FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1692
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Unlawful termination – prohibited reasons – whether a trade union a competent administrative authority within the meaning of s 659(2)(e) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) – whether recourse to competent administrative authority a reason for termination – reinstatement – back pay – penalty
WORDS AND PHRASES – Competent administrative authorities
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic)Laz v Downer Group Ltd (2000) 108 IR 244 cited
Catusanu v Ray’s Guard Security Services (unreported, MD Murphy JR, IR Court of Australia, 29 July 1997) referred to
Andersen v Umbakumba Community Council (1994) 56 IR 102 cited
Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics Pty Ltd (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200 cited
AB v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2007] FCAFC 140 cited
Povey v Qantas Airwas Ltd (2005) 2223 CLR 189 cited
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 cited
Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc (2005) 144 FCR 347 cited
He v Lewin (2004) 137 FCR 266 discussed
Leicester v Western Desert Puntukurnuparna Aboriginal Corporation (unreported, IRCA 16/97, 10 February 1997) referred to
Weier v Modern Alarms [2007] AIRC 432 referred to
Crowley v Parker Hannifin (Australia) Pty Ltd (2006) 154 IR 88 cited
Jennings v Salvation Army (2003) 128 IR 366 cited
Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc [2004] FCA 1392 cited
Perkins v Grace Worldwide (Aust) Pty Ltd (1997) 72 IR 186 cited
Abbott-Etherington v Houghton Motors Pty Ltd (1995) 63 IR 394 cited
Liddell v Lembke (1994) 127 ALR 342 cited
Anthony Smith & Associates Pty Limited v Sinclair (1996) 67 IR 240 cited
Treadwell v ACCO Australia Pty Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, VG 538/1997, 16 December 1997, BC9707067) referred toConvention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 1982
Termination of Employment Recommendation 1982Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 1958
Termination of Employment Recommendation 1963VICTOR CLAVERIA v PILKINGTON AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 005 357 522)
VID 216 OF 2007KENNY J
7 NOVEMBER 2007
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 216 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
VICTOR CLAVERIA
ApplicantAND:
PILKINGTON AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 005 357 522)
Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 NOVEMBER 2007
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.On or before 14 November 2007 the parties file draft minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons.
2.The matter be listed for mention, if necessary, on 19 November 2007.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 216 OF 2007
BETWEEN:
VICTOR CLAVERIA
ApplicantAND:
PILKINGTON AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 005 357 522)
Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE:
7 NOVEMBER 2007
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
KENNY J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
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- Case
- [2007] FCA 1692
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether Mr. Claveria's communication to the union on 24 January 2007 constituted "recourse to competent administrative authorities," or if the action of Mr. Claveria and Mr. Seneviratne constituted the "filing of a complaint." If either was true, then Pilkington contravened s 659(2)(e) of the Act. The court found that the respondent had failed to show that it did not terminate Mr. Claveria’s employment for reasons that included the fact that Mr. Claveria had complained to the union about Mr. Duncan’s mistreatment of him. Furthermore, the court was affirmatively satisfied that it was a reason for Mr. Dunstan deciding to terminate Mr. Claveria’s employment with the respondent on 24 January 2007.
The court's reasoning was based on the evidence presented and the circumstances disclosed by that evidence. It was determined that Pilkington had contravened s 659(2)(e) of the Act. As a result, the court ordered that Mr. Claveria be reinstated to his position with Pilkington, and that Pilkington pay him compensation for lost wages and other benefits from the date of his termination to the date of his reinstatement. The parties were required to file draft minutes of orders by 14 November 2007, and the matter was listed for mention on 19 November 2007.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. On or before 14 November 2007 the parties file draft minutes of orders to give effect to these reasons.
2. The matter be listed for mention, if necessary, on 19 November 2007.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: KENNY J
Having regard to the evidence and the circumstances that the evidence discloses, the respondent has failed to show that it did not terminate Mr Claveria’s employment for reasons that included the fact that Mr Claveria had complained to the union alleging Mr Duncan’s mistreatment of him. Furthermore, this evidence permits me to be affirmatively satisfied that it was a reason for Mr Dunstan deciding on 24 January 2007 to terminate Mr Claveria’s employment with the respondent. CONSIDERATION Subsection 659(2)(e) refers to three events: (1) the filing of a complaint and (2) the participation in proceedings, where the complaint or the proceedings are against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulation; and (3) recourse to competent administrative authorities. An employer must not terminate an employee’s employment on account of any of these events. No issue arises in relation to “proceedings”. Accordingly, two matters may now fall for consideration. Did Mr Claveria’s communication to the union on the morning of 24 January 2007 constitute “recourse to competent administrative authorities”? Alternatively, did the action of Mr Claveria, or Mr Claveria and Mr Seneviratne, constitute the “filing of a complaint”? If the answer to either question is ‘yes’, then the respondent contravened s 659(2)(e) of the Act. The expression “competent administrative authorities” is not defined in the Act. It is not an expression that has any particular accepted meaning in Australian law. Nor is it defined in the International Labour Organization (‘ILO’) Convention concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 1982 (C158) (done at Geneva on 22 June 1982; entered into force on 23 November 1985), from which s 659(2)(e) and the expression “competent administrative authorities” plainly derive. The Act refers to the ILO Convention C158 as “the Termination of Employment Convention”. I refer to it in this way hereafter. Section 659(2)(e) must be construed having regard to its statutory context and purpose, in this case, both general and particular. At least one object of s 659(2)(e) is “to assist in giving effect to the Termination of Employment Convention”: see ss 635(1)(e), 637(5) and [90]–[94] below. Section 659(1) confirms the importance of the Convention in the context of s 659 by proving that an additional object of the section is “to assist in giving effect to” the Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1982 (R166) (done at Geneva on 22 June 1982) (‘Termination of Employment Recommendation 1982’): see also s 637(6). Though it has no direct relevance to the present case, according to its preamble, the Termination of Employment Recommendation 1982 “supplements” the Termination of Employment Convention. Pilkington argued that the words “to assist in giving effect to” in s 635(1)(e), as opposed to the stronger form, “to give effect to”, were significant in the present case. It noted that the legislature had altered the language of the objects provision from its original and stronger form to the present, weaker version.