TSDack Pty Ltd v Australian Water Holdings Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TSDack Pty Limited v Australian Water Holdings Pty Limited [2015] FCA 931

Citation: TSDack Pty Limited v Australian Water Holdings Pty Limited [2015] FCA 931
Parties: TSDACK PTY LIMITED (ACN 130 130 317) , CONCA D'ORO HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED (ACN 093 319 209), BRAYSIDE INVESTMENTS & MANAGEMENT PTY LIMITED (ACN 169 279 547) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE BRAYSIDE DISCRETIONARY TRUST, JOHN KOUTSOGIANNIS AND ANGIE KOUTSOGIANNIS AS TRUSTEES FOR THE KOUTSOGIANNIS FAMILY TRUST and DANNY KOUTSOGIANNIS v AUSTRALIAN WATER HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED (ACN 003 702 832), JOHN RIPPON, WILLIAM MACGREGOR-FRASER, NICHOLAS DI GIROLAMO, GREGORY SKEHAN, MICHAEL COSTA, PETER CANAWAY, GIUSEPPE CATANZARITI, FRANCESCO CERRA and BG&E PTY LIMITED (ACN 150 804 603)
File number: NSD 105 of 2014
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 25 August 2015
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — security for costs — whether applicants’ impecuniosity caused by the respondents’ conduct — whether security should be provided by corporate applicants — whether security should be provided by trustee — whether respondents’ security for costs applications are oppressive — whether in substance the proceedings are defensive — form and quantum of security
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335(1)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 56
Cases cited: Al-Koronky v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1123
Bell Wholesale Co Ltd v Gates Export Corporation (1984) 2 FCR 1
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 5) [2006] FCA 1672
FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd v Mining Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 241
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744
Interwest Ltd v Tricontinental Corporation Ltd (1991) 5 ACSR 621
Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291; 65 ACSR 276
KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189
Newtons Travel Services Pty Ltd v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1982) 44 ALR 163
Pearson v Naydler [1997] 3 All ER 531
Reinsurance Australia Corporation Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance (in liq) [2003] FCA 803
Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2007] NSWCA 205
Sunday Times Newspaper Company Ltd v McIntosh (1933) 33 SR (NSW) 371
Wollongong City Council v Legal Business Centre Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 245
Date of hearing: 10 and 11 March 2015
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 97
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr D D Feller SC with Mr A Kostopoulos
Solicitor for the Applicants: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M R Elliott
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second, Third, Sixth and Eighth Respondents: Mr W G Muddle SC
Solicitor for the Second, Third, Sixth and Eighth Respondents: Norton Rose Fulbright
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr D A McLure
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Lander & Rogers
Counsel for the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Respondents: Mr G E S Ng
Solicitor for the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Respondents: Yeldham Price O’Brien Lusk

IN THE…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 931
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of TSDack Pty Ltd v Australian Water Holdings Pty Ltd involved an application for interlocutory relief in which the applicants sought relief from the consequences of their alleged impecuniosity. The applicants were investment companies who had invested substantial sums of money in the respondents' companies, only to see those investments squandered. The applicants alleged that the respondents had persuaded them to invest the money and were now liable for the losses. The respondents, in turn, sought security for costs from the applicants, claiming that the applicants were impecunious and unable to pay the respondents' costs if their defences were successful.

The court was required to determine whether the applicants' impecuniosity was caused by the respondents' conduct, and if so, whether security should be provided by the applicants or their trustees. The court also had to consider whether the respondents' security for costs applications were oppressive, whether the proceedings were defensive in substance, and the form and quantum of security that should be provided.

The court found that the applicants were indeed impecunious and unable to pay the respondents' costs if their defences were successful. The court also found that the applicants' impecuniosity was not caused by the respondents' conduct, and therefore the applicants were required to provide security for costs. The court rejected the applicants' argument that their trustees should provide security instead, holding that the trustees were not liable for the applicants' debts. The court also found that the respondents' security for costs applications were not oppressive, and that the proceedings were not defensive in substance. Finally, the court ordered that the applicants provide security for costs in specified amounts, and that the proceedings be stayed until such time as the applicants had complied with the orders.

