"Confidential" and Industry Research and Development Board
[2006] AATA 387
•4 May 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 387
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2005/1060
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re
“Confidential”
Applicant
And
Industry Research and Development Board
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Professor GD Walker, Deputy President Date4 May 2006
PlaceSydney
Decision The tribunal does have jurisdiction to review the respondent’s decision of 12 July 2005 in respect of the applicant’s application for registration of its research and development activities for the 2000/2001 income year.
..............................................
Professor GD Walker
Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
INDUSTRY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACT – jurisdiction of tribunal – registration for research and development activities – whether there was a decision made in respect of the applicant’s registration for 2000/2001 – the failure to comply with any precondition for internal review is irrelevant to the tribunal as the Board had made a factual decision – it is not the tribunal’s function to determine whether the internal review decision was correct – the tribunal is not deprived of jurisdiction because it is a decision of an intermediate appeal body being reviewed.
Industry Research and Development Act 1986 ss 39HH, 39J, 39L, 39S, 39T
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 ss 73B(1), 73(1)
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194
Clisdell v Commissioner of Police (1993) 31 NSWLR 555
Collector of Customs (New South Wales) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 24 ALR 307; 41 FLR 338
Lees and Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Ahmed (2005) 143 FCR 314
Re Moon and Repatriation Commission (2004) 85 ALD 477
Re Brian Lawlor Automotive and Collector of Customs (NSW) (1978) 1 ALD 167
Re Luke McWilliam and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2005] AATA 1148
Seventh Mingcourt Pty Ltd v Lawrence (1996) 64 FCR 367
Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 344
REASONS FOR DECISION
JURISDICTION ISSUE
4 May 2006
Professor GD Walker, Deputy President Summary
1. In December 1999, the applicant applied for advance registration under s 39HH of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (IRD Act) for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 years of income in respect of “Project Horizon”. Subsequently, in February 2002, the applicant lodged an application for registration under s 39J of the IRD Act for research and development tax concessions under s 73B of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (“the Tax Act”) for the 2000/2001 year of income in respect to “Project Horizon”.
2. On about 12 July 2005, the respondent, the Industry Research and Development Board (“the Board”) decided that the applicant’s activities for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 income years did not satisfy the definition of research and development under s 73B(1) of the Tax Act as the activities did not involve “innovation or high levels of technical risk”. That is the decision the subject of review by the tribunal.
Issue
3. The preliminary issue for the tribunal to determine in this matter is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decision or purported decision made by the Board on 12 July 2005 in respect of the applicant’s application for registration of its research and development activities for the 2000/2001 income year.
Background
4. The applicant is a large aggregate and pre-mixed concrete company, operating numerous hard rock, sand and gravel quarries and permanent concrete operations in all states and territories of Australia. Before its takeover in 2000, the former company had identified the need to change radically its existing business operations in order better to manage itself as a competitive international company, increase efficiency and lower costs, become more customer oriented while maintaining a competitive advantage and improving its business systems. To that end it developed the initiative “Project Horizon” to revamp its “end to end” operations and systems through new technology including new call centre technology, manufacturing control systems, transport optimising scheduling and dispatching systems, truck communications and monitoring systems, and integrated packaged software.
5. On 24 December 1999, the applicant lodged with the Board (known then as AusIndustry), an application for advance registration of its research and development activities under s 39HH of the IRD Act in relation to “Project Horizon”, for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 income years (T3A). On 27 April 2000, the applicant lodged an application for registration of its research and development activities for the 1998/1999 income years with the Board. In May 2000, the Board registered the applicant for the 1998/1999 income years (T7).
6. On 4 July 2000, the Board notified the applicant of its refusal for advanced registration under s 39HH of the IRD Act in respect of the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 income years (T14).
7. On 6 April 2001, the company lodged an application for registration with the Board in respect of its research and development activities for the 1999/2000 income years.
