Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2018] FCAFC 4

Appeal from: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 550
File number: VID 605 of 2017
Judges: KENNY, TRACEY AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 30 January 2018
Catchwords:

EVIDENCE – privilege against self-exposure to penalties – application for leave to appeal and appeal from orders of primary judge refusing the grant of a certificate to a party witness under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where party witness had declined to answer questions put to him in chief by his own counsel – meaning of “objects to the giving of particular evidence” in s 128(1) – whether primary judge erred in finding that s 128(1) was not engaged because the witness was not compellable to give the evidence objected to – whether Song v Ying [2010] NSWCA 237; 79 NSWLR 442 was plainly wrong

Held: application for leave to appeal granted – Song v Ying was correctly decided – second appellant was not entitled to a certificate under s 128 – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340(1), 343(1), 346, 348, 361, 546

Cases cited:

Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485

CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2009] HCA 47; 239 CLR 390

Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12; 231 CLR 260

FarahConstructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89

Ferrall v Blyton [2000] FamCA 1442; 27 Fam LR 178

Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196

R v Director of Serious Fraud Office; Ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1

Song v Ying [2010] NSWCA 237; 79 NSWLR 442

Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281

Ying v Song [2009] NSWSC 1344

Date of hearing: 16 November 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Applicants: Ms S Kelly
Solicitor for the Applicants: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Follett
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 605 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

First Applicant

DREW MACDONALD

Second Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER

Respondent

JUDGES:

KENNY, TRACEY AND BROMWICH  JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 JANUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal be granted in respect of proposed grounds of appeal 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017.

2.Grounds 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017 be treated as a notice of appeal. 

3.The appeal be dismissed.

4.There be no order as to costs.

Note:   Entry of orders…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 4
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner, the applicants sought to appeal a decision of the primary judge that refused to grant a certificate to a party witness under section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The primary judge had ruled that the witness was not compellable to give the evidence objected to, and therefore, section 128 was not engaged. The applicants argued that the primary judge erred in finding that section 128(1) was not engaged because the witness was not compellable to give the evidence objected to, and that Song v Ying [2010] NSWCA 237; 79 NSWLR 442 was plainly wrong. The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in his construction of the defined term "objects" in section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and whether the primary judge erred in his conclusion that the second applicant was not a witness who "objects" within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).

The court held that the argument that Song was wrongly decided could not be sustained, and that the decision was plainly correct and should be followed. The court found that there was no error in the primary judge's decision. The appeal was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The court found that the appellants faced significant obstacles to success, and that the persuasive weight of the legislative history and case law supported the primary judge's decision. The court held that the appellants' construction of section 128 was incorrect, and that the provision required consideration of whether the witness was otherwise compellable to give the evidence objected to. The court also held that the primary judge's construction of the defined term "objects" was correct, and that the word "objects" did require that the witness be compellable to give the evidence objected to. The court found that the second applicant was not a witness who "objects" within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and that the primary judge's conclusion was correct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal be granted in respect of proposed grounds of appeal 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017.

2. Grounds 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017 be treated as a notice of appeal.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr MacDonald’s submissions in support of his application for a s 128 certificate were largely responsive to the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Song, insofar as it was found in that decision that, in the case of a party witness giving evidence in chief, s 128 requires consideration of “whether the witness was otherwise compellable to give the evidence objected to” (at [22]). Relevantly, Hodgson JA, writing for the Court of Appeal in Song, had also observed at [24] that “there would rarely if ever be a question that the evidence in chief is given under compulsion or because of liability to compulsion” (emphasis added). Mr MacDonald contended that his case represented one of the rare exceptions to the proposition in Song that the giving of evidence in chief by a party witness will not involve an element of compulsion. This was argued on the basis that he was essentially compelled to give evidence of his intent or the reasons for his impugned conduct by operation of the reverse onus provision in s 361(1). The primary judge rejected this argument, doing so on the basis that the nature of the compellability asserted by Mr MacDonald had been rejected in Song. In that regard, it was observed by his Honour that Hodgson JA in Song had drawn a distinction between the compellability of a witness to answer questions at the instance of a party who had called the witness, or at the instance of a judge, and the motivation of a defendant to give evidence to avoid having a judgment entered against him or her. The latter was characterised as not amounting to relevant compellability. The primary judge, despite expressing some reservations, could not conclude that Song was plainly wrong.Mr MacDonald’s application for a s 128 certificate was therefore refused.Section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Section 128 of the Evidence Act obliges the Court to give a witness a certificate under that provision if certain requirements are met. The substantive effect of such a certificate is that the evidence given by the witness in respect of which the certificate has been granted, and any evidence obtained as a direct or indirect consequence, may not be used against that person in any proceeding in an Australian court: s 128(7). The provision is relevantly engaged if a witness objects to giving particular evidence on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence arising under Australian law or a law of a foreign country, or is liable to a civil penalty: s 128(1). If the section is engaged, the Court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the witness’ objection: s 128(2). If satisfied of those grounds, the Court must inform the witness that:(1)they need not give evidence unless required; and(2)the Court will give the witness a certificate if the witness willingly gives the evidence, or if the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so by the Court. Because of the issues of interpretation involved, it is necessary to set out s 128 of the Evidence Act in full, noting that the current version differs in certain respects from the version in force when Song and a number of other cases were decided:128 Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings (1)This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a)has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2)The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3)Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness: (a)that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if: (i)the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii)the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. (4)The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that: (a)the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5)If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6)The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if: (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b)after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection. (7) In any proceeding in an Australian court: (a)evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b)evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence; cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence. (8)Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9)If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (10)In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (11)A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (12)If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by the person in a proceeding in a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. (13)The following are prescribed State or Territory provisions for the purposes of subsection (12): (a) section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales; (b)a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of subsection (12). (14) Subsection (12) applies to: (a)a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4; and (b)a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth, other than a proceeding referred to in paragraph (a). Note 1: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege: see section 187. Note 2: Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. Note 4:Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007).The history of s 128

