Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman

Link copied
Case Copied 27 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324

Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324
Appeal from: Administrative Appeals Tribunal
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION v JOSEPHINE ROZMAN
File number: NSD 569 of 2009
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 1 April 2010
Catchwords:

TAXATION – Deemed dividend – Definition of payment in s 109C(1) Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – Direction to debtor by private company to pay shareholder is a payment.

TAXATION – Beneficial receipt of money – Whether conclusion that a couple who lives, works and makes contributions to business together sufficient to ground finding that money appropriated or misappropriated by them should be taxed as to one half each – Necessity for intermediate finding of constructive trust.

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Cheques Act 1986 (Cth) s 10
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 109C
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) Sch 1: ss 284-75, 284-90, 298-20
Taxation Law (Amendment) Act (No 3) 1998 (Cth)
Cases cited: Brookton Co-operative Society Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 441 cited
Commissioner of Taxation v P Iori and Sons Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 363 cited
East Finchley Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 cited
Dennis Wilcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267 cited
Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 735 cited
MacFarlane v Commissioner of Taxation (1986) 13 FCR 356 cited
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 cited
Re Harmony and Montague Tin and Copper Mining Company (Spargo’s Case) (1873) LR 8 Ch App 407 cited
Reid v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] AATA 357 reversed in part
Skourdoumbis v Findlay (2002) 190 ALR 554 cited
Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 cited
Stephens v Pittas (1983) BTC 367 cited
Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 cited
Whim Creek Consolidated (NL) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 17 ALR 421 cited
Date of hearing: 17 December 2009
Date of last submissions: 17 December 2009
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 48
Counsel for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Mr B J Sullivan SC with Ms C A Burnett
Solicitor for the Applicant / Cross-Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondent / Cross-Applicant: Mr F M Douglas QC with Mr I Young and Mr W A D Edwards
Solicitor for the Respondent / Cross-Applicant: Djekovic Hearne & Walker

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 569 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Applicant

AND:

JOSEPHINE ROZMAN
Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 APRIL 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The parties bring in short minutes of order reflecting these reasons for judgment within seven days.  

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2010] FCA 324
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman, the main issue before the court was the interpretation of the deemed dividend provisions under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The primary concern was whether a direction by a private company to a debtor to pay a shareholder constituted a payment under these provisions. Ms Rozman, a shareholder in Tredex Pty Ltd, argued that for the provisions to apply, there must be a direct payment from the company. She contended that the direction to debtors to pay her was not a payment by the company and thus did not fall under the deemed dividend provisions. The court examined the language of the provisions and considered whether a payment by direction could be considered a payment for the purposes of the Act. The Commissioner argued that the direction by Tredex to its debtors to pay Ms Rozman constituted a payment, which should be deemed as a dividend. The Tribunal had previously held that the direction by Tredex constituted a payment, but reduced the amount assessed by 50%, considering that Ms Rozman and her former partner lived off the proceeds as a couple.

The court held that the direction by Tredex to its debtors to pay Ms Rozman was indeed a payment within the meaning of the Act. It rejected Ms Rozman’s argument that a strict interpretation of the term "pay" required a direct transfer of funds from the company to the shareholder. The court found that the ordinary usage of the word "pay" includes the notion of satisfaction and discharge, and that a direction to pay can constitute a payment. This interpretation aligns with legal principles that recognize various forms of payment, including set-offs and agreements to repay. Therefore, the court concluded that the direction by Tredex to its debtors was a payment, triggering the application of the deemed dividend provisions. The Commissioner's appeal was allowed, and the Tribunal's decision to reduce the assessed amount by 50% was set aside.

