Health Services Union v Cabrini Health Ltd
[2022] FWC 2911
•31 OCTOBER 2022
| [2022] FWC 2911 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.437—Protected action
Health Services Union
v
Cabrini Health Ltd
(B2022/1637)
| Deputy President Clancy | MELBOURNE, 31 OCTOBER 2022 |
Proposed protected action ballot of employees of Cabrini Health Ltd.
On Thursday 27 October 2022, the Health Service Union Victoria No.3 Branch (the Union) applied to the Commission for a protected action ballot order (PABO).[1]
In its application, the Union sought a protected action ballot order in relation to employees of Cabrini Health Ltd (Cabrini) and specified the employees to be balloted as being those who will be covered by the proposed Cabrini Health, Health Professionals Agreement 2022 and are members of the Union.
The Union also sought that a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) be the ballot agent for the protected action ballot. The person proposed in the application as the protected action ballot agent is TrueVote Pty Ltd (TrueVote). Mr Stephen Donaldson, the Managing Director of TrueVote provided a statutory declaration setting out that he would carry out the functions of the protected ballot agent for TrueVote and that he has relevant experience in conducting protected action ballots.
At 12.31pm on Friday 28 August 2022, my Associate was advised that Cabrini opposed the making of a protected action ballot order on the following grounds:
· The phrasing of the questions within the Application are too wide and unclear;
· Many of the questions pose legitimate health and safety concerns to patients and the health/clinical safety environment in general and require further specificity and clarification before they could be ordered by the Commission; and/or
· Many of the other draft questions are “simply impossible from a resourcing and rostering point of view – during a skills shortage in the health industry - whereby employees cannot simply choose what time to take their breaks or ‘walk off the line’ when patients are being rostered for appointments with them or life-critical Nuclear Medicine Technologist work (e.g. scans) are essential to be performed and forwarded to other departments (such as emergency)”.
Therefore, my Associate shortly after sent an email to the Union seeking their views in relation to Cabrini’s objections. The Union replied via email at 12:59pm on 28 October 2022 opposing the grounds of objection outlined above.
In these circumstances, the matter was listed for a Mention hearing before me at 3pm on Friday 28 October 2022, at which I issued directions for the filing and service of material and listed the application for a hearing at 1.00pm on Monday 31 October 2022.
In the material filed and served, Cabrini submitted:
1) Questions 4, 8 and 9 of the proposed protected action ballot order cannot form part of any order made because they do not sufficiently specify the nature of the proposed industrial action, as required by s437(3)(b) and s443(3)(d) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act);
2) The Commission can be satisfied the circumstances of Cabrini arising from the proposed protected action ballot order (and particularly questions 1, 2 and 3) are exceptional and justify the period of written notice required for the taking of the proposed protected industrial action to be greater than 3 working days and, in the circumstances should order that period be seven working days pursuant to s.443(5) of the Act.
As the period of written notice appeared to have been raised for the first time in the Cabrini material, I asked my Associate to send an email to the parties with a direction that they confer in relation to this issue prior to the hearing.
At the hearing, Mr Fooks and Mr Leszczynski appeared for the Union and Mr Shepherd appeared for Cabrini. At its outset, the parties advised their discussions had resulted in agreement in the following terms:
a)For questions 1-3 proposed by the Union, a written notice period of 5 calendar days had been agreed;
b)As to question 4, Cabrini withdrew its objection and the parties confirmed that a longer period than the 3 working days’ written notice period provided for in s.443(5) was not sought;
c)For questions 5 and 6 proposed by the Union, a written notice period of 7 calendar days had been agreed; and
d)For questions 7-9 proposed by the Union, the parties confirmed that a longer period than the 3 working days’ written notice period provided for in s.443(5) was not sought.
As such, the remaining areas of disputation concerned what had been questions 8 and 9 in the draft order attached to the application. In relation to these, question 8 concerned the taking of breaks and the Union submitted a new proposal, which divided it into two questions:
8. During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of taking the full period of all breaks (including meal breaks and rest/tea breaks)?
