Director of Public Prosecutions v Kunz
[1993] FCA 470
•15 Jul 1993
7 0 1 \493
JUDGMENT No. 4.,1.0.... ...n.....-
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) \ VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) 1 GENERAL DIVISION 1
BETWEEN : DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (Applicant)
AND : LESLAW KUNZ (Respondent)
W: Ryan J W: Melbourne
Date: 15 July 1993 MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
1. That the Deputy Commissioner have leave to apply for an order under s.243F(1) of the Customs Act with respect to the order made herein by Sweeney ACJ on 7 September 1990 and that the motion on notice dated 20 January 1992 be deemed to have been issued pursuant to the leave hereby granted.
of the property hereby restrained, if that property, on or after 31 July 1993, be sufficient for the purpose, the 2. That the said order of Sweeney ACJ of 7 September 1990 be further varied by inserting after paragraph 6 thereof the
following additional paragraph:
"6A. Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in this
Order, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy shall pay out
amount required to comply with a bankruptcy notice which may be issued by the Deputy Cornmissloner of Taxation in respect of a judgment entered against the defendant in the Supreme Court of Victoria in the sum of $827,159.03
together with interest and costs."
3. That the costs of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of and incidental to the said motion on notice dated 20 January 1992 be the petitioning creditor's costs in any
bankruptcy petition that may be issued as a result of non-compliance with the bankruptcy notice referred to in paragraph 6A of the said order of Sweeney ACJ as varied by this order.
4. That the defendant's costs of and incidental to the said motion on notice dated 20 Zanuary 1992 including the costs of the hearing on 6 and 7 February 1992 be taxed and paid by the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy out of the property of the defendant restrained by the said order of Sweeney ACJ on account of the defendant to the solicitors
notice. acting for him in connection with the said motion on NOTE :
- Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
1 No VG 260 of 1990 1 GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (Applicant)
AND: LESLAW KUNZ (Respondent)
Coram: Ryan J Place: Melbourne
Date: 15 July 1993 ReASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Rvan J: By application dated 5 September 1990 the Director of Public Prosecutions ("the DPP") sought an order against the respondent Leslaw Kunz requiring payment of a pecuniary penalty under s.243B of the Customs Act 1901 in consequence of certain offences allegedly committed by him in connection with the importation of heroin.
On 7 September 1990, Sweeney ACJ made pursuant to s.243E of the Customs Act an interlocutory order which included the following paragraphs:
"2. Pursuant to sectlon 2433 of the Act speclfred property of the Defendant, detarls of whrch appear in Schedule A, and all other property of the Defendant (including property acqurred after the making of the order) save and except that property of the Defendant presently held by the Officlal Trustee in Bankruptcy pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court of Vrctoria made 5 September 1990 be restrained. 3. The property hereby restrained is not to be dlsposed of or otherwise dealt with by any person save with the prior consent in writing of the Applicant or as otherwise provided by order of this Court. 4. The Officral Trustee in Bankruptcy take custody and control of any property hereby restrained. 5. The Defendant furnish to the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy w~thin 14 days of the service upon him of a copy of such order, a statement verified by the oath or affirmation of the Defendant, settrng out partrculars of the nature, location and value of all his property. 6. Out of the property of the Defendant hereby restrained the Offrcial Trustee in Bankruptcy pay on account of the Defendant to the solicrtors for the time being retained by the Defendant funds sufficient to meet the reasonable legal costs and drsbursements of the Defendant incurred rn:
(i) Defendrng crimrnal charges against him berng the charges presently specified in an indictment filed in the County Court of Victoria on 13 July 1990; in the event the s a ~ d indictment is amended or a further indictment is filed thrs order shall extend to cover the reasonable costs of defending those different or further charges; (ir) Any proceedings relating to sentence subsequent to the final disposition of the said charges or such drfferent or further charges; (rii) Any appeals commenced withrn trme against sentence or conviction arrsing out of the said charges or such different or further charges; and (iv) Defending thrs Applicatron and any related rnterlocutory proceedings. In the event any such costs are not agreed the said costs are to be taxed by the taxing officer of this Court. 7. In the exercise of rts powers and the performance of rts duties pursuant to this order and any order this Court might subsequently make, the Offrcial Trustee m Bankruptcy may deposrt or Invest any moneys coming into its hands or under rts control by payrng the same or holding such to the credit of an account in its name on behalf of the Defendant and under its control at such bank or other financial rnstrtutron as it may consrder proper."
