Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 550

File number: VID 458 of 2016
Judge: BROMBERG  J
Date of judgment: 22 May 2017
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – privilege in respect of self-exposure to penalties – Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 128 – application for the issue of a certificate pursuant to s 128 – whether a party under no legal compulsion to give proposed evidence relevantly “objects to the giving of particular evidence” so as to engage s 128(1) – where respondent declines to answer questions put in chief by his own counsel – where respondent is subject to a statutory presumption of intent that would rarely be effectively rebutted without direct testimony– motivation to give evidence to avoid having judgment entered against him or her not relevant compellability – Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442 not plainly wrong – application refused
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 343, 346, 348, 361

Cases cited:

Aitken v Murphy [2011] FamCA 785

BHP Billiton Iron Ore v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234

Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500

Chao v Chao [2008] NSWSC 584

Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137

Clayton Utz v Dale (2015) 47 VR 48

Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260

Crawford v Crawford (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 704

Ferrall v Blyton [2000] FamCA 1442

Health Services Union NSW v Peter Mylan [2014] NSWSC 1026

Nezovic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 190

Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016

Re Lime Gourmet Pizza Bar (Charlestown) Pty Ltd (formerly under administration) [2014] NSWSC 1898

Sheikholeslami v Tolcher (2009) 75 NSWLR 418

Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442

SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214

Date of hearing: 9 May 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Follett
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms S Kelly
Solicitor for the Respondents:

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union


ORDERS

VID 458 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER

Applicant

AND:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

First Respondent

DREW MACDONALD

Second Respondent

JOHN DUGGAN

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMBERG  J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application of the second respondent that a certificate issue pursuant to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is refused.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMBERG J:

  1. In the course of examination by his counsel, the second respondent (“MacDonald”) indicated that he was concerned about giving certain evidence because it may “incriminate” him. At that juncture, MacDonald sought that a certificate…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 550
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, the Federal Court considered whether a certificate should be issued under s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to a witness who had declined to answer questions put in chief by his own counsel. The witness, MacDonald, had initially invoked the privilege against self-incrimination but later waived it, admitting to having blockaded a construction site. MacDonald then objected to giving further evidence on the ground that it might incriminate him, prompting an application for a certificate under s 128.

The legal issues before the court involved whether MacDonald’s objection to giving evidence could be considered a relevant “objection” under s 128(1) of the Evidence Act, and if so, whether the court should issue a certificate to protect MacDonald from the use of his evidence against him. The court examined whether MacDonald's motivation to give evidence, in this case to avoid having a judgment entered against him, constituted the kind of compellability necessary to engage s 128. The court referenced the case of Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442, which held that the motivation to avoid a judgment did not amount to relevant compellability.

The court concluded that MacDonald’s objection to giving evidence did not engage s 128 of the Evidence Act. It found that MacDonald’s motivation to avoid a judgment did not constitute the kind of compellability required by Song, and therefore, there was no occasion for the court to issue a s 128 certificate. The court held that MacDonald was not a witness who objected to giving evidence in a manner that would engage s 128. Consequently, the application for a certificate was refused.

The court's reasoning was consistent with the approach in Song and was followed by various other courts. The court was not persuaded that Song was plainly wrong, and thus it adhered to the established principle that a witness who declines to testify voluntarily does not have an objection under s 128. The application for a certificate was accordingly refused, and no certificate was issued under s 128 of the Evidence Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application of the second respondent that a certificate issue pursuant to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is refused.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