8. On 24 February 2002, the company lodged a further application for registration of its research and development activities under s 39J of the IRD Act in respect of the 2000/2001 income years (being the year the preliminary question relates to). That application was not received by the Board until 26 April 2002 (T29 p291). On approximately 27 May 2002, an unidentified officer of the Board made a recommendation (T39 p341):
that you refuse registration under section 39J of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 of the R&D activities claimed for Project Horizon (PH99/1) by [the applicant], on the grounds that the claimed activities are not research and development activities.
9. On 10 April 2002 at a meeting of the Tax Concession Committee of AusIndustry (T33), a decision was made to refuse the company registration under s 39J of the IRD Act in respect of its activities undertaken in respect of “Project Horizon” for the 1999/2000 income year because they did not satisfy the criteria in s 73B(1) of the Tax Act as being innovative or having high levels of technical risk. The Board also determined that the company’s activities for the 1998/1999 income year did not qualify for the same reasons (T34 p328). A determination under s 39J of the IRD Act was subsequently issued in respect of the 1999/2000 income year (T32) and a determination under s 39L was issued in respect of the 1998/1999 income year (T31 p325).
10. On 12 April 2002, AusIndustry notified the company’s then accountants, Michael Johnson & Associates, that registration under s 39J of the IRD Act had been refused in relation to “Project Horizon” for the 1999/2000 income year (T36). On 13 May 2002, the applicant requested a review of that decision and on 30 May 2002, the Board informed it that it agreed to undertake such review.
11. By letter dated 29 May 2002 (T41A p345), the Board wrote to the company acknowledging receipt of its application for registration for the 2000/2001 income years. The letter stated, inter alia:
At this point, no decision has been reached on whether to register the activities described in the application for the R&D Tax Concession.
To assist the Industry Research and Development Board (IR&D Board) in arriving at a decision on whether to accept the registration application, AusIndustry would appreciate your comments and elaboration on the following issues.
…
In view of Board decisions either to issue a certificate or to refuse registration, I would request that you confirm whether the description of R&D activities in the PCM Application for Registration for financial year 2000/01 is for the same activities described in PCM applications for financial year 1998/99 and 1999/00.
12. On approximately 28 April 2003, the applicant lodged an application for registration under s 39J of the IRD Act for research and development associated with “Project Horizon” for the 2001/2002 income years (T46). Approval of registration was notified to the company on 15 May 2003 (T48).
13. On approximately 1 September 2004, the applicant requested the Board conduct a review under s 39S of the IRD Act in relation to its refusal to register the company for the 1999/2000 income year (T58).
14. On 12 July 2005, the respondent made a decision under s 39S of the IRD Act which stated (T74 p1830):
That the IR&D Board confirms its original decision of 10 April 2002 that all activities for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/01 income years (December 1998 to February 2001) do not satisfy the definition of research and development activities in subsection 73B(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as they do not involve innovation or high levels of technical risk.
15. By letter dated 21 July 2005, the Board notified the company of its decision. The letter stated, inter alia (T75 pp1831-1832):
I am writing on behalf of the Industry Research and Development Board (the Board) concerning the claim by your company for the R&D Tax Concession under Section 73B of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (the ITAA 1936) for the 1998/99 to 2001/02 years of income.
As you are aware, the Board issued a certificate to the Commissioner of Taxation on 11 April 2002 under Section 39L of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (the IR&D Act).
In response to your request under Section 39S of the IR&D Act, the Board has reconsidered its original decision and has confirmed the decision as follows.
The activities do not meet the statutory requirements for the following reasons:
1. the activities were of the type routinely undertaken in Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) projects and did not contain an appreciable element of novelty. Although the activities may have required expertise in the methodologies including those relating to interfacing of software, it is considered that optimising the configuration could have been achieved by most computer engineers competent in the field; and
2. the activities did not contain high levels of technical risk because of:
i) the use of well established protocols,
ii) the involvement of software providers and an implementation partner, and
iii) the successful ERP projects previously undertaken by numerous companies in the building materials sector using this business management technique. These precedents allowed the probability of the technical outcome of the activities to be reliably known in advance.
