SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil)
CRANEFORD NOMINEES PTY LTD v VGC CO-OPERATIVE LTD
[2012] SASC 59
Reasons of Judge Lunn a Master of the Supreme Court
13 April 2012
CORPORATIONS
Statutory demand - action to set it aside - whether action competent - whether s 459G(3)(b) of Corporations Act 2001 satisfied in that copy of Originating Process served within the necessary 21 day period - copy served not show seal of Court, Registrar's signature or date of filing - no seal of Court on original on Court file - omissions of Registrar's signature and date of filing on copy served held to mean it was not a copy of the application for s 459G(3)(b).
Held: action dismissed.
CRANEFORD NOMINEES PTY LTD v VGC CO-OPERATIVE LTD
[2012] SASC 59JUDGE LUNN:
Reasons on whether plaintiff had properly invoked the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the statutory demand
On 3 February 2012 the defendant served a statutory demand under s 459E of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”) on the plaintiff claiming a debt of $514,709.43. On 22 February 2012 the plaintiff instituted this action seeking an order under s 459G of the Act setting aside that statutory demand on the ground there was a genuine dispute about the debt. The defendant has objected to the competence of this action. By agreement, I am first dealing with this point as a preliminary issue.
There is no dispute that the plaintiff instituted this action on 22 February 2012. The purported copies of the Originating Process and the supporting affidavit were sent to the defendant’s then solicitor on or before 24 February, which was the last of the 21 days allowed under s 459G of the Act for the proceedings to be served on the defendant.[1]
[1] There was an agreement between the respective solicitors which allowed the service to be by post.
The sole point in issue can be stated simply, but its resolution is difficult. Section 459G(3) of the Act provides:
An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within those 21 days:
…
(b)a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.
The defendant contends that the copy of the application[2] was not a true copy of the application and thus did not satisfy the condition laid down in sub-s (3)(b) for an application to the Court. The defendant relied upon the decision of the High Court in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation[3] that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the plaintiff’s action is conditional upon strict compliance with all of the conditions in sub-s 459G(3).
[2] Which is an Originating Process by virtue of Rule 2.2 of the Corporations Rules 2003 (South Australia) (“the Corporations Rules”).
[3] (1995) 184 CLR 265.
The defendant relies upon two instances where the copy of the Originating Process served within the 21 days did not…
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- Case
- [2012] SASC 59
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court considered the authorities on what constitutes a true copy of an application. The Court found that the omissions of the Registrar's signature and the date of filing could not be regarded as de minimus. The absence of the Court's seal meant the only indication of the authenticity of the copy was the Registrar's signature. Therefore, the omissions meant the copy was not a sufficient copy of the application to satisfy s 459G(3)(b) of the Act. While the omissions were procedural irregularities, they could not be regularised under the Corporations Rules as the issue was whether the conditions precedent for jurisdiction had been satisfied. The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case of Craneford Nominees Pty Ltd v VGC Co-Operative Ltd commenced in the Supreme Court of South Australia as an action by the plaintiff to set aside a statutory demand issued by the defendant under section 459E of the Corporations Act 2001. The plaintiff instituted this action on 22 February 2012, contending there was a genuine dispute regarding the debt claimed. The defendant objected to the competence of the plaintiff's action, arguing that the plaintiff had not strictly complied with the procedural requirements set out in section 459G(3)(b) of the Act, which mandates that a copy of the application and supporting affidavit be served on the person who served the statutory demand within 21 days. The defendant specifically noted discrepancies in the copy of the Originating Process served, including the absence of the Court seal, the Registrar’s signature, and the date of filing. Despite the plaintiff's argument that these omissions were inconsequential, the Court, adhering to the strict compliance principle established by prior case law, held that the procedural irregularities rendered the copy of the Originating Process insufficient. Consequently, the Court found it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the plaintiff's action to set aside the statutory demand competent, given the procedural irregularities in serving the copy of the application?
2. Has the plaintiff satisfied the condition laid down in s 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 that a copy of the application and a copy of the supporting affidavit were served on the defendant within the 21-day period?
3. Are the omissions of the Registrar's signature and the date of filing from the copy of the Originating Process sufficient to deem the copy not a true copy of the application under s 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001?
4. Does the failure to serve a copy of the Originating Process that precisely replicates the original, including the Registrar's signature and the date of filing, deprive the Court of jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand?
Held
1. The plaintiff's action to set aside the statutory demand is not competent due to procedural irregularities in serving the copy of the application, resulting in the application being dismissed.
2. The plaintiff did not satisfy the condition in s 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 as the copy of the application and the supporting affidavit were not served on the defendant within the 21-day period.
3. The omissions of the Registrar's signature and the date of filing from the copy of the Originating Process are sufficient to deem the copy not a true copy of the application under s 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001.
4. The failure to serve a copy of the Originating Process that precisely replicates the original, including the Registrar's signature and the date of filing, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand, resulting in the action being dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The plaintiff in this case, Craneford Nominees Pty Ltd, sought to set aside a statutory demand issued by the defendant, VGC CO-OPERATIVE Ltd, under section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001. The defendant raised objections to the competence of the plaintiff’s action, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the procedural requirements set out in section 459G(3)(b) of the Act, which necessitates serving a copy of the application and a copy of the supporting affidavit on the defendant within a 21-day period. The key issue was whether the plaintiff's action was competent given the procedural irregularities in serving the copy of the application.
Judge Lunn addressed the procedural requirement that a copy of the application and the supporting affidavit must be served within 21 days of instituting the action. The defendant argued that the copy served did not meet the statutory requirement as it lacked the Registrar's signature and the date of filing, which were present on the original document on the Court file. The plaintiff conceded that the copies sent did not replicate the originals exactly, but argued that these discrepancies were not material enough to deem the action incompetent. The court considered the relevant authorities, particularly the decision in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation, which underscored the necessity of strict compliance with the statutory conditions to invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
The court then examined whether the omissions of the Registrar's signature and the date of filing rendered the copy of the Originating Process insufficient to satisfy section 459G(3)(b). The omission of the Court's seal was deemed insignificant as it was not required for valid service, and the absence of the seal on the original also did not affect its validity. However, the omissions of the Registrar’s signature and the date of filing were critical, as these elements were essential for verifying the authenticity and the filing date of the document. The court relied on Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd, which emphasized the necessity for strict conformity between the original and the copy served. Other authorities, such as Eastern Metropolitan Regional Council v Four Seasons Construction Pty Ltd and Medeco Group Pty Ltd v Cripps, supported the strict interpretation of the statutory requirement for a true copy.
Judge Lunn concluded that the omissions of the Registrar's signature and the date of filing were not minor and thus rendered the copy of the Originating Process insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Despite the procedural nature of these irregularities and the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the court held that the statutory conditions precedent for jurisdiction under section 459G(3)(b) had not been met. The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke the discretionary powers of the Court under rule 6R 117(1) to overcome procedural irregularities, as it was not within the Court’s purview to retrospectively alter the statutory requirements for service.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that strict compliance with the procedural requirements for serving a copy of the application and the supporting affidavit within the 21-day period is mandatory for the Court to have jurisdiction to set aside a statutory demand. Any omission, even if minor, that affects the authenticity or completeness of the copy served can render the action incompetent, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction. The decision follows and applies the strict interpretation of statutory compliance established in prior authorities, without departing from them.