Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd [2018] FCAFC 163

Appeal from: Sharpcan Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2017] AATA 2948
File number: VID 22 of 2018
Judges: GREENWOOD ACJ, MCKERRACHER AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 27 September 2018
Catchwords:

TAXATION – appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – were taxpayer incurred expenditure to acquire gaming machine entitlements under Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) – whether Tribunal erred in finding that expenditure was on revenue account and deductible under s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether expenditure was “outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature” – whether expenditure was incurred to provide a necessary component of the profit-making structure of the taxpayer’s business

TAXATION – whether expenditure on gaming machine entitlements was “capital expenditure” deductible over 5 years in accordance with s 40-880(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether expenditure was “incurred to preserve (but not enhance) the value of goodwill” within the meaning of s 40-880(6)  

Legislation:

Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) Ch 3, Divs 5, 8, 9, 10; ss 3.4.1(1)(ab), 3.4.2(d), 3.4A.1(1)(a), 3.4A.2(1), 3.4A.7(1), 3.4A.8(2), 3.4A.16(1), 3.4A.27, 3.6.6, 3.6.6(2)(b), 3.6.6A, 3.6.6A(7)

Gambling Regulation Amendment (Licensing) Act 2009 (Vic)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 8-1, 40-880, 40-880(2), 40-880(5), 40-880(5)(f), 40-880(6); Part 3-1, ss 100-25, 108-5, 108-5(2)(b), 100-25, 110-25(5), 110-25(5A)

Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No 1) Act 2006 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (2006 Measures No 1) Bill 2006 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27

Ausnet Transmission Group Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 255 CLR 439

BP Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 112 CLR 386

Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378

Cliffs International Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 142 CLR 140

Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1953) 89 CLR 428

Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1955) 92 CLR 390

Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Limited (2006) 228 CLR 1

Commissioner of Taxation v Montgomery (1999) 198 CLR 639

Commissioner of Taxation v Roberts & Smith (1992) 37 FCR 246

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Cooper (1991) 29 FCR 177

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pine Creek Goldfields (1999) 91 FCR 263

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v South Australian Battery Makers Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 645

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Unit Trend Services Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 523

GP International Pipecoaters Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 170 CLR 124

Hallstroms Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 72 CLR 634

Henriksen v Grafton Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 K.B. 184

Herring v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946) 72 CLR 543

ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd concerns a dispute over the deductibility of expenditure incurred by Sharpcan Pty Ltd to acquire gaming machine entitlements (GMEs) under the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic). The issue at the heart of the dispute is whether the expenditure was incurred on a revenue account and thus deductible under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), or whether it constituted capital expenditure that was not deductible under section 40-880(5)(f) of the same Act. The dispute was initially decided by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and subsequently appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues that the court had to decide revolved around the nature of the expenditure incurred by Sharpcan Pty Ltd. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the expenditure was deductible under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) as an outgoing of capital, or of a capital nature, or whether it was incurred to provide a necessary component of the profit-making structure of Sharpcan's business. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the expenditure was deductible over five years in accordance with section 40-880(2) of the Act and whether it was incurred to preserve the value of goodwill under section 40-880(6). The court’s reasoning was influenced by the overall facts and circumstances of the case, as well as relevant legal principles established in previous cases. Ultimately, the court found that the expenditure incurred by Sharpcan Pty Ltd to acquire the GMEs was not deductible as it constituted capital expenditure that was not of a revenue nature.