The decision has been conveyed to the Commissioner of Taxation. Please find attached a copy of the certificate under Section 39S of the Act which replaces the original certificate issued by the Board.
…
The letter then advised the company of its appeal rights to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
16. By letter dated 22 July 2005, the Board wrote to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation stating, inter alia (T76 p1833):
I am writing on behalf of the Industry Research and Development Board (the Board) concerning the certificate issued under Section 39L of the Industry Research and Development Act 1986 (the IR&D Act 1986) on 11 April 2002 in relation to a claim by [the applicant] for the R&D Tax Concession for the 1998/99 to 2001/2002 years of income.
The Board has reviewed its original decision under Section 39S of the Act and has confirmed and varied its decision as follows:
1. The activities were of a type routinely undertaken …
2. The activities did not contain high levels of technical risk because of:
…
This certificate under Section 39S of the Act replaces the original certificate issued by the Board. …
17. On 16 August 2005, the company lodged an application for a review of that decision with the tribunal. In its reasons for application the company stated, inter alia, that the Board erred in not accepting the application for registration of research and development activities for the financial years 1998/1999 (application dated 27 April 2000), 1999/2000 (application dated 6 April 2001), 2000/2001 (application dated 24 February 2002) and 2001/2002 (application dated 28 April 2003).
18. On 20 September 2005, in compliance with s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the respondent filed its statement of reasons. Those reasons stated, inter alia:
2000-2001 year
…
35 [the applicant] was not registered for this year.
…
History of decisions
…
44 On 29 May 2002, AusIndustry wrote to the applicant about its application for registration under section 39J in respect of Project Horizon for the 2000-01 year of income (T-41A).
45 That letter noted the Board’s recent decision that the activities in relation to Project Horizon were not research and development activities and sought confirmation as to whether the descriptions of the activities for the 2000-01 year were the same activities described in the 1998-99 and 1999-00 applications (T-41A).
46 By letter dated 12 July 2002, the applicant’s representative confirmed that the activities for the 2000-01 year were the same but the 2000-01 application included additional comments under paragraph 5(c) of Schedule 2 in relation to delays (T-43).
47 The applicant was not registered for this year of income, but no formal decision was made.
…
Reasons for decisions
…
145 The Board therefore found that the particular activities specified in the applicant’s section 39J applications for the 1998-99 to 2000-01 income years did not meet the statutory definition of research and development activities for the following reasons:
…
19. At the hearing of this matter on the preliminary issue, the applicant was represented by Elizabeth Collins, counsel, instructed by Simon Florance, solicitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers Legal, and the respondent was represented by Dr Margaret Allars, counsel, instructed by Kim Robbins, special counsel, Phillips Fox solicitors. The documents before the tribunal comprised the documents produced pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T Documents) together with evidence tendered by the parties at the hearing.
Relevant Legislation
20. The primary legislation in this matter is the Industry Research and Development Act 1986. Section 39J provides:
Registration of eligible companies
(1) Subject to section 39K, if:
(a) an eligible company applies to the Board for registration in relation to its research and development activities in respect of a year of income; and
(aa) the application is in accordance with section 39JD; and
(b) the company provides to the Board such information in relation to its research and development activities as the Board reasonably requires;
the Board shall register the company, in relation to those research and development activities, in respect of that year of income.
21. Section 39K(1) of the IRD Act provides that the Board can refuse to register an eligible company in relation to particular research and development activities in respect of a particular year, on the ground that the activities are not research and development activities.
22. Section 39L provides:
Certificate as to research and development activities
(1) The Board may, and shall if requested in writing by the Commissioner to do so, give to the Commissioner a certificate stating whether particular activities that have been or are being carried on by or on behalf of a person were or are research and development activities.
(2) If the Board issues a certificate to the effect that particular activities were not or are not research and development activities, the Board must give notice in writing to the person concerned stating the reasons for issuing the certificate.