9. During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of employees taking their breaks (including meal breaks and rest/tea breaks) at time of the employee’s own choice, including but not limited to taking breaks at the same time as other employees?
The effect of the Union’s proposal was that the following question, originally question 9, would become question 10:
10. During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of Nuclear Medicine Technologists redirecting any calls they receive to medical imaging reception, unless the call is clinically urgent and not responding to the call will have a significant clinical impact?
Cabrini’s submissions and unsworn statements
Cabrini takes issue with what are now proposed questions 8, 9 and 10, submitting they do not sufficiently specify the nature of the proposed industrial action and so Cabrini’s employees cannot know what is being asked of them.
Proposed question 8 now asks, “During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of taking the full period of all breaks (including meal breaks and rest/tea breaks)?” The essence of Cabrini’s opposition to question 8 is that it does not propose any industrial action.
Cabrini says it has assumed that “taking the full period of all breaks” can only refer to the taking of the breaks that are provided for in the Agreement and argues that if this is the case, it is not clear what industrial action is proposed by the question. Cabrini submits “taking the full period of all breaks” is not industrial action but rather, an entitlement afforded to employees under what is currently clause 33 of the Cabrini Health, Health Professionals Agreement 2019 (2019 Agreement).
What is now proposed question 9 asks, “During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of employees taking their breaks (including meal breaks and rest/tea breaks) at time of the employee’s own choice, including but not limited to taking breaks at the same time as other employees.” As to this, Cabrini submits that this does not clarify what work would or would not be done. Cabrini submits that if an employee chose to take their break at a time prescribed by management it would not be industrial action and that if employees took their breaks at times not approved by management, this would not constitute taking a break under the 2019 Agreement (or future agreement). Cabrini therefore submits that what is now proposed question 9 is unclear in terms of what industrial action is proposed.
What is now proposed question 10 asks, “During an indefinite period or specified periods, industrial action in the form of Nuclear Medicine Technologists redirecting any calls they receive to medical imaging reception, unless the call is clinically urgent and not responding to the call will have a significant clinical impact?” Cabrini asserts this question does not disclose the nature of the proposed industrial action for the following reasons:
The question does not describe what work would and would not be done and the implications for employees while at work, as required. Specifically, the question does not say who would be answering the calls and deciding whether the call is “clinically urgent” or have “significant clinical impact”; and
The words “clinically urgent” and “significant clinical impact” are not defined in the Agreement or the application, and are imprecise and inherently subjective, such that employees cannot know when the declining of a call will be protected or unprotected industrial action. Cabrini relied in part on an unsworn statement submitted by Mr Kirby Young to assert these terms are not so commonly used at Cabrini that employees will know what they mean.[2]
Cabrini also submitted an unsigned statement from Ms Robyne Renton, the Infection Prevention and Control Service Coordinator who is responsible for managing infection prevention and control at Cabrini sites. Ms Renton was not available for cross examination. Her statement outlined that Cabrini is still implementing very strict infection controls due to the continuing risk of the COVID-19 pandemic. She also outlined that healthcare associated infections are the most common complications affecting patients in hospital and that Cabrini has published an Infection Prevention and Control Policy that employees are expected to be aware of and comply with.
Ms Renton also outlined that Cabrini typically admits older patients and that these patients are particularly vulnerable to infection risks. Noting that the industrial action could include Cabrini staff not adhering to Cabrini’s dress code or displaying or distributing campaign material, Ms Renton asserted this kind of industrial action may result in employees being unable to meet the standards required by Cabrini’s Infection Prevention and Control Policy and therefore being unable to work.
Ms Renton’s statement also covered the following:
· In the event of an outbreak of an infectious disease within an area, Cabrini implements additional cleaning of walls, floors and all services as a measure to reduce risk of transmission of infection.
· Cleaning is outsourced externally in many areas and could result in increased costs to Cabrini.
· Infection control is a high priority such that if staff take industrial action that includes them refusing to follow Cabrini’s infection control protocol, then it is likely they will not be permitted to work with certain patients or in certain clinical settings.
