Ward v Commissioner of Taxation

Link copied
Case Copied 32 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ward v Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCAFC 132

Appeal from: Ward and Commissioner of Taxation [2015] AATA 919
File number: ACD 141 of 2015
Judges: ROBERTSON, DAVIES AND WIGNEY JJ
Date of judgment: 5 October 2016
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) on a question of law – whether Tribunal misconstrued the scope of the expression “special circumstances” in s 292-465 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in considering that making the determination was consistent with the object of Div 292 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)

TAXATION – non-concessional contributions to superannuation fund – application to Commissioner for a written determination the non-concessional contributions be disregarded or allocated instead for the purposes of another financial year specified in the determination – whether Tribunal erred in considering there were no special circumstances – whether Tribunal erred in considering that making the determination was consistent with the object of Div 292 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether leave should be granted to the applicant to rely on grounds not advanced before the Tribunal

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AC

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Div 292, ss 292-5, 292-465

Cases cited:

Commissioner of Taxation v Dowling [2014] FCA 252

Commissioner of Taxation v Rozman [2010] FCA 324; 186 FCR 1

Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315

Liwszyc v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] FCA 112; 218 FCR 334

Lynton and Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 667; 90 ATR 950

Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue (1994) 50 FCR 405

Player v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCA 869; 84 ATR 541

Quality Publications Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2012] FCA 256; 202 FCR 574

Repatriation Commission v Warren  [2008] FCAFC 64; 167 FCR 511

Date of hearing: 11 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Taxation
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr CJ Bevan with Mr S Spadijer
Solicitor for the Applicant: Dwyer Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JO Hmelnitsky SC with Mr BC Kasep
Solicitor for the Respondent: ATO Review & Dispute Resolution

ORDERS

ACD 141 of 2015
BETWEEN:

COLIN WARD

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

JUDGES:

ROBERTSON, DAVIES AND WIGNEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 OCTOBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The notice of contention be upheld.

3.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.

4.The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law.

5.Subject to order 6, there be no order for costs of the proceedings…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ward v Commissioner of Taxation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCAFC 132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ward v Commissioner of Taxation involved an appeal by the applicant against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The dispute centred on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) concerning non-concessional contributions to a superannuation fund. The primary legal issue was whether the AAT misconstrued the term "special circumstances" in s 292-465 of the Act and whether it erred in finding that the making of a determination was consistent with the object of Div 292. The Commissioner of Taxation also filed a notice of contention challenging the AAT’s decision.

The Federal Court found that the notice of contention did not introduce a new case, and the Commissioner was not required to obtain leave to rely on it. The Court identified a question of law regarding whether the lump sum contribution could be considered as contributions made gradually over the applicant's lifetime. The Court held that the AAT misunderstood this legal question, particularly in light of its findings about the source of the funds. The Court emphasised that questions of fact and degree were involved and that the AAT needed to address the legal and beneficial ownership of the funds over time.

In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, upheld the notice of contention, and set aside the AAT's decision. The case was remitted to the AAT to be reheard according to law. The Court noted that no order for costs would be made unless either party requested a hearing on the matter within 14 days.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The notice of contention be upheld.

3. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 30 November 2015 be set aside.

4. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law.

