Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 5)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 5) [2006] FCA 1672

SECURITY FOR COSTS – whether respondents are entitled to an order for security for costs – guidelines which courts typically take into account in determining such applications – whether Court satisfied that order for security is a proper exercise of discretion – security previously ordered up to the first day of the trial – whether circumstances have changed – first and third applicants corporations which cannot meet a costs order – second applicant and his wife beneficiary of litigation – whether award of costs would stultify litigation – whether security for future costs should be ordered where trial part heard

SECURITY FOR COSTS – trial adjourned part heard to resume in May 2007 – whether, in the circumstances, respondents are entitled to an order for security for costs for 10 days trial just heard – previous unsuccessful application for costs in respect of those trial days – whether facts distinguish case from the usual circumstance where security is awarded in respect of prospective costs – whether oppressive to require security for costs to be paid for part of trial already heard

SECURITY FOR COSTS – quantum – whether further preparation costs for part heard matter should be given where hearing to be adjourned for over five months – when security for costs payable

Held: No security for costs ordered in respect of costs already incurred. Security for costs awarded in respect of adjourned hearing of seven days and associated preparation in the amount of $75 000 payable by 5 January 2007.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 56

Acohs Pty Ltd v Merck Ltd [1997] FCA 573 cited
Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1279 cited
Baygol Pty Ltd v Huntsman Chemical Co Australia Pty Ltd t/a RMAX [2004] FCA 1248 cited
Bell Wholesale Co Pty Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 cited
Billinudgel Pastoral Co Pty Ltd & Ors v Westpac Banking Corp & Ors [1997] FCA 863 cited
Brocklebank & Co v King’s Lynn Steam Ship Co (1878) 3 CPD 365 cited
Brown v Rodgers [2006] FCA 713 cited
Brundza v Robbie & Co [No 2] (1952) 88 CLR 171 cited
Bryan E Fencott and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497 distinguished
Buckley v Bennell Design and Constructions Pty Ltd (1974) 1 ACLR 301 cited
Caruso Australia Pty Ltd v Portec (Australia) Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 311 cited
CBS Records Australia Ltd v Telmak Teleproducts (Aust) Pty Ltd (1987) 72 ALR 270 cited
Checked-Out Pty Ltd v Eagle Eye Inspections Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1475 applied
Cherry v Read, unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Black CJ, Sackville and Finn JJ, 21 November 1996 cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 920 cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006]…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1672
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 5) involves an application by the first and second respondents (the respondents) for further security for costs against the first and third applicants (the applicants) in the amount of $200,000. The application arises in the context of an ongoing and protracted legal dispute between the parties. The respondents are seeking additional security due to the complexity and duration of the trial, which has faced multiple adjournments, delays, and complications. The applicants, who are corporations, one of which is under a Deed of Company Arrangement, oppose the application on various grounds, including the short notice of the application, the applicants' inability to meet any costs order from their own resources, and the lack of new evidence to justify the requested amount.

The legal issues before the court involve determining whether the court has the discretion to order further security for costs against the applicants under either section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act or section 1335 of the Corporations Act. The court considered the principles of judicial discretion in ordering security for costs, the protective purpose of such orders, and whether the respondents' application was justified given the circumstances of the case. The applicants argued that the respondents' application was not supported by new evidence, that the costs claimed were already incurred and dealt with in previous applications, and that there was no basis to order security for future costs. The court also noted the respondents' previous unsuccessful application for security for costs and the potential estoppel effect of that decision.

The court found that, while the applicants were unable to meet any costs order from their own resources, the application for further security was not supported by new evidence. The court was not persuaded that the trial would take a further seven days, as the only evidence on this matter was the applicants' expert's opinion, which was not cross-examined by the respondents. The court also considered the potential estoppel effect of the previous unsuccessful application for security for costs, which could have led the applicants to discontinue the proceedings had they known they would need to provide additional security. The court concluded that the appropriate amount of security, considering the remaining duration of the trial and the evidence presented, was $75,000. The court ordered that the applicants provide this security by way of an unconditional bank guarantee by a specified date, and that the proceedings be stayed until such security is provided or until further order of the court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first and third applicants pay the sum of $75 000 by way of security for costs, by way of unconditional bank guarantee in that sum, or otherwise to the satisfaction of the District Registrar of the Queensland District Registry of the Court, by 5 January 2007.

