Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v CE Marshall and Sons Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v CE Marshall & Sons Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 169

WORKPLACE RELATIONS – Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) Part 16 – whether employees dismissed from employment for a prohibited reason, specifically membership of and/or activities as members of industrial association – whether actually members of the relevant industrial association at the time - onus of proof – standard of proof – reasons of the decision-maker for termination of the employment of the employees – whether decision maker was aware of the employees’ involvement with the industrial association.

Held: The application be dismissed. The Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that employees were not dismissed by the respondent for prohibited reasons in the meaning of s 793(1)(a) and (o) of the Act. No finding made as to employees’ union membership status.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 729, 792(1), 793(1), 807, 809(1)

Anderson v Edith Cowan University [1999] FCA 1802 cited
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 applied
Hamberger v CFMEU (2000) 104 IR 45 cited
Heidt v Chrysler Australia Ltd (1976) 26 FLR 257 cited
Maritime Union of Australia and Geraldton Port Authority (1999) 93 FCR 34 applied
Seymour v Saint-Gabain Abrasives Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1452 applied
The Employment Advocate v National Union of Workers (2000) 100 FCR 454 cited

CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY, MINING & ENERGY UNION v CE MARSHALL & SONS PTY LTD (ACN 079 852 494)
QUD214 OF 2006

COLLIER J
22 FEBRUARY 2007
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD214 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY, MINING & ENERGY UNION
Applicant

AND:

CE MARSHALL & SONS PTY LTD (ACN 079 852 494)
Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 FEBRUARY 2007

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD214 OF 2006

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION FORESTRY, MINING & ENERGY UNION
Applicant

AND:

CE MARSHALL & SONS PTY LTD (ACN 079 852 494)
Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE:

22 FEBRUARY 2007

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application pursuant to Pt 16 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”) brought by the Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (“CFMEU”) (“the applicant”) on behalf of two individuals, Mr James McIlroy and Ms Anita St Henry, to whom I shall refer collectively as “the employees” where appropriate. Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were employed by CE Marshall & Sons Pty Ltd (“the respondent”) at Blackwater Mine during the period 15 February 2006 to 10 May 2006. Their employment was terminated on 10 May 2006. The applicant asserts that the respondent dismissed the employees for a prohibited reason, namely because they were members of an industrial association and/or because as members of an industrial association they did an act for the purposes of furthering or protecting the…

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Details
Case
[2007] FCA 169
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v CE Marshall and Sons Pty Ltd was heard before the court where the primary issue was whether the termination of employment of two employees, Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, was unlawful under the relevant sections of the Act. The employees, previously employed by CE Marshall and Sons, were re-hired on probation but their employment was terminated at the end of the probationary period. The union alleged that the termination was due to the employees' union activities, which was denied by the company. The court had to determine whether the termination was genuinely for reasons other than the union activities, as well as whether the employees were union members at the relevant time.

The legal issues before the court were twofold: firstly, whether the termination of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry's employment was genuinely for reasons other than their union membership or activities; and secondly, if necessary, whether the employees were members of the union at the relevant time. The court found that the decision to terminate the employees was made by Ms Melody Burey, the project manager, who considered the employees to be potentially troublesome due to their previous employment history and recent conduct. Ms Burey was not aware of the employees' union membership or activities and had no objection to union meetings. The court concluded that the termination was not influenced by the employees' union activities or membership.

The court's reasoning led to the conclusion that the termination was based on the employees' conduct and history, not their union activities. The evidence supported that Ms Burey's decision was made independently of any union-related factors. The court dismissed the union's application, finding no evidence that the termination was related to the employees' union membership or activities.

