Crane v Crane - [1949] HCA 52

CRANE AND OTHERS

RESPONDENTS.

PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WillConstruction-Vesting-Gift of fund to children as class-Children's shares

payable on attaining twenty-one years or marriage-Period of ascertainment of class-Gift over of lapsed shares.

A testator, by his will, left his residue on trust to pay the income thereof for the education maintenance and support of the children of his brother A, during their respective minorities and from and after A's son or sons respec- tively attaining twenty-one years and from and after A's daughter or daughters respectively attaining that age or marrying under that age in trust for them absolutely share and share alike. The will further provided that " if the legacies or shares payable to any of the legatees hereinbefore named shall lapse such lapsed legacies or shares shall vest in my brothers' A and B absolutely share and share alike. The will empowered the trustees at their discretion to raise the whole or any part or parts of the vested or presumptive shares of any nephew or niece of the testator and apply the same for his or her advancement, preferment or benefit.

At the date of the testator's death in 1932, A was a widower with three children. The eldest of these children attained the age of twenty-one years in 1939. In 1937 A re-married and in 1942 a child was born of this marriage.

Held, That the class of children to share in the gift was closed in 1939 when A's eldest child attained twenty-one years and that therefore the child of A's second marriage was not entitled to participate.

Andrews v. Partington, (1791) 3 Bro. C.C. 401 [29 E.R. 610], applied. Iredell v. Iredell, (1858) 25 Beav. 485, and Bateman v. Gray, (1868) L.R. 6 Eq. 215, discussed.

Decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Napier C.J.): In re Crane, Deceased, (1949) S.A.S.R. 1, affirmed.

80 CLR 328

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of South Australia.

Arthur Crane died on 30th March 1932 leaving a will dated 24th April 1930 whereof he appointed George Joseph Crane and Reginald Leo Heuzenroeder to be executors and trustees. G. J. Crane and R. L. Heuzenroeder duly proved the will in the Supreme Court of South Australia on 11th May 1932. The will directed the trustees to stand possessed of the residue of the estate 'in trust to pay the income thereof to the guardian or guardians of the children of my brother George Joseph Crane for their education maintenance and support during their respective minorities and from and after the son or sons of the said George Joseph Crane respectively attaining the age of 21 years and the daughter or daughters of the said George Joseph Crane respectively attaining that age or marrying under that age in trust for them absolutely share and share alike and if there shall be only one child then in trust for that one only provided always that if any child of the said…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Crane v Crane

Details

AGLC: Crane v Crane [1949] HCA 52
Case: [1949] HCA 52
Decision Date: 22 November 1949

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia regarding the interpretation of a testator's will. The testator's residuary estate was left on trust for the education, maintenance, and support of the children of his brother, George Joseph Crane, during their minorities. Upon sons attaining 21 years or daughters attaining 21 years or marrying under that age, the corpus was to be held in trust for them absolutely, share and share alike. A child born of George Joseph Crane's second marriage, William Clement Crane, appealed a decision that excluded him from participating in the trust, arguing the class of beneficiaries should remain open.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the rule of convenience, which typically closes a class of beneficiaries upon the first member attaining the specified age or condition, was displaced by the provisions of the will. Specifically, the appellant argued that clauses relating to the application of income for maintenance and support, and a power for trustees to make advancements from vested or presumptive shares, indicated an intention for the class to remain open beyond the attainment of majority by the eldest child.

The High Court, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court, held that the rule of convenience applied and the class of beneficiaries was closed when the eldest child of George Joseph Crane attained the age of twenty-one years. The Court reasoned that the provisions for income application were for the "respective minorities" of the children and did not require the entire corpus to be retained. Furthermore, the advancement clause, referring to "vested or presumptive shares," was considered a standard provision that did not sufficiently demonstrate an intention to keep the class open indefinitely. The Court found that the primary intention of the will was for shares to vest absolutely upon the specified conditions being met, and that the rule of convenience was necessary to give effect to this intention without undue postponement of distribution.

The appeal was dismissed. The High Court ordered that the costs of the appeal for all parties be paid out of the testator's estate, with the trustees' costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client.

Orders