On 19 September 1990, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation ("the Deputy Commissioner") Issued a writ out of the Supreme Court of Victoria seeklng payment of $827,159.03 for which the respondent had been assessed in respect of income tax. On 27 February 1991 a Master of the Supreme Court gave leave to the Deputy Commissioner to enter summary judgment against the respondent in the sum of $827,159.03 together with interest and costs. On 16 January 1992 Beach J dismissed an appeal against that order and ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the appeal.
On 5 July 1991 I made an order by consent varying the order made by Sweeney ACJ on 7 September 1990 which had the effect of releasing to Mr Kunz's wife, Henryka Kunz, certain jewellery and money which had been held subject to the orlginal restraining order. That order further provided for the payment out of funds under the control of the Official Trustee of approximately $7,000 to M r Kunz's son, Robert Peter Kunz, and amounts totalling $2,700 in payment of certain legal expenses and accounting fees.
The Deputy Commissioner desires to levy execution pursuant to the judgment entered in the Supreme Court and to issue a bankruptcy notice in respect of the judgment debt. Accordingly, by motion on notice dated 20 January 1992, the Deputy Commissioner seeks the following relief:
"1. A d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e Appl icant i s e n t i t l e d forthwith t o i s s u e
a Bankruptcy Notrce i n r e s p e c t of a pdgment ob ta rned a g a i n s t
t h e Respondent i n a c t i o n No. 10446 of 1990 i n t h e Supreme Court
of V i c t o r r a .
2. I n t h e a l t e r n a t r v e l e a v e of t h e Court t o I s s u e a Bankruptcy
Not ice i n r e s p e c t of t h e s a r d judgment deb t .
3. I n t h e f u r t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , l e a v e t o t h e Appl icant , pursuan t t o
paragraph 24F(2 ) (d ) of t h e Customs Act 1901 ( " t h e A c t " ) , t o
app ly f o r t h e v a r i a t r o n of an o r d e r made a g a r n s t t h e p rope r ty
o f t h e Respondent under s.243E of t h e A c t on 7 September 1990,
and v a r i a t i o n of t h e s a i d o rde r :
( a ) p e r m i t t i n g t h e p rope r ty t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e r e s t r a i n i n g
o r d e r t o be s u b j e c t t o t h e execu t ion of t h e s a i d
judgment, o r
( b ) m t h e a l t e r n a t i v e p e r m i t t ~ n g t h e Respondent t o comply
w i t h a Bankruptcy Notice i s s u e d pursuan t t o o r d e r 1 o r 2 hereof . "
The application for a declaration raises a question as to the inter-relationship of s.41(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act and s.243E of the Customs Act. The latter section provides, so far as is relevant:
"(1) Where the Minrster, the Commzssioner of Police, the Comptroller or the Dzrector of Public Prosecutions has rnstituted a proceeding under section 243B for an order that a person (in this section referred to as the "defendant") pay a pecuniary penalty rn relation to a particular prescrrbed narcotrcs dealrng, or in relation to prescribed narcotics dealings during a particular period, the Mrnrster, the Commissroner of Polzce, the Comptroller or the Drrector of Public Prosecutzons may make applrcation to the Court, ex parte, for an order under paragraph (2)(c) against:
(a) specrfied property of the defendant; (b)
all the property of the defendant (includrng property acquired after the making of the order);
(c)
specrfied property of the defendant and all other property of the defendant (including property acqurred after the making of the order);
(d)
all the property of the defendant (rncluding property acquired after the making of the order) other than specrfied property; or
(e) specified property of a person other than the defendant. (2) Where:
(a) an applicatron under subsection (1) 1s supported by:
(1) an affrdavit of a polrce offlcer or an officer of Customs
stating that he belreves that:( A ) the defendant has engaged in the prescribed
narcotrcs dealing to which the proceeding under
section 2438 relates, or in prescribed narcotics dealings during the perzod to which that proceeding
relates; and(B) benefits were derrved by the defendant by reason of the defendant's having engaged in that prescribed narcotrcs dealing, or rn prescrzbed narcotrcs dealings during that period, as the case may be; and setting out the grounds on which he holds those
beliefs; and(ri) if the application seeks an order against specified property of the defendant - an affidavit of a police officer or an offrcer of Customs statrng that he or she believes that the property is the property of the defendant and settzng out the grounds on whrch he or she holds that belief; and
(b)
the Court considers that, having regard to the matters contained in that affidavit or those aff~davits, there are reasonable grounds for holding those bel~efs;
the Court:
(C) Shall, subject to subsection (ZA), make an order: directing that the property, or such part of the property
(i) as is specifled in the order, LS not to be disposed of, or otherwise dealt wlth, by any person, except in such manner and in such circumstances (if any) as are specrfied in the order; and
(ii) ~f the Court is satisfied that the circumstances so require - dlrect the Official Trustee to take custody and control of the property, or such part of the property as is specified rn the order; and
(d) may, subject to subsection (3), include in the order such
prov~sion ( ~ f any) ln relation to the operation of the order as the Court thlnks flt.
