CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY - THE CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT - GENERALLY
GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY - ACTIONS AGAINST SURETY - GENERALLY
BANKING AND FINANCE - INSTRUMENTS - LOAN FACILITIES
CONTRACTS - GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES - HARSH AND UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
BANKING AND FINANCE - BANKS - LIABILITIES OF BANKS - FRAUD, UNDUE INFLUENCE AND UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT
EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - UNDUE INFLUENCE AND DURESS - PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE FROM RELATIONSHIP OF PARTIES - SPOUSES
The two defendants are married - the second defendant, as sole director of a company controlled by both defendants, entered into a loan contract with the bank for large advances to purchase a business - the defendants executed personal guarantees secured by three properties owned by them - the company defaulted - two of the security properties were sold leaving a substantial deficit which the bank claimed under the guarantees.
Whether the guarantees should be enforced - whether liability was limited to the value of the securities - whether the Code of Banking Practice applied - whether the bank had complied with the Code - whether the rule in Yerkey v Jones/Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd applied to the first defendant - whether the first defendant understood the purport and effect of the transactions - whether the first defendant was a volunteer - whether the guarantees should be construed as being conditional upon the bank registering its interest over the securities.
Held: The guarantees should be enforced - by their acts of signing the guarantees the defendants assumed a legally binding obligation to adhere to their terms and conditions - on proper construction the guarantees did not limit liability to the value of the securities - the Code of Banking Practice did not apply to the guarantees - even if it did apply, the Code is largely a collection of guiding principles for banker's conduct and a breach would not necessarily of itself wholly invalidate the guarantees - the first defendant was unable to raise a defence based on the rule in Yerkey v Jones/Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd - there was ample evidence of his substantial qualifications and business experience and that he understood the purport and effect of the transactions - the first defendant's medical conditions did not prevent him from arriving at that understanding - the first defendant was not a volunteer - the guarantee properly construed was not conditional upon the bank registering its interest over the securities - the securities did not emanate from a third party and the guarantee expressly provided that the absence of registration of securities by the bank would not affect or prevent liability of a guarantor - Greer v Kettle [1938] AC 156 considered.
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Starrs, the bank sought to enforce personal guarantees executed by the defendants, Dr Starrs and Mrs Starrs, in respect of a loan facility provided to their company, Starrs & Co Pty Ltd, for the purpose of purchasing a business. The company defaulted on the loan, resulting in the bank selling two of the three properties provided as security and seeking to enforce the personal guarantees for the remaining deficit. The defendants argued various defences, including that their liability should be limited to the value of the securities, that the bank had breached the Code of Banking Practice, that the bank had failed to comply with certain legal requirements, and that the first defendant lacked the capacity to understand the nature of the transactions.
The court held that the guarantees should be enforced in full, as the defendants had clearly assumed a legally binding obligation by signing the documents. The court found that the guarantees did not limit liability to the value of the securities and that the Code of Banking Practice did not apply to the situation. The first defendant's argument based on the rule in Yerkey v Jones and Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd was rejected, as the evidence showed that he had substantial qualifications and business experience and had understood the transactions. The court also found that the guarantee was not conditional upon the bank registering its interest over the securities. The court concluded that all defences failed, and the bank was entitled to judgment against both defendants for the full amount owed, plus interest.
The court determined that the total amount owed by the defendants was $2,345,176.25, including interest up to the date of the judgment. Formal orders would be made following further submissions from counsel.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
I foreshadow that I have determined that all defences fail and that the bank has established liability against each defendant. My reasons follow. (When I hereafter state during the course of the reasons that I am satisfied, find or make a finding about a fact or matter, I mean I am satisfied, find or make a finding that a fact or matter is proven on the balance of probabilities.)PART B: BACKGROUND FACTUAL MATTERS I find that the following facts and matters referred to in this Part B to be proven on the balance of probabilities. The marriage of Dr Starrs and Mrs Starrs Dr Starrs and Mrs Starrs were married on 29 April 2000 and had been a couple well before that. In late 2000 their daughter was born. At the time of signing the guarantees the subject of this action in November 2006, they were living in a substantial residence at 32 Northcote Terrace, Gilberton, South Australia (the Northcote Terrace property). Real estate owned by the defendants The defendants owned three properties in South Australia which are of relevance to these proceedings. Dr Starrs was the registered proprietor of the Northcote Terrace property. In addition, the defendants owned jointly a property at 3-5 Dudley Street, Semaphore (the Dudley Street property) and at 123 Jeffcott Street, North Adelaide (the Jeffcott Street property).Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd The contract to which the guarantees related was a loan facility whereby the bank advanced credit to a company then called Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd for the purpose of it purchasing the assets of a business in receivership, Trustcotts. Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd was a company which had originally been used by Dr Starrs[17] to run a business (“Amber Lodge”) which involved residential care for aged persons. Dr Starrs was the sole shareholder in this company at all times and Mrs Starrs was the sole director and sole secretary at all times. The Amber Lodge business had been sold and the company Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd had become inactive. [17] Mrs Starrs stated at T517 that “we had a business called Amber Lodge” and at T522 that she handled the financial side of the business. She stated at T662-663 that she was not “extensively” involved in that business. Dr Starrs and Mrs Starrs later decided to use that company for the purpose of acquiring and running the Truscotts business and two major changes were proposed in that connection. The first was that the company’s name be changed to Starrs & Co Pty Ltd, the previous name being unsuited to the new venture; this change only occurred after the loan agreement and other documents had been executed in the name of Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd. The second change was that the company became trustee for the “Chris Starrs Family Trust No 2” since it was decided that a family trust would be the most advantageous vehicle by which to run the Truscotts business.Starrs & Co Pty Ltd The name of Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd was changed to Starrs & Co Pty Ltd on about 28 November 2006. (Henceforth I will sometimes use the term “the Company” to refer to the company which was initially called Seniors Care Services Pty Ltd and later called Starrs & Co Pty Ltd). Dr Starrs remained the sole shareholder and Mrs Starrs remained the sole director and sole secretary of the company at all times. The Chris Starrs Family Trust No 2
