On 14 October 2019, the appellant was convicted of the following offences in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane:
Charge 1 - That on the 30th day of July 2013 at Capalaba in the State of Queensland [the appellant] used a restricted computer without the consent of its controller and [the appellant] gained a benefit, namely knowledge.
Charge 2 - That on the 24th day of September 2013 at Capalaba in the State of Queensland [the appellant] used a restricted computer without the consent of its controller and [the appellant] gained a benefit, namely knowledge.
Charge 3 - That on the 15th day of October 2013 at Wishart in the State…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The appellant, Punchard, appealed against the sentences imposed by the Brisbane Magistrates Court, arguing that the sentence was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. The appeal was heard in the context of the appellant's unauthorised access to restricted police information systems, QPRIME and MINDA, on nine occasions over 12 months to obtain personal information about a friend and his friend's ex-partner and her new husband. The appellant accessed these systems not in an official capacity, despite being trained and warned about the conditions of use. The key legal issue was whether the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was manifestly excessive, considering the breach of trust, the appellant's remorse, and the absence of a significant risk to public safety.
The court considered the appellant's breach of trust, the seriousness of the offending, and the mitigating factors, such as the appellant's timely guilty pleas, genuine remorse, and lack of prior offending history. The court also highlighted that the appellant's actions, while serious, did not place any person at risk, and there was no evidence that he was aware of any domestic violence allegations. The court noted that imprisonment is to be considered a sentence of last resort and weighed the sentences imposed in comparable cases. Ultimately, the court found that the wholly suspended sentence of two months imprisonment for each of the nine charges was excessive given the specific circumstances of the case, the mitigating factors, and the sentences imposed for similar offences.
The appeal was allowed, and the sentences imposed by the Brisbane Magistrates Court were set aside. The appellant was re-sentenced to convictions without further punishment for Charges 1–4, 6, 8, and 9, a 40-hour Community Service Order for Charge 5, and a 100-hour Community Service Order for Charge 7. Convictions were not recorded.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. The sentences imposed by the Brisbane Magistrates Court on 14 October 2019 are set aside.
3. The Appellant is re-sentenced as follows:
Charges 1 – 4, 6, 8 & 9: Convicted and not further punished
Charge 5: 40 hour Community Service Order
Charge 7: 100 hour Community Service Order
Convictions are not recorded.
Background
Background to the litigation
By way of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to s 222 Justices Act 1886 (“Justices Act”), the appellant appeals against the sentences imposed on the following ground:1.The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances.Relevant facts At the commencement of the sentence hearing on 14 October 2019, counsel for the prosecution referred to his written submissions, which had been provided to the Magistrate beforehand, he indicated that “I should tender those and the victim impact statement, which your Honour has”.[1] The written submissions were not in fact marked as an exhibit. In respect of this appeal the original submissions for the prosecution have been attached to the outline of argument for the respondent. In these circumstances it’s prudent to refer to the facts as outlined orally before the Magistrate during the hearing. The following was placed on the record by the prosecution:“The factual circumstances, I’ve set out in my outline of submissions, but I should place some things on the record. The defendant used two computers on nine occasions over 12 months to access restricted information held by the Queensland Police Service. The two restricted systems that he accessed were called MINDA and QPRIME. They are the mobile integrated network data access. That is the police computer inside police cars. And QPRIME, the Queensland police records management exchange. They are the primary record keeping systems for police. They contain a vast amount of primed information about citizens, their criminal histories, intelligence held about them, flags about them, matters in which they’d been accused, victims or witnesses, the details of their addresses, their phone numbers, any – there’s access through those systems to Queensland Transport so that vehicle registration details can be obtained. They truly contain a vast amount of very private and personal information about people. Now, access to those restricted systems is allowed as part of a police officer’s official duties. All police officers receive training in the use of those systems. They are told about the conditions of the use of those systems, which includes not accessing them for personal reasons. Every time those systems are used, a warning appears on the screen reminding police officers of the conditions surrounding the use of those systems. The defendant accessed those systems to obtain information about a friend, [GA] and his friend’s ex-partner, [AA], and her new husband, [PK]. On each occasion, he was not acting in any official capacity. The background to that offending is that – if I can use their first names, because they have the same last