(3) Paragraph (2) (d) does not authorize the Court to include in the order a provlslon postponing the operation of the order.
(4) Without l~miting the power of the Court under paragraph (2)
(d), the order against property:
(a) may set out conditions subject to whlch the order LS to apply to all of that property, or to a specifled part of that property; (b) may make provis~on for a review of the operation of the order by the Court; and (c) may make provlsron for meeting the reasonable living and business expenses of the defendant out of that property, or out
of a spec~fied part of that property. ( 4 A ) The Court shall not make provision of the kind referred to in paragraph (4) (c) unless ~t is satisfled that the defendant cannot meet the expenses concerned out of property that 1s not sublect to the order.
(7) Notwithstand~ng anything contarned m the Bankruptcy Act 1966, moneys that have come into the possession, or under the control, of the Off~cial Trustee ln accordance wrth an order made under
subsection (2) shall not be paid into the Common Investment Fund
established in pursuance of section 20B of that Act.
(8) Where the Offlclal Trustee is glven a direction under subparagraph (2) (c) (11) m relation to property, the Officlal Trustee may do anything that is reasonably necessary for the purpose of preserving the property including, without l~mitlng the generality of thls:
(a)
becoming a party to any civrl proceedings affecting the property;
(b) ensuring that the property is ~nsured; (C) ~f the property consists, wholly or partly, of securities or
investments - realising or otherwise dealing with the
securities or rnvestments; and
(d) rf the property consists, wholly or partly, of a business:
(i) employing, or terminating the employment of, persons in the busmess; and (11) doing any other thing that is necessary or convenient for carrying on the business on a sound commercral basis."
Section 41(3)(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
"A bankruptcy notrce shall not be issued in relatron to a debtor -
(b) if, at the time of the application for its issue, execution of the judgment or order to which it relates has been stayed."
The first question which thus arises is whether the order under s.253 of the Customs Act operates as a stay on the execution of the judgment obtained by the Deputy Commissioner in the Supreme Court of Victoria. It is clear that the making of an order under s.50 of the Bankruptcy Act appointing a trustee to take control of the property of a debtor until further order operates as a stay on the execution of a judgment against that debtor in the same way as the appointment by a court of a receiver of the debtor's property. See Penning v Steel Tube Supplies Pty Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 689
where a Full Court of thls Court observed, at 697: "It appears to be settled law both in the Unrted Kingdom and at least at frrst instance in thls country, that the words in s.41(3) "executron of the judgment or order to which rt relates had been stayed" are not restr~cted to an order expressly staying a judgment. They have been construed as having a much wider meaning. In certain circumstances execution rs deemed to have been stayed if the
execution credrtor is for some reason not in a position to issue
execution upon hrs judgment. Reference to such crrcumstances is to
be found in Halsburys Laws of England 4th ed, v01 3, para 262."
