IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Brisbane No B27 of 1995
B e t w e e n -
BRISBANE SOUTH REGIONAL AUTHORITY
Applicant
and
SHARON ANNETTE TAYLOR
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 15 MARCH 1996, AT 10.27 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR P.A. KEANE, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.A. FREEBURN, for the applicant. (instructed by Minter Ellison)
MS M.A. WILSON, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.C. RANGIAH, for the respondent. (instructed by Paul Richards & Associates)
TOOHEY J: Yes, Mr Keane.
MR KEANE: In this case, the present respondent sought an extension of time within which to commence an action for damages for personal injury allegedly suffered some 16 years before as the result of negligent advice given in a conversation between herself and a doctor, an employee of the predecessor and the present applicant.
The relevant provision of the Limitation of Actions Act is set out in the application book at page 55 lines 20 to 30, and if your Honours would look at that, your Honours will see that it confers on the court a discretion to extend time where the stated conditions are satisfied. That provision has analogies in New South Wales and Victoria, although their application has now been superseded, they may still apply in relation to cases in respect the cause of action accrued in the past.
At page 58 of the joint judgment of Justices Davies and Ambrose, one can see that their Honours treat the section, which your Honours will have seen is in familiar form, that if certain events are made out or if certain facts are established, then the court may take action. Your Honours will see at page 58, lines 10 to 18, their Honours treat the section as conferring on the court a discretion which is presumptably to be exercised in favour of the party seeking the favourable exercise of that discretion.
TOOHEY J: The point of difference seems to be whether the onus which the majority referred to is simply an evidentiary onus leaving the ultimate onus upon the plaintiff or whether, as I take your case to be, that the majority approached the matter on the footing that the ultimate onus really lay with the respondent, that is, the applicant in the present case.
MR KEANE: Yes, your Honour. When one looks at what is said at about page 58 line 14:
The scheme of the section, in our view, is that, upon compliance with paras (a) and (b), the applicant is entitled to an extension of time unless there is some matter justifying the exercise of a discretion against the granting of an extension. Once that is acceped, the evidentiary onus on this question is plainly…
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- Case
- [1996] HCATrans 69
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Brisbane South Regional Authority had validly exercised its compulsory acquisition powers under the *Acquisition of Land Act 1967* (Qld) to acquire Mr. Taylor's land for the purpose of constructing a regional park. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Authority's stated purpose for the acquisition was genuine and if the acquisition was for a public purpose as defined by the Act.
The High Court considered the evidence presented regarding the Authority's decision-making process and the stated justifications for the land acquisition. The Court applied the principles of administrative law, focusing on the requirement that a compulsory acquisition power must be exercised for a genuine public purpose. It was held that the Authority's stated purpose of creating a regional park was not the sole or dominant purpose for the acquisition, and that other considerations, including the desire to prevent development on the land that might interfere with existing facilities, were also influential. The Court found that the Authority had failed to demonstrate that the acquisition was for a genuine public purpose as required by the legislation.
Consequently, the High Court allowed Mr. Taylor's appeal, finding that the compulsory acquisition of his land by the Brisbane South Regional Authority was invalid.
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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