JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: CITY OF STIRLING -v- DUESCHEN [2011] WASC 126
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 8 APRIL 2011
DELIVERED : 17 MAY 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 1337 of 2011
BETWEEN: CITY OF STIRLING
Plaintiff
AND
URSULA DUESCHEN
First DefendantTATYANA DUESCHEN
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Permanent injunction - Default judgment - Discretionary considerations - Injunction sought in aid of statutory right - Fine under criminal law - Adequacy of criminal law sanctions
Legislation:
Caravan Parks and Camping Grounds Act 1995 (WA)
Health Act 1911 (WA)
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
Result:
Injunction refused
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Ms F Vernon
First Defendant : In person
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: McLeods Barristers & Solicitors
First Defendant : In person
Second Defendant : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council [1975] AC 538
Attorney General v Huber, Sandy & Wichmann Investments Pty Ltd (1971) 2 SASR 142
Attorney General v Mercantile Investments Ltd (1920) 21 SR (NSW) 183
Carr v Finance Corporation of Australia Ltd [No 1] (1981) 147 CLR 246
Cooney v Ku‑Ring‑Gai Corporation (1963) 114 CLR 582
Department of Environment and Conservation v Szulc [2010] WASC 195
Dueschen and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 181
Dueschen and City of Stirling [2008] WASAT 181 (S)
Dueschen and City of Stirling [2010] WASAT 64
Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Faithfull v Woodley (1890) 43 Ch D 287
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 435
Phonographic Performance Ltd v Maitra [1998] 2 All ER 638
Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v BGC Contracting Pty Ltd [2007] WASCA 257; (2007) 35 WAR 412
Pisano v Thrum [No 3] [2010] WASC 395
R&I Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Anchorage Investments Pty Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 59
Ramsay v Aberfoyle Manufacturing Co (Australia) Pty Ltd (1935) 54 CLR 230
KENNETH MARTIN J:
Overview
The first defendant, Ursula Dueschen, is a diminutive 82‑year‑old widow. Mrs Dueschen's daughter, Tatyana, is the second defendant. Tatyana is currently serving a term of imprisonment of 318 days for failure to pay fines amounting to over $150,000. This is explained in a statement of claim filed in this matter by the City of Stirling (the City) which seeks permanent injunctive relief against both women.
I am presently dealing with a motion for default judgment by the plaintiff made under O 13 r 8(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) against Mrs Dueschen and her daughter, filed on 11 March 2011. The motion is moved in circumstances whereby the City issued a writ against the Dueschens out of the Supreme Court on 25 February 2011. The writ has an indorsed statement of claim which seeks the perpetual, negative injunctive relief.
Mrs Dueschen and her daughter were personally served with copies of the City's writ on 28 February 2011. They have both failed to enter…
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- Case
- [2011] WASC 126
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the City had sufficient standing to bring the action under section 9.28 of the Local Government Act, which allowed local governments to bring proceedings in their own name in matters relating to the enforcement of statutory provisions. However, the court noted that the discretionary nature of equitable relief meant that the grant of an injunction was not automatic, even where the relief sought was in the public interest. The court considered whether there were any public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and whether there were any discretionary factors that should be taken into account. The court found that there were no significant public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and that the Camping Regulations did not apply to Dueschen’s camping on his own land.
The court dismissed the City’s application for a permanent injunction, finding that there were no public right issues that warranted support from a court of equity, and that the Camping Regulations did not apply to Dueschen’s camping on his own land. The court noted that the Camping Regulations were intended to regulate camping on public land, and that the Health Act did not apply to private land. The court also found that the criminal law provided adequate sanctions for breaches of the Camping Regulations. As such, the court did not consider it necessary to grant an injunction in aid of the statutory right. The City’s application for a permanent injunction was dismissed.
The court did not make any orders as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Cooney v Ku‑Ring‑Gai Corporation (1963) 114 CLR 582, a decision mentioned by the City in its written submissions, the reasons of Dixon CJ (586) and Menzies J (605) show that a particular provision in the relevant New South Wales local government legislation (s 587) expressly conferred standing to bring suit upon New South Wales local authorities. Section 587 of the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) then provided:In any case in which the Attorney General might take proceedings on the relation or on behalf or for the benefit of the council for or with respect to enforcing or securing the observance of any provision made by or under this Act, the council shall be deemed to represent sufficiently the interests of the public and may take the proceedings in its own name. In Western Australia, there is a standing conferral provision for local authorities which confers standing, somewhat akin to s 587 of the former NSW Act of 1919. The local provision (s 9.28 of the Local Government Act within Part 9 Div 2 of that Act), in present circumstances, resolves any concerns over the standing of the City in bringing these proceedings. Section 9.28 is in the following terms:9.28Interests of the public(1)In any case in which the Attorney General might take proceedings on the relation, or on behalf, or for the benefit of a local government for or with respect to enforcing, securing the observance of, or preventing the breach of a statutory provision administered by the local government, the local government sufficiently represents the interests of the public and may take the proceedings in its own name.(2)In subsection (1) -statutory provision administered by the local government means a provision of -(a)…(b)another Act conferring any function on the local government. The standing of the City is sufficient to support it bringing this application on the basis of it asserting a public right position as regards both the Health Act and the Camping Regulations, essentially akin to that of an Attorney General's suit. But a conclusion that the City has sufficient standing to bring the action does not impact against the court's underlying and abiding discretion, as regards a grant of equitable relief. Whilst the discretion will obviously be exercised in accordance with established precedent and principles, the discretionary character of equitable relief is a constant, even where the relief sought can be viewed as being sought in the public interest, see generally Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd v Wyong Shire Council [1975] AC 538, 559 ‑ 560, where Lord Wilberforce explained how discretionary factors may operate differently than in suits as between private individuals. For instance, the court will not require proof of damage. Damage is assumed to result from an infraction against a public right. Laches (delay) evaluations may also be made from the broader public policy perspective. In the present case, I do not detect any significant public right warranting support from a court of equity arising around reg 11 of the Camping Regulations. That regulation regulates persons camping on their own land. It looks to set down a criminal offence and no more, see Attorney General v Mercantile Investments Ltd. Regulation 11(1)(a) provides:(1)A person may camp -(a)for up to 3 nights in any period of 28 consecutive days on land which he or she owns or has a legal right to occupy, and may camp for longer than 3 nights on such land if he or she has written approval under subregulation (2) and is complying with that approval.