In my view, that principle applies to the circumstances of the present case so that the order of Sweeney ACJ of 7 September
1990, by vesting in the Official Trustee all of the property of the debtor, precluded the Deputy Commissioner from issuing immediate execution on his judgment. It is true that various sections of the Customs Act contemplate the supervening bankruptcy of a person whose property has been made the subject of an order under s.243E of that Act. Thus s.243(2)(d) provides that the charge securing payment to the Commonwealth of any pecuniary penalty that the person against whose property a restraining order has been made under s.243E may be ordered to pay ceases to have effect in respect of the property of that person "upon the person becoming a bankrupt". Section 243L applies the doctrine of relation back to moneys paid to the Commonwealth within six months of the presentation of a petition on which the person liable to pay a pecuniary penalty subsequently becomes bankrupt. Similarly, by virtue of s.243M, notice of the presentation of a creditor's petition against a person precludes the Official Trustee from selling property of the same person liable to pay a pecuniary penalty or paying to the Commonwealth any moneys in respect of that
person. Sub-section 243M(3) provides: "Where a person who 1s lrable to pay a pecunrary penalty becomes a bankrupt (whether on a credrtor's petltion or otherwise), any property of the person 1n the possession, or under the control, of the Offrcial Trustee in accordance with an order made under thrs Divlsion shall be deemed to be ln the possession, or under the control, of the Offlcial Trustee as, or on behalf of, the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt, and not otherwise."
It was contended on behalf of Mr Kunz that this Court only has the power conferred by s.243E of the Customs Act to make a restraining order and the power conferred by s.243F to make an
order which is ancillary or supplemental to the original
restraining order. Section 243F(1) provides:
"Where the Court makes, or has made, a restra~ning order (In this section called the "original order") agalnst property of a person (in thls section called the "owner"), the Court may, at the time rt makes the original order or at any subsequent time, make such orders in relation to that property as the Court considers lust and, without limitlng the power so conferred on the Court, the Court may, at any time or from time to tune, make an order:
(a) varylng the original order ln respect of the property to which it relates or any provision included in the orlginal order by virtue of paragraph 243E(d); (b) regulating the manner ln which the Officral Trustee may
exercise ~ t s powers or perform its duties under the orlginal order;
(C)
determining any question relating to the property to whrch the orlgmal order relates, including any question relating to the
liabilities of the owner, and the exercise of the powers, or the performance of the duties, of the Official Trustee, with
respect to the property to which the original order relates;(d) dlrecting:
(1) the owner; or
(ii)
if the owner rs a body corporate - a drrector of the body corporate speclfled by the Court;
to give to the Minrster, the Commissioner of Police, the Comptroller, the Drrector of Public Prosecutrons or the Officral Trustee, within a perlod specified in the order, a statement verifled by the oath of the person making the statement, setting out such particulars of the property, or dealrngs wrth the property, of the owner as the Court thinks proper;
(e)
for the exammation on oath of the owner or another person before the Court or Registrar of the Court concerning the affairs of the owner, including the nature and locatlon of the
owner's property;
(ea) dlrecting the owner or another person to do any act or thing necessary or convenient to be done to enable the Official Trustee to take custody and control of the property in
accordance wlth the orig~nal order; or
(f)
with respect to the carrying out of any undertaking w~th respect to the payment of damages or costs glven by the Commonwealth in connectron with the making of the original order. "
Reliance was placed in support of this proposition by Miss
Davies of Counsel for the debtor on Deputy Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v Kunz 90 ATC 4977 where Vincent J
considered the relationship between provisions of the Victorian Proceeds of Crime Act 1987, which are analogous to those of the Customs Act now under consideration, and s.218 of
the Income Tax Assessment Act. His Honour observed, at 4,985: "It is only necessary to refer to the prmcrpal objectives set out in sec.3 of the Proceeds of Crime Act to demonstrate that the provrslons of that legislation are directed to qurte different objectives to those of the Income Tax Assessment Act. The power conferred upon the Court in sec. 48 to make ancillary orders must be regarded as limited by the framework provided by the objectrves and provisrons of the Proceeds of Crime Act and the type and scope of the restrainrng orders whrch the Court is empowered to make. Such ancillary orders of therr very nature must be supplemental or incidental to the restraining orders to which they are attached. The order sought in the present matter cannot be so regarded."
