UNIVERSAL TRADE EXCHANGE PTY LTD -v- WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION [2002] WASC 36
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2002] WASC 36 | |
| Case No: | COR:35/2002 | 1 MARCH 2002 | |
| Coram: | MASTER SANDERSON | 7/03/02 | |
| 5 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application incompetent | ||
| A | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | UNIVERSAL TRADE EXCHANGE PTY LTD (ACN 078 335 681) WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ARBN 007 457 141) |
Catchwords: | Corporations Act Application to set aside statutory demand Failure to complete return date on application served on the defendant "Copy of application" not served as required by s 459G(3)(b) |
Legislation: | Corporations Act, s 459G(2), s 459G(3), s 467A |
Case References: | Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1181 Chelring Pty Ltd v Coombs [2000] WASC 60 David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265 Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 409 Nil |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CHAMBERS
- Applicant
AND
WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION (ARBN 007 457 141)
Respondent
Catchwords:
Corporations Act - Application to set aside statutory demand - Failure to complete return date on application served on the defendant - "Copy of application" not served as required by s 459G(3)(b)
Legislation:
Corporations Act, s 459G(2), s 459G(3), s 467A
Result:
Application incompetent
(Page 2)
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : Ms M L Lee
Respondent : Mr J R Atkinson
Solicitors:
Applicant : Summers Partners
Respondent : Minter Ellison
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1181
Chelring Pty Ltd v Coombs [2000] WASC 60
David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265
Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 409
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
(Page 3)
1 MASTER SANDERSON: This is an application to set aside a statutory demand. The defendant maintains there was a defect in the service of the application with the effect that there is no application properly on foot. In the event there was no disagreement between the parties on the facts and the fate of the application can be quickly determined.
2 On 18 January 2002 the defendant served on the plaintiff a statutory demand. On 8 February 2002 the plaintiff filed an application to set aside the statutory demand which was supported by an affidavit of Roy Albert Edwards ("Edwards") sworn that same day. The application was served by forwarding to the defendant's solicitors, Minter Ellison, what purported to be a copy of the application and the affidavit in support. That letter was dated 8 February 2002. On 18 February 2002 the defendant's solicitors wrote back pointing out that the copy of the application…
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- Case
- [2002] WASC 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The case came before the Supreme Court of Western Australia as an application to set aside a statutory demand. The matter was heard on 1 March 2002, and the judgment was delivered on 7 March 2002. The primary issue was whether the service of the application was defective due to the omission of the return date, rendering the application incompetent. The court referenced previous cases, including David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation, Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd, Benonyx Pty Ltd v Fetrona Pty Ltd, and Chelring Pty Ltd v Coombs, in its judgment.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was the application to set aside the statutory demand properly served on the defendant?
2. Did the omission of the return date from the copy of the application render the application incompetent?
3. Can the court extend the time limit for setting aside a statutory demand under s 459G of the Corporations Act?
Held
1. The application to set aside the statutory demand was not properly served on the defendant as it did not include the return date.
2. The omission of the return date from the copy of the application rendered the application incompetent.
3. The court cannot extend the time limit for setting aside a statutory demand under s 459G of the Corporations Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by noting that the application to set aside the statutory demand was made by the plaintiff but failed to comply with the statutory requirements as outlined in s 459G(3)(b) of the Corporations Act. The application was served on the defendant's solicitors but lacked the return date, a critical requirement for the application to be properly on foot. This omission was highlighted by the defendant's solicitors who pointed out that the copy of the application did not contain the return date. Despite the plaintiff's attempt to rectify the omission by providing a corrected copy, the court held that the application was still incompetent as it was not served within the 21-day period specified by s 459G(2) of the Corporations Act. The court relied on the Full Court decision in Robowash Pty Ltd v Robowash Finance Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 409, which established that a "copy" of the application must be an exact copy, including all necessary information such as the return date. The court also noted that the omission of the return date rendered the application incompetent, regardless of any potential prejudice to the defendant. The court further clarified that s 467A of the Corporations Act does not apply to s 459G(3)(b), meaning that compliance with s 459G(3)(b) is a strict requirement for any application to set aside a statutory demand. The binding legal principle established by the court is that strict compliance with the statutory requirements for serving an application to set aside a statutory demand is mandatory, and failure to meet these requirements renders the application incompetent.