names – [GA] and [AA] were married. They had three children. Around June 2013, the relationship broke down. They separated and ultimately [AA] came to live with [PK]. They have subsequently married. The defendant is close friends with [GA], and it appears they went to school together, and from some material I’ve seen they may have been friends from as young as four years old. They were long term friends. The defendant knew that he shouldn’t be accessing these systems to assist [GA]. He knew that not only because of the training he’d received and the warnings which appear on the computer screen each time it’s used. But he knew it intrinsically and obviously because he said as much to [GA] in 2012, when [GA] invited him to make some enquiries on the QPRIME system for [GA]. He indicated then that if he did that and it got out, it could be traced back to who did the search and he could lose his job over it, so he wasn’t prepared to risk that. Despite that, it appears that he became more and more embroiled in [GA’s] family law disputes with [AA]. They were going through quite an acrimonious break-up, and it’s in that context that he made searches for information in relation to [GA] but more concerningly in relation to [AA] and her new partner as well.In short-form, the offences occurred in this way. The first charge was 30 July 2013, when the defendant accessed QPRIME to conduct a search about [GA]. He looked at occurrence information concerning a shop stealing and a be-on-the-lookout warning. On 24 September 2013, Charge 2, he looked up [GA] on the Department of Transport and Main Roads through QPRIME. The third charge on 15 October 2013, again, through QPRIME – through – sorry – through MINDA this time, he accessed the Department of Transport and Main Roads system in relation to [AA’s] licence. That would have disclosed whether she was a person of interest in relation to anything.On the fourth charge of 23 October 2013, he used QPRIME to conduct a search again about [AA]. He opened a victim report about her. He accessed Department of Transport and Main Roads information about her. On the fifth occasion on 20 November 2013, he accessed QPRIME, conducted a search about [GA], [GA’s] sister and [AA], their licence details, their traffic histories. He again accessed the be-on-the-lookout which he previously accessed. He gained information about [GA’s] suspended driver’s licence – he had a SPER suspension and passed that onto [GA]. That was one of the two occasions on which he disseminated information, and, ultimately, [GA] later that day, contacted SPER and had that suspension lifted. Charge 6, on 9 December 2013, he accessed, through MINDA, the Main Roads – Transport and Main Roads system in relation to [GA’s] registration plate. He would have then been told that vehicle was not a vehicle of interest. When he accessed that, he was in the street where [GA’s] parents lived and he later bought that car off [GA] in March of 2014. On 3 February 2014, perhaps the most concerning offence, he accessed, through MINDA, a search of the Department of Transport and Main Roads in relation to [PK’s] driver’s licence – it included his residential address – and he passed that address onto [GA].On 24 March 2014, he conducted a search again about [GA] to look at information about [GA] contained within the Department of Transport and Main Roads system through QPRIME, and finally, on 17 July 2014, he used QPRIME to conduct a search about [GA], looked at information about [GA] on the Department of Transport and Main Roads system…”[1]R1-3, l 28.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
In the course of the proceedings, the learned Magistrate said that she would like to have a copy of the Family Court order. That was handed up by the solicitor for the appellant, but it does not seem that it was specifically marked as an exhibit. A copy of the order from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is on the Magistrates Court file that is before me. The order was made by consent on a final basis on 21 November 2013, which stated that both GA and AA have equal shared parental responsibility for the major long-term issues of the two named children. Paragraph 5 of the order relevantly stated that “the mother and father shall keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address and contact telephone number”. Paragraph 21 of the order set out the way in which future disputes should be resolved, including any dispute about “the interpretation, implementation or enforcement of these orders”. Paragraph 22 stated that both parties had liberty to apply to the court on any matter “including relating to the implementation meaning an interpretation of the terms herein.”Decision of the Magistrate In the course of considered remarks, the learned Magistrate made the following findings:·The appellant pleaded guilty in a timely way. Those pleas of guilty indicated his remorse. That remorse was confirmed by what was said by the psychologist, Dr Worthington, and the psychiatrist Dr Dodds, and that remorse was accepted to be genuine;·There has been a delay in the prosecution of the charges against the appellant, by reason of decisions made within the police force on 5 October 2016 and 13 August 2018. Consequently, while the offending occurred when the appellant was 47 and 48 years of age, he was 53 at the time of sentence, and such delay was a matter that could be taken into account in his favour for sentencing purposes;·His pay rank was reduced as a result of a decision taken in 2018, and it was reduced for 12 months from the 2016 date, and then stood down in 2018;·It was not disputed that the appellant had significantly contributed