[The order sought by the Deputy Commissioner and the Director of Public Prosecutions in that case was that the original restraining order be varied so as to enable the Official Trustee to comply with a notice pursuant to s.218 of the Income Tax Assessment Act requiring payment of tax to which the present debtor had been assessed]. Despite the conclusion expressed in the passage just quoted, his Honour went on to consider whether, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, the original restraining order should be varied, and concluded, at 4,985:
effect that there is a far more persuasive public interest "In my opinion the submissron of Mr Finkelstern on thrs aspect to the cons~deratron to be taken into account than the protection of the revenue and that is the publrc interest rnvolved in the possible deprivation of the abrlity of a person who zs facing serious crzminal charges to pay for his defence, possesses considerable force. The Proceeds of Crime Act rtself recognrses the importance of ensuring that an order restraining the property of a person should not operate rn a fashion which would deny to him access to his own funds in order to meet the reasonable expenses incurred rn defending the charges laid agarnst him. As Gibbs ACJ (as he then was) remarked when dealing with a clam of Crown privrlege wrth respect to the productron of a document rn Sankey v Whltlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at pp. 38-39: "It is in all cases the duty of the court, and not the privilege of the executive government, to decide whether a document wlll be produced or may be withheld. The court must decide which aspect of the public rnterest predominates, or in other words whether the publrc rnterest which requires that the document should not be produced outwerghs the public lnterest that a court of justice in performing its functrons should not be denied access to relevant evidence. In some cases, therefore, the court must weigh the one competing aspect of the public interest against the other, and decide where the balance lies. "
The possibility of practical rmpairment of the capacity of an indivrdual to defend himself fully against serrous criminal charges by reason of economic disadvantage must be viewed with considerable concern rn any situatron. Presumably, rf the source of funds presently available to the respondent were to be denied to hrm by the granting of the application, he would then erther become rellant upon already overburdened legal aid services funded out of the publrc purse, or left without adequate resources. In the case before the Court, at this level the matter involves a relatively straight- forward choice between the Interests of the revenue and those of a person facing criminal charges to have access to those funds. In my opinion rn such a conflrct the rrghts of the respondent should prevail and the applicatron be drsmissed."
It is true that Davies J in Kirk v Conunissioner of Australian Federal Police (1988) 81 ALR 321 at 337 referred to s.243F of the Customs Act as "providing for certain interlocutory and ancillary orders: and, at 339 said that it "provides for ancillary orders" . However, that characterization, in my view, does no more than acknowledge, as is obvious, that the power conferred by s.243F requires for its exercise an original restraining order, which itself is interlocutory in nature. By prefacing the list of powers specifically
of power to the Court to "make such orders in relation to that enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (f) of sub-S. (1) with a grant property as the Court considers just" the sub-section confers a very wide general discretion. The legislature's concern to preserve the full amplitude of that general grant of power is made clear by the words which immediately follow it, "and, without limiting the power so conferred on the Court...". In my view, s.243F, in the context in which it appear, performs a function akin to that of s.33(3) of the Acts Interpretation
Act 1901 which provides: "(3) Where an Act confers a power to make, grant or Issue any Instrument (Including rules, regulatrons or by-laws) the power shall, unless the contrary intentron appears, be construed as including a power exerclsable in the lrke manner and subject to the like conditions (if any) to repeal, rescind, revoke, amend, or vary any such instrument."
Accordingly, I consider that there is a discretion, under s.243F, to vary or discharge an original restraining order whether or not the variation or discharge can be seen as conducing to the purpose which the original order, or relevant part of it, was presumably framed to achieve.
Vincent J in the latter passage from Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Kunz which is quoted above saw himself as required to balance, in the exercise of his discretion, two competing public interests - that in augmenting the revenue on the one hand, and on the other hand the public interest in ensuring that an accused person has adequate funds for his or her defence against criminal charges so as to prevent that defence becoming a charge on the legal
the present case the discretion which the Court has to aid authorities or otherwise on the public purse. However, in exercise involves weighing the accused person's ability to continue to pay for his defence, not against the claim of the revenue or any other single creditor, but against the facility to have his assets administered without delay for the benefit of the totality of his creditors in accordance with the scheme ordained by the Bankruptcy Act.
