FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] FCA 550
File number: VID 458 of 2016 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 22 May 2017 Catchwords: EVIDENCE – privilege in respect of self-exposure to penalties – Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 128 – application for the issue of a certificate pursuant to s 128 – whether a party under no legal compulsion to give proposed evidence relevantly “objects to the giving of particular evidence” so as to engage s 128(1) – where respondent declines to answer questions put in chief by his own counsel – where respondent is subject to a statutory presumption of intent that would rarely be effectively rebutted without direct testimony– motivation to give evidence to avoid having judgment entered against him or her not relevant compellability – Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442 not plainly wrong – application refused Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 128
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 343, 346, 348, 361
Cases cited: Aitken v Murphy [2011] FamCA 785
BHP Billiton Iron Ore v National Competition Council (2007) 162 FCR 234
Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500
Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137
Clayton Utz v Dale (2015) 47 VR 48
Cornwell v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 260
Crawford v Crawford (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 704
Ferrall v Blyton [2000] FamCA 1442
Health Services Union NSW v Peter Mylan [2014] NSWSC 1026
Nezovic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 190
Ollis v Melissari [2005] NSWSC 1016
Re Lime Gourmet Pizza Bar (Charlestown) Pty Ltd (formerly under administration) [2014] NSWSC 1898
Sheikholeslami v Tolcher (2009) 75 NSWLR 418
Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214
Date of hearing: 9 May 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: Fair Work Division National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Follett Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondents: Ms S Kelly Solicitor for the Respondents: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
ORDERS
VID 458 of 2016 BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSIONER
Applicant
AND: CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Respondent
DREW MACDONALD
Second Respondent
JOHN DUGGAN
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 MAY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application of the second respondent that a certificate issue pursuant to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BROMBERG J:
In the course of examination by his counsel, the second respondent (“MacDonald”) indicated that he was concerned about giving certain evidence because it may “incriminate” him. At that juncture, MacDonald sought that a certificate…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 550
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved whether MacDonald’s objection to giving evidence could be considered a relevant “objection” under s 128(1) of the Evidence Act, and if so, whether the court should issue a certificate to protect MacDonald from the use of his evidence against him. The court examined whether MacDonald's motivation to give evidence, in this case to avoid having a judgment entered against him, constituted the kind of compellability necessary to engage s 128. The court referenced the case of Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442, which held that the motivation to avoid a judgment did not amount to relevant compellability.
The court concluded that MacDonald’s objection to giving evidence did not engage s 128 of the Evidence Act. It found that MacDonald’s motivation to avoid a judgment did not constitute the kind of compellability required by Song, and therefore, there was no occasion for the court to issue a s 128 certificate. The court held that MacDonald was not a witness who objected to giving evidence in a manner that would engage s 128. Consequently, the application for a certificate was refused.
The court's reasoning was consistent with the approach in Song and was followed by various other courts. The court was not persuaded that Song was plainly wrong, and thus it adhered to the established principle that a witness who declines to testify voluntarily does not have an objection under s 128. The application for a certificate was accordingly refused, and no certificate was issued under s 128 of the Evidence Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application of the second respondent that a certificate issue pursuant to s 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Song has since been followed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Crawford v Crawford (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 704 at [47]–[53] (Stevenson J); Re Lime Gourmet Pizza Bar (Charlestown) Pty Ltd (formerly under administration) [2014] NSWSC 1898 at [8] (Black J); Health Services Union NSW v Mylan [2014] NSWSC 1026 at [30] (Hammerschlag J)), the Family Court of Australia (Aitken v Murphy [2011] FamCA 785 at [121] (Young J)) and has been both followed (Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 137 at [236]–[238] (Redlich, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA)) and given otherwise favourable treatment (Clayton Utz v Dale (2015) 47 VR 48 at [169]–[180] (Tate JA, with whom Ashley and Ferguson JJA agreed)) by the Victorian Court of Appeal. CONSIDERATION MacDonald accepted that I should follow the reasoning in Song unless I was persuaded that it was plainly wrong. MacDonald’s submissions were directed to persuading me that his circumstances demonstrated compulsion and thus the touchstone of compellability required by Song was satisfied. Alternatively, MacDonald submitted that Song was plainly wrong and ought not be followed. MacDonald noted the reservation made at [24] of Song that evidence in chief given by a party would “rarely if ever” be given under compulsion. MacDonald essentially contended that his circumstances fell within the rare exception and that was because he is compelled to give the proposed evidence by operation of a statutory reversal of the common law onus of proof. In that respect, MacDonald relied on the operation of s 361(1) of the FW Act. MacDonald contended that in circumstances where the onus of proof is reversed, a respondent is in effect compelled to testify, because as the High Court observed in Bendigo Regional Institute of Technical and Further Education v Barclay (2012) 248 CLR 500 at [42]–[45] (French CJ and Crennan J), the presumption created by s 361(1) would rarely be effectively rebutted without direct testimony from the decision-maker. Whilst MacDonald’s submissions recognised that compulsion as a product of a statutory reversal of the common law onus of proof is a different kind of compulsion to that resulting from the use of the coercive powers of a court, MacDonald contended that it is no less a compulsion. MacDonald argued that, seen in that way, the principle in Song must accommodate the circumstance in which a respondent faced with a reverse onus must give particular evidence to exculpate him or herself but, in the absence of a s 128 certificate, objects to doing so because the evidence would expose the person to a civil penalty. The difficulty with MacDonald’s submission, as noted by the Commissioner, is that Song addressed the nature of the compellability required to enliven s 128 and rejected compellability of the kind that MacDonald relies upon. As earlier set out, Hodgson JA (at [27]) drew a distinction between the compellability of a witness to answer questions at the instance of a party who had called the witness or at the instance of a judge and the motivation of a defendant to give evidence to avoid having a judgment entered against him or her. The latter was characterised as not amounting “to relevant compellability”.