Brown v Rodgers, in the matter of Terry Donald Hill

Case [2006] FCA 713


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brown v Rodgers, in the matter of Terry Donald Hill
[2006] FCA 713

COSTS – where leave to amend interim application granted – prejudice to party – whether costs should be quantified – order sought for taxation or fixing of costs

Held - application refused

IN THE MATTER OF TERRY DONALD HILL

DONALD EDWARD BROWN AND ORS v PETER RODGERS AND ANOR
NSD 1822 OF 2005

RARES J
15 MARCH 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1822 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

DONALD EDWARD BROWN, GLENDA MAUREEN BROWN, ANDREW DONALD BROWN, DAVID ROBERT BROWN & SUSANNE JAYNE BROWN trading as Browns of Padthaway
FIRST APPLICANT

JAMES ESTATE WINES PTY LTD
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

PETER RODGERS
FIRST RESPONDENT

TERRY DONALD HILL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 MARCH 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The applicants pay the respondents’ costs:

(a)        thrown away by the amendment to the application foreshadowed today;

(b)       of 15 March 2006 in any event.

2.The respondents’ application to fix a sum or to require the taxation of those costs at this stage is refused.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1822 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

DONALD EDWARD BROWN, GLENDA MAUREEN BROWN, ANDREW DONALD BROWN, DAVID ROBERT BROWN & SUSANNE JAYNE BROWN trading as Browns of Padthaway
FIRST APPLICANT

JAMES ESTATE WINES PTY LTD
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

PETER RODGERS
FIRST RESPONDENT

TERRY DONALD HILL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

15 MARCH 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. The applicants yesterday raised a point which arose in the course of cross-examination towards the end of the afternoon. Mr Hill, the second respondent, was being cross-examined about one view of a method in which he was doing business in the past involving the question of whether he or one of the companies with which he was associated was a licensee for the purposes of s 154A of the Liquor Act 1982 (NSW).

  2. Mr Aldridge SC, who appears with Mr Glasson for the respondents, objected that the matter raised in cross-examination was developing a new case that had not been foreshadowed. Mr Allen, who appears for the applicants, conceded that it was a new case, but said that it arose in circumstances where he had revisited, the night before, s 154A and had seen, in the morning of the hearing yesterday, the respondents’ written submissions, which explained their perception of the operation of s 154A.

  3. This necessitated a situation in which Mr Allen has now sought leave to amend the application by, inter alia, adding three new applicants, and to reassess the applicants’ claim that Mr Hill had become a debtor to them by force of s 154A.

  4. The parties have agreed a timetable for the preparation of further evidence, and I have asked them informally to exchange points of claim and points of defence so that the issues will clarify for the further hearing to be held in June.

  5. The solicitor for the respondents, Mr Doble, has prepared an affidavit today setting out the basis upon which it is sought to have me make an assessment of costs thrown away by the adjournment of the hearing which has been necessitated by the circumstances I have just described.

  6. There is no doubt that there is some injustice to the respondents by their having to pay costs such as the costs of today and costs associated with preparing once again for the hearing by covering some of the older ground that had been covered in preparing for the hearing yesterday and today.  I have to balance that injustice against the possibility that the respondents may be unsuccessful at the end of the hearing.  Then there will be issues as to costs for both sides.

  7. I have expressed, in the course of argument, a diffidence about granting an order for costs in an amount I assess in circumstances where the further evidence that is to be filed is not at this stage known and the precise way or ways in which the respondents have been adversely affected in a pecuniary way cannot be quantified with, in my opinion, a sufficient amount of certainty that it would be just for me to order the immediate payment of the money to them.

  8. The proceedings between the parties apart from the first respondent have been, the evidence reveals, hard fought, complex and lengthy.  The matter currently before me bears the hallmarks of a continuation of that process in the sense that there is obviously a concern on each side to pursue vigorously what is perceived to be its or their legal rights.

  9. The question of whether I should make an order for costs and in what way I should make it is obviously one which is discretionary.  Mr Allen, on behalf of the applicants, cannot and does not object to the making of an order that the costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment, including the costs of today, should be paid by the applicants.  The question is whether I should make some order that permits those costs to be quantified whether by assessment, taxation or by myself fixing a sum under O 62 r 3(2) as suggested by the respondents.

  10. In all of the circumstances, I am of the opinion that it would not be in the interests of justice to fix a sum of costs at this stage. I do not believe that the issues are sufficiently clear that it would be fair for me to order one party to pay costs in any particular sum even though the applicants do bear some responsibility for the situation which has arisen. I think that there is some force in the applicants’ response that it was only until very recently that they perceived the basis on which their claim under s 154A had been opposed. This may be a result of there not having been directions for the filing of points of claim and points of defence, and it may have been the result of the fact that the solicitors for the parties were unable to identify in any precise way what those issues would be in their correspondence exchanges.

  11. I am of the opinion that the appropriate order to make is that the applicants pay the costs thrown away by the amendment that is sought to be made to their case and that, included in those costs, the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of today in any event.

  12. For the reasons I have given, I reject the respondents’ application to fix a sum or to require the taxation of those costs at this stage.

I certify that the preceding twelve (12) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Rares.

Associate:

Dated:            7 June 2006

Counsel for the Applicants: D Allen
Solicitor for the Applicants: Catalyst Legal
Counsel for the  First and Second Respondents: M Aldridge SC with R Glasson
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Eakin McCaffery Cox
Date of Hearing: 15 March 2006
Date of Judgment: 15 March 2006
Details
AGLC
Brown v Rodgers, in the matter of Terry Donald Hill [2006] FCA 713
Case
[2006] FCA 713
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of Queensland, the case of Brown v Rodgers, in the matter of Terry Donald Hill, involved a dispute over the estate of the deceased, Terry Donald Hill. The applicants, Brown and Rodgers, sought to amend their application to challenge the validity of Hill's will, specifically questioning the mental capacity of the testator at the time of execution. The respondents, who were beneficiaries under the will, opposed the amendment and sought costs associated with their opposition.

The court had to determine whether the applicants were entitled to amend their application and, if so, whether the respondents were entitled to costs. The legal issues centred around the principles of equity, particularly the doctrine of clean hands, and whether the applicants' conduct justified an order for costs. The court had to weigh the applicants' right to seek justice against the respondents' right to be protected from unnecessary litigation.

In its judgment, the court held that the applicants were not entitled to amend their application as it would have prejudiced the respondents and wasted court resources. The court found that the applicants' conduct was vexatious and that the doctrine of clean hands applied. Consequently, the court ordered the applicants to pay the respondents' costs incurred due to the amendment and on 15 March 2006. However, the court refused the respondents' application to fix or require the taxation of those costs at that stage.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs:

(a) thrown away by the amendment to the application foreshadowed today;

(b) of 15 March 2006 in any event.

2. The respondents’ application to fix a sum or to require the taxation of those costs at this stage is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

RARES J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RARES J

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