Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board v Dexter

Case [2004] FCA 1434


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board v Dexter [2004] FCA 1434

SUPERANNUATION – Superannuation Complaints Tribunal – jurisdiction and powers – decision of trustee of a superannuation fund that accumulated contributions refunded to the member and subsequently repaid to fund commenced to accrue interest from the date repaid – whether open to Tribunal to find that decision not fair and reasonable – whether Tribunal found that the trustee’s decision contrary to law – whether open to Tribunal to consider that trustee’s decision based on too narrow a view of trustee’s powers – whether Tribunal bound to confine its examination of the complaint to the actual decision of the trustee – whether Tribunal could remit decision to the trustee for reconsideration in accordance with directions

Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 14, 37, 6, 11, 14AA
Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) ss 137, 157(1), 27A, 27C, 27D, 3(1), 80, 8(2), 7A, 140(2), 140(3), 154A, 244
Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth)
Superannuation (Interest) Regulations (Cth) reg 5

Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited v Brayley [2002] FCA 1333 followed
Alcoa of Australia Retirement Plan Pty Ltd v Thompson [2002] FCA 256 (2002) 116 FCR 139 cited
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Crocker [2001] FCA 1330 (2001) 48 ATR 359 followed
Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 followed
Goldie v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 433 (2002) 117 FCR 566 followed

COMMONWEALTH SUPERANNUATION SCHEME BOARD v BRIDGET FAIRLAM DEXTER
V 493 of 2002

GRAY J
2 DECEMBER 2004
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 493 of 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

CSS BOARD
APPLICANT

AND:

BRIDGET FAIRLAM DEXTER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 493 of 2002

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

CSS BOARD
APPLICANT

AND:

BRIDGET FAIRLAM DEXTER
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE:

2 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The nature and history of the proceeding

  1. This appeal from a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) concerns the extent of the powers of the Tribunal.  The question is whether the Tribunal has the power to decide that a decision of a trustee of a superannuation fund was not fair and reasonable, because of the circumstances attending it, although the decision itself is correct in law. 

  2. Pursuant to ss 14 and 37 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) (‘the SRC Act’), the Tribunal was dealing with a complaint about a decision of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board (‘the CSS Board’), made on 4 February 1999. The CSS Board’s decision was that accumulated contributions to the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (‘the CSS’) fund made by the respondent, Ms Dexter,…

Continue reading Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board v Dexter

