Chamberlin v Spry

Case [2008] VSC 562


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
AT MELBOURNE

COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION

No. 7430 of 2007

JOHN FRANCIS CHAMBERLIN and BARRY JAMES BENNETT (in their capacity as Trustees of the Estate of the late ROBERT HENRY SPRY) Plaintiffs
and
SUSAN SPRY (by STATE TRUSTEES LIMITED
(ABN 68 064 593 148) as Administrator of her Estate under section 43 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986)
Firstnamed
Defendant

and

MATTHEW WILLIAM SPRY Secondnamed
Defendant

and

CHRISTOPHER MARK ASHLEY SPRY TURNBULL
(by his Litigation Guardian MAX TURNBULL)

Thirdnamed
Defendant

and

JOHN FREDERICK HENRY
(as representative of the unborn children of SUSAN SPRY,
MATTHEW WILLIAM SPRY and CHRISTOPHER MARK
ASHLEY SPRY TURNBULL)

Fouthnamed
Defendant

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JUDGE:

PAGONE J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

19 November 2008

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

12 December 2008

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

John Francis Chamberlin and Barry James Bennet v Spry & Ors

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2008] VSC 562

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WILLS – Construction – Renunciation and release – Whether children’s interests accelerated – Whether class of beneficiaries is closed on renunciation.

TRUSTS – Trustees’ power to enter into Deed of Renunciation and Release – Validity of power – Power of Court to rule upon propriety of contemplated exercise of discretion – Form of order.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff Mr S McLeish, SC with
Mr T Scotter
Cornwall Stodart
For the Firstnamed Defendant Mr P Pascoe State Trustees Limited

For the Secondnamed
Defendant

Mr J O’Bryan

Holding Redlich

For the Thirdnamed
Defendant

Mr S Newton

Lawson Hughes Peter Walsh

For the Fourthnamed
Defendant

Mr R Boaden Tolhurst Druce Emmerson

---

HIS HONOUR:

  1. The plaintiffs bring this proceeding by originating motion seeking the Court’s advice and other orders pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005.  The first, and principal, issue raised in the proceeding concerns the provisions of clause 9 of the Will (“the Will”) of the late Robert Henry Spry (“the deceased”) who died on 11 August 1999.  The deceased had one daughter, the first defendant (“Susan Spry”), living at the time of his death.  The deceased had a son, Mark Spry, who predeceased his father leaving no children.  Susan Spry has two children being the second defendant (“Matthew Spry”) and the third defendant (“Christopher Spry Turnbull”).

  1. Susan Spry has been found to be unable to manage her affairs and the State Trustees Limited (“State Trustees”) has been appointed her guardian pursuant to s 43 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986.  She was born on 10 October 1949, Matthew Spry was born on 1 April 1983 (now aged 25) and Christopher Spry Turnbull was born on 3 August 1990 (now aged 18).  The parties agreed (and I will confirm that by formal order) that the fourth defendant should be appointed to represent the unborn children of Susan Spry as well as Matthew Spry and Christopher Spry Turnbull, and appeared at the hearing.  Each of the defendants was represented in the proceeding before me by separate counsel.

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Chamberlin v Spry [2008] VSC 562
Case
[2008] VSC 562
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Chamberlin v Spry concerns a dispute over the construction of a will and the interpretation of a trust deed. The deceased had left a will that included a trust, and the dispute centred on whether the renunciation and release by some of the beneficiaries accelerated the interests of the remaining beneficiaries and whether the class of beneficiaries was closed upon the renunciation. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central legal issues were whether the renunciation and release by certain beneficiaries resulted in the acceleration of interests of other beneficiaries and whether the class of beneficiaries was closed upon the renunciation. The court had to consider the validity of the trustees’ power to enter into the Deed of Renunciation and Release, and the extent of the court's power to rule on the propriety of the contemplated exercise of that discretion.

The court examined the language of the will and the trust deed to determine the intentions of the deceased. It was held that the renunciation and release did not result in the acceleration of interests of the remaining beneficiaries, and the class of beneficiaries remained open. The court found that the trustees had the power to enter into the Deed of Renunciation and Release, and the court had the power to review the exercise of that discretion. The court ruled that the form of order should be one that preserves the flexibility of the trust and allows for future adjustments based on the needs of the beneficiaries. The court's decision was based on a careful analysis of the language of the will and trust deed, and the intentions of the deceased. The outcome ensures that the trust operates in a manner consistent with the deceased's intentions, while also providing for the needs of the beneficiaries.

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Legal Principle Established

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