23. The mechanism for internal review of decisions is provided in s 39S which states:
Internal review of decisions
(1) This section applies to a decision of the Board under section 39ED, subsection 39EE(3), subsection 39EF(2) or (4), subsection 39F(4), (6), (7) or (9), section 39FA, 39HH, 39J, 39JE, 39L, 39LAA or 39LA, subsection 39P(3) or 39PB(3).
Note: A decision of the Board whether to register a company as mentioned in subsection 39JF(1) is a decision of the Board under section 39J to which this section applies.
(1A) This section also applies to a decision of the Board under the finance scheme guidelines.
(2) A person who is affected by a decision of the Board may, if dissatisfied with the decision, by notice given to the Board:
(a) within the period of 21 days after receiving notice of the decision; or
(b) within such further period as the Board allows;
request the Board to reconsider the decision.
(3) The request must set out the reasons for making the request.
(4) Upon receipt of the request, the Board must reconsider the decision and may, subject to subsection (5), confirm or revoke the decision or vary the decision in such manner as the Board thinks fit.
24. Section 37T of the IRD Act provides:
Review of decisions by Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(1) Applications may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of decisions of the Board:
(a) that have been confirmed or varied under subsection 39S(4); or
(b) under subsection 39G(4), section 39HD, 39HF, 39M or 39MA or subsection 39N(2), 39P(4) or 39PB(6).
25. The expression “research and development” is defined in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 as follows:
Certain expenditure on research and development activities
"research and development activities" means:
(a) systematic, investigative and experimental activities that involve innovation or high levels of technical risk and are carried on for the purpose of:
(i) acquiring new knowledge (whether or not that knowledge will have a specific practical application); or
(ii) creating new or improved materials, products, devices, processes or services; or
(b) other activities that are carried on for a purpose directly related to the carrying on of activities of the kind referred to in paragraph (a).
26. The relevant provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provide:
3 Unless the contrary intention appears, a reference in this Act to a decision includes a reference to:
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination;
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission;
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or other instrument;
(d) imposing a condition or restriction;
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement;
(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or
(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing.
25 Tribunal may review certain decisions
Enactment may provide for applications for review of decisions
(1) An enactment may provide that applications may be made to the Tribunal:
(a) for review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by that enactment; or
(b) for the review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred, or that may be conferred, by another enactment having effect under that enactment.
…
(4) The Tribunal has power to review any decision in respect of which application is made to it under any enactment.
26 Restriction on powers of decision-maker after application for review is made
(1) Subject to section 42D, after an application is made to the Tribunal for a review of a decision, the decision may not be altered otherwise than by the Tribunal on the review unless:
(a) the enactment that authorised the making of the application expressly permits the decision to be altered; or
(b) the parties to the proceeding, and the Tribunal, consent to the making of the alteration.
Submissions and consideration
27. Both the applicant and respondent made written and oral submissions on the preliminary issue of whether the tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of the decision or purported decision made in respect of the 2000/2001 income tax years.
28. The applicant submitted that no primary decision was made in respect of its application relating to the 2000/2001 income year and that the failure to register the company for this year cannot be characterised as a “refusal” to register, as a “refusal” requires the doing of an act or thing and does not extend to inertia or inaction whether inadvertent or deliberate. The applicant submits that the respondent’s contention that the absence of a primary decision in relation to the 2000/2001 application does not matter because the secondary decision of 12 July 2005 expressly deals with it is incorrect. The applicant submitted that the tribunal gains its power to review a decision under s 39S by the provisions of s 39T. Section 39S also provides for internal review by the Board and if such a review is sought, the board must reconsider the decision and may confirm, revoke or vary the decision in a manner which it thinks fit.