Background

Background to the litigation

The issues between the parties are largely concerned with the operation of a set of provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘the Act”) known as the deemed dividend provisions. These provisions require a taxpayer who is a shareholder in a private company to bring to tax payments made to it by that private company as if those payments had been paid as dividends even if the form of the payment properly bears some other legal characterisation. Facts Before turning to those provisions, however, it is useful first to say something of the facts giving rise to the issues between the parties. The relevant events all occurred in the fiscal year ended 30 June 2001. In that year, Ms Rozman was a shareholder in a company called Tredex Pty Ltd (“Tredex”) which was incorporated in New South Wales. Its business was that of importing and exporting shredded recycled waste paper as well as renting out shipping containers. Apart from Ms Rozman herself there was only one other shareholder in Tredex and that was a Mr Holland. Matters are complicated somewhat by the fact that in the year ended 30 June 2001 Ms Rozman and Mr Holland were in a de facto relationship. In that same year, Tredex made sales (presumably of recycled paper) to a United States corporation called Fibre Trade Inc (“Fibre”) in the amount of AUD$144,533 and earned commission on containers from another United States’ corporation, Triton Container Inc (“Triton”), in the sum of AUD$26,525. Tredex’s return for the year ended 30 June 2001 should have included, but did not, those two items as income totalling AUD$171,058. In fact, although that money was earned by Tredex it was never received by it. This is because, at Tredex’s direction, the two debtors, Fibre and Triton, paid the moneys owed to Tredex elsewhere. So far as Fibre is concerned, its debt to Tredex (or nearly all of it) was discharged by wire transfers on dates between 10 April 2001 and May 2001 to an account with the Bank of America held in Ms Rozman’s name. At the end of that process AUD$141,085.26 had been deposited to the credit of that account. So far as Triton is concerned, its debt to Tredex was discharged by wire transfers by it to a Bank of America account in the name of a company associated with Mr Holland and from there on to Ms Rozman’s account. By that mechanism, and between May and June 2001, a further amount of AUD$26,525 was transferred to Ms Rozman’s account. The sum of those two sets of transfers was $167,610.26 which, rounded to the nearest dollar, is the sum which the Commissioner assessed as income in Ms Rozman’s hands when he issued the amended notice of assessment for the year ended 30 June 2001. As has already been noted, Tredex did not declare the $167,610.26 received into Ms Rozman’s account as assessable income in its return for the year ended 30 June 2001. However, on or about 14 January 2005, Tredex voluntarily disclosed to the Commissioner that it had earned this income. What moved Tredex to this act of honesty was not disclosed in this proceeding. However, it is permissible to note that Mr Holland and Ms Rozman’s de facto relationship had come to an end by January 2004 as a result of which two events had taken place. First, Mr Holland and Ms Rozman had settled a property dispute arising from their relationship. Secondly, perhaps connected to that proposition, Ms Rozman had ceased, on 20 February 2004, to be involved in any way in the affairs of Tredex. The voluntary disclosure by Tredex subsequently in January 2005 that it had not accounted to the Commissioner for the funds put in Ms Rozman’s account is susceptible to many interpretations, some of which may not be especially flattering. However, those issues are neither relevant to this proceeding nor does the material permit any ready resolution of them. The Commissioner’s determination.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Commissioner did not agree and concluded that Ms Rozman had used the moneys for her own benefit and that s 109C applied. Consequently, he concluded that the payments made by Fibre to Triton were taken to be dividend payments to Ms Rozman by Tredex. On the issue of the penalty the Commissioner observed that Ms Rozman was a chartered accountant and, in effect, should have known better and determined to maintain the 75% penalty on the shortfall.The Tribunal’s decision Before the Tribunal Ms Rozman contended: first, that for s 109C(1) to be engaged there had to be a payment by Tredex; secondly, that a direction by Tredex to a debtor to discharge a debt by paying a third party was not, relevantly, a payment by Tredex; thirdly, that the discharge of a debt could not constitute a transfer of that debt to Ms Rozman; fourthly, that in any event, even if those matters were not accepted, Ms Rozman never received the moneys beneficially but, at all times, they were held by her on behalf of Mr Holland and used at his direction; and, fifthly, that the 75% penalty should be reduced because her position was reasonably arguable. The Tribunal rejected the first three of these arguments outright. It held that the direction by Tredex to Fibre and Triton to pay the moneys into Ms Rozman’s account was a payment to which s 109C(1) applied and that it also operated as a transfer of Tredex’s choses in action against the debtors to her, that is, was a payment within s 109C(3)(c). Having seen Ms Rozman cross-examined, it rejected her evidence that she received the funds only for Mr Holland. It did conclude, however, that the evidence suggested that she and Mr Holland lived off the proceeds as a couple and that, consequently, she held moneys received from Fibre and Triton for the both of them. The Tribunal reasoned that accordingly she received, for herself, only 50% of those moneys. It observed that no argument had been advanced that the penalty should be reduced. In the circumstances, it varied the objection decision so that the additional income assessed was reduced by 50% and left the penalty determination at 75%. The proceedings in this Court The Commissioner has now appealed challenging the Tribunal’s conclusion that the assessment should be reduced by half and seeking the restoration of his original decision. Ms Rozman has also sought the setting aside of the Tribunal’s decision but, by contrast, seeks the setting aside