CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

In CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a national of Pakistan, sought a Protection (Class XA) visa. The dispute centred on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) assessment of whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm due to his Shia religious identity and imputed political opinion if he returned to his home area in Pakistan. The AAT found that other areas in Pakistan were relatively free from sectarian violence and provided relative safety, which led to the appellant's appeal against the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss his challenge to the AAT's decision.

The central legal issue was whether the AAT had adopted a relative rather than an objective approach in applying the 'real chance' test when considering the appellant's potential relocation within Pakistan. The court had to determine if the AAT correctly applied the objective test for determining a real chance of serious harm and whether the AAT's use of terms such as 'relatively' indicated a departure from this objective standard.

The court concluded that the AAT had correctly applied the objective 'real chance' test when assessing the appellant's risk of harm in urban centres like Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The AAT's reasons indicated a consideration of the objective likelihood of harm, rather than merely comparing risks across different locations. The court held that the AAT's use of the term 'relatively' could be interpreted to mean 'mostly, albeit not absolutely', acknowledging that these urban areas were not entirely free from danger. Therefore, the AAT's decision should be understood as applying the correct test throughout.

The appeal was allowed, and the Federal Circuit Court's orders were set aside. The court issued an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the AAT's decision and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the AAT to review the delegate's decision according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs before the Federal Circuit Court and the appellant's costs of the appeal.