Commissioner of Taxation v Stuart-Jones

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Stuart-Jones [2000] FCA 1022

BANKRUPTCY – sequestration order – whether a restraining order made pursuant to s 10 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) acts as a stay of execution of the judgment under s 41(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – the restraining order did not relate to the whole of the debtor’s assets.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

Re Solomon; Ex parte Reid (1986) 10 FCR 423 followed
Penning v Steel TubeSupplies Pty Ltd (1988) 18 FCR 568 followed
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kunz (1993) 115 ALR 197 followed
Wiltshire-Smith v Mellor Olsson (1995) 57 FCR 572 followed
Boscolo v Botany Council (Jenkinson, O’Loughlin and Sackville JJ, 16 October 1996, unreported) followed
Re Ousley; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 48 FCR 131 referred to
Re Ling; Ex parte Enrobook Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 87 followed
Ling v Enrobook Pty Ltd (1997) 143 ALR 396 followed

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 42A(5) & 44(2A)
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) s 10
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40(1)(g) & 41(3)(b)

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES
N 7602 of 1999

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
N 170 of 2000

MATHEWS J
4 AUGUST 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7602 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
APPLICANT

AND:

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES
RESPONDENT

N 170 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MATHEWS J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

In the matter of N 7602 of 1999:

1.   A sequestration order be made against the estate of Shireen Joy Chloris Stuart-Jones.

2.   The applicant creditor’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

In the matter of N 170 of 2000:

1.   The application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal is dismissed.

2.   The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 7602 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
APPLICANT

AND:

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES
RESPONDENT

N 170 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

SHIREEN JOY CHLORIS STUART-JONES
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MATHEWS J

DATE:

4 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. The applicant creditor is seeking a sequestration order against the estate of the respondent debtor in reliance upon an act of bankruptcy said to have been committed on the 12 April 1999 when the debtor failed to comply with a bankruptcy notice served on 22 March 1999.  The bankruptcy…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1022
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Stuart-Jones involved a dispute between the Commissioner of Taxation and Shireen Joy Chloris Stuart-Jones, primarily focusing on the validity of a bankruptcy notice and the subsequent application for an extension of time to appeal from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) decision. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the court was required to determine whether a restraining order over the debtor's interest in a property operated as a stay of execution and, if so, whether the bankruptcy notice was valid. Additionally, the court had to consider whether an extension of time to appeal from the AAT decision should be granted.

The key legal issues addressed by the court were whether the restraining order constituted a stay of execution under section 41(3)(b) of the relevant Act and if the bankruptcy notice was valid. The court found that the restraining order did not operate as a stay of execution, thus the challenge to the validity of the bankruptcy notice failed. The court also examined the extensive delay in filing the application for an extension of time to appeal from the AAT decision and concluded that the debtor's circumstances did not justify the delay. The debtor's inability to provide further evidence or instructions to support the application further undermined its merits.

The court's reasoning was grounded in statutory interpretation and procedural fairness. It found that the restraining order did not meet the criteria for a stay of execution, and the lengthy delay in appealing the AAT decision was unjustified. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal and denied the bankruptcy notice's validity. The orders included making a sequestration order against the debtor, taxing the applicant's costs and paying them from the debtor's estate, and dismissing the application for an extension of time with costs to be paid by the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

In the matter of N 7602 of 1999:

1. A sequestration order be made against the estate of Shireen Joy Chloris Stuart-Jones.

2. The applicant creditor’s costs be taxed and paid from the estate of the respondent debtor in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).

In the matter of N 170 of 2000:

1. The application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MATHEWS J
In the result I find that the restraining order over the debtor’s interest in the property at 368 Bronte Road, Bronte did not operate as a stay of execution under s 41(3)(b) of the Act. The challenge to the validity of the bankruptcy notice therefore fails.Should time be extended to appeal from the AAT decision? As mentioned earlier, the taxation assessments which formed the basis of the judgment debt relied upon in this case arose from assessments issued for the years of income ended 30 June 1986 to 30 June 1990 inclusive. In September 1991 the debtor objected to these assessments. In October 1992 the applicant disallowed the objections. On 8 December 1992 the debtor applied under s 29 of the AAT Act for review of these decisions. On 14 June 1994 her application was dismissed on the ground of her failure “to comply with the Directions of this Tribunal made on 13 January 1994”. The order purported to be made under s 42A(2) of the AAT Act. However the following day, 15 June 1994, a corrigendum was issued amending the Tribunal’s decision by substituting s 42A(5) for the previously named section. Section 42A(5) was clearly the relevant provision, given the terms of the Tribunal’s decision. That sub-section provides as follows:“42A (5) If an applicant for a review of a decision fails within a reasonable time:(a)to proceed with the application; or(b)to comply with a direction by the Tribunal in relation to the application;a presidential member or senior member, on behalf of the Tribunal, may dismiss the application without proceeding to review the decision.” On various occasions over the next two years or so, the debtor, through her solicitor, sought to have her application to the AAT reinstated. However there is no power for the AAT to reinstate a decision dismissing an application under s 42A(5). On 2 October 1996 the associate to the AAT Senior Member who had dismissed the debtor’s application wrote to the debtor’s solicitors declining to take any further action in the matter. This was the last communication from the Tribunal in relation to the matter. On 2 March 2000 the debtor lodged an application for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal from the AAT. This application, N170 of 2000, was placed into my docket and, by consent, dealt with together with the bankruptcy petition. The parties agreed that the most convenient course would be for me to adjudicate on both issues at the same time. Under s 44(2A) of the AAT Act an appeal is to be lodged within 28 days after the person has been furnished with the Tribunal’s decision or within such further time as the Federal Court might allow. The operative “decision” was clearly the decision made on 14 June 1994 dismissing the debtor’s application pursuant to s 42A(5) of the AAT Act. No explanation has been provided by the debtor as to the very extensive delay between the giving of that decision and the application for an extension of time to appeal from it, made nearly six years later. The mere fact that the debtor has been in prison since 1996 is, on its own, an inadequate explanation for such a lengthy delay. Nor is there any substantive material before the Court going to the merits of the debtor’s application to the AAT. Mr Whitfield, who appeared for the debtor before me, was granted adjournments on several occasions to enable him to place such material before the Court. However, he eventually said that, despite having made numerous attempts to obtain instructions from the debtor he was unable to adduce any further evidence in support of this application. Indeed he informed the Court that he intended to withdraw his appearance. This avenue is available to Mr Whitfield pursuant to Order 45 rule 7 of the Federal Court Rules, but to date it has not occurred.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MATHEWS J