5. Subject to order 6, there be no order for costs of the proceedings in this Court.

6. If either party wishes to be heard in relation to order 5, they should notify the other side and the Court within 14 days, whereupon orders will be made for the exchange of submissions and the consideration of those submissions by the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred in concluding that it did not consider that there were special circumstances. Thus, the applicant’s appeal centred on s 292-465(3)(a). The Commissioner’s notice of contention centred on s 292-465(3)(b) and is to the effect that the Tribunal erred in considering that the making of the determination sought by the applicant was consistent with the object of Div 292.The facts found by the TribunalIn relation to the appeal The Tribunal found the following facts. At [43], the Tribunal referred to the final statement from BT Super for Life to Mr Ward and said that apparently only the first page of a four page document was supplied to Mr Ward’s advisor, Ms Smith, by Mr Ward. At [44], the Tribunal found that Mr Ward did not make a conscious and informed decision to breach the bring forward rule. Even if he had some basic understanding of the bring forward rule, which might have suggested that he could not put more money into his superannuation account at that time, that understanding was readily displaced by the firm and authoritative advice proffered by Wholistic Financial Solutions (Wholistic). Neither Ms Smith of Wholistic nor Mr Ward acted with the intention of avoiding the cap on superannuation contributions or of obtaining some tax advantage for Mr and Mrs Ward. At [46], the Tribunal held that the incorrect advice given by Ms Smith to Mr Ward was induced by the misleading notice provided by BT Super for Life. At [49], the Tribunal said the imposition of excess contributions tax on Mr Ward was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the decisions he and his advisers made, albeit in ignorance. At [50], the Tribunal found that the excess contributions tax levied here, $209,250, wiped out the entirety of Mr Ward’s superannuation savings at retirement. At [54], the Tribunal said that the strict application of the law to Mr Ward’s situation produced an outcome which was harsh and unfair. At [46] and [47], the Tribunal said the effect of the amount of the excess contributions tax on Mr Ward was oppressive or had catastrophic consequences.In relation to the notice of contention At [32], the Tribunal rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the contribution of $450,000 made by Mr Ward to the Parr Post Fund in September 2010 did not represent superannuation contributions made by him over the course of his working life. The Tribunal found that Mr Ward cashed in his benefits in his two superannuation schemes, APSS and CSS, in early 2008, invested them in BT Super for Life for a period and later deposited them into term deposit accounts. The Tribunal found that the $450,000 invested in the Parr Post Fund in September 2010 was essentially the proceeds of Mr and Mrs Ward’s superannuation accounts, plus the proceeds of the sale of a former home in Perth. This corpus of funds passed through several superannuation and term deposit accounts before being deposited in the self-managed superannuation fund. They were, clearly, the Tribunal said, the same funds Mr Ward had withdrawn in early 2008. The fact that Mr Ward deposited and withdrew his superannuation assets several times, in desperate attempts to maintain their value, did not detract from the reality that these were the same assets, more or less, from start to finish.The reasoning of the Tribunal in relation to special circumstances

