Christensen and Australian Capital Territory (Compensation) [2020] AATA 5059 (15 December 2020)
AppID: Christensen and Australian Capital Territory
MatterType: Compensation
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s):2020/5812
Re:Jane Christensen
APPLICANT
Australian Capital TerritoryAnd
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D O'Donovan
Date: 15 December 2020
Place:Canberra
The Tribunal grants the applicant an extension of time to 24 December 2020 for making an application for review of a decision made by the respondent on 12 April 2019.
…………………….……………….
Senior Member D O’Donovan
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – decision to cease payment of compensation under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act – attended solicitor after period for applying for review had expired – solicitor misunderstood nature of claim and failed to apply to Tribunal for review – error only picked up when counsel became involved – further delay in making application – no resting on rights – no actual prejudice – whether there is unfairness or unsettling of compliant applicants if extension granted – whether case weak or hopeless – application granted
Actew AGL Distribution v Australian Energy Regulator [2011] FCA 639
Arbon and Comcare [2017] AATA 2870
Brisbane South Regional Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Comcare v A’hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
De La Torre-Greene and Comcare [2020] AATA 419
Flahive and Comcare [2020] AATA 3044
Hamden v Secretary, Department of Human Services [2013] FCA 3
Hewson and Australian Postal Corporation [1998] AATA 71
Hunter Valley Developments Pty ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Others [2015] FCA 1391
Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83
Thompson and Comcare [2019] AATA 714REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D O'Donovan
15 December 2020
INTRODUCTION
This is an application pursuant to section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the Act) seeking to extend the time for making an application for review of a decision concerning the applicant’s entitlement to compensation under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (SRC Act).
The reviewable decision was made on 12 April 2019 by a reconsideration officer employed by Employers Mutual Limited (EML). EML is the claims manager for the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). The ACT is a licensee under the SRC Act. The decision that was made is commonly described as a ‘cease effects’ decision. The applicant had an accepted claim for an injury described as an aggravation of displacement of intervertebral disc – lumbar, generalised anxiety disorder, and aggravation of bruxism. The injury came about as a result of a specific incident when the applicant moved a fridge. The date of injury was 7 February 2003. Compensation had been paid to the applicant under the SRC Act from that time.
In February 2019 Comcare determined that it had no present liability for medical expenses, incapacity payments and household and attendant care services in relation to the injury. The applicant sought…
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- Case
- [2020] AATA 5059
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether to grant Ms Christensen an extension of time to lodge her application for review. This involved considering the reasons for the delay, the length of the delay, whether the applicant had rested on her rights, and the prospects of success of the substantive application. The Tribunal also had to assess whether the applicant should be held responsible for the failures of her solicitors.
The Tribunal reasoned that where a delay in lodging an application is caused by the error of a party's solicitor, those failures should not be visited upon the client. This principle, supported by case law, was central to the decision. The Tribunal found that the bulk of the delay was due to the applicant's solicitor's lack of understanding of the review process and the applicable time limits, rather than any inaction by Ms Christensen herself. The Tribunal was satisfied that Ms Christensen had acted reasonably in entrusting her matter to her legal representatives and that the delay attributable to her own conduct was minimal. Furthermore, the Tribunal considered that the applicant had a prospect of success in her substantive application, and there was no discernible prejudice to the respondent.
Consequently, the Tribunal ordered that an extension of time be granted to Ms Christensen to make an application to the Tribunal until 24 December 2020.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In a case where the delay has been caused by an error on the part of a party’s solicitor the approach which has been consistently taken is that the failures of a solicitor should not be visited upon their client.[4] Indeed in some cases the failure of a solicitor to take the proper steps could itself be regarded as establishing a sufficient cause for an extension of time.[5] That is the basis on which I have proceeded for the purposes of resolving this application.CONSIDERATION[4] Comcare v A’hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 443.[5] Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 190 cited with approval in Comcare v A’hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 443. Reasons for delay There are a number of components of the delay in this case. The evidence suggests that the applicant did not take active steps during the appeal period to pursue her rights and only approached a lawyer at the very end of the appeal period or a little after. However both parties accept that if the applicant had approached a competent lawyer who took immediate steps to seek an extension of time in June 2019 it is likely that any extension of time sought would have been contested. The bulk of the delay arose as a consequence of the lawyer who the applicant approached having no appreciation of what needed to be done in relation to the application. The applicant’s intention, and seemingly that of her lawyer, was to contest the reviewable decision, but the steps taken for more than a year were misdirected and ineffective in terms of triggering and advancing any review. There was a further short delay once counsel had picked up on the errors made by the applicant’s solicitor, but steps were taken promptly to put the respondent on notice that the applicant contested the decision. Accordingly the primary reason for the material delay in this case was the result of incompetence or inadvertence on the part of the applicant’s solicitor. The respondent suggests that the applicant herself did not do enough to progress the matter. I do not accept that submission. The applicant clearly believed that she was putting her matter in the hands of competent solicitors and that the steps they were taking were progressing her claim. She was providing them with relevant documentation, attending medical appointments and when things were not progressing she chased them up. The applicant should not be saddled with responsibility for the shortcomings of her lawyers. Almost all of the delay can be put down to the failings of the applicant’s lawyers.Length of delay Once the delay attributable to the applicant’s lawyer is removed from the picture, the length of delay to be considered is small. A very small period in June 2019 following the expiry of the time limit and a small period following advice from counsel in August 2020 during which the applicant’s lawyers endeavoured to put the respondent on notice that their client did not rest upon her rights. In those circumstances the length of delay attributable to the applicant is not significant.Did the applicant rest on her rights?