiff first paying the sum presently owing for the outgoings the subject of clause 4 of the agreement to the first defendant and the costs of the transfer. The court also ordered the appointment of statutory trustees for sale upon the parties bringing in minutes of orders which reflect the reasons below. The court did not make any declarations.

Orders

Orders of the court

I direct the parties to bring in Minutes of Orders that reflect these reasons.

Background

Background to the litigation

This judgment determines first whether the plaintiff is precluded from pursuing his claim and the conclusion is that he is not precluded. The claim is then considered. The results of that consideration are that there will be an order for specific performance and an order for the appointment of statutory trustees for sale, upon the parties bringing in minutes of orders which reflect the reasons below. No declarations are made.Background to the claim in the current proceeding The circumstances which have given rise to this proceeding are as follows. The plaintiff is the brother of the second defendant. The first defendant is a corporate entity. The second defendant is the director of the first defendant, and has been the sole director since 13 September 2018. The third defendant is her partner. The father of the plaintiff and the second defendant, John Alexander Crawford, died in April 2017. In his will, he left a legacy ($5000), then the residue of his estate to the plaintiff and the second defendant in equal shares as tenants in common. The settlement agreement resulted from a mediation on 20 February 2019. The plaintiff (together with his lawyer), the first defendant (through its director, the second defendant), the second defendant (together with her lawyer), the third defendant and the executor of the father’s estate participated in the mediation. The settlement agreement was signed by the plaintiff, the current defendants and the executor. It was headed “BS 1497/16 BS2957/18 20 February 2019 Terms of resolution of issues relating to the affairs of the estate of John Alexander Crawford (JAC) and Ainsworth Investments Pty Ltd ACN 010 744 779 (AIPL)”. The terms were as follows:[2][2]As the settlement agreement was recorded partly in handwriting and partly in typed form, counsel were asked to produce an agreed version of it in type written form. This version was made Exhibit 1B and is the version reproduced above.“1In part compromise of SAC’s claim against AIPL and the executor and by way of further provision for SAC, AIPL will transfer a half share in the Toorbul property to Scott Andrew Crawford (SAC) as tenant in common with AIPL in equal shares2The costs of transfer must be paid from JAC3Occupancy of the property must be as follows:(a)The property has an existing fence such that it is divided into two areas as approximately shown on the attached aerial photo.(b)SAC is entitled to occupy the portion of the property (containing the house, sheds and infrastructure) north of the fence for three years from today rent free.(c) Gillian Alexis (GA) is entitled to occupy the residual portion of the property from three years from today rent free.(d) Neither AIPL nor SAC may seek appointment of trustees for sale or otherwise force a sale of the property for 3 years.4SAC must pay 70% of the rates, regulatory charges, insurance (Public liability) and 100% of house and improvements insurances for the property5A GA must pay 30% of the rates, regulatory charges, insurance (Public liability) and necessary outgoings for the property5B Any commercial activity undertaken by either party would require insurance appropriate to the activity, including public liability at their cost6In part compromise of these actions, JAC waves (sic) /discharges the ‘debt’ from AIPL the subject of the Statutory Demand7In part compromise of SAC claims against AIPL, AIPL releases SAC from all alleged indebtedness.8JAC transfers 21 shares back to GA, in part compromise of these actions.9All Supreme Court proceedings (1497/2016 and 2957/2018 must be discontinued with all parties to pay their own costs (including reserve costs), reserving the rights of JAC’s costs out of the estate of JAC.10SAC must withdraw caveat #718486605 and discontinues his application in BD 4751/1711The executor shall administer the estate, and make interim residuary distributions, as soon as practicable12AIPL and SAC grant the other a right of first refusal to purchase the half shares owned by them to the other upon the death of SAC or GA respectfully (sic).13Fulfillment of these terms shall be in complete satisfaction of all claims of any nature any party may have against another”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is no dispute that the plaintiff has not received an unencumbered interest in the property as a tenant in common in equal shares with the first defendant. There is no dispute that if clause 1 of the settlement agreement had been performed he would have received an unencumbered interest as just described.Evidence relevant to preclusion In the previous proceeding[3] the plaintiff sought a declaration that the settlement agreement[4] be declared void for common mistake. On 30 September 2021 the plaintiff was given leave to add Mr Love, the executor, as the third defendant. Leave was also given to amend the claim so that the orders sought were:(a)That the “Deed of 20th February 2019 be read and construed as entitling the plaintiff to an unencumbered one half share of the Toorbul property that, save for clauses 4 and 5 of the Deed is only subject to obligations and/or liabilities attaching thereto or otherwise payable in respect to the parties’ performance of all transactions required by the Deed which are no greater than those of [Ms Alexis]”.(b)“Specific performance of the Deed as so construed”.[3]BS 9188/21.