I was invited to take into account, in exercising the discretion under s.243F, that the solicitor acting for Mr Kunz
in resisting the criminal charges against him has undertaken considerable work and incurred substantial expenses in reliance on paragraph 6 of the order of Sweeney ACJ which is set out above. The relevant paragraphs of that solicitor's
affidavit are in these terms:
' '4. As a result of acting on behalf of the Respondent, my firm has rncurred substantral legal fees and out of pocket expenses. My firm has been p a ~ d legal fees for the perrod 9 July 1990 to 7 September 1990 but we have not been paid any fees since the latter date. Durrng that time there have been numerous bar1 appllcatrons on behalf of the Respondent, appeals against bail orders, applrcations to the High Court of Australia in respect of ball orders and approxrmately 2 months in total of sittrng days at Ment~ons before His Honour Judge Kelly. At all times Mr Kunz has been represented by both Senior Counsel and Junior Counsel. The fees payable to Counsel have been meet from the trust fund marnta~ned by the Off~c~al Trustee but no fees have been rendered to the Respondent by thrs firm. In fact, whilst we have continued to lncur fees, the vlew was taken that Counsel acting for the Respondent had to be pard out of available monles and we have not at this stage rendered a detailed bill of costs in respect of our work during the perrod. However, I am able to estrmate that the fees and out of pocket expenses owrng to this f ~ r m are not less than $100,000.00 and are more likely to be rn the vicinity of $lso,ooo.oo. 5 . My firm has continued to act for the Respondent and incur costs and out of pocket expenses m reliance upon paragraph 6 of the Restraining Order made herein by the Honourable Acting Chief Justice Sweeney on 7 September 1990. As indicated earller, we have continued to carry out our professional obligation to the Respondent m relation to the varrous matters in which we are retained notwithstandrng that we have not been paid for work
done since 7 September 1990 because the said Order makes express provision for payment of those costs in due course."
However, the power to make provision for meeting the reasonable business and living expenses of the defendant out of the property the subject of a restraining order which is conferred by s.Z43E(3)(c) does not extend to the creation of a charge over part of that property in favour of a particular creditor or prospective creditor of the defendant. It may be
open to an intended supplier of goods or services to a defendant who is subject to a restraining order to require payment in advance pursuant to an order of the kind contemplated by s.243E(3)(c), but that is far short of the supplier's obtaining a charge over assets in the hands of the Official Trustee, not merely in priority to the contingent entitlement of the DPP, but in priority to all other unsecured creditors of the defendant.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument advanced on behalf of Mr Kunz as to how the discretion under s.243F should be exercised entails the consequence that an insolvent defendant who is made subject, before being served with a bankruptcy notice, to a restraining order with provision for payment of reasonable business and living expenses, would be in a better position to continue to defray those expenses than a CO-defendant who became bankrupt while the restraining order was in force. I do not regard that consequence, which is so
obviously unintended, as being necessarily required by the relevant provisions of the Customs Act. In all the circumstances, I consider it an appropriate exercise of the Court's discretion to grant leave to the Deputy Commissioner to apply for an order under s.243F(l) of the Customs Act in respect of the order made by Sweeney ACJ on
7 September 1991 and to further vary that order by inserting after paragraph 6 thereof the following additional paragraph: "6A. Notwithstanding anything elsewhere contained in this
Order, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy shall pay out of the property hereby restrained, if that property, on or after 31 July 1993, be sufficient for the purpose, the amount required to comply with a bankruptcy notice which may be issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in respect of a judgment entered against the defendant in the Supreme Court of Victoria in the sum of $827,159.03 together with interest and costs."
I shall order that the costs of the Deputy Commissioner of the
motion on notice dated 20 January 1992 including the hearings on 6 and 7 February 1992 be the Deputy Commissioner's costs of any bankruptcy petition which may be issued on the basis of the bankruptcy notice contemplated by paragraph 6A of the said order of Sweeney ACJ as varied by my order of this day. I shall also order that the corresponding costs of the respondent be taxed and paid by the Offlcial Trustee out of the property of the defendant restrained by the said order of
Sweeney ACJ on account of the defendant to the solicitors acting for him in connection with the said motion on notice. I certify that this and the preceding thirteen (13) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of his Honour Mr Justice Ryan
Associate: Qhd kĥ yy
Date : 4 / -L+ @6,3
| Counsel for the applicant: | Mr M Crennan | ||
| Solicitor for the applicant: |
| ||
| Solicitor | |||
| Counsel for the respondent: | Miss J Davies | ||
| Solicitor for the respondent: | F W Robson & CO |
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