Conlan v Walker

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Conlan v Walker [2011] FCA 347

Citation: Conlan v Walker [2011] FCA 347
Parties: MARK ANTHONY CONLAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF DUNCAN ALLISTER WALKER and LINCOLN AGENCIES (WA) PTY LTD ACN 071 035 160 v BEVERLY CLARE WALKER AS TRUSTEE OF THE DUNCAN WALKER FAMILY TRUST; BEVERLY CLARE WALKER AS TRUSTEE OF THE DUNCAN WALKER FAMILY TRUST; MARK ANTHONY CONLAN
File number: WAD 67 of 2010
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 12 April 2011
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – Application to restrain use of documents - whether documents should be characterised as a without prejudice communication – whether documents are subject to legal professional privilege generally or under the Propend rule – whether without prejudice privilege inhering in certain documents has been waived – whether documents fall under exception to the rule in Propend
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 30, ss 77, 120(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Cases cited: Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; (1997) 188 CLR 501
Dalrymple Park Pty Ltd v Tabe & Lees Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, 5 December 1997)
Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1
Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading SA v TMT Asia Ltd [2010] UKSC 44; (2010) 3 WLR 1424
Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd [2009] SASC 377; (2009) 262 ALR 738
Date of hearing: 28 March 2011
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 62
Counsel for the Applicants/Cross Respondent: Mr R J Price
Solicitor for the Applicants/Cross Respondent: Brickhills
Counsel for the Respondent/Cross-Claimant: Mr D H Solomon
Solicitor for the Respondent/Cross-Claimant: Solomon Brothers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 67 of 2010

BETWEEN:

MARK ANTHONY CONLAN AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF DUNCAN ALLISTER WALKER
First Applicant

LINCOLN AGENCIES (WA) PTY LTD ACN 071 035 160
Second Applicant

AND:

BEVERLY CLARE WALKER AS TRUSTEE OF THE DUNCAN WALKER FAMILY TRUST
Respondent

BEVERLY CLARE WALKER AS TRUSTEE OF THE DUNCAN WALKER FAMILY TRUST
Cross-Claimant

AND:

MARK ANTHONY CONLAN
Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 APRIL 2011

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The documents described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h) and (j) of the Schedule to the respondent’s amended interim application filed 17 March 2011 and currently in the possession of the first applicant are the subject of legal professional privilege and may not be used in these proceedings and ought be returned to Duncan Allister Walker as soon as practicable.

2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the interim application to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 67…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Conlan v Walker involved the dispute over the use of certain documents in legal proceedings. The parties involved were Conlan and Walker, with the latter seeking to restrain the use of specific documents that were claimed to be privileged. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the primary focus was on determining the nature and extent of the privilege claimed over these documents.

The central legal issues that the court had to resolve included whether the documents should be characterised as without prejudice communications and whether they were subject to legal professional privilege either generally or under the Propend rule. Additionally, the court needed to decide if the without prejudice privilege inhering in certain documents had been waived and whether these documents fell under an exception to the rule in Propend. The determination of these issues was crucial in deciding the admissibility of the documents in the ongoing proceedings.

In its reasoning, the court found that there was no basis to conclude that by putting the without prejudice discussions of 28 June 2005 in issue, any other privilege, including general legal professional privilege or Propend privilege, had been waived in the documents in question. The court also held that there was no inconsistency between the conduct of the Walkers in allowing the respondent to run its constructional case and the maintenance of the primary legal professional privilege or Propend privilege they individually may have in these other documents. Given the findings, the court made declarations concerning the status of the privileged documents, understanding that the applicants would not use or return those documents for the purpose of the proceeding. The court ordered that the privileged documents be returned to Duncan Allister Walker and that the applicants pay the respondent's costs of the interim application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The documents described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h) and (j) of the Schedule to the respondent’s amended interim application filed 17 March 2011 and currently in the possession of the first applicant are the subject of legal professional privilege and may not be used in these proceedings and ought be returned to Duncan Allister Walker as soon as practicable.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the interim application to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no basis to find, however, that, by the conduct of putting in issue the without prejudice discussions of 28 June 2005, any other privilege, be it general legal professional privilege or privilege under the Propend rule, has been waived in the documents in question. There is no relevant inconsistency between the conduct of the Walkers in allowing the respondent to run its constructional case in the manner described, and the maintenance of the primary legal professional privilege or Propend privilege they individually may have in these other documents.CONCLUSION AND ORDER In these circumstances the respondent is entitled to the substance of the relief it seeks in respect of the documents described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h) and (j) of the schedule to the amended interim application filed 17 March 2011. A question arises whether, in light of my findings, and the fact that privilege in these documents inheres in Mr Walker, it is necessary or appropriate for the Court to grant injunctions against the applicants concerning the use and return of the privileged documents. In my view, given the status of the first applicant and his control of the second applicant, and the background to this application, it is sufficient for the Court to make declarations concerning the status of the privileged documents on the understanding that the applicants will then not use or return those documents for the purpose of this proceeding. The respondent is, however, entitled to its costs of this application. The Court:1.Declares that the documents described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (h) and (j) of the Schedule to the respondent’s amended interim application filed 17 March 2011 and currently in the possession of the first applicant, are the subject of legal professional privilege and may not be used in these proceedings and ought be returned to Duncan Allister Walker as soon as practicable.2.Orders that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the interim application to be taxed if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.