The final order of the court was to dismiss the application brought by the Construction Forestry, Mining and Energy Union.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Clearly, if the reasons for termination of the employees’ employment were not prohibited by the relevant sections of Act claimed by the applicant, the claim of the applicant would not succeed, irrespective whether the employees were members of the applicant at the relevant time. For this reason, and in view of the manner in which the trial was conducted, I propose to deal first with the issues concerning termination of employment, and then deal, if necessary, with the issue whether the employees were members of the applicant at the relevant time.Background facts There is considerable common ground between the parties as to the background facts. The respondent company specialises in earthmoving, overburden removal, mud removal, dozer stripping, rehabilitation and topsoil works. Mr McIlroy performed the duties of plant operator. Ms St Henry performed duties as a truck driver; she is also qualified as a “Trainer Assessor” and trained new employees in this capacity. Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry lived together, and were at various times described by other witnesses as married or engaged to be married. It is clear that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were regarded as “a couple” by other employees, including management, of the respondent. Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry had previously been employed by the respondent on or about 15 February 2005. I understand that there had been allegations by Ms St Henry of workplace bullying and sexual harassment by another employee of the respondent at that time. A number of witnesses also deposed that there had been rivalry between Mr McIlroy and that same employee at that time (affidavit of David McDonald sworn 19 October 2006) which resulted in shouting matches between them (affidavit of John Date sworn 19 October 2006). At that time, Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry had remained in employment with the respondent until 17 June 2005 (in the case of Mr McIlroy) and 8 July 2005 (in the case of Ms St Henry). Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were re-employed by the respondent at Blackwater Mine during the period 15 February 2006 to 10 May 2006. They were re-employed following discussions with Mr Bradley Marshall, who was at all relevant times the managing director of the respondent. Usually decisions concerning employment of staff of the respondent are made by Ms Melody Burey, the project manager of the respondent. I understand however that Ms Burey was on leave at the time that the employees were re-employed. The employees each deposed that, whilst being offered employment by Mr Bradley Marshall, they were told that they were not to “cause any trouble” for 12 months. It is common ground that their employment was terminated on 10 May 2006 during separate meetings held with Ms Burey. At those separate meetings with each of the employees, Ms Burey handed Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry letters in identical terms terminating their employment. The letters were addressed to each of the employees and signed by Ms Burey, and in the following terms:As you are aware, CE Marshall and Sons recently offered you employment on the basis of a three month probationary period, commencing on 15 February 2006.Unfortunately, CE Marshall and Sons shall not be seeking to extend this offer and shall terminate your employment on the Monday, 15 May 2006, as explained to you by myself and Production Superintendent, Pete Beddows.I would like to thankyou for your efforts during your time with CE Marshall and Sons and wish you well in your future employment endeavours.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In particular:· the decision to terminate the employees at the end of their probation period was made on 4 May 2006 by Ms Burey, with some contribution by Mr Marshall following a discussion between Ms Burey, Mr Marshall and Mr Peter Beddow, the respondent’s Production Superintendent· Ms Burey was influenced in her decision by information provided to her on 4 May 2006 by Mr Beddow as to the incidents involving the employees on 1 and 2 May 2006· Ms Burey discussed the incidents involving the employees with Mr Lilly, and read the employee case notes concerning the matters on the files of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry· Ms Burey was influenced predominately by the fact that both employees were still within their three months probation period and it was in her view permissible to terminate their employment at the end of that period without explanation to them· Ms Burey was unaware of the union status of the employees or their activities in relation to the union prior to or at the time of termination of their employment.Evidence as to reasons for termination As I indicated at the commencement of this judgment, a considerable amount of evidence was lead in relation to the reasons for termination of the employees. Most of this evidence was produced by witnesses for the respondent.Witnesses for the respondentMs Melody Burey The evidence of Ms Melody Burey is of most significance to the issue of the reasons for termination. As I have already stated, Ms Burey is the project manager for the respondent, and in this capacity she is responsible for employment-related issues including hiring employees and terminating their employment. That she was the individual responsible for the decision to terminate Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry is clear from her evidence, as well as the evidence of Mr Bradley Marshall and Mr Peter Beddow. This fact was accepted by Mr Hinson SC of Counsel for the applicant in written submissions, and in oral submissions (TS 9 Feb 2006 p 185 ll 1-7). Ms Burey deposes that she reached the decision to terminate the employment of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry on 4 May 2006. She made this decision after checking the date of expiration of their probationary period (a date she understood to be 15 May 2006), speaking with Mr Marshall, Mr Beddow and Mr Lilly concerning matters including the incidents on 1 and 2 May 2006, and reading the employees’ personnel files. Ms Burey deposes that as at 4 May 2006 she did not know whether Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were members of any union. She further deposes that it was not until after reading their affidavits in these proceedings that she became aware that they were members of the applicant. Ms Burey deposes that she was aware that on around 9 May 2006 there was going to be a union meeting to discuss the new WorkChoices Laws. She deposes that “I thought it was a good idea for people to have information about the new laws”. Ms Burey deposes that she was told on or about 10 May 2006 that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, and other employees of CE Marshall & Sons attended the meeting. However, Ms Burey deposes that “Jim and Anita’s attendance at the union meeting on 9 May 2006 had nothing to do with my decision to terminate their employment. I respect people’s rights to be union members if they wish. The reasons that their employment was terminated are those that I have set out above”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