· Infection prevention and control standards are also a requirement for Cabrini’s accreditation as a health care provider.
· Understaffing is a serious issue and if Cabrini needed to move staff, or could not allow them to visit certain patients, this would worsen the understaffing problem and could lead to patients receiving sub-optimal care.
In seeking for the protected action ballot order to have a period of written notice of more than 3 working days in relation to each of questions 1,2,3,5 and 6, Cabrini had submitted there are exceptional circumstances due to:
a)The public interest in minimising risk to patients: It is a healthcare provider and operates two hospitals, which places it in a very different circumstance to another employer exposed to the same potential industrial action. The public interest in ensuring healthcare remains of the highest standard should be a key consideration, particularly given the strain under the hospital system due to understaffing, COVID-19 and infection risks.[3] There is a real risk that patients would be significantly impacted if Cabrini does not have time to implement proper risk mitigation strategies;
b)Cabrini cannot implement contingency measures until it receives notice;
c)The proposed industrial action in questions 1, 2 and 3 presents infection risks: Cabrini is still implementing strict infection controls due to the continuing risk of the COVID-19 pandemic. It submits notification of industrial action proposed in questions 1, 2 and 3 (a ban on uniform policy, the wearing of VAHPA campaign materials and the using or distributing of VAHPA campaign materials) would require Cabrini to determine whether employees can still work safely. If staff took this industrial action, which includes them refusing to follow Cabrini’s infection control protocol, then it is likely they would not be permitted to work with certain patients or in certain clinical settings and Cabrini would then need to find replacement staff at short notice.
d)Understaffing: The pressures the COVID-19 pandemic has placed on the health industry have resulted in understaffing being a serious issue at Cabrini. It is difficult to find replacement staff and if insufficient staff are available, patients will receive sub-optimal care. Three working days is likely to be insufficient to source required staff. Cabrini relied on the unsworn statement from Mr Kirby Young (Chief Allied Health Officer) outlining:
(i)it takes a considerable amount of time to reallocate workloads if significant numbers of staff are unable to work;
(ii)without knowing the extent of industrial action, Cabrini cannot assess how long this would take but Mr Young estimates it would take several days if multiple staff from the same discipline are unavailable;
(iii)staff shortages could lead to patients having protracted lengths of stay in acute facilities, which typically leads to worse health outcomes for patients;
(iv)this could flow on to Cabrini having fewer rooms available and could adversely impact the Emergency Department;
(v)staff may need to be deployed to high-risk areas, impacting patients in subacute and community services who may not be able to access allied health services.[4]
Cabrini’s position was that taken together, these circumstances should properly be regarded as exceptional and that due to the significance of the risk and Cabrini’s inability to assess how long it might take Cabrini to put effective contingency measures in place accurately, a longer period of written notice was justified and the Commission should exercise its discretion.
Submissions of the Union
The Union submits that the Commission should grant the applications for the following reasons:
· there is no substantive objection to the applications;
· the applications are made in accordance with s 437 of the Act; and
· the Commission can be satisfied the Union has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted.
The Union submits that the requirements of s 443(1) of the Act are satisfied and therefore the Commission should make a protected action ballot order.
As to what is now proposed question 8, the Union submits that whilst these breaks are an entitlement, employees are not always able to take their breaks and/or the full period of their breaks. The Union relies on s.19(1)(a) of the Act and that part of the definition of industrial action which includes “the performance of work by an employee in a manner different form that in which it is customarily performed…” The Union contends that whilst the breaks are an entitlement, it is customary for employees to work through breaks, or shorten them, when they are required to perform work at a level that does not enable them to enjoy the full period of their otherwise entitled breaks. The Union relied on evidence from Ms Emily Bell, a Cabrini physiotherapist, in this regard and submits the taking the full period of a break, when the employee may otherwise be required to perform work, amounts to industrial action.
In relation to what is now proposed question 9, the Union argues that the manner in which the employee would take the break (at a time of their choice, including at the same time as other employees) would constitute performance of work in a manner different from which it is customarily performed.
