HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND GORDON JJCOMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA APPELLANTAND
SHARPCAN PTY LTD RESPONDENT
Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd
[2019] HCA 36
Date of Hearing: 9 August 2019
Date of Judgment: 16 October 2019M52/2019
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 27 September 2018 and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)the appeal to that Court be allowed;
(b)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2017 be set aside; and
(c)the appellant's objection decision be affirmed.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
G J Davies QC with J E Jaques and L J S Molesworth for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
D H Bloom QC and T P Murphy QC with D J McInerney and C M Horan for the respondent (instructed by Rigby Cooke Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ. This is an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Greenwood A‑CJ, McKerracher J agreeing; Thawley J dissenting) that a sum of $600,300 paid by Spazor Pty Ltd ("the Trustee") to the State of Victoria for the allocation to the Trustee of 18 gaming machine entitlements ("GMEs") under the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) was an outgoing on revenue account and, as such, deductible under s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the 1997 Act")[1]. The majority further held (Thawley J dissenting) that, if the outgoing were not so deductible, it would be deductible under s 40‑880 of the 1997 Act as expenditure incurred to preserve but not enhance the value of goodwill in relation to a legal or equitable right of which the value to the Trustee was solely attributable to the effect that it had on goodwill[2].
[1]FederalCommissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd (2018) 262 FCR 151 at 165 [36]‑[37], 196 [184].
[2]FederalCommissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd (2018) 262 FCR 151 at 207‑208 [254], [256].
For the reasons which follow, the appeal should be allowed. The amount of $600,300 which the Trustee paid for the acquisition of the GMEs was an outgoing on capital account, and thus not deductible under s 8-1 of the 1997 Act. Nor was it deductible under s 40‑880 of the 1997 Act, because it was not incurred to preserve but not enhance the value of goodwill and the value of the GMEs to the Trustee was not solely attributable to the effect which they had on goodwill.
The facts
At all relevant times, the Trustee was the trustee of the Daylesford Royal Hotel Trust ("the Trust"), of which the respondent ("Sharpcan") was the sole beneficiary. On 8…
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- Case
- [2019] HCA 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court were whether the $600,300 paid by the taxpayer for the acquisition of 18 GMEs was an outgoing on revenue account deductible under section 8-1 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth), or alternatively, whether it was expenditure incurred to preserve, but not enhance, the value of goodwill, deductible under section 40-880 of the same Act. The GMEs granted the taxpayer the right to operate gaming machines at its hotel premises for ten years.
The High Court reasoned that the GMEs were not outgoings on revenue account, as they represented an expenditure of a capital nature. The Court found that the GMEs were identifiable assets with a value independent of any contribution to goodwill, deriving their value from their capacity to generate income and their potential for sale or transfer. Consequently, the expenditure was not deductible under section 8-1. Furthermore, the Court held that the expenditure did not qualify for deduction under section 40-880 because it was not incurred solely for the preservation of goodwill, and the value of the GMEs was not solely attributable to their effect on goodwill. The Court distinguished the GMEs from mere goodwill, noting they were distinct statutory rights capable of individual quantification and disposal.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed, the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside, and the Commissioner's objection decision be affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 27 September 2018 and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed;
(b) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2017 be set aside; and
(c) the appellant's objection decision be affirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
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