to and received awards for various activities within the police service, in terms of the 2011 floods, the attitudinal drivers’ workshop, which the court and other courts around the State consider very highly and refer people to it. It was accepted that he had personally contributed financially to what is required in that course, and any additional monies from fees required from participants had been referred on to charity;·The appellant had no prior history of any offending at all, which indicated and was accepted that the offending was out of character, even though the offending occurred over a 12 month period. Both expert reports indicated there was a low risk of re-offending;·Two of the charges involved information actually being released to GA. The most serious of the charges was the release of information on 3 February 2014, of the unit number where AA lived with PK and the two children of AA and GA. GA did not otherwise have that unit number, even though he knew the unit block, the street and the suburb;·It is serious that the appellant knew that what he was doing was wrong. He had indicated that to GA on an earlier occasion in 2012, when GA asked him to check someone else’s address from their licence plate. The appellant also knew that GA could go to the Family Court to obtain the information he needed. The appellant had in fact told GA that and that he did not do so;·The emails in evidence that were sent by the appellant to GA over the period 8 September 2013 and 9 July 2014, clearly confirmed that the appellant had become involved in the Family Law proceedings. The appellant appeared to have accepted entirely GA’s version of events. They did not indicate that the appellant had sought, questioned, or had any information about AA’s version of events. The appellant went so far as to instruct GA as to what to write in those emails, including that GA knew where AA lived, and for an email to be sent which included the words “if you won’t comply with court orders, I will take matters into my own hands.” The appellant had knowledge that AA would “flip” or “fucking explode” when she learned that GA had her precise address;·The appellant unquestionably accepted GA’s version of events despite the fact that there had been orders made in the Family Court;·The current situation, as stated to the court, was that there are further Family Court orders denying GA contact with the children, and there is a warrant for his arrest, apparently for a breach of domestic violence orders. It was accepted that any domestic violence orders that do exist were made after the period in which the appellant offended;·The victim impact statement set out considerable psychological impact upon AA. It was accepted by the prosecution, correctly, that the full extent of the effects on AA was not entirely down to the appellant’s offending. It was certainly accepted by the court that some of those effects must be the result of the acrimonious nature of the relationship between GA and AA. However, it was accepted that there was a psychological impact upon AA by reason of her knowledge of GA being aware of where she lived;·In respect of the appellant’s psychological and psychiatric state, there are the two reports put before the court. The psychologist’s report confirmed consecutive appointments in March 2017, and the result of testing indicated mild anxiety, and the appellant being prone to distress if reminded of the traumatic events referred to in that report. It was considered “not unreasonable that – by the psychologist – that the severity of those traumatic events influenced his judgment in accessing information to reduce the suffering to GA and his children.” However, on the facts there was no mention in any of the emails to any suffering of the children or any concerns of them suffering. The flavour of all the messages that had been referred in the submissions of the prosecution indicate that AA was the clear focus, and her deserving of the treatment that was to be meted out to her;·The psychologist recommended EMDR treatment, but there was no evidence that any treatment of that kind or any other kind occurred until the appellant consulted the psychiatrist Dr Dodds, after he was charged. The psychiatrist’s opinion is based on the appellant’s self-reporting, and the psychiatrist himself admitted to a retrospective analysis of the appellant’s life experiences before the offending. He also had the psychologist’s report. The psychiatrist diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder as the significant causal factor of the appellant’s offending. However, that is at odds with what appears, from the character references, to the appellant’s working to a high standard on a daily basis in his employment over a considerable number of years, coupled with evidence that the appellant clearly knew what he was doing was wrong;·Post-traumatic stress disorder can be a mitigating factor, one that can, and has, in many cases, reduced a defendant’s moral culpability or reduce the extent to which general deterrence and specific deterrence principles become relevant.