Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  APPELLANT

AND

SHARPCAN PTY LTD  RESPONDENT

Commissioner of Taxation v Sharpcan Pty Ltd

[2019] HCA 36

Date of Hearing: 9 August 2019
Date of Judgment: 16 October 2019

M52/2019

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 27 September 2018 and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)the appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2017 be set aside; and

(c)the appellant's objection decision be affirmed.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

G J Davies QC with J E Jaques and L J S Molesworth for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

D H Bloom QC and T P Murphy QC with D J McInerney and C M Horan for the respondent (instructed by Rigby Cooke Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ.   This is an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Greenwood A‑CJ, McKerracher J agreeing; Thawley J dissenting) that a sum of $600,300 paid by Spazor Pty Ltd ("the Trustee") to the State of Victoria for the allocation to the Trustee of 18 gaming machine entitlements ("GMEs") under the Gambling Regulation Act 2003 (Vic) was an outgoing on revenue account and, as such, deductible under s 8-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ("the 1997 Act")[1]. The majority further held (Thawley J dissenting) that, if the outgoing were not so deductible, it would be deductible under s 40‑880 of the 1997 Act as expenditure incurred to preserve but not enhance the value of goodwill in relation to a legal or equitable right of which the value to the Trustee was solely attributable to the effect that it had on goodwill[2].

  2. For the reasons which follow, the appeal should be allowed. The amount of $600,300 which the Trustee paid for the acquisition of the GMEs was an outgoing on capital account, and thus not deductible under s 8-1 of the 1997 Act. Nor was it deductible under s 40‑880 of the 1997 Act, because it was not incurred to preserve but not enhance the value of goodwill and the value of the GMEs to the Trustee was not solely attributable to the effect which they had on goodwill.

    The facts

  3. At all relevant times, the Trustee was the trustee of the Daylesford Royal Hotel Trust ("the Trust"), of which the respondent ("Sharpcan") was the sole beneficiary. On 8…

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Details
Case
[2019] HCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the Commissioner of Taxation against a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia concerning the deductibility of expenditure incurred by Sharpcan Pty Ltd (as beneficiary of the Daylesford Royal Hotel Trust) for gaming machine entitlements (GMEs). The dispute centred on whether the purchase price of these GMEs, acquired under a new Victorian regulatory regime, constituted a revenue or capital outgoing for the taxpayer.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the $600,300 paid by the taxpayer for the acquisition of 18 GMEs was an outgoing on revenue account deductible under section 8-1 of the *Income Tax Assessment Act 1997* (Cth), or alternatively, whether it was expenditure incurred to preserve, but not enhance, the value of goodwill, deductible under section 40-880 of the same Act. The GMEs granted the taxpayer the right to operate gaming machines at its hotel premises for ten years.

The High Court reasoned that the GMEs were not outgoings on revenue account, as they represented an expenditure of a capital nature. The Court found that the GMEs were identifiable assets with a value independent of any contribution to goodwill, deriving their value from their capacity to generate income and their potential for sale or transfer. Consequently, the expenditure was not deductible under section 8-1. Furthermore, the Court held that the expenditure did not qualify for deduction under section 40-880 because it was not incurred solely for the preservation of goodwill, and the value of the GMEs was not solely attributable to their effect on goodwill. The Court distinguished the GMEs from mere goodwill, noting they were distinct statutory rights capable of individual quantification and disposal.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court. It ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed, the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside, and the Commissioner's objection decision be affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside order 1 of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 27 September 2018 and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) the appeal to that Court be allowed;

(b) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 14 December 2017 be set aside; and