COLLIER J
The reasons I form this view are as follows:1. It was common ground between the parties that the decision-maker in the respondent in terminating the employment of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry was Ms Burey. She had the role of, and responsibility for, hiring and firing staff. In making her decision she consulted Mr Marshall and Mr Beddow, but the primary decision was hers.2. With respect to Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, from the evidence both in affidavit form and emerging in cross-examination, I am of the view that the reason that their employment was terminated was because Ms Burey took the view that they were “trouble” in the context of the performance of their duties on the site and in view of their history of employment with the respondent, and it was preferable to terminate the employment of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry before the expiration of the probation period. I make this finding with no comment as to the fairness or otherwise to either Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry of the approach taken by Ms Burey or the respondent in so terminating their employment. In particular:·From the evidence of Mr Marshall, Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry it appears that, when the respondent re-hired the employees in February 2006, the events of 2005 when the employees had previously been in the employ of the respondent influenced the approach of Mr Marshall to re-hiring Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry. It was common ground that the tenor of Mr Marshall’s comments to Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry on re-hiring them was that the respondent required the employees not to cause trouble on the worksite during the next 12 months. In my view the clear inference could be drawn that, from the perspective of the respondent and its decision-makers (in this case, Mr Marshall), Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were potentially troublesome employees.·It is clear from the evidence of Ms Burey that she considered Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry to be a “package” so far as their employment relationship with the respondent was concerned (TS 9 Feb 2007 p 92 ll 41-43). I note that the evidence indicates that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry had previously left the employment of the respondent at a similar time; they were re-hired together by Mr Marshall; they both worked in D crew; it was well-known that they were partners; and that it was, for example, appropriate for Mr McIlroy to take time off work to drive Ms St Henry home after her suspension. It was also clear from Ms Burey’s evidence, that it was natural for her to either retain them as employees together, or to terminate both employees at the same time, rather than to differentiate between them.·In my view the clear inference can be drawn that, although the conduct of Ms St Henry in backing the truck over a 750 mm rock was the subject of a suspension, it was the reaction of Mr McIlroy to the suspension which was the key factor in Ms Burey’s decision that the employment of Mr McIlroy (and consequentially, of Ms St Henry), should be terminated. I note in particular evidence of Mr Lilly in relation to his view of Mr McIlroy’s treatment of the truck and his subsequent verbal exchange with Mr McIlroy, and evidence of Mr Date as to his verbal exchange with Mr McIlroy. I note that Mr Lilly prepared a case note referring to the incident involving Mr McIlroy and the truck, which Ms Burey deposed that she had read. Further, although no direct evidence was given on this point, it was clear during the course of the hearing that the actions of individual staff members of the respondent were the subject of interest and conversation by other staff members. In this case it is clear that following the incidents of 1 and 2 May 2006, Mr Date had spoken to Mr Beddow concerning Mr Date’s conversation with Mr McIlroy, and Mr Beddow subsequently spoke to Ms Burey and Mr Marshall on 4 May 2006. It appears that Ms Burey had therefore been informed of the incidents of 1 and 2 May 2006 concerning Ms St Henry and Mr McIlroy.·Ms Burey discussed the termination of the employees with Mr Beddow and also Mr Marshall who had originally hired them. It was clear from the evidence that Mr Beddow and Mr Marshall knew the employees, and had been aware of their previous experiences of employment with the respondent during 2005.3. I am also satisfied that Ms Burey had made up her mind on 4 May 2006 to terminate the employment of the employees. I find that Ms Burey was a credible witness. Her version of her decision-making process and the reasons for it are consistent with:·The evidence of Mr Marshall and Mr Beddow as to their conversations with Ms Burey, and her awareness that the probation period for the employees had almost expired.·Her evidence that she thought it fair to allow the employees to complete their next shift, which finished on 10 May 2006, and then to terminate them as still permitted by the certified agreement within the probation period.