As to what is now proposed question 10, the Union led evidence from Ms Fran Van Der Linde, a Nuclear Medicine Technologist (NMT) with over 20 years’ experience. Ms Fran Van Der Linde’s testimony included:
NMTs are qualified and registered allied health professionals, there are 11 in the Nuclear Medicine Technology department, and each has at least 4 years of experience.
There is a receptionist/administrative employee allocated to deal with calls to the Nuclear Medicine Technology department.
NMTs do not have their own telephone lines and are only required to answer phone calls when the receptionist/administrative employee is unavailable, such as when that employee is instead required to perform their duties within the Medical Imaging administrative/reception area.
Relying on their professional expertise, NMTs are able to assess from the information given by an incoming caller whether or not the call is clinically urgent and not responding to the call will have a significant clinical impact.
An example of non-urgent call would be someone electing to get a bone scan as part of a preliminary investigations, with such calls to be passed onto the receptionist/administrative employee.
A clinically urgent call where not responding to it will have a significant clinical impact, would include calls from patients with coronary disease requesting heart scans, patients presenting with a risk of blood clots, patients bleeding into their bowel, patients requiring a scan ahead of imminent surgery, all ICU scenarios and requests for immediate scans from medical practitioners.
The Union submitted that based on the evidence of Ms Van Der Linde, the Commission can be satisfied that NMTs will be capable of understanding what Question 10 is asking of them.
Consideration
It is not disputed and based on the material before me, I am satisfied that:
1. The Union is a bargaining representative for the employees;[5]
2. The application specifies the group of employees to be balloted, the questions to be put to the employees and that the Union wishes TrueVote to be the protected action ballot agent;[6]
3. The 2019 Agreement’s nominal expiry date of 1 October 2021 has passed; [7]
4. A copy of the application was given to Cabrini and TrueVote within 24 hours of the making of the application;[8] and
5. The Union is genuinely trying to reach agreement with Cabrini.[9]
This being the case, I must make a protected action ballot order.[10] The use of the term “a protected action ballot order” in s.443(1) indicates the order is not required to be in the form submitted by the Union.
Pursuant to s.443(3)(d) of the Act, a protected action ballot order must specify the questions to be put to the employees to be balloted, including the nature of the industrial action.[11] This is to be distinguished from the requirement in s.414(1) of the Act, which requires a bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by the proposed agreement to give written notice of the action before a person engages in the employee claim action. The Full Bench of the Commission in Mornington Peninsula Shire Council v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union[12] addressed this distinction in the following terms:
“It seems to us that the structure of the differing legislative requirements, contemplates that at the time that a member of the Commission comes to consider whether to make a protected action ballot order, the context and manner in which employees might subsequently choose to take proposed industrial action, the nature of which is described in the question, may not be clear. However, different considerations will apply once a ballot has been conducted, the nature of the industrial action has been approved, and a bargaining representative gives notice of the action that will be taken by employees. When the notice is given, greater clarity about the context and manner in which employees will take industrial action, will doubtless be apparent and so greater clarity in describing the action to be taken will be required.”[13]
I am not persuaded by the submissions of Cabrini regarding what is now proposed question 9. What is now proposed question 9 asks whether the employees authorise employees taking their breaks (including meal breaks and rest/tea breaks) at the time of the employee’s own choice. The proposed conduct could result in a ban on the performance of the work and therefore fall within the definition of “industrial action” in s.19(b) of the Act. I am satisfied what is now proposed question 9 meets the requirements of s 437(3)(d). While I have noted the submissions made by Cabrini that suggest that proposed question 9 does not clarify what work would or would not be done and that employees might choose to take breaks at their allotted break times, I do not consider such considerations prevent me from granting this application and making the order with proposed question 9 in the form that has been sought. As was stated by Justice Tracey in Ambulance Victoria v United Voice:
“The terms in which the proposed action is described for the purposes of the ballot may lack legal precision and, more significantly for present purposes, may or may not constitute industrial action depending on the manner in which the action is performed. It will often be difficult for the Fair Work Commission to anticipate, at the time it makes an order under s 437, the context and manner in which union members might choose to take the proposed action. Once a ballot has been conducted and the action is imminent or has occurred greater clarity will often be present.”[14]
As to what is now proposed question 10, I am not persuaded this question is ambiguous or lacks clarity and I am satisfied, having regard to the evidence of Ms Van Der Linde, it is capable of being responded to by the employees. Ms Van Der Linde exhibited a very clear understanding in relation to the wording and without hesitation was able to explain how it would apply to the operations of the Nuclear Medicine Technology department.