29. In the applicant’s submission, there is a three-tier process of review involved under the IRD Act – first, the original decision is made under s 39J or s 39L, second, a decision is made on internal review under s 39S and third, a decision of the tribunal under s 39T. Section 39T(1)(a) provides that the tribunal can review a decision which has been varied or confirmed, a process of indirect review. Section 39T(1)(b) provides a direct AAT review in certain other classes of case. The Act should be construed so as to give effect to the direct/indirect distinction.
30. Section 39S requires a primary decision to reconsider. In this case, the applicant submits, the decision on internal review which purportedly dealt with the applicant’s 2000/2001 application is incorrect as there was no primary decision to “reconsider” and “confirm, revoke or vary” as it saw fit.
31. Further, in addition to there being no primary decision in relation to its application for registration for 2000/2001, there is a fundamental error relating to the effect of s 39S(4) which permits the board, on reconsideration, to confirm, revoke or vary a primary decision. The Board’s decision of 12 July 2005 purported to “confirm its original decision of 10 April 2002 that all activities for the 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 income years do not satisfy ...”, yet the company’s application for registration for the 2000/2001 income year (which was dated 24 February 2002) was not received by AusIndustry until 26 April 2002.
In other words, [the company’s] application for registration for 2000/2001 under s39J was not even received by the Board until after the Board had made its s.39L decision for 1998/1999 and 39J decision for 1999/2000, on 10 April 2002.
In making its s39S decision to confirm its original decision of 10 April 2002 the Board erroneously described the original decision as being a decision which extended to the 2000/2001 year. The Board’s misdescription of what the original decision actually constituted cannot give the Tribunal jurisdiction to review [the applicant’s] application for registration for 2000/2001.
The provision is not self-executing and cannot operate in the present case because of the lack of a primary decision. Section 39U, the applicant further submitted, supports that contention, presupposing as it does the existence of an original decision capable of affecting a person’s interests.
32. Counsel for the respondent submitted that non-compliance with a procedural requirement associated with the making of the primary decision under s 39J for the 2000/2001 income year cannot preclude the Board from having purported, or intended, to make a decision under s 39S of the IRD Act. The respondent does not concede there was any defect in the process in making the s 39 decision, and the minutes of the Board and statement of reasons are evidence that it purported to make a decision under s 39S. The respondent submitted that there is no need for an original decision to exist in fact or law in order for the Board to have purported to have made a decision under s 39S and that the use of the expression “original decision” in the provision conferring jurisdiction upon the internal review decision-maker does not preclude a factual inference from the available material that the internal review decision-maker purported to exercise the power as described in the materials.
33. The respondent also argued that the applicant’s letter of 13 May 2002 (T38) requesting review was general and not tied to any particular year. To the applicant, however, the respondent’s reply of 30 May 2002 (t42) showed that the application was not general in scope.
34. Both the applicant and the respondent in their written submissions referred the tribunal to Collector of Customs (New South Wales) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 24 ALR 307; 41 FLR 338 which established that the AAT has power to review a decision irrespective of whether the decision was made in excess of power. Bowen CJ held at 315:
In the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act a wide meaning is given to the word "decision" by s. 3(3). In s. 25 it appears to me that the word simply refers to a decision in fact made, regardless of whether or not it is a legally effective decision.
…
However, in the ordinary course, it would be reasonably clear from the objective facts under which enactment or in the exercise of which statutory powers an official had purported to act. The adoption of this view would mean that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal would have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision in fact made, which purported to be made in the exercise of powers under an enactment. It could then proceed to determine whether the decision was properly made in fact and in law. There is nothing unusual in holding that an administrative decision which is legally ineffective or void is susceptible of appeal: see Calvin v. Carr (1979) 53 ALJR 471.
35. The applicant sought to distinguish Brian Lawlor on the ground that in this case, no primary decision had been made in respect of the applicant’s registration for the 2000/2001 income year and therefore there was nothing to confirm. The decision made under s 39S therefore has no bearing on the application for registration for 2000/2001, it being a confirmation of decisions made earlier in relation to other income years.
