Commissioner of Police v Punchard

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Commissioner of Police v Punchard [2021] QCA 166

PARTIES:

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(applicant)
v
PUNCHARD, Neil
(respondent)

FILE NO:

CA No 200 of 2020
DC No 4007 of 2019

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane – [2020] QDC 211 (Chowdhury DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

13 August 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

20 July 2021

JUDGES:

Sofronoff P and Fraser and Mullins JJA

ORDERS:

1.   Leave to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal allowed.

3.   Set aside the orders made by Chowdhury DCJ on 1 September 2020.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE – SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE – where the respondent pleaded guilty and was sentenced for nine counts of use restricted computer without consent and cause or intend to cause detriment, damage or gain – where the sentencing magistrate sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for a wholly suspended period of two months – where the operational period for the suspended term of imprisonment was 18 months – where the respondent appealed to the District Court pursuant to s 222(2)(c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) on the basis that the punishment was excessive – where the District Court judge on appeal re-sentenced the respondent to 140 hours of community service with no conviction recorded – where the District Court judge on appeal could not re-sentence the respondent unless the sentencing magistrate erred in exercising the sentencing discretion – whether the District Court judge on appeal erred in re-sentencing the respondent

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE – APPEALS BY CROWN – EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – GENERALLY – where the sentencing magistrate sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for a wholly suspended period of two months – where the District Court judge on appeal re-sentenced the respondent to 140 hours of community service – where the District Court judge on appeal erred in re-sentencing the respondent – where the respondent completed 140 hours of community service – whether the reinstatement of the magistrate’s sentence would cause an injustice to the respondent – whether the court should exercise its residual discretion and decline to interfere with the sentences imposed in the District Court

Criminal Code (Qld), s 408E
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222

Commissioner of Police v Broederlow (2020) 5 QR 296; [2020] QCA 161, cited
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; [2011] HCA 10, cited
R v Yarwood (2011) 220 A Crim R 497; [2011] QCA 367, cited

COUNSEL:

A J Edwards for the applicant
J R Hunter QC for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

QPS Legal Unit for the applicant
Gnech & Associates for the respondent

  1. THE COURT:  The respondent pleaded guilty before her Honour Magistrate Previtera on 14 October 2019 to nine counts of use restricted computer without…

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Details
Case
[2021] QCA 166
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Commissioner of Police v Punchard, the Court was called upon to review the sentence imposed by a District Court judge on appeal against a sentencing magistrate's decision. The respondent, a former police officer, pleaded guilty to nine counts of using a restricted computer without consent or with intent to cause detriment, damage, or gain. The sentencing magistrate sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for a wholly suspended period of two months with an operational period of 18 months. Dissatisfied with the sentence, the respondent appealed to the District Court, which re-sentenced the respondent to 140 hours of community service with no conviction recorded. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the District Court judge erred in re-sentencing the respondent. The Court had to determine whether the sentencing magistrate made an error in exercising their discretion when imposing the original sentence and whether the District Court judge was correct in re-sentencing the respondent.

The Court found that the District Court judge did err in re-sentencing the respondent. The Court held that the District Court judge could only re-sentence the respondent if the sentencing magistrate had erred in exercising the sentencing discretion. In this case, the Court found no such error. The Court emphasised the importance of adhering to the principle that the Court should only interfere with the sentence if it was manifestly excessive or inadequate. The Court noted that the respondent had completed the 140 hours of community service and that reinstating the magistrate’s sentence would cause an injustice to the respondent. Nevertheless, the Court exercised its residual discretion and declined to interfere with the sentences imposed in the District Court.

The Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal. The orders made by Chowdhury DCJ on 1 September 2020 were set aside.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal allowed.

