Clement v Australian Bureau of Statistics

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Clement v Australian Bureau of Statistics [2016] FCA 948

File number: ACD 22 of 2016
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 12 August 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — summary judgment — whether no reasonable prospects of success — where case doomed from outset

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — whether notices should be given under s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) — where constitutional point said to be raised is frivolous

PUBLIC SERVICE — claim for compensation for reprisals under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) — “public interest disclosure” — defined to apply only to disclosures occurring from commencement date —where alleged reprisals relate to alleged beliefs concerning disclosures occurring before commencement date

Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15A, 15AA

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 570(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)

Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) ss 10, 13, 14, 26

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 292

Australian Workers Union’ v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 232 FCR 428

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd (No 2) (2015) 230 FCR 337

Bayne v Baillieu (1908) 6 CLR 382

Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty LtdvFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297

Danielsen v Oneseteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 56; 253 ALR 661

Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532

Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173

Priestley v Godwin (No 3) (2008) 172 FCR 139

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Taniela v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 375

Taniela v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 104

Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1

Date of hearing: 29 July 2016
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms T Kyprianou of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

ACD 22 of 2016
BETWEEN:

KRISTINE THERESE CLEMENT

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS

First Respondent

COMCARE

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Judgment be given against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 10 June 2016 be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Kristine Therese Clement is a former public servant who harbours deep-seated grievances against the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Comcare. Over a number of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 948
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Clement v Australian Bureau of Statistics, the applicant, Ms Clement, sought to challenge the decisions of the Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Australian Government Solicitor regarding reprisals she faced. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with deciding whether Ms Clement had any reasonable prospects of success in her claims. The key legal issue was whether the reprisals Ms Clement experienced were connected to public interest disclosures that occurred before the commencement of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth). Ms Clement argued that the alleged reprisals related to her beliefs concerning disclosures made in 1991, which predated the commencement of the Act. The respondents contended that the reprisals were not connected to public interest disclosures under the Act because those disclosures occurred before the Act's commencement.

The Court held that Ms Clement's claims were without reasonable prospects of success as the reprisals she faced did not relate to public interest disclosures within the meaning of the Act. The Court noted that the Act only applies to disclosures occurring from its commencement date. Since the alleged reprisals were related to disclosures made before the Act commenced, they did not fall within the scope of the Act. The Court further held that Ms Clement's constitutional arguments were without merit, as they did not provide a valid basis to challenge the validity of the legislation. Consequently, the Court granted summary judgment in favour of the respondents, dismissed Ms Clement's interlocutory application, and ordered her to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be given against the applicant pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. The interlocutory application filed by the applicant on 10 June 2016 be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) entitles the Court in civil proceedings to give judgment before trial. It relevantly provides:31A Summary judgment...(2)The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a)the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and(b)the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3)For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospects of success.… Shortly put, the respondents’ contention is that the proceeding has no reasonable prospects of success because the disclosures upon which Ms Clement relies were all made in 1991, more than 20 years before s 26 of the PID Act commenced, and are therefore not public interest disclosures within the meaning of the Act. On 10 June 2016, after the respondents’ interlocutory application had been fixed for hearing, Ms Clement filed an interlocutory application of her own, seeking an order under r 9.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that the ACT Community Services Directorate be joined as a party to the proceeding so that she could seek injunctive relief against the Directorate under s 15 of the PID Act. Her ultimate purpose, the application indicates, was to prevent the Directorate from taking reprisals against her “under its belief or suspicion that she made, may have made or proposes to make a public interest disclosure” and to prevent Housing ACT, which I gather is a division of the Directorate, from evicting her. I listed Ms Clement’s interlocutory application for directions on the same day as the hearing. At the hearing I indicated that I would hear the respondents’ application for summary judgment first and only make directions with respect to her joinder application if the respondents were unsuccessful. The applicant’s contentions Ms Clement resists the respondents’ application for summary judgment on three bases. First, she submits that s 26(2) of the PID Act is an invalid exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth because, if applied on its terms, it would defeat the objects of the PID Act. Second, she submits that s 26(2) is unconstitutional because it is “antithetical to the ‘peace, order and good government of Australia’ the Constitutional qualification of the Parliament’s power to legislate” and, since this “defect” is “not curable by any interpretation”, it is an invalid exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth and must be “struck down”. This submission picks up the opening words of ss 51 and 52 of the Constitution. The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:…

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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