36. The respondent submitted that Brian Lawlor has been consistently applied by the tribunal where the jurisdiction of the tribunal has been challenged on the ground of a legal defect in the decision under review: see Re Moon and Repatriation Commission (2004) 85 ALD 477; Re Luke McWilliam and Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2005] AATA 1148; in relation to other federal merits review tribunals: see Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 344; in relation to appeals from state tribunals: see Clisdell v Commissioner of Police (1993) 31 NSWLR 555; and in the context of judicial review: see Seventh Mingcourt Pty Ltd v Lawrence (1996) 64 FCR 367.
37. In this case, the respondent submitted, the applicant’s argument that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction under s 39T(1)(a) to review the decision under s 39S -
flies in the face of the construction reached by the Full Federal Court and by this Tribunal of many similar provisions in a variety of enactments in cases where the Brian Lawlor principle has been applied. When a decision is “confirmed or varied under section 39S(4)” the Board’s internal review decision replaces a primary decision or purports to do so. If the primary decision is invalid, and hence void and of no effect, then according to Brian Lawlor all that is required to establish the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is that the Board purported to review the invalid primary decision. … the Tribunal is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because there was no primary decision to confirm, revoke or vary. That is the very principle established by Brian Lawlor.
38. In my view that submission is correct. The absence of a factual primary decision might well raise a jurisdictional problem if a direct appeal were launched, but not where, as in this case, it is the decision of an intermediate appeal body (the Board) that the applicant seeks to have reviewed.
39. The Board’s decision of 12 July 2005 purported to relate, inter alia, to the applicant’s 2000/2001 income year. Its reasons for decision supported that approach, with findings that treated Project Horizon as a global entity and applied to income years that included 2000/2001.
40. While s 39T does contemplate a three-tier hierarchy of decision-making, the failure to comply with any preconditions for internal review becomes irrelevant from this tribunal’s viewpoint once the Board has made a factual decision, as it has in this case. Contrarily to the applicant’s submission, it is not the tribunal’s function to determine whether the internal review decision was correct. It has long been held that the tribunal’s proceedings are de novo and that it stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker, exercising the same powers in accordance with its own conclusions of law and fact (Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409; Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194, 203-204). It can if it sees fit set aside a reviewable decision that contains no error, or affirm a decision that does contain an error.
41. To decide otherwise would be to fall into the error against which the Full Court of the Federal Court cautioned in Zubair v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 139 FCR 344 at 353:
… There is no reason why the Act, which provides for a full merits review by the Tribunal of decisions which may be brought to it, should impose upon the Tribunal the task of culling out those decisions which may involve jurisdictional error on the part of the original decision-maker. That would impose an unnecessary additional complexity upon the merits review process. Moreover, it may expose the Tribunal’s decision as to the existence of a valid delegate’s decision (as jurisdictional fact on the appellant’s argument) to review by a court even where (as here) the Tribunal has fully reviewed the decision on the merits. Administrative convenience strongly points to an alternative conclusion to that urged by senior counsel of the appellant. …
42. The powerful rationale set out in that passage provides the unifying principle that connects Brian Lawlor and the other cases that have applied it. While it may have the effect, as the applicant argues, of allowing the Board’s alleged misdescription of the original decision to give the tribunal jurisdiction to review the applicant’s registration application for 2000/2001, such a result is consistent with the legislation’s purpose, as seen by the Federal Court, of minimising complexity and the possibilities for error.
43. I therefore conclude that this tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decision or purported decision made by the Board on 12 July 2005 in respect of the applicant’s application for registration of its research and development activities for the 2000/2001 income year.
I certify that the 43 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Professor GD Walker, Deputy President
Signed: .....................................................................................
AssociateDate/s of Hearing 18 April 2006
Date of Decision 4 May 2006
Counsel for the Applicant Ms E Collins
Solicitor for the Applicant Mr S Florance
Counsel for the Respondent Dr M Allars
Solicitor for the Respondent Ms K Robbins
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