(c) the appellant's objection decision be affirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, the appeal should be allowed. The amount of $600,300 which the Trustee paid for the acquisition of the GMEs was an outgoing on capital account, and thus not deductible under s 8-1 of the 1997 Act. Nor was it deductible under s 40‑880 of the 1997 Act, because it was not incurred to preserve but not enhance the value of goodwill and the value of the GMEs to the Trustee was not solely attributable to the effect which they had on goodwill. The facts At all relevant times, the Trustee was the trustee of the Daylesford Royal Hotel Trust ("the Trust"), of which the respondent ("Sharpcan") was the sole beneficiary. On 8 August 2005, the Trustee, in its capacity as trustee of the Trust, purchased from Tattersall's Ltd ("Tattersall's") the business of the Royal Hotel in Daylesford at a price of $1,025,000. At the time of purchase, the hotel premises were a venue approved for gaming under the Gambling Regulation Act[3], and Tattersall's was the authorised gaming operator of 18 gaming machines that Tattersall's owned and operated at the premises[4]. The Trustee did not purchase the gaming machines, but, in accordance with the terms of agreement under which it purchased the hotel business, between 8 August 2005 and 15 August 2012 Tattersall's continued to operate the 18 gaming machines at the premises and paid to the Trustee, as the new venue operator, a percentage of the income derived from the machines.[3]See Gambling Regulation Act (as at 18 June 2009), ss 1.3(1) (definition of "approved venue"), 3.2.1, 3.4.1.[4]See Gambling Regulation Act (as at 18 June 2009), ss 1.3(1) (definition of "gaming operator"), 3.4.2, 3.4.9; Victoria v Tatts Group Ltd (2016) 90 ALJR 392 at 398 [31]‑[32] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ; 328 ALR 564 at 571. On 10 April 2008, the Victorian government announced that gaming operator licences issued to Tattersall's would not be renewed following their expiration in 2012 and that a new regulatory regime would be introduced in their place[5]. Thereafter, by the Gambling Regulation Amendment (Licensing) Act 2009 (Vic), new gaming machine licensing provisions were enacted that provided for GMEs to be allocated directly to gaming venue operators – thus, in effect, cutting out Tattersall's[6]. Pursuant to that legislation, the Victorian government put up new GMEs for auction, and the Trustee bid for and was allocated 18 new GMEs for the sum of $600,300. Each of the new GMEs was of ten years' duration and permitted the Trustee to operate one gaming machine (a total of 18 gaming machines) at the premises for that period[7]. Subject to necessary approvals, the GMEs were capable of being sold and transferred to other venue operators for the operation of gaming machines at other premises[8].[5]See Victoria v Tatts (2016) 90 ALJR 392 at 399 [38] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ; 328 ALR 564 at 572.[6]See Gambling Regulation Act (as at 1 January 2010), Ch 3, Pt 4A; Victoria v Tatts (2016) 90 ALJR 392 at 399‑400 [39]‑[41] per French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ; 328 ALR 564 at 573.[7]See Gambling Regulation Act (as at 1 January 2010), ss 3.4A.1(1), 3.4A.2(1), 3.4A.5(4), 3.4A.7(1)(b).[8]See Gambling Regulation Act (as at 1 January 2010), s 3.4A.3, Ch 3, Pt 4A, Div 5.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, BELL, GAGELER, NETTLE AND GORDON JJ (dissent)
The majority erred in considering the effect on the goodwill of the integrated hotel business and, as appears from Commissioner of State Revenue (WA) v Placer Dome Inc[103], in conflating goodwill with the going concern value of the business. Here the GMEs were assets which could be individually identified and quantified in the accounts of the Trustee's business, which had a value quite apart from any contribution that they may have made to goodwill. That value resided in their capacity to generate gaming income and the fact that they could be sold and transferred to other venue operators, albeit subject to some restrictions and qualifications[104].[103](2018) 93 ALJR 65 at 84 [97]-[98] per Kiefel CJ, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ; 362 ALR 190 at 211.[104]See and compare Murry (1998) 193 CLR 605 at 626‑627 [57], 629 [65] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ.Conclusion It follows that the appeal should be allowed. Order 1 of the Full Court should be set aside. In its place, it should be ordered that the appeal to the Full Court be allowed and that the decision of the AAT be set aside. In its place, it should be ordered that the objection decision be affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

Full text does not contain this section.