of the Commissioner’s original decision and in its place the upholding of her objection.The submissions of Ms Rozman Ms Rozman’s principal submission rested upon the language of s 109C(1)(a). It was a deeming provision which would be activated, on its terms, “if the private company pays an amount to the entity during the year” and “the payment is made when the entity is a shareholder in the private company” (my emphasis). The first expression, so it was said, required an act of payment by the company itself. It was true that the second only required that a payment be made without necessarily identifying who was making the “payment” and that “payment” was defined in s 109C(3)(a) in terms which likewise did not identify the payer. However, it was necessary – and this was lynchpin of the argument – to undertake a grammatical transformation in which the pith of s 109C(1)(a) – which contemplated the verb “pays” governed by the subject “private company” – was transplanted into the definition in s 109C(3). The consequence was that “payment” was a concept inherently linked to the idea of an act of payment by the private company. The last step was to observe that the payments were made not by Tredex but, instead, by Fibre and Triton.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On this basis, Ms Rozman says that s 109C(3)(a) should receive a strict construction. I take from this that s 109C(3)(a) should be construed consistently with s 109C(1) and not in a way which contradicts that provision’s operation.Consideration There is no doubt that s 109C(1) requires there to be a payment by the private company – no other conclusion may be reconciled with the words “if the private company pays an amount to the entity”. Further, it may be accepted that the definition of “payment” in s 109C(3) cannot operate in a way which is inconsistent with s 109C(1). If s 109C(1) properly construed is not activated by a payment by direction then the definition of payment in s 109C(3) should be construed consistently with that conclusion. The question which arises, therefore, is whether a direction by a private company to a debtor to discharge the debt by payment to a shareholder can be described as being a situation in which “a private company pays an amount to an entity”. I have no doubt that it does. As a matter of ordinary English, the verb “to pay” includes amongst its many meanings notions of satisfaction and discharge. Thus, only a pedant would protest that a woman who buys a pair of shoes on a credit card has not paid for them; and this is so notwithstanding that every credit card purchase conceals at least one payment by direction: Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300 at 320-321 [71]-[74] per Tamberlin J. So too, it would be idle to suggest that a man who buys a hat by cheque has not paid for it simply because a cheque is a direction to a financial institution to pay a sum certain to another person: s 10 Cheques Act 1986 (Cth). In this case it could scarcely be suggested that had Tredex drawn a cheque upon its bankers in favour of Ms Rozman and delivered that cheque to her that it would not have paid her any money because the true flow of funds was from its bankers to hers. Yet, if that be not so, there is no plausible way of distinguishing other kinds of payment by direction. If a direction to pay given by cheque can be a payment why not a direction given by letter, email or telephone call? If a direction given to a bank is a payment, why not a direction given to some other kind of business, such as Fibre or Triton? In truth, there is no reason to construe “pay” as requiring a direct flow of money from payer to payee. Only in a world in which the concept of money was confined to cash and coin could such a notion even begin to work, for once it be accepted that that concept includes debts and other choses of action, it becomes nonsensical to speak about money literally moving from the payer to the payee. Ms Rozman’s construction of the word “pay” is, therefore, to be rejected. It ignores ordinary usage and it does so for no good reason. Ms Rozman’s attempt to confine the word “pay” to situations where actual money changes hand is not novel and, when raised, has generally been rejected. Thus, for example, the rule in Spargo’s Case (Re Harmony and Montague Tin and Copper Mining Company (1873) LR 8 Ch App 407 at 412 per Sir James LJ) holds that, for the purposes of company law, when a liability upon shares and a liability on a cross-demand against the company of a sum certain immediately payable are set-off against each other this constitutes payment for the shares in cash: see also Whim Creek Consolidated (NL) v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 17 ALR 421 at 425 per Bowen CJ, Franki and Deane JJ; Commissioner of Taxation v P Iori and Sons Pty Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 363 at 368 per Fox J. The rule in Spargo’s Case is “not a principle confined merely to the company law context in which it was decided”: East Finchley Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 90 ALR 457 at 469 per Hill J. Thus “payment of a dividend may occur in a variety of ways not involving payment in cash or by bill of exchange, as, for example, by an agreed set-off, account stated or an agreement which acknowledges that the amount of the dividend is to be lent by the shareholder to the company and is to be repaid to the shareholder in accordance with the terms of that agreement”: Brookton Co-operative Society Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 441 at 455 per Mason J (with whom on this point, each of the other Justices agreed). It is difficult to identify how payments by direction might be distinguished from any of those arrangements: cf. Fruehauf Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Zurich Australia Insurance Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 735 at 740 per Giles J; Skourdoumbis v Findlay (2002) 190 ALR 554 at 582-583 [83]-[84] per Gray J. The statement of de Jersey CJ in an obiter dictum in Starco Developments Pty Ltd v Ladd [1999] 2 Qd R 542 at 546 [4] that a party directing a debtor to pay another “is to be regarded as making the payment” is, in those circumstances, hardly surprising. There is, therefore, no reason to read “the private company pays” in s 109C(1) as precluding payment by direction.