[4]Referred to in that claim as the deed of settlement. On 22 October 2021 the claim and statement of claim were amended to seek rectification of the settlement agreement or a term implied based on a common intention that the plaintiff was to receive an unencumbered one half interest in the property only subject to obligations or liabilities attaching to the parties’ performance of transactions required by the agreement that were no greater than those of the plaintiff. Specific performance was sought based on that construction. The steps taken up to 22 October 2021 were taken by solicitors on the plaintiff’s behalf. On 12 November 2021 the plaintiff filed a notice that he was acting in person. The plaintiff gave evidence in the current proceeding about why he came to act for himself in the previous proceeding. He said that he had lost all confidence in his solicitor and could not afford to have anyone act for him after that. It was clear from his evidence in this proceeding that the plaintiff had no legal training. On 25 November 2021 orders were made striking out some paragraphs in the amended statement of claim. Leave was given for the plaintiff to file and serve a further amended statement of claim within 28 days. The plaintiff did not comply with that order. His explanation for not doing so in this proceeding was that he did not know what to do, he had no money and he could not find anyone to help him. On 16 February 2022 the Court heard an application to strike out the further amended statement of claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and that the plaintiff had not filed and served a further amended statement of claim. Alternatively, dismissal for want of prosecution was sought. The Court made orders that the time for complying with the previous order for filing a further amended statement of claim be extended to 4:00 pm on 17 March 2022 and if the plaintiff did not do so by then the proceeding would be dismissed and in that event the plaintiff was to pay the defendants’ costs on the standard basis. Before these orders were made the judge explained the nature of the orders to the plaintiff and informed him that if he did not comply the case would “automatically be over”. The plaintiff said he understood. The plaintiff did not file any further amended statement of claim by 4:00 pm on 17 March 2022 and the proceeding was dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In due course there shall be an order for specific performance conditional upon the plaintiff first paying (1) the sum presently owing for the outgoings the subject of clause 4 of the agreement to the first defendant, and (2) the costs of the transfer. The order shall include the term set out in the paragraph above.Declarations The plaintiff seeks a number of declarations: a declaration that prior to the first defendant granting mortgages over the property to the second and third defendants, the first defendant held the property on trust for him and the first defendant as tenants in common in equal shares; alternatively, a declaration that in granting the mortgages the first defendant breached its fiduciary duty to him. In the event either of these declarations is made, further declarations are sought concerning the alleged accessorial liability of the second and third defendants and their liability to indemnify the plaintiff against the consequences of the breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff’s evidence was he did not consent to the second and third defendants lodging the mortgages and did not know of them until his solicitors informed him about them. He had not received any benefit from the mortgages. This evidence was not challenged. I accept the plaintiff’s evidence about these matters. The plaintiff argues the effect of clause 1 was that the first defendant held the property on trust for it and him as tenants in common in equal shares. The trust was a constructive trust arising from the first defendant’s role as vendor or because clause 1 was specifically performable at the time of the agreement. He submits that at the moment of entry into a valid contract for the sale of land the vendor becomes in equity a naked or bare trustee for the purchaser[28] and at that point the purchaser acquires equitable ownership of the land. The plaintiff relies on PSAL Pty Ltd v Raja where it was stated:[29]“As counsel for PSAL submitted, the High Court in Tanwar (a case concerning relief from forfeiture) emphasised that the source of the parties’ rights is the contract for the sale of the land, rather than the existence of a relationship of trustee and beneficiary. Nevertheless, the Court has not overturned, nor cast doubt on, its many previous decisions which establish that once the contract of sale becomes specifically enforceable (in the manner described above), the vendor holds the land as a bare trustee for the purchaser, pursuant to a constructive trust, and the purchaser acquires equitable ownership of the land.” (Footnotes omitted) [28]Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 237 at [98] (Golden Mile).[29][2016] WASC 295 at [69]. He submits that the first defendant breached the trust when it entered into the two mortgages because it burdened the property it held on trust for the plaintiff. The defendants argue that the claim for a declaration must fail because the first defendant did not hold the property on trust for it and the plaintiff from the date of the agreement. In reliance upon Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi[30] the defendants submit that even if the plaintiff was to be regarded as a purchaser of an interest in the property, it is not correct to regard the vendor (first defendant) as holding land on trust for the purchaser. In Tanwar, Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ said:[31][30](2003) 217 CLR 315 (Tanwar).[31]At [53].“At all events, the analogies drawn over a century ago in Lysaght with the trust and the mortgage are no longer accepted. Jacobs J observed in Chang v Registrar of Titles that:‘[w]here there are rights outstanding on both sides, the description of the vendor as a trustee tends to conceal the essentially contractual relationship which, rather than the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, governs the rights and duties of the respective parties.’Subsequently, in Kern Corporation Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd, Deane J said:‘[I]t is both inaccurate and misleading to speak of the unpaid vendor under an uncompleted contract as a trustee for the purchaser’.In Stern, Gaudron J points out, consistently with authority in this Court, that the ‘interest’ of the purchaser is commensurate with the availability of specific performance. That availability is the very question in issue where there has been a termination by the vendor for failure to complete as required by the essential stipulation. Reliance upon the ‘interest’ therefore does not assist; it is bedevilled by circularity.” (Footnotes omitted)