By his Defence, MacDonald initially invoked the privilege against self-exposure to a penalty. At the close of the Commissioner’s case, MacDonald waived that privilege and filed a Further Amended Defence in which, relevantly, MacDonald admitted that he had blockaded the site on 5 and 8 December 2014 but denied that he had acted for the reasons or with the intent alleged by the Commissioner. It was in that context that MacDonald was called to give evidence and, in the course of giving that evidence, that the application for a certificate under s 128 was made.SECTION 128 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT Section 128 of the Evidence Act provides:128 Privilege in respect of self-incrimination in other proceedings (1)This section applies if a witness objects to giving particular evidence, or evidence on a particular matter, on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness: (a)has committed an offence against or arising under an Australian law or a law of a foreign country; or (b) is liable to a civil penalty. (2)The court must determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the objection. (3)Subject to subsection (4), if the court determines that there are reasonable grounds for the objection, the court is not to require the witness to give the evidence, and is to inform the witness: (a)that the witness need not give the evidence unless required by the court to do so under subsection (4); and (b) that the court will give a certificate under this section if: (i)the witness willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4); or (ii)the witness gives the evidence after being required to do so under subsection (4); and (c) of the effect of such a certificate. (4)The court may require the witness to give the evidence if the court is satisfied that: (a)the evidence does not tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence against or arising under, or is liable to a civil penalty under, a law of a foreign country; and (b) the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence. (5)If the witness either willingly gives the evidence without being required to do so under subsection (4), or gives it after being required to do so under that subsection, the court must cause the witness to be given a certificate under this section in respect of the evidence. (6)The court is also to cause a witness to be given a certificate under this section if: (a) the objection has been overruled; and (b)after the evidence has been given, the court finds that there were reasonable grounds for the objection. (7) In any proceeding in an Australian court: (a)evidence given by a person in respect of which a certificate under this section has been given; and (b)evidence of any information, document or thing obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of the person having given evidence; cannot be used against the person. However, this does not apply to a criminal proceeding in respect of the falsity of the evidence. (8)Subsection (7) has effect despite any challenge, review, quashing or calling into question on any ground of the decision to give, or the validity of, the certificate concerned. (9)If a defendant in a criminal proceeding for an offence is given a certificate under this section, subsection (7) does not apply in a proceeding that is a retrial of the defendant for the same offence or a trial of the defendant for an offence arising out of the same facts that gave rise to that offence. (10)In a criminal proceeding, this section does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue. (11)A reference in this section to doing an act includes a reference to failing to act. (12)If a person has been given a certificate under a prescribed State or Territory provision in respect of evidence given by the person in a proceeding in a State or Territory court, the certificate has the same effect, in a proceeding to which this subsection applies, as if it had been given under this section. (13)The following are prescribed State or Territory provisions for the purposes of subsection (12): (a) section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 of New South Wales; (b)a provision of a law of a State or Territory declared by the regulations to be a prescribed State or Territory provision for the purposes of subsection (12). (14) Subsection (12) applies to: (a)a proceeding in relation to which this Act applies because of section 4; and (b) a proceeding for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or for the recovery of a civil penalty under a law of the Commonwealth, other than a proceeding referred to in paragraph (a). Note 1: Bodies corporate cannot claim this privilege: see section 187. Note 2: Clause 3 of Part 2 of the Dictionary sets out what is a civil penalty. Note 4:Subsections (8) and (9) were inserted as a response to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Cornwell v The Queen [2007] HCA 12 (22 March 2007).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Despite the reservations that I have expressed, I am not persuaded that Song is plainly wrong: BHP Billiton Iron Ore v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234 at [83]–[89] (Greenwood J, with whom Sundberg J agreed); SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214 at [146]–[149] (Weinberg J). As Weinberg J stated at [146] of SZEEU, the principle applies in relation to decisions of other intermediate appellate courts on questions of interpretation involving uniform national legislation. Furthermore, as French J observed in Nezovic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 190 at [52] (cited by Greenwood J in BHP Billiton at [89]): … where questions of law and in particular statutory construction are concerned, the view that a judge who has taken one view of the law or a statute is ‘clearly wrong’ is not likely to be adopted having regard to the choices that so often confront the courts particularly in the area of statutory construction. CONCLUSION For those reasons, I am not persuaded that in the circumstances raised by this case, MacDonald is a witness who “objects” to giving particular evidence. That has the result that s 128 has not been engaged and that there is no occasion for the Court to issue a s 128 certificate. MacDonald’s application is refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Song has since been followed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Crawford v Crawford (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 704 at [47]–[53] (Stevenson J); Re Lime Gourmet Pizza Bar (Charlestown) Pty Ltd (formerly under administration) [2014] NSWSC 1898 at [8] (Black J); Health Services Union NSW v Mylan [2014] NSWSC 1026 at [30] (Hammerschlag J)), the Family Court of Australia (Aitken v Murphy [2011] FamCA 785 at [121] (Young J)) and has been both followed (Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [236]–[238] (Redlich, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA)) and given otherwise favourable treatment (Clayton Utz v Dale (2015) 47 VR 48 at [169]–[180] (Tate JA, with whom Ashley and Ferguson JJA agreed)) by the Victorian Court of Appeal. CONSIDERATION MacDonald accepted that I should follow the reasoning in Song unless I was persuaded that it was plainly wrong. MacDonald’s submissions were directed to persuading me that his circumstances demonstrated compulsion and thus the touchstone of compellability required by Song was satisfied. Alternatively, MacDonald submitted that Song was plainly wrong and ought not be followed. MacDonald noted the reservation made at [24] of Song that evidence in chief given by a party would “rarely if ever” be given under compulsion. MacDonald essentially contended that his circumstances fell within the rare exception and that was because he is compelled to give the proposed evidence by operation of a statutory reversal of the common law onus of proof. In that respect, MacDonald relied on the operation of s 361(1) of the FW Act. MacDonald contended that in circumstances where the onus of proof is reversed, a respondent is in effect compelled to testify, because as the High Court observed in Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at [42]–[45] (French CJ and Crennan J), the presumption created by s 361(1) would rarely be effectively rebutted without direct testimony from the decision-maker. Whilst MacDonald’s submissions recognised that compulsion as a product of a statutory reversal of the common law onus of proof is a different kind of compulsion to that resulting from the use of the coercive powers of a court, MacDonald contended that it is no less a compulsion. MacDonald argued that, seen in that way, the principle in Song must accommodate the circumstance in which a respondent faced with a reverse onus must give particular evidence to exculpate him or herself but, in the absence of a s 128 certificate, objects to doing so because the evidence would expose the person to a civil penalty. The difficulty with MacDonald’s submission, as noted by the Commissioner, is that Song addressed the nature of the compellability required to enliven s 128 and rejected compellability of the kind that MacDonald relies upon. As earlier set out, Hodgson JA (at [27]) drew a distinction between the compellability of a witness to answer questions at the instance of a party who had called the witness or at the instance of a judge and the motivation of a defendant to give evidence to avoid having a judgment entered against him or her. The latter was characterised as not amounting “to relevant compellability”.