FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hadgkiss [2009] FCAFC 17
INDUSTRIAL LAW – findings of contraventions of Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – power of the Court to make orders under s 298U – whether orders made applied in respect of conduct in contravention of Part XA – whether s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is an additional source of power – primary judge made orders for union to destroy all Code of Conduct for Union Delegate forms in its custody, possession or control – orders made for union to publish advertisement correcting misrepresentations made by union delegates – penalties imposed
INDUSTRIAL LAW – mandatory injunctions – destruction orders – whether procedural fairness afforded to appellants – whether orders were too wide to be capable of compliance – whether injunction could be amended to clarify purpose – whether orders necessary to do justice between parties – whether mandatory injunctions protect any right or restrain any unlawful conduct – whether factual foundation for the grant of injunction existed
INDUSTRIAL LAW – publication orders – whether any utility in making orders – orders stayed until hearing of appeal – three years since orders made by primary judge – whether orders have any practical effect
INDUSTRIAL LAW – penalties imposed on union delegates – whether primary judge had failed to take account of third appellant’s history of non-contravention – whether primary judge had miscarried in exercise of discretion – whether issue of parity arises in relation to difference in penalties
Held: appeal allowed in part – destruction orders and publication orders set aside
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to cross-appeal – whether extension of time should be granted – no explanation of delay – whether cross-appeal incompetent – no direct challenge to orders of primary judge
Held: cross-appeal incompetent - leave to cross-appeal refused
Crimes Act1914 (Cth) s 4AA
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15, O 52 r 22
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 298SC, 298UAustralian Consolidated Press Limited v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483
Australian Corporation and Consumer Commission v Dynacast (Int) Pty Ltd (formerly Phoneflasher.com Pty Ltd) ACN 061 234 642 [2007] FCA 429
Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical Services Union v Greater Dandenong City Council (No. 2) [2001] FCA 1076
Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463
Dinsdale v R (2000) 202 CLR 321
Effort Shipping Company Ltd v Linden Management SA (the Giannis NK) [1998] 1 AC 605
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) [2007] FCA 87
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) [2007] FCA 425
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 5) [2008] FCA 1040
Hadgkiss v CFMEU [2008] FCAFC 22
Hiero Pty Ltd v Somers (1983) 68 FLR 171
Hoffman v Chief of Army (2004) 137 FCR 520
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Jackson v…
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- Case
- [2009] FCAFC 17
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In conclusion, the High Court found that the primary judge did not have the jurisdiction to issue the destruction orders under the specific sections of the Fair Work Act. The publication orders were upheld as they were within the permissible scope of the Act. The Court set aside the destruction orders and dismissed the cross-appeal by the CFMEU. The final orders of the Court included allowing the appeal by the first and second appellants, dismissing the appeals by the third and fourth appellants, and setting aside certain paragraphs of the primary judge's orders. Additionally, the Court refused leave to file the cross-appeal out of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The first and second appellants’ appeal be allowed.
2. The third appellant’s appeal be dismissed.
3. The fourth appellant’s appeal be dismissed.
4. Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the orders made by the primary judge on 26 March 2007 be set aside.
5. Leave to file a cross-appeal be refused.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NORTH, LANDER AND BUCHANAN JJ
In my view the cross-appeal, as proposed, was not competent. In any event I do not think that the delay in attempting to file it was satisfactorily explained. In the circumstances I would refuse leave to file the cross appeal out of time.The operation of s 298U I earlier set out the terms of s 298U. The primary judge indicated in the relief judgment (at [8] to [19]) that in his view the powers of the Court under s 23 of the FCA Act would be available, if necessary, in addition to the express powers under s 298U. Section 23 of the FCA Act provides:23 The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate. Although the primary judge identified s 23 of the FCA Act as a source of possible power for the orders he might make he appears to me, in the end, to have relied on s 298U for all the orders which he made. I propose therefore to deal first with the power granted by s 298U(e) and (f). Then it will be necessary to examine the availability and possible significance of the wider grant of power under s 23 of the FCA Act to make such orders as the Court thinks “appropriate”. Section 298U provides a direct grant of power for orders of the kind contemplated by paragraphs (a) to (f) where there has been “conduct in contravention” of Part XA. It might be noted that paragraph (a) contemplates, before a penalty is imposed, a finding that particular conduct has “contravened or is contravening” a relevant provision. Section 298U(a) proceeds therefore upon an acceptance that the conduct may have occurred in the past or may be continuing. The relevant conduct for the purpose of imposing penalties was identified in the findings stated by the primary judge in Order 1 made on 26 March 2007 in the following terms:(a)By making a representation on 19 January 2004 to each of Norm Philipp, Reinhard Philipp, Barry Sindel and Norman Philipp Jnr to the effect that in order to work on the Fairy Meadow site [a site in Woodhill Street, Fairy Meadow at which Lanskey Constructions Pty Limited (‘Lanskey’) was the head contractor] workers were obliged to join the first respondent and/or second respondent, the third respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’).(b)By making a representation on 18 February 2004 to Norm Philipp and Reinhard Philipp to the effect that in order to continue working on the Fairy Meadow site, or to work on the Wollongong site [a site at the corner of Bank and Harbour Streets, Wollongong at which Hansen Yuncken Pty Limited (‘Hansen Yuncken’) was the head contractor] or any other site in Wollongong, each of Norm Philipp and Reinhard Philipp was obliged to join the first respondent and/or the second respondent, the fourth respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (c)By making a representation on 18 February 2004 to Anthony Summers to the effect that in order to continue working on the Fairy Meadow site, or to work on the Wollongong site he was obliged to join the first respondent and/or the second respondent, the fourth respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (d)By the action of the third respondent referred to in (a) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (e)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (b) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.(f)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (c) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.(g)By the action of the third respondent referred to in (a) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (h)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (b) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (i)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (c) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.