Decision

Reasons for decision

The argument that Song was wrongly decided cannot be sustained. To the contrary, that decision was plainly correct and should be followed. Accordingly, there was no error in the primary judge’s decision.Conclusion The appeal must be dismissed. It was common ground that there should not be any orders as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellants did not press ground 4 in their notice of appeal. The remaining grounds of appeal (following the grant of leave) were as follows:1.The primary judge erred in his construction of the defined term “objects” in section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) because, on its proper construction, the term “objects” imports a subjective test that means only that a witness objects as a matter of fact.2.The primary judge erred in his construction of the defined term “objects” in section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) because, on its proper construction, the word “objects” does not require that the witness be otherwise compellable to give the evidence objected to.3.By reason of the matters in 1 and/or 2 above, the primary judge erred in concluding that the second applicant was not a witness who “objects” within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).Consideration of the competing submissions Given the persuasive weight of the legislative history and case law considered above, the appellants faced significant obstacles to success. In that regard, credit should be given to counsel for the appellants for her advocacy in advancing her clients’ position. Counsel for the appellants relied upon textual and historical analysis to support the contention that Song was wrongly decided. It was submitted that, on its proper construction, the term “objects” in s 128 requires only a formal objection by a witness, without any requirement that the witness be compellable to give the evidence objected to. In support of this construction, it was submitted in writing that:(1)by reason of its definition in cl 7 of Part 2 of the Dictionary to the Evidence Act, the word “witness” in s 128 applies to all witnesses without distinction;(2)the syntax of s 128(1) requires that the word “objects” and the words “on the ground that” be read together as forming a compendious phrase, linking the objection to the purpose of the objection – so read, the phrase simply conveys that the witness has elected to invoke the privilege; (3)what is referred to in s 128 is an objection to giving particular evidence on a particular matter, rather than an objection to answering questions – the objection is the same whether the question arises viva voce in chief or in cross-examination, or in respect of affidavit evidence;(4)contextually, s 128 needs to be construed consistently with the operation of the common law, recalling that in civil proceedings, a party witness who objected remained silent and a court was thereby deprived of the evidence the witness could give;(5)the construction of s 128 urged by the appellants made consistent sense of the word “require”, referring to circumstances in which a party witness might not subjectively wish to give the evidence and gives an explanation for that decision, but the Court nonetheless compels the witness to do so; (6)the Court should favour a construction that best serves the purpose of the provision – in this regard, it was submitted that the paramount consideration is the Court’s interest in receiving the evidence of all witnesses, including those who subjectively do not wish to give the evidence in chief on the relevant grounds; such a construction was said to reflect the evolution of the law of evidence considered by the High Court in Cornwell;(7)the ALRC was concerned with maintaining a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the privilege against self-incrimination as it had evolved at common law and in statute, with the focus shifting towards making more evidence available than was possible with the privilege remaining intact;(8)the rejection by the legislature of the ALRC’s optional certificate model meant that primacy was given to the interests of justice by enabling a court to require the witness to give the relevant evidence – those interests would not be advanced if the Court were to be deprived of evidence merely because the questions adducing that evidence were asked by the witness’ own representative;(9)regard should be had to changes made to s 128 following subsequent review by the ALRC and the dispensing with the distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and penalty privilege; (10)the deliberation on enactment of the section did not distinguish, save as to what became the current s 128(10), between party-witnesses and non-party witnesses; and(11)upholding Song would produce absurd results, such as a court being deprived of relevant evidence – it was suggested, by way of example, that Mr MacDonald could circumvent the restrictions on s 128 by being called by another party in the same interest, or by the Commissioner, by whom he was also compellable.