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Again in Equuuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments, a unanimous bench of the High Court declared that:[46][33]The respondents each having executed a loan agreement, each is bound by it. Having executed the document, and not having been induced to do so by fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation, the respondents cannot now be heard to say that they are not bound by the agreement recorded in it.[47] The parol evidence rule,[48] the limited operation of the defence of non est factum[49] and the development of the equitable remedy of rectification,[50] all proceed from the premise that a party executing a written agreement is bound by it. Yet fundamental to the respondents’ case that the operative agreements between the parties were wholly oral, and reached earlier than the execution of the written agreements, was the proposition that the written agreements subsequently executed not only may be ignored, they must be. That is not so. Having executed the agreement, each respondent is bound by it unless able to rely on a defence of non est factum, or able to have it rectified. The respondents attempted neither. [34]There are reasons why the law adopts this position. First, it accords with the “general test of objectivity [that] is of pervasive influence in the law of contract”.[51] The legal rights and obligations of the parties turn upon what their words and conduct would be reasonably understood to convey, not upon actual beliefs or intentions.[52] [35]Secondly, in the nature of things, oral agreements will sometimes be disputable. Resolving such disputation is commonly difficult, time-consuming, expensive and problematic. Where parties enter into a written agreement, the Court will generally hold them to the obligations which they have assumed by that agreement. At least, it will do so unless relief is afforded by the operation of statute or some other legal or equitable principle applicable to the case. Different questions may arise where the execution of the written agreement is contested; but that is not the case here. In a time of growing international trade with parties in legal systems having the same or even stronger deference to the obligations of written agreements (and frequently communicating in different languages and from the standpoint of different cultures) this is not a time to ignore the rules of the common law upholding obligations undertaken in written agreements. It is a time to maintain those rules. They are not unbending. They allow for exceptions. But the exceptions must be proved according to established categories. The obligations of written agreements between parties cannot simply be ignored or brushed aside.(Emphasis added)[46] (2004) 218 CLR 471, 483 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ).[47] L'Estrange v Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394.[48] Hoyt's Pty Ltd v Spencer [1919] HCA 64; (1919) 27 CLR 133.[49] Petelin v Cullen [1975] HCA 24; (1975) 132 CLR 355.[50] Taylor v Johnson [1983] HCA 5; (1983) 151 CLR 422.[51] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540, 549 per Gleeson CJ.[52] Gissing v Gissing [1970] UKHL 3; [1971] AC 886, 906 per Lord Diplock; Ashington Piggeries Ltd v Christopher Hill Ltd [1972] AC 441, 502 per Lord Diplock.Conclusion as to the defendants’ limit of liability
Decision
Reasons for decision
PEEK J
For completeness, I mention that, as stated above, the defendants advanced a specific equitable defence in the alternative to the broader Greer v Kettle defence. The facts relied upon were that an unpaid supplier of goods to Starrs & Co Pty Ltd placed a caveat on the Jeffcott Street property on about 14 July 2009,[146] and it was only after that occurrence that the bank belatedly registered the second mortgage. The bank then purported, without any authorisation by the defendants, to settle the supplier’s claim for a debt of $198,967.12 by a payment of about $100,000 from the proceeds of sale of the defendants’ property in return for the supplier withdrawing the caveat. The bank then claimed that amount it had paid to the supplier as part of an outstanding balance owing by the defendants. During the course of the trial I intimated that if the plaintiff maintained that claim for $100,000 I would likely disallow it and the bank withdrew it. It is unnecessary to say anything more, other than to observe that an exercise of the equitable jurisdiction of the Court in those specific circumstances has no effect upon, and forms no basis for, the different and broader issue of the construction of the guarantee itself as a matter of law. That interpretation remains as I have stated above. [146] Exhibit P37.PART G: CONCLUSION There were pleadings of an Amadio defence and breaches of ss 51AA, 51AB and 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (now ss 20 and 21 of Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010) but these aspects of the defence were abandoned at trial and no evidence was led that could possibly have established such matters in relation to either defendant. I conclude that all defences of each defendant fail and that the plaintiff has established the joint and several liability of each defendant. Accordingly, there will be judgment for the plaintiff against each defendant. As referred to above at [22], on 24 October 2012 Mr Howard tendered by consent a revised statement of quantum as exhibit P73 which took into account the abandonment by the bank of a number of items of its claim and established that, subject to the question of liability on the guarantees, as at 24 October the bank was owed the total amount of $2,337,560.44 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of 15.080 per cent per annum. The parties agreed that the only other adjustment that was needed to be made was to bring the amount owing for interest up to date as at the time of reservation of judgment. Accordingly, during his final address Mr Howard by consent supplied the Court with the final agreed quantum of $2,345,176.25 which takes into account the addition of further interest up to 31 October 2012.Orders I will hear counsel as to the making of formal orders.