City of Stirling v Dueschen

Link copied
Case Copied 46 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   CITY OF STIRLING -v- DUESCHEN [2011] WASC 126

CORAM:   KENNETH MARTIN J

HEARD:   8 APRIL 2011

DELIVERED          :   17 MAY 2011

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1337 of 2011

BETWEEN:   CITY OF STIRLING

Plaintiff

AND

URSULA DUESCHEN
First Defendant

TATYANA DUESCHEN
Second Defendant

Catchwords:

Permanent injunction - Default judgment - Discretionary considerations - Injunction sought in aid of statutory right - Fine under criminal law - Adequacy of criminal law sanctions

Legislation:

Caravan Parks and Camping Grounds Act 1995 (WA)
Health Act 1911 (WA)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)

Result:

Injunction refused

Category:    A

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Ms F Vernon

First Defendant             :     In person

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     McLeods Barristers & Solicitors

First Defendant             :     In person

Second Defendant         :     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council [1975] AC 538

Attorney General v Huber, Sandy & Wichmann Investments Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 142

Attorney General v Mercantile Investments Ltd (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 183

Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd [No 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246

Cooney v Ku‑Ring‑Gai Corporation (1963) 114 CLR 582

Department of Environment and Conservation v Szulc [2010] WASC 195

Dueschen and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 181

Dueschen and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 181 (S)

Dueschen and City of Stirling [2010] WASAT 64

Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135

Faithfull v Woodley (1890) 43 Ch D 287

Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435

Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra [1998] 2 All ER 638

Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 257; (2007) 35 WAR 412

Pisano v Thrum [No 3] [2010] WASC 395

R&I Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Anchorage Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 59

Ramsay v Aberfoyle Manufacturing Co (Australia) Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 230

KENNETH MARTIN J: 

Overview

  1. The first defendant, Ursula Dueschen, is a diminutive 82‑year‑old widow.  Mrs Dueschen's daughter, Tatyana, is the second defendant.  Tatyana is currently serving a term of imprisonment of 318 days for failure to pay fines amounting to over $150,000.  This is explained in a statement of claim filed in this matter by the City of Stirling (the City) which seeks permanent injunctive relief against both women.

  2. I am presently dealing with a motion for default judgment by the plaintiff made under O 13 r 8(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) against Mrs Dueschen and her daughter, filed on 11 March 2011. The motion is moved in circumstances whereby the City issued a writ against the Dueschens out of the Supreme Court on 25 February 2011. The writ has an indorsed statement of claim which seeks the perpetual, negative injunctive relief.

  3. Mrs Dueschen and her daughter were personally served with copies of the City's writ on 28 February 2011. They have both failed to enter…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read City of Stirling v Dueschen and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2011] WASC 126
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of City of Stirling v Dueschen, the City of Stirling sought a permanent injunction against Dueschen, to prevent him from camping on his own land in contravention of the Camping Regulations. The matter was heard in the District Court of Western Australia. The City claimed that Dueschen’s camping activities were in breach of the Camping Regulations and the Health Act, which regulated camping on private land. Dueschen argued that the Camping Regulations did not apply to him as he was camping on his own land and that the Health Act did not apply to private land. The court was required to determine whether the City had standing to bring the action, and whether the Camping Regulations applied to Dueschen’s camping on his own land.

The court found that the City had sufficient standing to bring the action under section 9.28 of the Local Government Act, which allowed local governments to bring proceedings in their own name in matters relating to the enforcement of statutory provisions. However, the court noted that the discretionary nature of equitable relief meant that the grant of an injunction was not automatic, even where the relief sought was in the public interest. The court considered whether there were any public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and whether there were any discretionary factors that should be taken into account. The court found that there were no significant public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and that the Camping Regulations did not apply to Dueschen’s camping on his own land.

The court dismissed the City’s application for a permanent injunction, finding that there were no public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and that the Camping Regulations did not apply to Dueschen’s camping on his own land. The court noted that the Camping Regulations were intended to regulate camping on public land, and that the Health Act did not apply to private land. The court also found that the criminal law provided adequate sanctions for breaches of the Camping Regulations. As such, the court did not consider it necessary to grant an injunction in aid of the statutory right. The City’s application for a permanent injunction was dismissed.

The court did not make any orders as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Cooney v Ku‑Ring‑Gai Corporation (1963) 114 CLR 582, a decision mentioned by the City in its written submissions, the reasons of Dixon CJ (586) and Menzies J (605) show that a particular provision in the relevant New South Wales local government legislation (s 587) expressly conferred standing to bring suit upon New South Wales local authorities. Section 587 of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) then provided:In any case in which the Attorney General might take proceedings on the relation or on behalf or for the benefit of the council for or with respect to enforcing or securing the observance of any provision made by or under this Act, the council shall be deemed to represent sufficiently the interests of the public and may take the proceedings in its own name. In Western Australia, there is a standing conferral provision for local authorities which confers standing, somewhat akin to s 587 of the former NSW Act of 1919. The local provision (s 9.28 of the Local Government Act within Part 9 Div 2 of that Act), in present circumstances, resolves any concerns over the standing of the City in bringing these proceedings. Section 9.28 is in the following terms:9.28Interests of the public(1)In any case in which the Attorney General might take proceedings on the relation, or on behalf, or for the benefit of a local government for or with respect to enforcing, securing the observance of, or preventing the breach of a statutory provision administered by the local government, the local government sufficiently represents the interests of the public and may take the proceedings in its own name.(2)In subsection (1) -statutory provision administered by the local government means a provision of -(a)…(b)another Act conferring any function on the local government. The standing of the City is sufficient to support it bringing this application on the basis of it asserting a public right position as regards both the Health Act and the Camping Regulations, essentially akin to that of an Attorney General's suit. But a conclusion that the City has sufficient standing to bring the action does not impact against the court's underlying and abiding discretion, as regards a grant of equitable relief. Whilst the discretion will obviously be exercised in accordance with established precedent and principles, the discretionary character of equitable relief is a constant, even where the relief sought can be viewed as being sought in the public interest, see generally Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council [1975] AC 538, 559 ‑ 560, where Lord Wilberforce explained how discretionary factors may operate differently than in suits as between private individuals. For instance, the court will not require proof of damage. Damage is assumed to result from an infraction against a public right. Laches (delay) evaluations may also be made from the broader public policy perspective. In the present case, I do not detect any significant public right warranting support from a court of equity arising around reg 11 of the Camping Regulations. That regulation regulates persons camping on their own land. It looks to set down a criminal offence and no more, see Attorney General v Mercantile Investments Ltd. Regulation 11(1)(a) provides:(1)A person may camp -(a)for up to 3 nights in any period of 28 consecutive days on land which he or she owns or has a legal right to occupy, and may camp for longer than 3 nights on such land if he or she has written approval under subregulation (2) and is complying with that approval.