2. The proceeding by the first and third applicants be stayed as against the first and second respondents until provision of that security or until further order of the Court.

3.

Background

Background to the litigation

I have before me a notice of motion brought by the first and second respondents seeking further security for costs in the amount of $200 000. For the purposes of this application, I shall refer to the respondents to the substantive action as ‘the respondents’ notwithstanding that they are the applicants in this notice of motion. Similarly, I shall refer to the applicants to the substantive action as ‘the applicants’.BACKGROUND In determining this application it is useful to outline background events which resulted in an application for abridgment of time for service of the notice of motion before me, and extensive written submissions in relation to this application following the hearing on Friday 24 November 2006. This application for security for costs comes in the context of a dispute which has been the subject of multiple applications during the course of 2006 including adjournment of the original date of the trial (Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 920), a recent unsuccessful application for security for costs brought by the respondents (Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1498), and delays because of extensive objections to evidence (some of which have not yet been determined). As a result of developments including extensive and complex argument concerning objections to evidence of witnesses of the applicants, the non-appearance of a key witness for the applicants and foreshadowed amendment to his evidence, and other unforeseen complications during the course of the two weeks of the trial (which re-commenced 13 November 2006 following the adjournment in July 2006), the hearing of the matter was not completed during the time allocated. After I ordered the applicants to open their case on Wednesday 15 November 2006, the applicants requested that the Court adjourn for that day while they consulted their legal representatives. The respondents consented to this adjournment. However in Court on Thursday 16 November 2006, Mr Bell on behalf of the respondents indicated that if the hearing was adjourned to a future date prior to the applicants opening their case, his clients would be making another application for security for costs in the sum of $200 000. Despite my reservations as to the applicants opening their case in light of the clear risk that the trial would not conclude at the end of two weeks, and problems faced by the lack of availability of Counsel after that time which would prevent the trial running beyond that time, both the applicants and the respondents indicated that they preferred the trial to commence. Accordingly, I allowed Mr Perry on behalf of the applicants to make opening submissions on Thursday 16 November 2006. By midway through last week it was clear that, despite lengthy hearing days commencing at 9.30 am and ending at times close to 6.00 pm and efforts by both Counsel and this Court, the trial would not conclude by Friday 24 November 2006. Evidence in chief and cross-examination of the second applicant extended from Friday 17 November 2006 until Wednesday 22 November 2006. Indeed by Friday 24 November 2006 although the applicants had closed their case, only three witnesses out of twelve had been called by the respondents. Because of workload commitments of the Court and lack of availability of Counsel, the hearing of the substantive matter has now been adjourned until 8 May 2007.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