·In relation to offences of this kind, imprisonment is to be considered as a sentence of last resort and that was borne in mind;·The comparable cases that had been referred to by both parties was considered. It was observed that there are never any two cases that are directly on point. The closest decision to the current one was the decision in the matter of Philippi. In that case there were many more persons affected by that offending, 62 in fact, whose information had been unlawfully accessed. There was no suggestion, however, that any of that released information was similar to the release of information in the instant case. While there was information about many more people, and information on many more occasions, there was no release of information that the prosecution argued, as they do here, that placed the safety of a person at risk. Also in Philippi’s case, there had been significant issues relating to his son’s special needs in 2015, his failed marriage in 2017, his very stressful employment in the Child Protection Investigation Unit, severe financial distress, misuse of alcohol, and at the time of sentence he was medicated, undergoing psychotherapy, and attending alcohol management;·The appellant’s breach of trust loomed large in the proceedings, and reference was made to statements made by judges in R v Reid [2004] QCA 9, R v Smith; ex parte A-G [2000] QCA 390, R v Price; ex parte A-G [2011] QCA 87 and Hughes v R [2014] NSWCCA 15;·It was accepted by reason of Dr Dodd’s report that there was a reduced degree, in terms of consideration of principles of moral culpability, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, but it was not a significant degree, for the reasons that the offending involved the appellant taking a significant risk in relation to the safety of a member of the public. As the appellant knew there was a high level of acrimony between GA and AA, there was an expectation that the police will protect a person such as AA and certainly not take any action to place them at any degree of risk, regardless of whether there were domestic violence proceedings on foot;·For all of the reasons, the Court was of the view that a term of wholly suspended imprisonment was the appropriate sentence in this case, given that general deterrence loomed large. On each charge the appellant was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for an operational period of 18 months. That necessitated convictions being recorded.Submissions on behalf of the appellant
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I have had regard to all of the comparable sentencing decisions referred to me by both the appellant and the respondent. Like most sentence decisions, there is a wide variety of circumstances, both aggravating and mitigating. Consideration It is important to observe that the appellant was not charged with the circumstance of aggravation that he used a restricted computer without consent, with the intention to cause detriment or damage, or caused detriment or damage. He was charged with the circumstance of aggravation that he “gained a benefit”, and that benefit was specifically stated by the prosecution to be “knowledge”. In Hughes v R [2014] NSWCCA 15, Hall J said this at [129]:“It need hardly be emphasised that police officers are subject to important responsibilities having regard in particular to the position of trust that they occupy. In addition, the importance of maintaining confidentiality of police information is paramount in the effective pursuit of investigative activities and thus the restrictions upon unauthorised persons having access to information including the database information relevant to the present case.” In R v Anderson [1995] 1 Qd R 49, McPherson JA, with whom Fitzgerald P agreed, observed that a sentence of imprisonment, even if it has been wholly suspended pursuant to s 147 PSA, is a term of imprisonment, within the meaning of s 156(1) of the Act. In my view, a sentence of imprisonment for these offences, albeit wholly suspended, was excessive when having regard to the precise circumstances of the offending, the mitigating factors, and sentences imposed by Magistrates for this specific offence in other cases. In Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357, McHugh J said the following at [65] of his judgment:“Unfortunately, discretionary sentencing is not capable of mathematical precision or, for that matter, approximation. At best, experienced judges will agree on a range of sentences that reasonably fit all the circumstances of the case. There is no magic number for any particular crime when a discretionary sentence has to be imposed.” There is no question that the offending constituted a significant breach of trust imposed in the appellant. The duties of police officers necessitates their access to highly sensitive and confidential information. The accessibility of such information obviously provides a temptation to some officers to abuse the trust imposed in them. The Queensland Police Service, alive to that temptation, has put measures in place to warn its officers of the consequences of any misuse of the information, and as evidenced in this case, has the means to trace all access to its database by its officers. The objective seriousness of the appellant’s offending was considered at length by the learned Magistrate. In respect of the most serious of the offences, the disclosure of the precise unit number where the former wife of GA was living, it is important to note the following facts:1. There was a final court order by consent in place from the Federal Circuit Court that required AA to disclose her residential address to GA.2. GA already knew the street and apartment complex where AA lived.3. No domestic violence order was in place with AA as the aggrieved and GA as the respondent.4. There was no evidence to indicate that the appellant was aware of any allegation of domestic violence levelled by AA against GA. In fact, he specifically checked whether any protection order had been made before releasing the address.5. GA did not attend the address of AA as a result of the disclosure of the precise unit number by the appellant.6. The appellant was not charged with causing or intending to cause detriment to AA.