·The contents of her letters of termination, which she said she had prepared on 4 May 2006, and which referred to the discussions with her and “Pete Beddow”. It is common ground that Mr Beddow was not present at the meeting between Ms Burey and the employees. However, as I noted earlier in this judgment, Mr Beddow during cross-examination gave evidence that it would have been usual for him to have been present at such a meeting, because he was better acquainted with site staff of the respondent, including Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, than Ms Burey was. The letters of termination referring to the presence of Mr Beddow are consistent with Ms Burey’s evidence that she had prepared the letters several days prior to the meetings with Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, in the expectation that Mr Beddow would be present at those meetings.4. Assuming for the moment, without considering the issue, that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry were members of the applicant, I am satisfied that neither their membership of the applicant as an industrial organisation, nor any action performed by Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry for the purposes of furthering or protecting the industrial interests of the applicant (including any actions concerning meetings called by the applicant), were in any way reasons operative to the termination of their employment. The evidence is clear that any union membership or activities of Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry were simply not issues in relation to the termination of their employment in the mind of Ms Burey as the decision-maker. In making this finding I note:·Ms Burey gave evidence that she was not aware of whether Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry were members of the applicant, or of any of their activities concerning the applicant. I also note Ms Burey’s evidence that she had no objection to a presentation concerning the new Workplace Relations laws. As I indicated earlier, I find Ms Burey a credible witness.·Evidence given by Mr Lilly and Mr Leeson is, at best, of peripheral relevance. With respect, this evidence is in the nature of workplace gossip and of little weight in the context of this claim. I note Mr Lilly’s evidence that he had no knowledge of any involvement by Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry in organising or participating in the union meeting, and accordingly it was unlikely that he would have asked Mr Leeson a question whether invitations had been distributed by Mr McIlroy or Ms St Henry. However even if the version of the conversation deposed to by Mr Leeson is accurate, in my view it is more likely that Mr Lilly was far more concerned that he had personally been the subject of criticism at the meeting. Further, I note that Mr Lilly was not a decision-maker in the respondent concerning the termination of the employment of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry. I also note, and accept, Mr Lilly’s evidence that he was unaware that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry had ceased working for the respondent until he came to work on 11 May 2006.·There is clear inconsistency in the evidence of Mr Irwin and Mr Lalor as to their conversation, in particular where Mr Lalor deposed that Mr Irwin had said that the employees’ employment had been terminated “because of the Union meeting” and “because they handed out invitations to the meeting and they were also causing trouble at the hardstand”. Mr Irwin denied that he had attributed the termination of employment of the employees to their union activities, and deposed that he was unaware that the employees had ceased employment with the respondent until informed by Mr Lalor. In my view, with respect, this evidence is in the nature of workplace gossip and speculation, and is of little weight in the context of this claim. Even if Mr Lalor’s version of the conversation is accurate, in my view it is more likely that Mr Irwin was simply speculating as to the reasons for termination of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry, from a position of ignorance. It is clear that Mr Irwin was not in any sense a decision-maker in this case, nor is there any evidence that he was privy to the processes by which the decision to terminate the employment of Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry was made. I accept Mr Irwin’s evidence that he was unaware that Mr McIlroy and Ms St Henry had been terminated until he was so informed by Mr Lalor. This is consistent with the evidence of Mr McDonald and Mr Lilly, both of whom also deposed that they were unaware of the termination of the employment of the employees until after the event. Finally, it is also consistent with the fact that the Ms Burey was the decision-maker, and that, with the possible exceptions of Mr Marshall and Mr Beddow she had not communicated her decision to anyone other than the employees prior to 10 May 2006.Conclusion

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COLLIER J

Full text does not contain this section.