Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Sydney Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Sydney Ltd [2019] FCAFC 99

Appeal from:

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd t/a DP World and Others [2019] FWC 908

Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd t/a DP World and Others [2019] FWCFB 1150

File number: NSD 414 of 2019
Judges: RARES, JAGOT AND BROMWICH JJ
Date of judgment: 20 June 2019
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – protected action ballot – application for the extension of time under s 443(5) of the Fair Work Act for the giving of notice of the taking of industrial action – was the decision of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission subject to jurisdictional error –whether the Deputy President had exercised discretion upon finding exceptional circumstances – whether the Deputy President considered if the extended notice period would diminish the employees’ bargaining power – whether sufficient evidence was put before the Deputy President –application be dismissed.
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 12, 414(1), 414(2), 443(5)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Charles Darwin University [2018] FWCFB 4011

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 353 ALR 600

Date of hearing: 30 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: Fair Work Division
National Practice Area: Employment & Industrial Relations
Sub-area: Regulator & Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 24
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Crawshaw SC with Ms L Doust
Solicitor for the Applicant: Slater & Gordon Lawyers
Counsel for the First to Fourth Respondents: Mr Y Shariff with Mr N Condylis
Solicitor for the First to Fourth Respondents: Seyfarth Shaw Australia

ORDERS

NSD 414 of 2019
BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MARITIME, MINING AND ENERGY UNION

Applicant

AND:

DP WORLD SYDNEY LTD ACN 001 351 159

First Respondent

DP WORLD (FREMANTLE) LTD ACN 009 106 763

Second Respondent

DP WORLD MELBOURNE LTD ACN 000 049 301

Third Respondent

DP WORLD BRISBANE PTY LTD ACN 130 876 701

Fourth Respondent

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

Fifth Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, JAGOT AND BROMWICH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.In the event that either party wishes to make an application for costs, that party must file and serve written submissions (limited to 2 pages) within 7 days of the delivery of the Full Court’s reasons, and the other party must file and serve its written submissions (limited to 2 pages) in response within 7 days thereafter.

Note:   Entry of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Sydney Ltd, the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMMEU) sought to appeal the Full Bench’s decision regarding the granting of an extension of time under section 443(5) of the Fair Work Act for the giving of notice of industrial action. The CFMMEU argued that the Full Bench’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as it failed to correct three jurisdictional errors by the Deputy President. The central issue before the court was whether the decision of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission was subject to jurisdictional error and whether the Deputy President had exercised discretion upon finding exceptional circumstances. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the Deputy President considered if the extended notice period would diminish the employees’ bargaining power and whether sufficient evidence was put before the Deputy President.

The court found that the Full Bench’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. It was observed that the Full Bench had correctly applied the principle that the reasons for the decision must be read fairly and as a whole. The court found that the Deputy President had considered the exceptional circumstances justifying the extension of the notice period and had weighed the interests of the employer and third parties against the diminution of the employees’ bargaining power. The court concluded that there was no jurisdictional error in the Full Bench’s decision and that the Deputy President had exercised his discretion properly.

ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. In the event that either party wishes to make an application for costs, that party must file and serve written submissions (limited to 2 pages) within 7 days of the delivery of the Full Court’s reasons, and the other party must file and serve its written submissions (limited to 2 pages) in response within 7 days thereafter.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. In the event that either party wishes to make an application for costs, that party must file and serve written submissions (limited to 2 pages) within 7 days of the delivery of the Full Court’s reasons, and the other party must file and serve its written submissions (limited to 2 pages) in response within 7 days thereafter.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The CFMMEU contended that the Full Bench’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error because the Full Bench had failed to correct three jurisdictional errors by the Deputy President. Background One of the requirements for industrial action in the form of proposed employee claim action to be protected industrial action, for the purposes of the Act, is that written notice of the action be given by a bargaining representative of the employees to the employer: s 414(1). By s 414(2) the period of notice must be 3 working days or, if a protected action ballot order for the employee claim action specifies a longer period of notice, the longer period. Section 443 deals with the circumstances in which the FWC must make a protected action ballot order. Section 443(5) provides that:If the FWC is satisfied, in relation to the proposed industrial action that is the subject of the protected action ballot, that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days. By s 441(1):The FWC must, as far as practicable, determine an application for a protected action ballot order within 2 working days after the application is made. The Deputy President determined the application within 2 working days as required by s 441(1). The CFMMEU acknowledged that in the decision, Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd T/A DP World and Others [2019] FWC 908, the Deputy President correctly identified the applicable law. Accordingly, the Deputy President explained that:[36] The proper interpretation and application of the words ‘exceptional circumstances’ has been considered in a number of decisions of the Commission. In Transport Workers’ Union of Australia [[2012] FWA 133] it was noted that the uniform approach adopted by this Commission is that of Vice President Lawler in CEPU v Australia Post [[2007] AIRC 848] dealt with under the Workplace Relations Act 1996 which cites with approval the decision of Rares J of the Federal Court of Australia in Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [[2007] FCA 388]:“[10] In this passage his Honour was concerned with the ordinary meaning of the expression “exceptional circumstances” and the approach identified is, in my view, equally applicable to the use of that expression in s.465(3). In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.[11] However, it is important to note that when considering whether to make an order pursuant to s.463(5) the Commission is not simply concerned with determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There must be exceptional circumstances “justifying” the specification of a longer notice period. The notion of justification is critical and calls for a consideration of the purpose of the notice required by s.441.”[37] The Vice President went on to state:“[21] Essentially, what is required in determining whether exceptional circumstances justify an extension of the required notice period is a weighing of the interests of the employer and third parties in the employer having a greater opportunity to take appropriate defensive action as against the diminutions in the effectiveness of the employees’ bargaining power that results from such an extension. The fact that the legislature has seen fit to condition the ordering of an extension of the required notice period on the presence of exceptional circumstances justifying it, as distinct from merely conferring a simple discretion to extend the required notice period, indicates that ordinarily there should be no extension.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

We agree also with the observations of the Full Bench of the FWC at [23] that in circumstances where a written decision must be provided within 2 working days, the principle that the reasons for the decision must be read fairly and as a whole is of particular importance as the authorities we have cited at [20] above show.Conclusion For these reasons, we concluded that the application had to be dismissed. We also ordered a timetable if any party wished to apply for costs.