In summary, the court held that the applicants were required to provide security for costs in the specified amounts, and that the proceedings would be stayed until such time as the applicants had complied with the orders. The applicants were also ordered to pay the respondents' costs of their applications for security. The court granted liberty to the applicants to apply to vary the amounts set out in the orders if there was a narrowing of the issues, and to the respondents to apply for further security if necessary.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first, second and third applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the first respondent in the amount of $300,000; and

(b) the second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in the amount of $200,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

2. The first, second, third and fourth applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the fourth respondent in the amount of $100,000; and

(b) the ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents in the amount of $100,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

3. Within 14 days after the applicants’ evidence is served, the first, second and third applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the first respondent in the amount of $300,000; and

(b) the second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in the amount of $300,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

4. Within 14 days after the applicants’ evidence is served, the first, second, third and fourth applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the fourth respondent in the amount of $100,000; and

(b) the ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents in the amount of $100,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

5. Within seven days after the order is made listing the matter for final hearing, the first, second and third applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the first respondent in the amount of $300,000; and

(b) the second, third, sixth, seventh and eighth respondents in the amount of $350,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

6. Within seven days after the order listing the matter for final hearing, the first, second, third and fourth applicants provide security for the costs of:

(a) the fourth respondent in the amount of $100,000; and

(b) the ninth, tenth and eleventh respondents in the amount of $115,000,

by payment into a bank account of the Court or provision of a bank guarantee.

7. The proceedings be stayed until such time as the applicants have complied with orders 1 and 2.

8. Upon service of the applicants’ evidence, the proceedings be stayed again until such time as the applicants have complied with orders 3 and 4.

9. Upon the making of the order listing the matter for final hearing, the proceedings be stayed again until such time as the final tranche of security is provided.

10. The first, second, third and fourth applicants pay the respondents’ costs of their applications for security.

11. Upon the provision of the first tranche of security, the applicants contact the Court to arrange for the matter to be listed for directions.

12. Liberty be granted to the applicants to apply to vary the amounts set out in orders 3–6 inclusive in the event that after the close of pleadings, discovery or the exchange of evidence, there has been such a narrowing of the issues as to call into serious question the assessments of costs upon which these orders were made.

13. Liberty be granted to the respondents to apply for further security, if necessary.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for interlocutory relief. In the substantive proceedings the applicants complain about the conduct of a number of individuals and entities they allege persuaded them to invest substantial sums of money only to squander their investments.BACKGROUND The following account is largely taken from the amended statement of claim and the applicants’ chronology. For present purposes at least, it does not appear to be contentious. The first respondent, Australian Water Holdings Pty Limited (“AWH”) (originally Rouse Hill Infrastructure Consortium Pty Limited), was established as a not-for-profit venture in response to a particular problem in the supply of water and sewerage infrastructure in northwest Sydney. It was originally owned by a number of commercial landholders and the Housing Commission of New South Wales. Its sole client for water infrastructure projects was the Sydney Water Corporation, a government instrumentality. Some time before 2005 or 2006 John Rippon, the second respondent, and William MacGregor-Fraser, the third respondent, purchased AWH. Mr Rippon invited Nicholas Di Girolamo, the fourth respondent, to join the board as a non-executive director for the specific purposes of expanding the company’s existing business and developing and exploring new business opportunities. On 9 November 2006 another company, Australian Water Pty Limited (“AW”), was registered. AW was the brainchild of Messrs Rippon, MacGregor-Fraser and Di Girolamo. It was apparently conceived as a corporate vehicle to secure and pursue the new business opportunities identified by AWH but which would not be subject to any not-for-profit status or restrictions. In or about February 2007 Mr Di Girolamo was appointed Chief Executive Officer of AW. On various dates in 2007 and 2008 each of the applicants (the third by a different trustee) entered into convertible note agreements (“CNAs”) with AWH and AW. Their investments ranged from $275,000–$1 million. Under the terms of the CNAs, those sums were transferred to AWH and AW, now called ACN 122 590 836 Pty Limited. Each CNA was for a fixed term, after which the applicants were entitled to have the sums repaid together with interest. However, the applicants chose not to exercise their entitlements and instead converted their interests into equity in AWH. By the end of 2008 all the money they had caused to be paid to AW was gone. In the middle of 2012 the applicants agreed to a proposal by which they converted the convertible notes into what were ultimately worthless shares in AWH. They blame their predicament on AWH and its then directors. The second to tenth respondents are former and current directors of AWH. They included a fifth respondent, Arthur Sinodinos. As I explain later, however, he is no longer a party. Each of Messrs Rippon, MacGregor-Fraser and Di Girolamo was a director of both AWH and AW. The 11th respondent, BG&E Pty Limited (“BG&E”), allegedly invested in AWH in 2012 and procured or arranged for two other companies — BG&E Management Pty Limited (“BG&E Management”) and Superra Pty Limited (“Superra”) — to acquire significant shareholdings in AWH.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The purpose of these powers is “to ensure that a party to a proceeding brought by an impecunious claimant is not oppressed in consequence of the moving party litigating without responsibility”: Sagacious Procurement Pty Ltd v Symbion Health Ltd [2007] NSWCA 205 at [53] (Mason P).Is there credible evidence that the corporate applicants may be unable to pay the respondents’ costs if their defences succeed? There is no doubt that credible evidence has been adduced. The applicants do not contend otherwise. Indeed, their own evidence alone provides reason to believe that they will not be able to pay the respondents’ costs in the event that the respondents prevail. This is what the evidence reveals. TSDack is an Australian proprietary company, limited by shares, with four directors and three shareholders. It is an investment vehicle. It was incorporated on about 12 March 2008 for the sole purpose of the CNA investment and has no other business operations. It has a paid up capital of $4 and holds no interest in land. Through its solicitor it has conceded it has no assets. Its directors are George Daaboul, Anthony and Corriene Karam and Tony Saad. None of them has offered to stand behind the company. Conca D’Oro is also an Australian proprietary company, limited by shares. It has five directors and two shareholders. The directors are Maria Florio and John, Salvatore, Filippo and Sarina Navarra. None of them has come forward offering security. Unlike TSDack, Conca D’Oro has interests in a number of pieces of real estate. But it has a paid up share capital of only $2. Some of its landholdings are mortgaged to the Westpac Banking Corporation, and all of its present and future assets are subject to a fixed and floating charge in Westpac’s favour. Despite repeated requests, it has refused to provide details of its financial position. In his affidavit Mr McGregor said that Mr Navarra (presumably John, as he is the only Navarra mentioned in the affidavit) told him that Conca D’Oro is a substantial trading entity and information relating to its assets and financial position is “commercially sensitive”. He also told Mr McGregor that the company was unwilling to divulge information about its assets and financial position because to do so would result in:(a)Conca D’Oro’s profits and margins being disclosed. If this information were to be obtained by market competitors, Conca D’Oro would be operating at a commercial disadvantage and substantial harm could result to its business; and(b)Conca D’Oro’s commercial interests and business assets being disclosed. In the hospitality and venue hire industry, the location of venues is critical to profits and success. If Conca D’Oro’s asset position were disclosed, then the information concerning its ventures in potential growth locations would be revealed. This would flag to competitors the future opportunities that Conca D’Oro is considering and thereby erode its competitive advantage. This evidence provides an explanation for the company’s failure to disclose the information but it is an unsatisfactory explanation. The Court has the power to make orders protecting confidential information from publication.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicants' impecuniosity was caused by the respondents' conduct.
2. Whether security should be provided by the corporate applicants.
3. Whether security should be provided by the trustee.
4. Whether the respondents' security for costs applications are oppressive.
5. Whether in substance the proceedings are defensive.
6. What is the appropriate form and quantum of security.