3. Set aside the orders made by Chowdhury DCJ on 1 September 2020.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first and third reasons for seeking leave to appeal are then reflected in the grounds of the appeal.Relevant facts The respondent had been a police officer since 25 September 2002 and was a Senior Constable when he offended. He was aged 47 to 48 years at the time of the offending and had no prior criminal history. The respondent was a very close and long-term friend of X who was married to Y and there were children of that relationship. Around June 2013 there was a breakdown in the relationship of X and Y that led to Y moving out of the marital home. Y later commenced a relationship with Z with whom she began to cohabit. Even before X and Y had separated, X had on 28 August 2012 asked the respondent to check someone’s address from their licence plate and the respondent refused to do so. The nine offences arose out of the nine occasions on which the respondent accessed the police systems QPRIME and MINDA after the breakdown in the relationship between X and Y. The respondent was authorised to access those computer systems only in connection with his official duties. Charge 1 was committed on 30 July 2013 when the respondent used a police computer to access QPRIME to conduct a search about X and looked at current information concerning a shop stealing matter and a be on the lookout (BOLO) warning that had been placed on the system about X. There were no notations or indications in the respondent’s daily activity log to account for this search. Charge 2 was committed on 24 September 2013, when the respondent used a police computer to access QPRIME to conduct a search about X on the Department of Transport and Main Roads (DTMR) system for licence details and the traffic history of X, when the respondent was reportedly on speed camera deployment. Charge 3 involved the respondent using a police computer in a police vehicle to do a MINDA search of the DTMR system on Y’s licence on 15 October 2013, when the respondent was reportedly delivering briefs of evidence to Holland Park, Wynnum and Cleveland prosecutions. On 23 October 2013 the respondent committed charge 4 when he used a police computer to access QPRIME to conduct a search about Y and opened a victim report concerning her and then accessed DTMR information about her. According to the respondent’s activity log, he was undertaking training at the time. Charge 5 was committed on 20 November 2013 when the respondent accessed QPRIME to conduct a search about X, X’s sister and Y and also accessed information within the DTMR systems, including licence details and traffic histories. He also revisited the BOLO previously accessed on 30 July 2013 and gained information about X’s suspended driver’s licence which he passed onto X. Later that same day X contacted SPER and had the suspension lifted. According to the respondent’s activity log, he was undertaking a speed detection device requalification at the time of the searches. The respondent committed charge 6 on 9 December 2013 when he used a police computer in a police vehicle to conduct a MIMDA search of the DTMR system on the registration number plate of X’s car and was informed that the vehicle was not a vehicle of interest. In March 2014 the respondent bought that car from X.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent tendered numerous references that showed how highly he was regarded by other police officers who provided references in their personal capacity and members of the community. He was involved for many years in administering a police sponsored program on road safety that reached out to the community called the Attitudinal Drivers Workshop for which he received community awards.The Magistrate’s decision The Magistrate accepted that the respondent pleaded guilty in a timely way and that the pleas of guilty indicated his remorse which was also confirmed by the reports of Mr Worthington and Dr Dodds. The Magistrate took into account the delay in the prosecution between 5 October 2016 and 13 August 2018 in the respondent’s favour for sentencing purposes. The Magistrate noted that the respondent had received awards for various activities he had undertaken within the police service, the offending was out of character and there was a low risk of the respondent’s reoffending. The Magistrate noted that charges 5 and 7 involved information actually being released by the respondent to X and the most serious of those (charge 7) committed on 3 February 2014 involved the release of the unit number where Y lived with her new partner and the children of the marriage with X which was information that X did not otherwise have, even though X knew the unit block, the street and the suburb. The Magistrate characterised as serious the fact that the respondent knew what he was doing was wrong, as he had refused on the earlier occasion in 2012 to provide information to X on his request, and the respondent also knew that X could go to the Family Court to obtain the information he needed and had advised X that he could do so. Emails sent by the respondent to X over the period between 8 September 2013 and 9 July 2014 confirmed that the respondent had become involved in the family law proceedings between X and Y and appeared to accept entirely X’s version of events. The Magistrate referred to the victim impact statement from Y that was before the court and noted the prosecution correctly accepted that the full extent of the psychological impact upon Y was not entirely due to the respondent’s offending and some of the effects must be the result of the acrimonious nature of the relationship between X and Y. The Magistrate did accept that there has been a psychological impact upon Y by reason of her knowledge that X knew where she lived. The Magistrate noted the psychologist’s report dated March 2017 where there was an indication that the respondent suffered from mild anxiety and was prone to distress if reminded of certain traumatic events that were referred to in the report. The psychologist considered it was not unreasonable that the severity of those traumatic events influenced the respondent’s judgment in accessing information to reduce the suffering to X and his children. The Magistrate noted, however, that there was no mention in any of the emails sent by the respondent to any suffering by the children or any allegations being made concerning suffering or harm to the children. The Magistrate accepted that the flavour of the messages was that the respondent’s focus was that Y was deserving of the treatment that was being meted out to her. The Magistrate noted the psychiatrist diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as the significant causal factor of the respondent’s offending, but that was “at odds” with the character references that the respondent set, and worked to, a high standard on a daily basis in his employment over a considerable number of years and evidence that the respondent knew what he was doing was wrong, because he had refused X’s first request of him for information in 2012.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established