FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Building and Construction Commissioner [2018] FCAFC 4
Appeal from: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 550 File number: VID 605 of 2017 Judges: KENNY, TRACEY AND BROMWICH JJ Date of judgment: 30 January 2018 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – privilege against self-exposure to penalties – application for leave to appeal and appeal from orders of primary judge refusing the grant of a certificate to a party witness under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – where party witness had declined to answer questions put to him in chief by his own counsel – meaning of “objects to the giving of particular evidence” in s 128(1) – whether primary judge erred in finding that s 128(1) was not engaged because the witness was not compellable to give the evidence objected to – whether Song v Ying [2010] NSWCA 237; 79 NSWLR 442 was plainly wrong
Held: application for leave to appeal granted – Song v Ying was correctly decided – second appellant was not entitled to a certificate under s 128 – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340(1), 343(1), 346, 348, 361, 546
Cases cited: Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485
CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2009] HCA 47; 239 CLR 390
Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12; 231 CLR 260
FarahConstructions Pty Limited v Say-Dee Pty Limited [2007] HCA 22; 230 CLR 89
Ferrall v Blyton [2000] FamCA 1442; 27 Fam LR 178
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; 251 CLR 196
R v Director of Serious Fraud Office; Ex parte Smith [1993] AC 1
Song v Ying [2010] NSWCA 237; 79 NSWLR 442
Date of hearing: 16 November 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Applicants: Ms S Kelly Solicitor for the Applicants: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Follett Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 605 of 2017 BETWEEN: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Applicant
DREW MACDONALD
Second Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
JUDGES:
KENNY, TRACEY AND BROMWICH JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JANUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal be granted in respect of proposed grounds of appeal 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017.
2.Grounds 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017 be treated as a notice of appeal.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 4
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the argument that Song was wrongly decided could not be sustained, and that the decision was plainly correct and should be followed. The court found that there was no error in the primary judge's decision. The appeal was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The court found that the appellants faced significant obstacles to success, and that the persuasive weight of the legislative history and case law supported the primary judge's decision. The court held that the appellants' construction of section 128 was incorrect, and that the provision required consideration of whether the witness was otherwise compellable to give the evidence objected to. The court also held that the primary judge's construction of the defined term "objects" was correct, and that the word "objects" did require that the witness be compellable to give the evidence objected to. The court found that the second applicant was not a witness who "objects" within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), and that the primary judge's conclusion was correct.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal be granted in respect of proposed grounds of appeal 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017.
2. Grounds 1 to 3 in the draft notice of appeal filed on 5 June 2017 be treated as a notice of appeal.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellants did not press ground 4 in their notice of appeal. The remaining grounds of appeal (following the grant of leave) were as follows:1.The primary judge erred in his construction of the defined term “objects” in section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) because, on its proper construction, the term “objects” imports a subjective test that means only that a witness objects as a matter of fact.2.The primary judge erred in his construction of the defined term “objects” in section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) because, on its proper construction, the word “objects” does not require that the witness be otherwise compellable to give the evidence objected to.3.By reason of the matters in 1 and/or 2 above, the primary judge erred in concluding that the second applicant was not a witness who “objects” within the meaning of s 128(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).Consideration of the competing submissions Given the persuasive weight of the legislative history and case law considered above, the appellants faced significant obstacles to success. In that regard, credit should be given to counsel for the appellants for her advocacy in advancing her clients’ position. Counsel for the appellants relied upon textual and historical analysis to support the contention that Song was wrongly decided. It was submitted that, on its proper construction, the term “objects” in s 128 requires only a formal objection by a witness, without any requirement that the witness be compellable to give the evidence objected to. In support of this construction, it was submitted in writing that:(1)by reason of its definition in cl 7 of Part 2 of the Dictionary to the Evidence Act, the word “witness” in s 128 applies to all witnesses without distinction;(2)the syntax of s 128(1) requires that the word “objects” and the words “on the ground that” be read together as forming a compendious phrase, linking the objection to the purpose of the objection – so read, the phrase simply conveys that the witness has elected to invoke the privilege; (3)what is referred to in s 128 is an objection to giving particular evidence on a particular matter, rather than an objection to answering questions – the objection is the same whether the question arises viva voce in chief or in cross-examination, or in respect of affidavit evidence;(4)contextually, s 128 needs to be construed consistently with the operation of the common law, recalling that in civil proceedings, a party witness who objected remained silent and a court was thereby deprived of the evidence the witness could give;(5)the construction of s 128 urged by the appellants made consistent sense of the word “require”, referring to circumstances in which a party witness might not subjectively wish to give the evidence and gives an explanation for that decision, but the Court nonetheless compels the witness to do so; (6)the Court should favour a construction that best serves the purpose of the provision – in this regard, it was submitted that the paramount consideration is the Court’s interest in receiving the evidence of all witnesses, including those who subjectively do not wish to give the evidence in chief on the relevant grounds; such a construction was said to reflect the evolution of the law of evidence considered by the High Court in Cornwell;(7)the ALRC was concerned with maintaining a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of the privilege against self-incrimination as it had evolved at common law and in statute, with the focus shifting towards making more evidence available than was possible with the privilege remaining intact;(8)the rejection by the legislature of the ALRC’s optional certificate model meant that primacy was given to the interests of justice by enabling a court to require the witness to give the relevant evidence – those interests would not be advanced if the Court were to be deprived of evidence merely because the questions adducing that evidence were asked by the witness’ own representative;(9)regard should be had to changes made to s 128 following subsequent review by the ALRC and the dispensing with the distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and penalty privilege; (10)the deliberation on enactment of the section did not distinguish, save as to what became the current s 128(10), between party-witnesses and non-party witnesses; and(11)upholding Song would produce absurd results, such as a court being deprived of relevant evidence – it was suggested, by way of example, that Mr MacDonald could circumvent the restrictions on s 128 by being called by another party in the same interest, or by the Commissioner, by whom he was also compellable.