SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Miscellaneous Appeal: Civil)
CRANEFORD NOMINEES P/L v VGC CO-OPERATIVE LTD
[2012] SASC 74
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley
9 May 2012
PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS - OTHER MATTERS
CORPORATIONS - GENERALLY - CORPORATIONS LEGISLATION
Appeal from a master of the Supreme Court dismissing action to set aside statutory demand – master held court lacked jurisdiction because appellant had not served copy of application on respondent in accordance with s 459G(3)(b) of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether master erred in finding document was not ‘copy of the application’ within the meaning of s 459G(3)(b) – whether omission of Registrar’s signature and filing date render document not a copy within meaning of s 459G – whether master erred in dismissing the action.
Held: Appeal allowed. Document reflected form of originating process – document evidenced court’s acceptance by court’s ‘Received’ stamp and action number – document recorded return date of application – document served by appellant satisfied description of ‘copy of the application’ in s 489G – court has jurisdiction to set aside statutory demand – matter remitted to master.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E, s 459F, s 459G; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 50, r 51, referred to.
Craneford Nominees Pty Ltd v VGC Co-Operative Ltd [2012] SASC 59; Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd (2000) 158 FLR 338; Cooloola Dairys Pty Ltd v National Foods Milk Ltd & Ors (2004) 184 FLR 86; Opensoft Australia Pty Ltd v Miller Street Pty Ltd (2011) 29 ACLC 11-040; Howship Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (1996) 41 NSWLR 542; Hope v Hope (1854) 43 ER 534, discussed.
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, considered.
CRANEFORD NOMINEES P/L v VGC CO-OPERATIVE LTD
[2012] SASC 74Appeal from a Master
STANLEY J:
Introduction
This is an appeal from the order of a master dismissing an action to set aside a statutory demand pursuant to s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The master dismissed the action because the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand on the basis that the court’s jurisdiction could only be invoked where the appellant had, in accordance with s 459G(3)(b), served a copy of the application to set aside the statutory demand on the respondent, being the person who had served the demand on the appellant.
Section 459G(3)(b) provides:
(3) An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within those 21 days:
…
(b)a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.
At issue before the master was whether the document, which had been served within the 21 day period stipulated in s 459G, was “a copy of the application” within the meaning of that provision.
The learned master found the document served…
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- Case
- [2012] SASC 74
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the omission of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date from the copy application served meant that the copy was not a sufficient copy of the application to satisfy the requirements of s 459G(3)(b). The respondent argued that the authorities established that the document served must inform the recipient that the proceedings had in fact commenced through acceptance by the court of the originating process and inform the recipient of the return date. However, the court found that the authorities relied on by the master did not compel the conclusion that the omission of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date rendered the document not a copy within the meaning of the section. The court held that the document served by the appellant satisfied the description of a ‘copy of the application’ in s 459G, as it reflected the form of originating process, evidenced the court’s acceptance by the court’s ‘Received’ stamp and action number, and recorded the return date of the application.
The court concluded that the master had erred in finding that the document was not a sufficient copy of the application to satisfy the requirements of s 459G(3)(b) and that the omission of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date did not render the document not a copy within the meaning of the section. The court held that the court had jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand and that the appeal should be allowed. The matter was remitted to the master to hear and determine the merits of the application. The court did not consider it necessary to make any orders in relation to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant appealed the master's decision, arguing that the omission of the Registrar's signature and filing date did not render the document an insufficient copy. The appellant contended that the document reflected the form of originating process, evidenced the court's acceptance through the 'Received' stamp and action number, and recorded the return date of the application. They submitted that these elements satisfied the description of a 'copy of the application' under section 459G, and therefore, the court had jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand. The respondent, represented by Mr Thomas, maintained that the authorities established that for a document to satisfy the description of a 'copy of the application', it must inform the recipient that the proceedings have commenced through acceptance by the court of the originating process and inform the recipient of the return date. Without the court's seal, the only indication of the authenticity of the copy of the originating process was the presence of the Registrar's signature, which was absent from the served document. Thus, the master's conclusion was correct.