COLLIER J
In summary, the submissions of the applicants are as follows:1. Short notice was given by the respondents for this application.2. It is admitted that the first and third applicants are unable, from their own resources, to meet any costs order made against them in these proceedings.3. The respondents have not adduced any new factual evidence in support of the application to justify the costs of $217 229.4. It is inappropriate to consider future costs in light of the affidavit of Mr McLellan.5. Mr McLellan made no calculation of the costs now claimed, and there is no suggestion that a person experienced in the calculation of legal costs has turned their mind to claims made in items 4-7 of the schedule.6. No authority was cited by the respondents or principle enunciated to support the contention that in exercise of its discretion the Court will order security for costs already incurred, particularly where there has been an earlier unsuccessful application.7. Mr Graham’s evidence is that the daily rate for party and party costs is $7124.25, making a total of $21 372.75 for the further three days of the trial. Accordingly, in all the circumstances if the Court decides to exercise its discretion to order further security then the appropriate quantum of such security is $21 372.8. The effect of Mr Graham’s evidence is that the costs claimed at items 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the schedule are not appropriate to form part of an order for security because they have already been incurred and because they have been dealt with by the orders made by the Court on the two previous security for costs applications.9. In giving his evidence, Mr Graham relies on the fact that all that remains to be done in relation to the witnesses is cross-examination and re-examination.10. The facts in Bryan E Fencott and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd were not relevant to this case; further the observations of French J in that case concern the issue of power rather than discretion. Neither Bryan E Fencott and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd nor another case, Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire and All Ricks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114, are authority for the proposition that the Court has power to order security for costs already incurred in the circumstances of this case.11. The fact that the respondents have relied on previous affidavits filed by them in support of earlier applications for security for costs is a tacit admission that nothing that has occurred since those affidavits were filed.12. The respondents chose not to cross-examine Mr Graham, and in those circumstances Mr Graham’s evidence as to the quantum of any appropriate security order is uncontested.13. There is no admissible evidence before the Court to support the assertion that the trial will take a further seven days to complete. The only admissible evidence which comprehends the extent to which the trial has been heard and the likely further duration of the trial is Mr Graham’s evidence in which he gives his expert opinion that the trial will take a further three days to complete. This estimate is based on a consideration of the remaining witnesses to be cross-examined by the applicants and has regard to the fact that written submissions are likely to be required.14. It is inappropriate for the Court to take into account any of the evidence adduced thus far at the trial because the evidence is incomplete and no findings of fact have yet been made, including in relation to whether the third applicant was trading whilst insolvent or whether Mr Tracy had transferred property to which he was beneficially entitled in order to defeat creditors.15. As the respondent had failed in its most recent application for security for costs (Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1498) and had not appealed the decision, the decision created an estoppel against a further application based on the facts extant at the date of the order. The policy reason for such an estoppel is that, had the applicants known on the date upon which the Court dismissed the most recent security for costs application that they would have to provide a further $200 000 security, they may have elected to discontinue the proceedings at that point, thereby saving the costs of the 10 day trial because of their inability to meet the further security order. This is prejudice which cannot now be remedied.16. Mr McLellan’s evidence is unhelpful in that it does not contain any assessment of the likely further duration of the trial having regard to the witnesses already dealt with or remaining witnesses; whether the respondents are able to obtain an order for security for incurred costs or whether the respondents are estopped from obtaining further security; or whether the respondents are entitled on a party and party basis to obtain an allowance for preparation for trial more than once.QUESTIONS FOR DECISION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COLLIER J

It does not appear to be in dispute that, if an order for security for costs is made, it is appropriate to order that the matter be permanently stayed pending the payment of the amount ordered.ARE THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONDENTS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER FOR SECURITY FOR COSTS AGAINST THE FIRST AND THIRD APPLICANTS UNDER EITHER SECTION 56 FEDERAL COURT ACT OR SECTION 1335 CORPORATIONS ACT?General Principles The Court is empowered by s 56 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (‘the Act’) to order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him. Section 56(2) vests the Court or Judge with a discretion to order the security to be of such amount and given at such time and in such manner and form as the Court or Judge directs. Although O 28 r 3 Federal Court Rules refers to matters the Court may take into account when considering an application for an order for security for costs under s 56 of the Act, it is clear that the rule is not intended to be an exhaustive statement of the factors the Court may consider, nor does the rule limit the power of the Court under s 56 (Bell Wholesale Co Pty Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1 at 2-3). The first and third applicants in this case are corporations, one of which is currently subject to a Deed of Company Arrangement within the meaning of Pt 5.3A Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Accordingly, s 1335 Corporations Act is also relevant. Section 1335 provides:‘(1) Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.(2) The costs of any proceeding before a court under this Act are to be borne by such party to the proceeding as the court, in its discretion, directs.’ Although the respondents have sought an order for security for costs pursuant to either s 56 of the Federal Court Act or s 1335 Corporations Act, in the circumstances of this case the parties have not addressed the issue whether the content of the requirement to act judicially is different under s 56 to that under s 1335. Accordingly, it is not necessary for me to consider this issue separately. Notwithstanding the long-standing principle that the door of the court should not be barred to a prospective applicant because of impecuniosity (Bowen LJ in Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 at 38, Full Court of the Federal Court in Cherry v Read (unreported, Black CJ, Sackville and Finn JJ, 21 November 1996 at 8), and note cases discussed in GE Dal Pont Law of Costs LexisNexis Butterworths 2003 at p 955) the protective object of an order for security for costs is well known. As Einstein J said in Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v National Australia Bank Limited [2001] NSWSC 744 at [52]:‘The purpose of a security for costs order is therefore a protective jurisdiction to ensure that the primary purposes for having costs orders themselves, can be achieved. A defendant is protected against the risk that a costs order obtained at the end of the day may turn out to be of no value by reason of the impecuniosity of the plaintiff.’