In its decision, the court highlighted that the GMEs had a distinct value separate from their effect on goodwill, as they provided an entitlement to conduct gaming and generate income. The court noted that the GMEs resulted in a taxable income stream that was different from previous income and would be significantly more profitable after the last instalment was paid in 2016. The court concluded that the expenditure was capital in nature and thus not deductible under section 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was set aside.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was required to pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the appeal. This outcome underscores the importance of understanding the specific facts and circumstances of a case when determining the nature of an expenditure under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The parties agreed before the Tribunal and agreed before the Full Court that, subject to the operation of s 40‑880(6) in the context of the “facts overall” (T, p 7, lns 36‑40), s 40‑880(5)(f) applies to deny the availability of a deduction under s 40‑880(2)(a). In other words, the parties accept that each GME is a CGT asset (s 995‑1; s 108‑5 of the 1997 Act) and not an exempt asset. The relevant facts It is now necessary to consider aspects of the findings of the Tribunal and other aspects of the documents and other evidence before the Tribunal to which the Full Court was taken by each of the parties. As to the evidence to which we were taken, it should be noted that there was no challenge by the Commissioner to the evidence of Mr Canny: T, p 7, lns 36‑40; T, p 9, lns 31‑32; T, p 12, lns 37‑43; T, p 15, lns 31‑33. The Commissioner relies upon the facts set out in paras 2, 6, 7, 8 and most of paras 9 and 10 of the Tribunal’s Decision. I will identify those matters in the course of setting out some aspects of the “facts overall”, having regard to the observations at [89] to [93] of these reasons. As already mentioned, Mr Canny is the sole shareholder and director of Sharpcan. He is the sole shareholder and director of Spazor. He has worked in the hotel industry since the 1980s and is an experienced hotel venue operator. In 2004, Mr Canny, together with Mr Wayne Sharp, began investigating the possibility of purchasing the business undertaking of the Royal Hotel. Having regard to his experience in the hotel industry, Mr Canny took the view that the appropriate price to pay to acquire the business of the Royal Hotel was a multiple of four times its net profits adjusted for particular items such as drawings by directors. Mr Canny considered that a multiple of four times net profit was appropriate given that the Royal Hotel had gaming machines, even though those machines did not produce the majority of the Hotel’s revenue. The presence of gaming machines at the venue justified a higher multiple than a non‑gaming hotel as it meant that the Royal would, in the view of Mr Canny, “generate a steady cash flow and a stable profit margin that could be used to improve other areas of the Royal’s operations, such as its food and beverage and accommodation services”. Mr Canny understood, from his experience in the hotel industry, that hotels without gaming revenue tended to be sold for around three times their net profit whereas hotels that were “more heavily reliant on gaming machines were commonly sold for six or seven times net profit”. Ultimately, Mr Canny agreed with the vendor a sale price of $1,025,000.00 which was approximately four times the net profits of the hotel from all its activities. A goodwill component of the purchase price was calculated by deducting from the total purchase price the value of the chattels transferred including the “liquor licence”. The purchase did not involve a purchase of the freehold to the property. The purchase was subject to the mortgagee consenting to the landlord granting Spazor, as and from the settlement date, a lease over the premises. Spazor’s assumption of the lease was important. It had 27 years of its term left to run including extensions. Mr Canny says he would not have acquired a business with a lease for less than 25 years because it would not have provided a sufficient term to recoup investment in the business. Ideally, he says, the term needed to be 25 to 30 years.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The value to the Trustee of the GMEs was not solely attributable to the effect that the right had on goodwill. The GMEs provided an entitlement for the Trustee lawfully to conduct gaming at its venue and to generate substantial income from those activities. The GMEs had a value distinct from any effect the GMEs had on goodwill. The GMEs resulted in a taxable income stream. This income stream was different to that which had previously been earned and it was likely to be significantly more profitable after the last instalment was paid in 2016. Further, the GMEs were a valuable asset capable of transfer.CONCLUSION The appeal should be allowed and the decision of the Tribunal should be set aside.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Commissioner says that all of these things are features of the new regime which need to be taken into account in determining the true character of the outgoing of the acquisition cost of the GMEs on 10 May 2010 of $600,300.00. Consideration of the issues In these reasons, I have attempted to set out the particular facts and circumstances of the Trustee’s activities in order to assess the proper context within which the question of whether the outgoing is in the nature of capital or on revenue account arises. In 1938, Dixon and Evatt JJ observed, in determining whether an item was a matter of capital or income, in Western Gold Mines NL v Commissioner of Taxation (W.A.) (1938) 59 CLR 729 at 740, that “it is necessary to make both a wide survey and an exact scrutiny of the taxpayer’s activities” [emphasis added]. Their Honours also observed that they had become “only too familiar with the standard or criterion which the law provides for distinguishing between the two” and “it is a most unsatisfactory criterion, and a decision must often be made by reference to matters of degree and by reason of the weight given to particular circumstances affecting the activities of the taxpayer …”. The question in issue in that case, put simply, was not the character of an outgoing but rather the character of a receipt in the form of an unrealised “excess” and whether it gave rise to a profit or was capital in nature. Nevertheless, the observations remain relevant in determining the character of an outgoing. In 1965, Lord Pearce, delivering judgment for the Privy Council in BP Australia Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 112 CLR 386 at 399 (“BP Australia v FCT”), in determining whether expenditure was recurrent, said this:Their Lordships agree with Owen J. in thinking that if regard was had to “the whole picture” the expenditure was recurrent. To find whether expenditure is of a recurrent nature one must take a broad view of the general operation under which the expenditure was incurred. Here it was made to meet a continuous demand in the trade. …[emphasis added] In 1979, Barwick CJ in Cliffs International Inc v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 142 CLR 140 at 148 (“Cliffs International”) said, in relation to the question of whether the payments made in that case were capital payments, “[t]he proper conclusion in each case in this particular area of the law is peculiarly dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of [the] case” [emphasis added]. Moreover, I am not assisted by observations that the outgoing in question in this case is either like or unlike payments made in an entirely different case. In this area of the law, there is little to be gained by defaulting to analogical references or analogical reasoning (Commissioner of Taxation v Citylink Melbourne Limited (2006) 228 CLR 1 at 43 [151], Crennan J; see also Commissioner of Taxation v Montgomery (1999) 198 CLR 639 at 661 [64], Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), or the outcome of finely balanced evaluative judgments entirely dependent upon the calculus of factors determining that balance in other cases and other circumstances. The outgoing, in this case, either is in the nature of capital having regard to the calculus of factors relating to the taxpayer’s activities, “exactly scrutinised”, or it is not. That is not to say that the decision as to characterisation is either black or white; or binary/on or off. In some cases, it may be clear (there are “obvious cases” that “lie far from the boundary”: BP Australia v FCT at 397) but such cases are unlikely to (or at least ought not to) find their way into the appellate structure of judicial decision‑making.