Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hadgkiss

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hadgkiss [2009] FCAFC 17

INDUSTRIAL LAW – findings of contraventions of Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – power of the Court to make orders under s 298U – whether orders made applied in respect of conduct in contravention of Part XA – whether s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is an additional source of power – primary judge made orders for union to destroy all Code of Conduct for Union Delegate forms in its custody, possession or control – orders made for union to publish advertisement correcting misrepresentations made by union delegates – penalties imposed

INDUSTRIAL LAW – mandatory injunctions – destruction orders – whether procedural fairness afforded to appellants – whether orders were too wide to be capable of compliance – whether injunction could be amended to clarify purpose – whether orders necessary to do justice between parties – whether mandatory injunctions protect any right or restrain any unlawful conduct – whether factual foundation for the grant of injunction existed

INDUSTRIAL LAW – publication orders – whether any utility in making orders – orders stayed until hearing of appeal – three years since orders made by primary judge – whether orders have any practical effect

INDUSTRIAL LAW – penalties imposed on union delegates – whether primary judge had failed to take account of third appellant’s history of non-contravention – whether primary judge had miscarried in exercise of discretion – whether issue of parity arises in relation to difference in penalties

Held: appeal allowed in part – destruction orders and publication orders set aside

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – leave to cross-appeal – whether extension of time should be granted – no explanation of delay – whether cross-appeal incompetent – no direct challenge to orders of primary judge

Held: cross-appeal incompetent - leave to cross-appeal refused

Crimes Act1914 (Cth) s 4AA
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15, O 52 r 22
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 298SC, 298U

Australian Consolidated Press Limited v Morgan (1965) 112 CLR 483
Australian Corporation and Consumer Commission v Dynacast (Int) Pty Ltd (formerly Phoneflasher.com Pty Ltd) ACN 061 234 642 [2007] FCA 429
Australian Municipal Administrative Clerical Services Union v Greater Dandenong City Council (No. 2) [2001] FCA 1076
Davids Distribution Pty Ltd v National Union of Workers (1999) 91 FCR 463
Dinsdale v R (2000) 202 CLR 321
Effort Shipping Company Ltd v Linden Management SA (the Giannis NK) [1998] 1 AC 605
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) [2007] FCA 87
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 4) [2007] FCA 425
Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 5) [2008] FCA 1040
Hadgkiss v CFMEU [2008] FCAFC 22
Hiero Pty Ltd v Somers (1983) 68 FLR 171
Hoffman v Chief of Army (2004) 137 FCR 520
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Jackson v…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 17
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Hadgkiss involved the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and several individuals, including Hadgkiss, contesting the legality of certain orders made by a primary judge under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). The primary dispute was over whether the orders, which included destruction and publication orders, were within the jurisdiction of the court and whether they were procedurally fair. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia. The central legal issues were whether the primary judge had the authority to issue the destruction and publication orders under sections 23 and 298U of the Fair Work Act and whether the orders were procedurally fair. The court had to determine whether the orders were appropriate remedies for the conduct found to be in contravention of the Act. The court examined the language and scope of the statutory provisions to ascertain the extent of the judge's power. The Court concluded that the primary judge had the authority to make the publication orders under section 298U(c) of the Act as they were aimed at remedying the effects of the respondents' conduct. However, the destruction orders were beyond the scope of section 298U(e) and (f) because they were not directly related to stopping the proscribed conduct under section 298SC(c). As for procedural fairness, the Court found that although the destruction orders were not identical to those sought by the respondent, the primary judge had considered the evidence and concerns about the Code of Conduct form, which was central to the case. The Court deemed the cross-appeal by the CFMEU as incompetent and refused leave to file it out of time.

In conclusion, the High Court found that the primary judge did not have the jurisdiction to issue the destruction orders under the specific sections of the Fair Work Act. The publication orders were upheld as they were within the permissible scope of the Act. The Court set aside the destruction orders and dismissed the cross-appeal by the CFMEU. The final orders of the Court included allowing the appeal by the first and second appellants, dismissing the appeals by the third and fourth appellants, and setting aside certain paragraphs of the primary judge's orders. Additionally, the Court refused leave to file the cross-appeal out of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and second appellants’ appeal be allowed.

2. The third appellant’s appeal be dismissed.

3. The fourth appellant’s appeal be dismissed.

4. Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the orders made by the primary judge on 26 March 2007 be set aside.

