SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
CPR Solutions Mackay Pty Ltd v Zammit Earthmoving Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 165
PARTIES:
CPR SOLUTIONS MACKAY PTY LTD
ACN 166 773 271(applicant)
v
ZAMMIT EARTHMOVING PTY LTD
ACN 124 851 501(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
SC No 17 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Mackay
DELIVERED ON:
11 June 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Rockhampton
HEARING DATE:
28 April 2020
JUDGE:
Crow J
ORDER:
1. The application to set aside the statutory demand is dismissed.
2. The parties are to file and serve submissions regarding costs as follows:
a. respondent by close of business Friday 12 June 2020; and
b. applicant by close of business Tuesday 16 June 2020.
CATCHWORDS:
CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY – STATUTORY DEMAND – APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS – SERVICE OF APPLICATION – where application to set aside statutory demand filed within period for service – where the application is stamped as received and a filing receipt issued by the registry – where complete application is not provided to applicant for a further twenty-one days - where unsealed copy of the application, bearing no return date, file number, or ‘received’ stamp emailed to respondent’s solicitors within period of service – where receipt for filing was emailed to respondent’s solicitors within period for service – where complete application to set aside statutory demand served outside period of service - whether the application served was a copy for the purpose of s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether service had been properly effected
CORPORATIONS – WINDING UP – WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY – STATUTORY DEMAND – APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS – OTHER MATTERS – where the procedural rules regarding corporation’s proceedings are set out in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) as the Corporations Proceedings Rules – where registrar has duty to immediately affix a court seal, return date, and matter number to filed applications - where s 15 of the Covid-19 Emergency Response Act 2020 (Qld) empowers the court to modify statutory time limits relating to a proceeding – whether s 15 alters the duties of a registrar to immediately affix a court seal, return date, and matter number to filed applications - whether the alteration or suspension of procedural requirements under the Corporations Proceedings Rules can effect operation of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459G, s 459H, s 559E, s 1337B
COVID-19 Emergency Response Act 2020 (Qld), s 2, s 15
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 26, r 964, r 967, r 968, r 978, Schedule 1AAinsworth & Ors v Redd (1990) 19 NSWLR 78, cited
Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 181, cited
Chelring Pty Ltd v Coombs [2000] WASC 60, cited
Cooloola Dairys Pty Ltd v National Foods Milk Ltd (2004) 211 ALR 293; [2004] QSC 308, applied
Craneford Nominees Pty Ltd…
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- Case
- [2020] QSC 165
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the statutory provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), specifically section 459G, which mandates that an application to set aside a statutory demand must be made within 21 days after the demand is served, with specific procedural requirements to be followed. The court found that the application was not properly served as it did not include the necessary supporting affidavit and was not stamped or marked with a return date or matter number. The court also considered the impact of the Covid-19 Emergency Response Act 2020 (Qld) on procedural time limits, but found that it did not alter the duties of the registrar to affix a court seal, return date, and matter number to filed applications. The court concluded that the application was not served within the statutory period, and therefore the application to set aside the statutory demand was invalid.
The court dismissed the application to set aside the statutory demand and ordered the parties to file and serve submissions regarding costs by specific dates.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to set aside the statutory demand is dismissed.
2. The parties are to file and serve submissions regarding costs as follows:
a. respondent by close of business Friday 12 June 2020; and
b. applicant by close of business Tuesday 16 June 2020.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The uncertainty as to the hearing dates for the Supreme Court at Mackay were significantly affected by the pre-emptive restrictions put in place to combat COVID-19. It was not until 6 April 2020 that a return date, being 28 April 2020, could be set for the application. Accordingly, on 6 April 2020, the acting registrar placed the return date on the application and advised the applicant that the application was ready for collection. Part 5.4 Corporations Law – Operates Harshly Section 459G of the Corporations Act provides:“459GCompany may apply(1)A company may apply to the Court for an order setting aside a statutory demand served on the company.(2)An application may only be made within the statutory period after the demand is so served.(3)An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within that period:(a) an affidavit supporting the application is filed with the Court; and(b) a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, are served on the person who served the demand on the company.” The leading decision upon the meaning and effect of s 459G is the decision of Gummow J in David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (“David Grant”).[21] In David Grant, Gummow J (with whom Brennan CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ agreed) said:[22][21](1995) 184 CLR 265.[22]David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 at 276, 278, 279. “In providing that an application to the court for an order setting aside a statutory demand ‘may only’ be made within the twenty-one day period there specified and that an application is made in accordance with s 459G only if, within those twenty-one days, a supporting affidavit is filed and a copy thereof and of the applications are served, sub-ss (2) and (3) of s 459G attach a limitation or condition upon the authority of the court to set aside the demand. In this setting, the use in s 459G(2) of the term ‘may’ does not give rise to the considerations which apply where legislation confers upon a decision-maker an authority of a discretionary kind and the issue is whether ‘may’ is used in a facultative and permissive sense or an imperative sense. Here, the phrase ‘[a]n application may only be made within twenty-one days’ should be read as a whole. The force of the term ‘may only’ is to define the jurisdiction of the court by imposing a requirement as to time as an essential condition of the new right conferred by s 459G. An integer or element of the right created by s 459G is its exercise by application made within the time specified. To adapt what was said by Isaacs J in The Crown v McNeil, it is a condition of the gift in sub-s (1) of s 459G that sub-s (2) be observed and, unless this is so, the gift can never take effect. The same is true of sub-s (3).…These matters emphasise the importance of s 459G as an integral part of the particular scheme established by Pt 5.4. Paragraph (d) of s 1322(4) empowers the court to make an order where the period concerned ended before the application to extend it is made. An application to set aside the demand made not within the twenty-one days specified in s 459G but within another period allowed pursuant to an order under s 1322(4), could not modify what otherwise would be the operation of the definition of the ‘period for compliance’ with the statutory demand set out in s 459F(2). That in turn would not change the answer to the question posed under s 459C(2) as to whether the court must presume the company to be insolvent because it had, within the period there specified, failed ‘as defined by s 459F’ to comply with the statutory demand.… Section 467A provides that an application under Pt 5.4 ‘must not be dismissed’ merely because of ‘a defect or irregularity in connection with the application’, unless the court is satisfied that substantial injustice has been caused and this cannot otherwise be remedied. However, s 467A cannot assist the appellants. If an application for an order setting aside a statutory demand has not been made within 21 days after service of the demand, there is no application under Pt 5.4 before the court. Therefore, there is no question of such an application being dismissed because of a defect or irregularity in connection with it. In Re J and E Holdings Pty Ltd, Sheller JA summed the matter up as follows:‘The position is quite simply that unless the Court has a power to extend the time within which the application to set aside the statutory demand can be made, the plaintiff has no right to make it.’Sheller JA also referred to various examples where it might be thought that, upon the construction he preferred, which I also have accepted, Pt 5.4 might operate harshly. In particular, reference was made to the drastic commercial consequences which may follow the issue of process for winding up and to the inability of a company, which for good reason had been late in filing or serving an application to set aside the statutory demand, to prevent the issue of that winding up process. The damage to the commercial reputation of the company in the meantime might not be answered by the eventual success of the company in defeating the application to wind it up as insolvent. Further, default clauses in securities given by the company may have been so drawn as not to take full account of the new statutory scheme, with the consequence that floating charges may have crystallised and the whole of the principal and interest become payable.(Footnotes omitted.)