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In our opinion, the notice of contention does not raise a case that was not put to the Tribunal. Therefore, the Commissioner does not need leave to rely on his notice of contention. The written submissions made by the Commissioner to the Tribunal were made available to the Court and the point raised in the notice of contention was put in those submissions. Secondly, in our opinion, there is a question of law, which is whether it could be said on the facts found by the Tribunal that the lump sum contribution represented contributions made gradually over the course of Mr Ward’s lifetime: compare Dowling at [115] per Greenwood J. Thirdly, in our opinion, the reasoning of the Tribunal at [32] shows that the Tribunal must have misunderstood that legal question as, at the least, the Tribunal found that the $450,000 included the proceeds of the sale of a former home in Perth. It does not give a complete picture of the Tribunal’s findings to focus, as the applicant did, only on the statement that the $450,000 invested in the Parr Post Fund in September 2010 was the same funds as Mr Ward had withdrawn in early 2008. That is to take what the Tribunal said, as a matter of conclusion in that sentence, out of its context in [32] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Fourthly, although the facts in Dowling were indeed different to the present facts, we would not regard what was said in [115] and [117] as obiter dicta as the matters were remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law, which meant both in relation to special circumstances and in relation to consistency with the object of Div 292. We accept, however, that questions of fact and degree are involved and it could not be said that there is only one possible answer. The Tribunal would have to address, in our view, who was the legal and beneficial owner from time to time, and in what circumstances, of the funds which made up the amount of $450,000.Conclusion and orders For these reasons both grounds 4, 5 and 6 of the appeal and also the notice of contention should be upheld. The matter should be remitted to the Tribunal. We would not make any direction as to by whom the Tribunal should be constituted or as to the scope of the further hearing in the Tribunal. Our preliminary view is that there should be no order as to the costs of the appeal given the equal and mixed success of the parties. If either party wishes to be heard in relation to costs, they should notify the other side and the Court within 14 days.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions, the applicant submitted that the case propounded by the Commissioner in the Tribunal was recited in the decision at [31]-[32] at length. The applicant submitted it was a factual case, and it had been rejected in every aspect. Part of the basis for its rejection was an acceptance of the Commissioner’s flow of funds diagram as annotated by Ms Smith. Its rejection was unsurprising as it was effectively an agreed fact. The case before the Tribunal focused on Mr Ward as the only relevant taxpayer and on the statutory quality of his superannuation entitlements. The attempt to introduce Mrs Ward as a relevant taxpayer in the notice of contention was a new case on appeal. It was also a factual case because it turned on the ownership of money. It was submitted that such a case had to be put to Mrs Ward but was not. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to be asked to make findings of fact about this new case and it was not asked. The applicant submitted that Dowling was as factually far removed from this case as was possible to imagine. A further distinguishing feature of Dowling was that the finding made by Greenwood J at [115], that much of that Tribunal’s conclusionary findings were based on mere assumption of the facts about who contributed what, when and why, stood in contradistinction to the affirmative findings made here by the Tribunal in the decision at [43]-[46] which the notice of contention sought to reverse. Here the findings of fact were made on black and white documents, much of it the subject of agreement or concessions, and evidence in cross-examination. The applicant also submitted that there had also been a no evidence finding made by Greenwood J in [116] in Dowling, and the Commissioner had made no “no evidence” complaint in his notice of contention in this Court. ConsiderationThe application for leave to amend In Repatriation Commission v Warren [2008] FCAFC 64; 167 FCR 511 (Warren), Lindgren and Bennett JJ (with whom Logan J agreed on this point) outlined at [78] the relevant principles, as follows: ŸThe general rule that a litigant is bound by, and accordingly is entitled to act on, admissions and concessions does not automatically apply, although cases concerned with the exercise of judicial power may be of assistance (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 342; 35 ALR at 194 per Bowen CJ).ŸA party to the proceeding is not necessarily precluded from arguing on “appeal” matters that were conceded before the tribunal. Whether the party is so precluded depends on the nature of the matter conceded, its conduct of its case, whether the concession represented an agreement by the parties as to the facts to be decided and other relevant circumstances (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 343; 35 ALR at 195 per Bowen CJ and at 348; 199 per Fox J).ŸWhere a concession is made, there must be some difficulty in finding an “error of law” when the contrary of the concession is raised for the first time in this Court (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Raptis (1989) 20 ATR 1262 at 1267 per Gummow J).ŸA tribunal does not err in law in failing to regard as material a fact which counsel failed in submissions to contend was material (Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Perkins (1993) 26 ATR 8 at 10 per Davies J).ŸThere is a difference between factual matters not canvassed before the tribunal and a new issue relating to the validity of a regulation (Tefonu Pty Ltd v Insurance and Superannuation Commissioner (1993) 44 FCR 361 at 367 per Beazley J).ŸEven though the parties may be “able, in practical terms, to narrow the issues by concession … even a concession does not permit the [t]ribunal to avoid its duty as an administrative decision-maker to make the correct or preferable decision … on all relevant aspects of the matter before it” (Peacock v Repatriation Commission (2007) 161 FCR 256 at [23]);ŸA concession “does, however, permit the decision-maker to reach the correct or preferable decision by reference to the concession as well as to its findings on disputed questions” (Peacock 161 FCR 256 at [23]; and see Comcare v Fiedler (2001) 115 FCR 328 at 337–338).ŸThe Court will more readily permit a matter to be raised for the first time in this Court on an appeal from a tribunal where:(a)the matter is a pure question of law, such as a question as to the validity of a regulation (Kuswardana 54 FLR at 343; 35 ALR at 195; Tefonu 44 FCR at 367) or a question as to whether the tribunal had applied the correct standard of proof on the true construction and application of legislation: Ferriday 69 FCR at 527–528 per Lee J);(b)the matter goes to a misapprehension that was shared by the parties before the tribunal and therefore by the tribunal itself (Perpetual Trustee Company (Canberra) Ltd v Commissioner for Revenue (ACT) (1994) 50 FCR 405 at 418–419 per Wilcox J) such as a shared misapprehension as to the applicable law (cf Thomas 50 FCR at 120 per Beazley J); or(c)the matter goes to a condition precedent to the availability of a power, the exercise of which will have a serious impact on the individual (Kuswardana 54 FLR 334; 35 ALR 186).