The court found that the authorities did not provide a clear-cut answer on whether the omission of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date meant that the copy served was not a copy of the application for the purpose of section 459G(3)(b). The case of Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd, for instance, held that the omission of annexures from a supporting affidavit in the copy served meant that a sufficient copy of the affidavit had not been served. Other authorities concerned circumstances where what was served was a draft of the originating process that had not yet been filed in court, meaning the service copy did not include an action number, a return date, or any other evidence of the document having been filed in court. However, these cases did not compel the conclusion that the omission of the Registrar’s signature and filing date rendered the document an insufficient copy in this case. The document in question included the court’s ‘Received’ stamp, action number, and return date, which were sufficient to satisfy the description of a 'copy of the application' within the meaning of section 459G(3)(b).
In the matter of Craneford Nominees Pty Ltd v VGC Co-Operative Ltd, the appellant, Craneford Nominees, sought to set aside a statutory demand issued against them by the respondent, VGC Co-Operative Ltd. The case initially came before a master of the Supreme Court who dismissed the application on the basis that Craneford Nominees had not served a copy of the application on the respondent as required by section 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The master concluded that the copy served by Craneford Nominees was insufficient because it did not include the Registrar's signature and the filing date, leading to the dismissal of the action. Dissatisfied with this decision, Craneford Nominees appealed to the Supreme Court.
The appeal before the Supreme Court centred on whether the master correctly found that the document served was not a 'copy of the application' within the meaning of section 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) due to the absence of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date. Craneford Nominees argued that these omissions did not render the document insufficient and that the document served was, in fact, a valid copy of the application. The court had to determine if the master erred in concluding that the document was not a sufficient copy, and if so, whether this affected the court's jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand. The Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the master's decision was incorrect and that the document served by Craneford Nominees satisfied the requirements of section 459G(3)(b). The court held that the absence of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date did not invalidate the document, and the matter was remitted to the master to hear and determine the merits of the application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Thomas, counsel for the respondent, submitted that the authorities establish that in order to satisfy the description of a “copy of the application” pursuant to s 459G(3), the document served must inform the recipient that the proceedings have in fact commenced through acceptance by the court of the originating process and inform the recipient of the return date. He submitted that the conclusion reached by the learned master was correct because absent the court’s seal, the only indication of the authenticity of the copy of the originating process was the presence of the Registrar’s signature. As the Registrar’s signature did not appear on the document that was served on the respondent, there was no evidence the recipient could rely upon that the originating process had been accepted by the court. Consideration The learned master was correct in observing that the authorities he relied upon did not provide a clear cut answer on whether the omission of the Registrar’s signature and the filing date meant that the copy served was not a copy of the application for the purpose of s 459G(3)(b). Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd,[2] a decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, was concerned with the corresponding requirement in s 459G(3)(b) for the service of a copy of the supporting affidavit. There the court held the omission of four pages of the annexures to the affidavit in the copy served meant that a sufficient copy of the affidavit had not been served and thus subsection (3) was not satisfied. [2] (2000) 158 FLR 338. The other authorities relied upon by the learned master concerned circumstances where what was served was a draft of the originating process which had not yet been filed in court such that the service copy of the application did not include an action number, nor a return date, nor any other evidence of the document having been filed in court. In each instance the court found that these documents did not meet the description of a “copy of the application” within the meaning of s 459G(3). In Cooloola Dairys Pty Ltd v National Foods Milk Ltd & Ors,[3] Chesterman J, in the Supreme Court of Queensland, analysed these authorities and concluded that they expressed a justifiable exposition of s 459G. His Honour said:[4]The copy of the application which the section requires to be served must show that an application has been filed and when the respondent is required to attend and answer it. It will not perform these functions if it is not sealed and does not show the action number allocated by the court. The inclusion of the return date is obviously necessary.The authorities establish that the copy of the application served on the respondent must be such as to show that it is a replication of the application which has been filed in the court. To do that it must show the action number given it by the court and it must show the return date for the hearing of the application. It must, also, I think, show the seal of the court to indicate that there are curial proceedings on foot.[3] (2004) 184 FLR 86.[4] (2004) 184 FLR 86 at [34] - [35].