Collins House Pty Ltd v Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 61 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Collins House Pty Ltd v Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 724

Citation:

Collins House Pty Ltd v Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 724

Parties:

COLLINS HOUSE PTY LTD (ACN 109 236 722) and ALAFACI NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 006 267 554) AS THE TRUSTEE FOR THE DOMINIC ALAFACI FAMILY TRUST v GOLDEN AGE SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (ACN 602 142 049), APG ON COLLINS PTY LTD (ACN 141 107 440) and GA COLLINS DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (ACN 602 142 030)

File number:

VID 343 of 2015

Judge:

MORTIMER J

Date of judgment:

17 July 2015

Catchwords:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – application for interlocutory injunctions on grounds of contravention of ss 18(1) and 29(1)(g) and (h) of the Australian Consumer Law, passing off, infringement of registered trade mark – consideration of relevant factors – no serious question to be tried – similar incidental services not sufficient to give rise to overlapping services – confusion likely to be transitory only – balance of convenience – considerable prejudice to respondents if injunctions granted – interlocutory relief sought would effectively deliver final relief

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for interlocutory injunctions – consideration of relevant factors – no serious question to be tried – balance of convenience – considerable prejudice to respondents if injunctions granted – interlocutory relief sought would effectively deliver final relief

Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law ss 18(1), 29(1)(g), 29(1)(h), 232, 236

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 120, 126

Cases cited:

Abundant Earth Pty Ltd v R & C Products Pty Ltd [1985] FCA 40; 7 FCR 233

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63; 208 CLR 199

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; 227 CLR 57

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia [1986] HCA 58; 161 CLR 148

Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Rivers (Australia) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1655; 95 FCR 136

Knight v Beyond Properties [2007] FCAFC 170; 242 ALR 586

McIlhenny Co v Blue Yonder Holdings Pty Ltd [1997] FCA 962; 149 ALR 496

MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Company Ltd [1998] FCA 1616; 90 FCR 236

REA Group Ltd v Real Estate 1 Ltd [2013] FCA 559; 217 FCR 327

Registrar of Trademarks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCA 1020, 93 FCR 365

Samsung Electronics Company Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238

Shercliff v Engadine Acceptance Corporation Pty Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 729

Date of hearing:

15 July 2015

Place:

Melbourne

Division:

GENERAL DIVISION

Category:

Catchwords

Number of paragraphs:

108

Counsel for the Applicants:

Ms S Ryan

Solicitor for the Applicants:

Thomson Geer

Counsel for the Third and Fifth Respondents:

Mr MS Goldblatt

Solicitor for the Third and Fifth Respondents:

Tisher Liner FC Law Pty Ltd

Counsel for the Fourth Respondent:

Mr WA Rothnie

Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent:

Mills Oakley Lawyers


IN THE…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Collins House Pty Ltd v Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty L... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 724
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Collins House Pty Ltd v Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty Ltd, the applicants sought interlocutory injunctions to prevent the respondents from using the trade mark "Collins House" in connection with property services, alleging infringement and passing off. The applicants, Collins House Pty Ltd and Collins House Financial Services Pty Ltd, claimed extensive use of the "Collins House" mark in various professional services. They argued that the respondents' use of the mark for property services would infringe on their trade mark rights and cause consumer confusion. The respondents, Golden Age Sunrise Development Pty Ltd and Golden Age Collins Development Pty Ltd, denied these claims, asserting their independent right to use the mark and denying any likelihood of confusion or infringement.

The court had to determine whether the applicants had established a serious question to be tried on the merits, whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunctions, and if the interlocutory relief would effectively deliver final relief. The court found that the respondents' use of the mark for property services did not constitute infringement as the services were not of the same description as those for which the applicants' mark was registered. Additionally, the court held that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunctions, as the respondents would suffer significant financial and reputational harm from a mid-stream rebranding. The court also concluded that the interlocutory relief sought would effectively deliver final relief.

The court refused the application for interlocutory injunctions. It ordered that any party wishing to file and serve evidence on the question of costs or submissions on costs should do so by a specified date. Furthermore, a confidential exhibit from Mr Dominic Alafaci's affidavit was declared confidential for the purposes of the proceeding, to prevent disclosure of commercially sensitive information.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for interlocutory relief is refused.

2. Any party who wishes to file and serve evidence on the question of costs and/or alternatively submissions on the question of costs is to do so on or before 4 pm on Friday 31 July 2015.

3. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, in particular, to prevent disclosure of commercially sensitive information, until further order, the page marked “Confidential Exhibit DA-A” appearing at page 27 of the affidavit made by Mr Dominic Alafaci dated 29 June 2015 will be confidential in this Federal Court Proceeding No. VID 343 of 2015 and except by prior consent of the applicants:

(a) may be used only for the purposes of this proceeding; and

(b) will not be open to public inspection, disclosed in open Court or disclosed in the open part of any Court transcript.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is plain that some modifications are required to para 2, in particular to refer to s 37AF of the Federal Court Act rather than the repealed s 50, and to reflect more appropriate wording to accord with ss 37AF and 37AG. However, the respondents did not dispute the substance of this order.Mr Alafaci’s evidence Subject to a few paragraphs which were not read, the application was supported by two affidavits of Mr Dominic Alafaci, the managing director and secretary of the first applicant and director, secretary and sole shareholder of the second applicant. In his affidavit, Mr Alafaci deposed that since 1999 he has operated a financial planning business under and by reference to the Collins House name and logo through a number of entities, including more recently the first applicant. He deposed that those entities, described as the Collins House Group, offer services in accounting, taxation, business management, management consultancy, employment and recruitment, financial planning, information technology consultancy and legal services and advice under the Collins House mark. He states that between 2005 and 2007 the company Collins House Financial Services Pty Ltd established by him had marketed property services under the Collins House mark. Annexed to his affidavit were multiple examples of how the Collins House Group has used the “Collins House” trade mark, as well as a confidential exhibit of annual sale revenue derived from those services offered under the mark. The revenue to which Mr Alafaci deposes is not insignificant, but has fluctuated over the years. Mr Alafaci gave evidence about how the mark and the applicants’ services had been promoted, principally by his personal appearances on radio, including: ·regular appearances from 1999 onwards as a financial commentator on programs for the major Melbourne radio station Radio 3AW, on which he deposed he was always introduced as “Dominic Alafaci from Collins House”;·paid advertising on Radio 3AW including “almost continuously” since 2001. Examples of recorded radio and television appearances, print advertising, and stock market and business reports using the Collins House mark were exhibited to Mr Alafaci’s affidavit and some examples were played in Court. It is clear that the name “Collins House” was prominent in these advertisements and reports. The longevity and continuity of these activities was emphasised in Mr Alafaci’s evidence. His evidence also showed Collins House sponsored the news on 3AW in the morning and Collins House services were advertised over three news segments each weekday morning on 3AW. Mr Alafaci also stated that when callers phoned in to his “spot” on 3AW with questions, or in need of advice, the following would occur:When callers requested advice on an issue, including those relating to investment in property that fell within the Applicants' Services, I was able to refer them to an appropriate person within the Collins House Group, who I would describe on air as an "in house expert at Collins House" or provide the general guidance on air myself.When a caller required specific advice on a property I would refer them to a qualified estate agent or property consultant and assist them if they required any taxation, legal or conveyancing work through one of our in house experts at Collins House. The caller would be asked to leave their details with Radio 3AW and I would call them after the programme.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The fourth matter is that, based on the evidence before me, I doubt the applicants could satisfy any order for damages made consequent upon their undertaking. If I had been firmly persuaded of the merit of interlocutory relief, this factor would have loomed larger in my reasons. As it is, there are other factors which persuade me relief should be refused.CONCLUSION The application must be refused. Counsel for GAS and GA Collins Development Pty Ltd sought an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs. It is appropriate the parties all have an opportunity put on whatever evidence and submissions they wish the Court to take into account in determining what if any costs orders should be made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On the balance of convenience, the respondents rely on the financial and reputational consequences to them flowing from a rebranding of such a high value and high profile development, “mid-stream”, as set out in Ms Du’s affidavit.CONSIDERATION I bear in mind the caution in the authorities that there must be no rigid separation between the assessment whether the applicant has identified a serious question to be tried (or prima facie case) and where the balance of convenience lies. The nature and strength of each of the considerations affects the other. Is there a serious question to be tried: the trade mark infringement claim Whatever might be said about the first limb of s 120(1) of the Trade Marks Act (substantially identical or deceptively similar), I am not satisfied there is a serious question to be tried on infringement because the use to which the respondents have put the mark is not in respect of services of the same description as those for which the Collins House mark is registered. In MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Company Ltd [1998] FCA 1616; 90 FCR 236 at 243-244, the Full Court said:where, in this case, services are performed which are incidental to the conduct of the hotel business, it is not correct, in our view, to conclude that Touraust is using the word "Chifley" (or a sign incorporating it) in relation to property management services. If Touraust arranges tenancies for retail shops within an hotel and collects rent, it does not thereby provide property management services: those activities are not to be characterised as the provision of a separate service in relation to the property but simply as an integral, if relatively minor, part of operating the hotel. Nor, we think, does it help to identify a number of discrete aspects of the hotel business which, if carried on in other circumstances, might be characterised as the provision of property management services. In this context, each will take its character from the overall nature of the business which Touraust intends to conduct. Are, then, services to be provided by Touraust services of the same description as that of services in respect of which MID's mark is registered (s 120(2)(c))? That expression in the context of services seems to have received no reported judicial consideration. This is partly because the statutory protection for trade marks used in relation to goods has been extended to trade marks in relation to services only relatively recently: see F J Smith, "The Trade Marks Amendment Act 1978" (1979) 53 Australian Law Journal 118. It is also a consequence of the fact that s 120(2)(c) of the Act had no precise equivalent in the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) (the TM Act 1955), although the expression "services of the same description as [services in respect of which the trade mark is registered]" was used in the earlier legislation: see the TM Act 1955, ss 33(2), 36(1A). The question whether two sets of goods are "of the same description" has, however, been considered in a number of decisions. Thus, for example, in Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 at 606 the High Court said this:"There may be many matters to be considered apart from inherent character of the goods in respect of which the application is made and some indication of what matters are relevant to this inquiry was given by Romer J in Re Jellinek's Application (1946) 63 RPC 59. Romer J thought it necessary to look beyond the nature of the goods in question and to compare not only their respective uses but also to examine the trade channels through which the commodities in question were bought and sold. Shortly after the decision in Jellinek's case the Assistant-Comptroller elaborated on the observations of Romer J in the following manner: 'In arriving at a decision upon this issue the reported cases show that I have to take account of a number of factors, including in particular the nature and characteristics of the goods, their origin, their purpose, whether they are usually produced by one and the same manufacturer or distributed by the same wholesale houses, whether they are sold in the same shops over the same counters during the same seasons and to the same class or classes of customers, and whether by those engaged in their manufacture or distribution they are regarded as belonging to the same trade'."Similarly (in a passage cited by Burchett J in Polo Textile Industries Pty Ltd v Domestic Textile Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 227 at 240) Lord Evershed MR said in Re J Lyons & Co Ltd's Application [1959] RPC 120 at 128:"In all cases of this kind regard will be had to such matters as the nature and composition of the goods, to their respective uses and functions, and to the trade channels through which respectively they are marketed or sold; and in different cases ... one (but not always the same one) of these characteristics may have greater significance or emphasis than the others. The matter falls to be judged … 'in a business sense'; and this is to my mind made clear by considering the legislative background against which the problem has to be judged. By the Trade Marks legislation Parliament has provided that a registered proprietor of a mark, to be used by him in the course of his trade, has a monopoly right to that mark as an indication of the trade source or origin of the goods … The question whether goods are or not goods of the same description must therefore (I think) be one to be answered in the context of that purpose; and having regard to that context, the cases cited … lend some support to the view that the phrase 'goods of the same description' ought not to be given too restrictive a construction – not, at all events, so as to be limited to goods substantially analogous in kind, or commonly used as mere substitutes or alternatives the one for the other."We accept that these principles, subject to any necessary modification, apply in relation to services. But they do not advance MID's argument.For reasons that have already been given, the services involved in managing an hotel have different characteristics than property management services. If, as we have held, particular incidental services take their character from the whole, the position is not altered by the fact that managing an hotel may involve the performance of incidental services akin to those carried out by property managers.This conclusion is reinforced if, as Southern Cross suggests, the proper approach is that attention should be directed to the "trade channels" through which the services are provided. It is not difficult to infer that hotel management is a specialised undertaking, ordinarily carried out by different entities than those involved in providing property management services, such as real estate agents or shopping centre managers. Partly for this reason, it is difficult to regard hotel managers as being engaged in the same trade or industry as those providing property management services.