Clements v Bull

Case [1953] HCA 61


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572 HIGH COURT

[1953.

[HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.]

CLEMENTSA p p e l l a n t

;

I n f o r m a n t ,

AND

BULL . .

R e s p o n d e n t .

D e f e n d a n t ,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA.

H. C. OF A. Melbourne Harbor Trust—Regulation— Validity—Prohibition against holding

1953.                 meeting or addressing assemblage within Port of Melbourne without written consent of commissioners— Statutory power to make regulations—For improve­

M elb o u r n e , ment and management of port—Relating to conduct and behaviour of certain

June 3, 4 ; persons resorting to the port— Generally for carrying out objects and purposes

Se-pt. 22.

of Act— Melbourne Harbor Trust Act 1928 (Viet.) [No. 3733) s, 138 (i) (q)—

AVilliams

Melbourne Harbor Trust Regulations 1951, reg. 275 (36).

A.C.J.,

M’ebb,

Fidlagar, Section 138 of the Melbourne Harbor Trust Act 1928 (Viet.) provided:

Kitto and

“ Subject to the provisions contained in this Act and so far as consistent

Taylor

JJ .

therewith the Commissioners may from time to time make regulations for or relating to all or any of the following subjects :—(i) The improvement and management of the p o r t : . . . (q) The working of coaches cabs drays carriages and other vehicles and the conduct and behaviour of porters carters draymen coachmen ferrymen and others resorting to the rivers piers wharfs docks jetties landing-stages canals or other works within the port, and for prohibiting persons from acting as porters carters draymen and cabmen within the port without previously obtaining a licence to that effect: . . . And generally for carrying out the objects and purposes of this Act.”

Regulation 275 of the Melbourne Harbor Trust Regulations provided: “ Every person who shall commit any of the acts following shall be guilty of an offence, that is to say :— . . . 36. Hold any meeting or address any assemblage within the Port without the consent of the Commissioners in writing.”

Held by Webb, Fullagar and Taylor J J . (Williams A.C.J. and Kitto J . dissenting), that reg. 275 (36) was not authorized by s. 138 of the Act.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Full Court) affirmed.

88 C.L.R.] OF AUSTRALIA.

573

A p p e a i , from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

H. C. OF A.

1953.

By two informations dated 25th February 1952, Eric Lawrence Clements, Constable of Police, charged Albert Edward Bull with

Clem en ts

that he “ did at Victoria Dock within the Port of Melbourne on

V.

25th February 1952 address an assemblage of persons without the

B u l l .

consent of the Harbor Trust Commissioners ” and that he…

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Clements v Bull [1953] HCA 61
Case
[1953] HCA 61
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CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Clements v Bull*, heard by the High Court of Australia, the applicant challenged the validity of a regulation made by the Melbourne Harbor Trust Commissioners. The regulation prohibited the holding of any meeting or the addressing of any assemblage within the Port of Melbourne without the prior written consent of the Commissioners.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Melbourne Harbor Trust Commissioners possessed the statutory authority under section 138(1)(q) of the *Melbourne Harbor Trust Act 1928* (Vic) to make such a regulation. This section empowered the Commissioners to make regulations for the improvement and management of the port, relating to the conduct and behaviour of persons resorting to the port, and generally for carrying out the objects and purposes of the Act.

The Court considered the scope of the Commissioners' regulatory power. It reasoned that while the Act granted broad powers for the management and improvement of the port, the regulation in question went beyond what was reasonably incidental to those powers. The prohibition on meetings and public addresses, without any qualification as to their nature or potential impact on port operations, was found to be an unreasonable exercise of the power to regulate conduct and behaviour. The Court concluded that the regulation was not a valid exercise of the statutory power conferred by section 138(1)(q) as it unduly restricted public rights without sufficient justification related to the core functions of the port.

The High Court found the regulation to be invalid and made orders accordingly.

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