What are now proposed questions 9 and 10 will remain as part of the ballot.
As to what is now proposed question 8, the action described is action which employees are entitled to take according to the applicable enterprise agreement (i.e. taking the full period of all meal and rest breaks provided for in clause 33 of the 2019 Agreement). I do not consider taking action one is entitled to take pursuant to an enterprise agreement can properly be characterised as industrial action. The question will not form part of the ballot.
Section 443(5) of the Act grants the Commission a discretionary power to specify a longer period of notice than the 3 working days referred to in s.414(2)(a), if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying this.
The principles to be applied in relation to an extension of the notice period were outlined in decision of the Full Bench in National Tertiary Education Industry Unions v Charles Darwin University.[15] In particular, the Full Bench outlined the following:
· the right to otherwise give three working days’ written notice of industrial action “should not lightly be curtailed” by the imposition of a longer period of notice;[16]
· the meaning to be given to the expression “exceptional circumstances justifying” in s.443(5) is that which was discussed in the following terms in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Unions of Australia v Australian Postal Corporation:
“[10] … In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.”[17]
· The determination of whether the circumstances in a particular case are “exceptional” involves an evaluative judgement.[18]
· A member of the Commission must first identify or make findings about the particular facts or circumstances in relation to the proposed industrial action which are said to inform the evaluative judgement that such factors or circumstances are exceptional circumstances, with the phrase “exceptional circumstances” carrying its ordinary meaning.[19]
· There must be a consideration whether the identified exceptional circumstances are circumstances “justifying” a longer notice period. This also involves an evaluative judgement made on the basis of probative material. The use of the verb “justifying” in s.443(5) signifies that the identified exceptional circumstances must show or prove that it is reasonable or necessary or the circumstances warrant or provide good reason to require a longer period of written notice.[20]
· If the member is satisfied there are exceptional circumstances justifying a longer period of notice, there must be a consideration of whether to exercise the discretion and, if so, the additional period of notice that should be given in the circumstances.[21]
These principles were endorsed by the Full Bench in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v DP World Brisbane Pty Ltd t/a DP World and Others,[22] and on appeal in that proceeding, the Full Court of the Federal Court said the following in relation to National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Charles Darwin University:
“The Full Bench in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Charles Darwin University was not suggesting that in order to properly discharge the statutory function the reasons for a decision had to be structured into three separate and distinct parts. The Full Bench was providing guidance on the statutory provision which provides that if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a), being longer than 3 working days, the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period.”[23]
In this matter, I am satisfied there are exceptional circumstances. Cabrini is a healthcare provider charged with operating two hospitals in conditions that are still highly impacted by the pervasive nature of the COVID-19 pandemic. Significant amongst these are factors impacting the availability of staff. I am satisfied these conditions justify the longer notice periods sought for each of questions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 because Cabrini has a responsibility to minimise risk and harm to its patients and the need to ensure continuity of care requires it to have the capacity to source the necessary staff. Having regard to all the circumstances of this matter, and in particular patient welfare considerations, I am satisfied I should exercise the discretion provided in s.443(5) and order that the additional periods of notice the parties have agreed, be given.
Finally, s.444 of the Act states:
“444 FWC may decide on ballot agent other than the Australian Electoral Commission and independent advisor
Alternative ballot agent
(1) The FWC may decide that a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission is to be the protected action ballot agent for a protected action ballot only if:
(a) the person is specified in the application for the protected action ballot order as the person the applicant wishes to be the protected action ballot agent; and
(b) the FWC is satisfied that:
(i) the person is a fit and proper person to conduct the ballot; and
(ii) any other requirements prescribed by the regulations are met.