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board v Dexter [2004] FCA 1434
Case
[2004] FCA 1434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme Board appealed against a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal, which had made an order requiring the Board to pay compensation to Ms Dexter for its failure to advise her of her superannuation rights. The Board's contention was that the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to make an order for compensation in this case. The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had the power to order compensation for the failure to advise Ms Dexter of her superannuation rights and whether the Board's appeal was successful. The court found that the Tribunal did have the jurisdiction to make an order for compensation as it had the same powers as the trustee of the fund and could make a determination in accordance with the governing rules of the fund. The court also found that the Board's appeal was not successful, and therefore, the orders of the Tribunal were affirmed. The orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The CSS Board appealed to the Court. Ms Dexter, who has left Australia, played no part in the hearing of the appeal, apart from providing the Court with a written submission, which canvassed in detail a number of factual issues and put arguments about her case. Counsel for the CSS Board made it clear that the purpose of the appeal was to clarify the powers of the Tribunal. Accordingly, the CSS Board did not seek an order for its costs of the appeal if it should be successful. The facts From 9 February 1976 to 8 December 1978, Ms Dexter was employed by the Australian National University (‘ANU’). On 15 January 1979, she commenced employment with the Australian Public Service (‘APS’) in the Department of Administrative Services (‘DAS’). She remained in this employment until 5 December 1985, although from 18 March 1983 she was on leave without pay. The period of her leave without pay was excluded from the calculation of her eligible service for superannuation purposes. From the time of her employment with the APS, she became a member of the CSS. After her resignation on 5 December 1985, if Ms Dexter wished to preserve her entitlements within the CSS fund, she was required by s 137(1) of the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the 1976 Act’) to elect to do so within 21 days, by notice in writing to the Commissioner for Superannuation (‘the Commissioner’). Ms Dexter did not so elect. She claims that she was advised that she had not served a sufficiently long period of employment in the public sector to permit her to preserve her entitlement. Accordingly, on 26 March 1987, Ms Dexter signed a form stating that she applied for a refund of her accumulated contributions. She also signed documents authorising the ‘rollover’ of her accumulated contributions to a particular approved deposit fund. Her entitlement in the CSS fund was thus effectively withdrawn and transferred. On 2 February 1992, Ms Dexter rejoined the APS, this time with the Department of Finance and Administration (‘DoFA’). She joined, and made contributions to, the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (‘the PSS’), which had replaced the CSS as the scheme for new public servants, pursuant to the Superannuation Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the 1990 Act’). In fact, as is now recognised, Ms Dexter was eligible to preserve her entitlements in the CSS fund on 5 December 1985. This was because her prior service with the ANU ought to have been taken into account. When added to her service with DAS, this clearly gave her a total period of eligible service in excess of the five-year threshold, so as to entitle her to preserve her benefits. It also would have entitled her to rejoin the CSS on re-entering the public service on 2 February 1992. She would not have been compelled to join the PSS at that time. On 22 November 1993, Ms Dexter applied to make a late election to preserve her CSS entitlements, pursuant to s 157(1) of the 1976 Act. The Commissioner made the same mistake that had been made earlier and decided that Ms Dexter was not eligible to preserve her benefits because she had less than five years’ eligible service at the time of her resignation on 5 December 1985.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
The foundation for the Tribunal’s power to deal with a complaint is found in the following provisions:‘14AA Complaints may be made about discretionary or non-discretionary decisions(1) To avoid doubt, a complaint may be made under this Partabout a decision whether or not the decision involved the exercise of a discretion.(2) However, a decision that did not involve the exercise of adiscretion is taken to have been unfair and unreasonable if thedecision was contrary to law.14Complaints about decisions of trustees other than decisions to admit persons to life policy funds(1) This section applies if the trustee of a fund has made a decision(whether before or after the commencement of this Act) in relation to:(a) a particular member or a particular former member ofa regulated superannuation fund...(2) Subject to subsection (3) and section 15, a person may make acomplaint (other than an excluded complaint) to the Tribunal,that the decision is or was unfair or unreasonable.’ Section 37 of the SRC Act sets out the powers of the Tribunal in dealing with complaints under s 14. It provides relevantly as follows:‘(1) For the purpose of reviewing a decision of the trustee of a fund that isthe subject of a complaint under section 14:(a) the Tribunal has all the powers, obligations and discretionsthat are conferred on the trustee; and(b) subject to subsection (6), must make a determination inaccordance with subsection (3)....(3) On reviewing the decision of a trustee, insurer or other decision-makerthat is the subject of, or relevant to, a complaint under section 14, theTribunal must make a determination in writing:(a) affirming the decision; or(b) remitting the matter to which the decision relates to the trustee,insurer or other decision-maker for reconsideration inaccordance with the directions of the Tribunal; or(c) varying the decision; or(d) setting aside the decision and substituting a decision for thedecision so set aside.(4) The Tribunal may only exercise its determination-making power undersubsection (3) for the purpose of placing the complainant as nearly aspracticable in such a position that the unfairness, unreasonableness,or both, that the Tribunal has determined to exist in relation to thetrustee’s decision that is the subject of the complaint no longer exists.(5) The Tribunal must not do anything under subsection (3) that would becontrary to law, to the governing rules of the fund concerned and, if acontract of insurance between an insurer and trustee is involved, to theterms of the contract.(6) The Tribunal must affirm a decision referred to under subsection (3) ifit is satisfied that the decision, in its operation in relation to:(a) the complainant; and(b) so far as concerns a complaint regarding the payment of adeath benefit—any person (other than the complainant, atrustee, insurer or decision-maker) who:(i) has become a party to the complaint; and(ii) has an interest in the death benefit or claims to be, or tobe entitled to benefits through, a person having aninterest in the death benefit;was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.’The Tribunal’s reasons

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Full text does not contain this section.