FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ward v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCAFC 132
Appeal from: Ward and Commissioner of Taxation [2015] AATA 919 File number: ACD 141 of 2015 Judges: ROBERTSON, DAVIES AND WIGNEY JJ Date of judgment: 5 October 2016 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) on a question of law – whether Tribunal misconstrued the scope of the expression “special circumstances” in s 292-465 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in considering that making the determination was consistent with the object of Div 292 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
TAXATION – non-concessional contributions to superannuation fund – application to Commissioner for a written determination the non-concessional contributions be disregarded or allocated instead for the purposes of another financial year specified in the determination – whether Tribunal erred in considering there were no special circumstances – whether Tribunal erred in considering that making the determination was consistent with the object of Div 292 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave should be granted to the applicant to rely on grounds not advanced before the Tribunal
Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AC
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Div 292, ss 292-5, 292-465
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Dowling [2014] FCA 252
Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324; 186 FCR 1
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315
Liwszyc v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 112; 218 FCR 334
Lynton and Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 667; 90 ATR 950
Player v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 869; 84 ATR 541
Quality Publications Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 256; 202 FCR 574
Repatriation Commission v Warren [2008] FCAFC 64; 167 FCR 511
Date of hearing: 11 August 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Taxation Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr CJ Bevan with Mr S Spadijer Solicitor for the Applicant: Dwyer Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JO Hmelnitsky SC with Mr BC Kasep Solicitor for the Respondent: ATO Review & Dispute Resolution ORDERS
ACD 141 of 2015 BETWEEN: COLIN WARD
Applicant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
JUDGES:
ROBERTSON, DAVIES AND WIGNEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 OCTOBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The notice of contention be upheld.
3.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.
4.The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law.
5.Subject to order 6, there be no order for costs of the proceedings…
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- Case
- [2016] FCAFC 132
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Federal Court found that the notice of contention did not introduce a new case, and the Commissioner was not required to obtain leave to rely on it. The Court identified a question of law regarding whether the lump sum contribution could be considered as contributions made gradually over the applicant's lifetime. The Court held that the AAT misunderstood this legal question, particularly in light of its findings about the source of the funds. The Court emphasised that questions of fact and degree were involved and that the AAT needed to address the legal and beneficial ownership of the funds over time.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, upheld the notice of contention, and set aside the AAT's decision. The case was remitted to the AAT to be reheard according to law. The Court noted that no order for costs would be made unless either party requested a hearing on the matter within 14 days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The notice of contention be upheld.
3. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.
4. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law.
5. Subject to order 6, there be no order for costs of the proceedings in this Court.
6. If either party wishes to be heard in relation to order 5, they should notify the other side and the Court within 14 days, whereupon orders will be made for the exchange of submissions and the consideration of those submissions by the Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In oral submissions, the applicant submitted that the case propounded by the Commissioner in the Tribunal was recited in the decision at [31]-[32] at length. The applicant submitted it was a factual case, and it had been rejected in every aspect. Part of the basis for its rejection was an acceptance of the Commissioner’s flow of funds diagram as annotated by Ms Smith. Its rejection was unsurprising as it was effectively an agreed fact. The case before the Tribunal focused on Mr Ward as the only relevant taxpayer and on the statutory quality of his superannuation entitlements. The attempt to introduce Mrs Ward as a relevant taxpayer in the notice of contention was a new case on appeal. It was also a factual case because it turned on the ownership of money. It was submitted that such a case had to be put to Mrs Ward but was not. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to be asked to make findings of fact about this new case and it was not asked. The applicant submitted that Dowling was as factually far removed from this case as was possible to imagine. A further distinguishing feature of Dowling was that the finding made by Greenwood J at [115], that much of that Tribunal’s conclusionary findings were based on mere assumption of the facts about who contributed what, when and why, stood in contradistinction to the affirmative findings made here by the Tribunal in the decision at [43]-[46] which the notice of contention sought to reverse. Here the findings of fact were made on black and white documents, much of it the subject of agreement or concessions, and evidence in cross-examination. The applicant also submitted that there had also been a no evidence finding made by Greenwood J in [116] in Dowling, and the Commissioner had made no “no evidence” complaint in his notice of contention in this Court. ConsiderationThe application for leave to amend In Repatriation Commission v Warren [2008] FCAFC 64; 167 FCR 511 (Warren), Lindgren and Bennett JJ (with whom Logan J agreed on this point) outlined at [78] the relevant principles, as follows: ŸThe general rule that a litigant is bound by, and accordingly is entitled to act on, admissions and concessions does not automatically apply, although cases concerned with the exercise of judicial power may be of assistance (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 342; 35 ALR at 194 per Bowen CJ).ŸA party to the proceeding is not necessarily precluded from arguing on “appeal” matters that were conceded before the tribunal. Whether the party is so precluded depends on the nature of the matter conceded, its conduct of its case, whether the concession represented an agreement by the parties as to the facts to be decided and other relevant circumstances (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 343; 35 ALR at 195 per Bowen CJ and at 348; 199 per Fox J).ŸWhere a concession is made, there must be some difficulty in finding an “error of law” when the contrary of the concession is raised for the first time in this Court (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 20 ATR 1262 at 1267 per Gummow J).ŸA tribunal does not err in law in failing to regard as material a fact which counsel failed in submissions to contend was material (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Perkins (1993) 26 ATR 8 at 10 per Davies J).ŸThere is a difference between factual matters not canvassed before the tribunal and a new issue relating to the validity of a regulation (Tefonu Pty Ltd v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 at 367 per Beazley J).ŸEven though the parties may be “able, in practical terms, to narrow the issues by concession … even a concession does not permit the [t]ribunal to avoid its duty as an administrative decision-maker to make the correct or preferable decision … on all relevant aspects of the matter before it” (Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256 at [23]);ŸA concession “does, however, permit the decision-maker to reach the correct or preferable decision by reference to the concession as well as to its findings on disputed questions” (Peacock 161 FCR 256 at [23]; and see Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328 at 337–338).ŸThe Court will more readily permit a matter to be raised for the first time in this Court on an appeal from a tribunal where:(a)the matter is a pure question of law, such as a question as to the validity of a regulation (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 343; 35 ALR at 195; Tefonu 44 FCR at 367) or a question as to whether the tribunal had applied the correct standard of proof on the true construction and application of legislation: Ferriday 69 FCR at 527–528 per Lee J);(b)the matter goes to a misapprehension that was shared by the parties before the tribunal and therefore by the tribunal itself (Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Revenue (ACT) (1994) 50 FCR 405 at 418–419 per Wilcox J) such as a shared misapprehension as to the applicable law (cf Thomas 50 FCR at 120 per Beazley J); or(c)the matter goes to a condition precedent to the availability of a power, the exercise of which will have a serious impact on the individual (Kuswardana 54 FLR 334; 35 ALR 186).