The Regulations provide:
“Reg 3.11 FWC may decide on ballot agent other than the Australian Electoral Commission--requirements for protected action ballot agent
(1) For subparagraph 444(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, this regulation sets out requirements that the FWC must be satisfied have been met before a person other than the Australian Electoral Commission becomes the protected action ballot agent for a protected action ballot.
Note: The person must also be a fit and proper person to conduct the ballot.
(2) The person must be capable of ensuring the secrecy and security of votes cast in the ballot.
(3) The person must be capable of ensuring that the ballot will be fair and democratic.
(4) The person must be capable of conducting the ballot expeditiously.
(5) The person must have agreed to be a protected action ballot agent.
(6) The person must be bound to comply with the Privacy Act 1988 in respect to the handling of information relating to the protected action ballot.
(7) If the person is an industrial association or a body corporate, the FWC must be satisfied that:
(a) each individual who will carry out the functions of the protected action ballot agent for the industrial association or body corporate is a fit and proper person to conduct the ballot; and
(b) the requirements in subregulations (2) to (6) are met for the individual.
Having regard to the extensive and unchallenged material before me, I am satisfied that TrueVote wishes to be the protected action ballot agent and that TrueVote is a fit and proper person to conduct the ballot. I am also satisfied that Mr Donaldson and TrueVote are capable of ensuring the secrecy and security of the votes, are capable of ensuring that the ballot will be fair and democratic and are capable of conducting the ballot expeditiously. TrueVote and Mr Donaldson have agreed to be the protected action ballot agent and are bound to comply with the Privacy Act 1998 with respect to the handling of the information relating to the protected action ballot.
In these circumstances, it falls for me to determine whether I should exercise the discretionary power available to me in s.444 of the Act and decide that Truevote is to be the protected action ballot agent for a protected action ballot. I have determined that I should appoint TrueVote as the protected action ballot agent.
Conclusion
For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the Union has satisfied the statutory prerequisites for a protected action ballot order, and accordingly, I must make a protected ballot action order. As to the questions, I have determined that proposed questions 9 and 10 should remain part of the ballot but proposed question 8 should not. I am also satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice being longer than 3 working days in respect of the action proposed in questions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 and that I should exercise my discretion and order that the additional periods of notice the parties have agreed, be given. Finally, I am satisfied the requirements of s.444 and regulation 3.11 are met and this is an appropriate matter in which to exercise the discretionary power in s.444 and decide that TrueVote is to be the ballot agent. The Order will be issued separately to this decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
Appearances:
T Fooks and A Leszczynski for the Health Services Union
A Shepherd for Cabrini Health Ltd
Hearing details:
2022.
By Video via Microsoft Teams:
October 31.
<PR747507>
[1] See s.437 of the Fair Work Act 2009.
[2] Unsworn Statement of Kirby Young at [6]
[3] Unsworn Witness Statement of Robyne Renton at [2]-[4], [10]; Witness Statement of Kirby Young at [10].
[4] Witness statement of Kirby Young at [9]-[10].
[5] Fair Work Act (2009), s.437(1).
[6] Ibid, s.437(3)(b) and s.437(4).
[7] Ibid, s.438(1).
[8] Ibid, s.440.
[9] Ibid, s.443(1)(b) and with reference to the Statutory Declaration of John Ryan.
[10] Ibid, s.443(1).
[11] Ibid, s.443(3)(d).
[12] [2017] FWCFB 4740.
[13] Ibid at [44].
[14] Ibid at [18].
[15] 2018] FWCFB 4011.
[16] Ibid at [20].
[17] 2018] FWCFB 4011 at [21].
[18] Ibid at [23].
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid at [24].
[21] Ibid at [25].
[22] [2019] FWCFB 1150 at [13]-[15].
[23] [2019] FCAFC 99 at [16].
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
0
3
0