Held
1. The court concluded that the applicants' impecuniosity was not caused by the respondents' conduct, thus the first issue was resolved against the applicants.
2. The court ordered the corporate applicants to provide security for the costs of the respondents in various amounts, as detailed in the orders.
3. The court did not mandate the trustee to provide security as part of the decision.
4. The court found that the respondents' security for costs applications were not oppressive, dismissing the applicants' contention on the fourth issue.
5. The court determined that the proceedings were not defensive in substance, refuting the applicants' claim on the fifth issue.
6. The court specified the form and quantum of security to be provided by the applicants as per the detailed orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court began by examining the evidence of the applicants' financial status and the likelihood of their ability to pay the respondents' costs if their defences were successful. The applicants, being companies with limited assets and capital, provided evidence that they were unlikely to be able to meet the respondents' costs. This led the court to order the corporate applicants to provide security to cover the respondents' costs, in amounts deemed appropriate based on the potential risk to the respondents. The court's decision on the form of security (bank account payment or bank guarantee) and the quantum was based on ensuring the respondents were protected without placing an undue burden on the applicants. The court also addressed the applicants' argument that the respondents' security for costs applications were oppressive, finding that the orders for security were reasonable and necessary to prevent the oppression of the respondents. The court further considered whether the proceedings were defensive in substance, concluding that the applicants' actions were not merely a defensive strategy but had merit, thus the applications were not defensive. The court granted liberty to both parties to apply for variations to the security amounts or for further security, reflecting a balanced approach to the security for costs applications.

The ratio decidendi of this case lies in the court's application of the principles of fairness and necessity in ordering security for costs, balancing the protection of the respondents against the potential oppression of the applicants. The court distinguished its decision from cases where the applicants' impecuniosity was directly caused by the respondents' conduct, emphasising that the applicants' financial situation was a result of their own investment decisions. The decision followed the precedent that security for costs may be required to prevent oppression of a respondent, but departed from any suggestion that the applicants' predicament automatically entitled them to relief from such orders.