5. Leave to file a cross-appeal be refused.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH, LANDER AND BUCHANAN JJ
The Court should therefore proceed upon the basis that the primary judge had jurisdiction to make the destruction orders under s 23 of the FCA Act.CONCLUSION ON POWER Section 298U(c) authorised the primary judge to make the publication orders because the effect of those orders might be to remedy the effects of the appellants’ conduct. Section 298U(e) and (f) did not empower the primary judge to make the destruction orders because the orders which were made were not directed to stopping the conduct which was proscribed by s 298SC(c), which is conduct involving false or misleading representations about another person’s obligation to join an industrial association. Section 23 of the FCA Act would empower the making of the destruction orders of the kind in paragraphs 11 and 12 if those orders were necessary to do justice.PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS Before dealing with the question whether the destruction orders or the publication orders should have been made under either s 23 of the FCA Act or s 298U of the WR Act, the question of denial of procedural fairness which was raised by the appellants should be addressed. It may be accepted that the destruction orders made by the primary judge were not in exactly the terms sought by the respondent at trial. However, it is clear that at trial the primary judge let it be known that he was concerned about the existence of the Code of Conduct form. That, in fact, was the very reason why the appellants provided evidence to the effect that an administrative decision had been made to discard the Code of Conduct form which had been in existence at the time when the contravention occurred and to substitute the new form. The new form substituted the word “encourage” for the word “ensure”. When the destruction orders are compared to the orders which were contended for by the respondent, it can be seen that the issue before the primary judge was whether there ought to be an order of the kind that prevented the first and second appellants from retaining within their Code of Conduct forms a direction that a delegate ensure that workers on a building or construction site be members of the first and/or second appellant. In a sense, the orders made by the primary judge are narrower than those contended for in that the destruction orders only refer to the “CFMEU Code of Conduct for Union Delegates” form, whereas the respondent contended for “any Code of Conduct or other instruction”. However, the first and second appellants contended that the destruction orders would have the effect that the first and second appellants must destroy not only all unused CFMEU Code of Conduct for Union Delegates forms but, indeed, all forms which had been completed by a delegate in the past which were in the custody, possession or control of the first or second appellant. I think that is the construction which the destruction orders require, although I do not think it was the intention of his Honour to make orders of such breadth. I think if the destruction orders are construed that way, then they are wider than those contended for by the respondent at trial because the respondents only contended for orders in relation to any Code of Conduct or other instruction “to be given to a delegate” which would exclude forms which had previously been given to a delegate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH, LANDER AND BUCHANAN JJ

In my view the cross-appeal, as proposed, was not competent. In any event I do not think that the delay in attempting to file it was satisfactorily explained. In the circumstances I would refuse leave to file the cross appeal out of time.The operation of s 298U I earlier set out the terms of s 298U. The primary judge indicated in the relief judgment (at [8] to [19]) that in his view the powers of the Court under s 23 of the FCA Act would be available, if necessary, in addition to the express powers under s 298U. Section 23 of the FCA Act provides:23 The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate. Although the primary judge identified s 23 of the FCA Act as a source of possible power for the orders he might make he appears to me, in the end, to have relied on s 298U for all the orders which he made. I propose therefore to deal first with the power granted by s 298U(e) and (f). Then it will be necessary to examine the availability and possible significance of the wider grant of power under s 23 of the FCA Act to make such orders as the Court thinks “appropriate”. Section 298U provides a direct grant of power for orders of the kind contemplated by paragraphs (a) to (f) where there has been “conduct in contravention” of Part XA. It might be noted that paragraph (a) contemplates, before a penalty is imposed, a finding that particular conduct has “contravened or is contravening” a relevant provision. Section 298U(a) proceeds therefore upon an acceptance that the conduct may have occurred in the past or may be continuing. The relevant conduct for the purpose of imposing penalties was identified in the findings stated by the primary judge in Order 1 made on 26 March 2007 in the following terms:(a)By making a representation on 19 January 2004 to each of Norm Philipp, Reinhard Philipp, Barry Sindel and Norman Philipp Jnr to the effect that in order to work on the Fairy Meadow site [a site in Woodhill Street, Fairy Meadow at which Lanskey Constructions Pty Limited (‘Lanskey’) was the head contractor] workers were obliged to join the first respondent and/or second respondent, the third respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’).(b)By making a representation on 18 February 2004 to Norm Philipp and Reinhard Philipp to the effect that in order to continue working on the Fairy Meadow site, or to work on the Wollongong site [a site at the corner of Bank and Harbour Streets, Wollongong at which Hansen Yuncken Pty Limited (‘Hansen Yuncken’) was the head contractor] or any other site in Wollongong, each of Norm Philipp and Reinhard Philipp was obliged to join the first respondent and/or the second respondent, the fourth respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (c)By making a representation on 18 February 2004 to Anthony Summers to the effect that in order to continue working on the Fairy Meadow site, or to work on the Wollongong site he was obliged to join the first respondent and/or the second respondent, the fourth respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (d)By the action of the third respondent referred to in (a) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (e)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (b) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.(f)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (c) above, the first respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.(g)By the action of the third respondent referred to in (a) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (h)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (b) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act. (i)By the action of the fourth respondent referred to in (c) above, the second respondent contravened s 298SC(c) of the Act.