FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324
Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324 Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v JOSEPHINE ROZMAN File number: NSD 569 of 2009 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 1 April 2010 Catchwords: TAXATION – Deemed dividend – Definition of payment in s 109C(1) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – Direction to debtor by private company to pay shareholder is a payment.
TAXATION – Beneficial receipt of money – Whether conclusion that a couple who lives, works and makes contributions to business together sufficient to ground finding that money appropriated or misappropriated by them should be taxed as to one half each – Necessity for intermediate finding of constructive trust.
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) s 10
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 109C
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1: ss 284-75, 284-90, 298-20
Taxation Law (Amendment) Act (No 3) 1998 (Cth)Cases cited: Brookton Co-operative Society Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 441 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v P Iori and Sons Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 363 cited
East Finchley Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 cited
Dennis Wilcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267 cited
Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 735 cited
MacFarlane v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 13 FCR 356 cited
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 cited
Re Harmony and Montague Tin and Copper Mining Company (Spargo’s Case) (1873) LR 8 Ch App 407 cited
Reid v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] AATA 357 reversed in part
Skourdoumbis v Findlay (2002) 190 ALR 554 cited
Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 cited
Stephens v Pittas (1983) BTC 367 cited
Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 cited
Whim Creek Consolidated (NL) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 17 ALR 421 citedDate of hearing: 17 December 2009 Date of last submissions: 17 December 2009 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 48 Counsel for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Mr B J Sullivan SC with Ms C A Burnett Solicitor for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Respondent / Cross-Applicant: Mr F M Douglas QC with Mr I Young and Mr W A D Edwards Solicitor for the Respondent / Cross-Applicant: Djekovic Hearne & Walker
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 569 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
ApplicantAND: JOSEPHINE ROZMAN
Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 APRIL 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The parties bring in short minutes of order reflecting these reasons for judgment within seven days.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 324
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the direction by Tredex to its debtors to pay Ms Rozman was indeed a payment within the meaning of the Act. It rejected Ms Rozman’s argument that a strict interpretation of the term "pay" required a direct transfer of funds from the company to the shareholder. The court found that the ordinary usage of the word "pay" includes the notion of satisfaction and discharge, and that a direction to pay can constitute a payment. This interpretation aligns with legal principles that recognize various forms of payment, including set-offs and agreements to repay. Therefore, the court concluded that the direction by Tredex to its debtors was a payment, triggering the application of the deemed dividend provisions. The Commissioner's appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's decision to reduce the assessed amount by 50% was set aside.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On this basis, Ms Rozman says that s 109C(3)(a) should receive a strict construction. I take from this that s 109C(3)(a) should be construed consistently with s 109C(1) and not in a way which contradicts that provision’s operation.Consideration There is no doubt that s 109C(1) requires there to be a payment by the private company – no other conclusion may be reconciled with the words “if the private company pays an amount to the entity”. Further, it may be accepted that the definition of “payment” in s 109C(3) cannot operate in a way which is inconsistent with s 109C(1). If s 109C(1) properly construed is not activated by a payment by direction then the definition of payment in s 109C(3) should be construed consistently with that conclusion. The question which arises, therefore, is whether a direction by a private company to a debtor to discharge the debt by payment to a shareholder can be described as being a situation in which “a private company pays an amount to an entity”. I have no doubt that it does. As a matter of ordinary English, the verb “to pay” includes amongst its many meanings notions of satisfaction and discharge. Thus, only a pedant would protest that a woman who buys a pair of shoes on a credit card has not paid for them; and this is so notwithstanding that every credit card purchase conceals at least one payment by direction: Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 at 320-321 [71]-[74] per Tamberlin J. So too, it would be idle to suggest that a man who buys a hat by cheque has not paid for it simply because a cheque is a direction to a financial institution to pay a sum certain to another person: s 10 Cheques Act 1986 (Cth). In this case it could scarcely be suggested that had Tredex drawn a cheque upon its bankers in favour of Ms Rozman and delivered that cheque to her that it would not have paid her any money because the true flow of funds was from its bankers to hers. Yet, if that be not so, there is no plausible way of distinguishing other kinds of payment by direction. If a direction to pay given by cheque can be a payment why not a direction given by letter, email or telephone call? If a direction given to a bank is a payment, why not a direction given to some other kind of business, such as Fibre or Triton? In truth, there is no reason to construe “pay” as requiring a direct flow of money from payer to payee. Only in a world in which the concept of money was confined to cash and coin could such a notion even begin to work, for once it be accepted that that concept includes debts and other choses of action, it becomes nonsensical to speak about money literally moving from the payer to the payee. Ms Rozman’s construction of the word “pay” is, therefore, to be rejected. It ignores ordinary usage and it does so for no good reason. Ms Rozman’s attempt to confine the word “pay” to situations where actual money changes hand is not novel and, when raised, has generally been rejected. Thus, for example, the rule in Spargo’s Case (Re Harmony and Montague Tin and Copper Mining Company (1873) LR 8 Ch App 407 at 412 per Sir James LJ) holds that, for the purposes of company law, when a liability upon shares and a liability on a cross-demand against the company of a sum certain immediately payable are set-off against each other this constitutes payment for the shares in cash: see also Whim Creek Consolidated (NL) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 17 ALR 421 at 425 per Bowen CJ, Franki and Deane JJ; Commissioner of Taxation v P Iori and Sons Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 363 at 368 per Fox J. The rule in Spargo’s Case is “not a principle confined merely to the company law context in which it was decided”: East Finchley Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 at 469 per Hill J. Thus “payment of a dividend may occur in a variety of ways not involving payment in cash or by bill of exchange, as, for example, by an agreed set-off, account stated or an agreement which acknowledges that the amount of the dividend is to be lent by the shareholder to the company and is to be repaid to the shareholder in accordance with the terms of that agreement”: Brookton Co-operative Society Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 441 at 455 per Mason J (with whom on this point, each of the other Justices agreed). It is difficult to identify how payments by direction might be distinguished from any of those arrangements: cf. Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 735 at 740 per Giles J; Skourdoumbis v Findlay (2002) 190 ALR 554 at 582-583 [83]-[84] per Gray J. The statement of de Jersey CJ in an obiter dictum in Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 at 546 [4] that a party directing a debtor to pay another “is to be regarded as making the payment” is, in those circumstances, hardly surprising. There is, therefore, no reason to read “the private company pays” in s 109C(1) as precluding payment by direction.