Child Support Registrar & Meekin
[2008] FMCAfam 877
•30 September 2008
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR & MEEKIN | [2008] FMCAfam 877 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Enforcement proceedings – whether any part of liability subject to Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) – legislative scheme effectively covers the field – recovery of amount claimed not statute barred. |
| Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) Judiciary Act 1903 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) |
Deputy Commission of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 55
MUC v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) NSWCA 96
| Applicant: | CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR |
| Respondent: | MR MEEKIN |
| File Number: | MLC 10879 of 2007 |
| Judgment of: | Hartnett FM |
| Hearing date: | 17 June 2008 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Reasons delivered on: | 30 September 2008 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr North SC |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Australian Government Solicitor |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ms Moorehouse-Perks |
ORDERS made 9 September 2008
The parties attend a Conciliation Conference with a Registrar of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia at the Melbourne Registry on
15 September 2008 at 9:15am.Upon the Court determining that the Applicant is not barred by the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) from recovering the child support debt (including late payment penalties) which are greater than six years old the application of the Respondent heard 17 June 2008 is dismissed.
Otherwise all extant applications are adjourned to 7 October 2008 at 10:00am for hearing.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Child Support Registrar & Meekin is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLC 10879 of 2007
| CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR |
Applicant
And
| MR MEEKIN |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Proceedings commenced on 1 October 2007 with the applicant filing an enforcement summons claiming the respondent was indebted to the Commonwealth under sections 30 and 67 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988. Relied upon by the applicant in these proceedings are the following affidavits:
a)Affidavit of Ms U sworn 27 September 2007; and
b)Supplementary Affidavit of Ms U sworn 14 February 2008; and
c)Affidavit of Ms U sworn 3 April 2008; and
d)Affidavit of Ms P sworn 2 June 2008.
Also before the Court and tendered in evidence (Exhibit CSR 1) is a Certificate signed by the Child Support Registrar under s.116(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (the section 116(2) Certificate). That document certifies that the following amounts totalling $40,789.69 are due and payable by the respondent and remain unpaid as at the 17 day of June 2008 in respect of registered maintenance liabilities:
·Child support debt of $17,526.60
·Plus penalties of $22,981.27
·Plus consolidated revenue debt of $281.82
History
There are two children for whom the respondent has a registered liability with the Child Support Agency. They are [X] born in1986 and [Y] born in 1996.
The liability for [X] arises from a Stage 1 Court Order in respect of child support payable by the respondent. The liability commenced on 8 August 1990, was registered for collection with the Agency on
8 August 1990and ceased on 27 November 2004. The liability for [Y] arises from a Stage 2 Assessment in respect of child support payable by the respondent. The liability commenced on 27 October 1997 and was registered for collection with the Agency on 27 October 1997.
By correspondence dated 22 May 2007 the solicitors acting for the applicant informed the respondent that he had an outstanding amount for arrears of child support liabilities and late payment penalties and that if he did not pay that outstanding amount legal action would be taken. On 1 June 2007 copies of the letters sent by the Child Support Agency to the respondent enclosing his child support assessment notices and the respondent’s transaction statement for period 8 August 1990 to 1 June 2007 were forwarded by the solicitors for the applicant to the solicitor for the respondent. Further correspondence did not avoid the issuing of the enforcement summons. Various queries raised by the solicitor for the respondent were answered in an extensive manner by the solicitors for the applicant by letter dated 30 August 2007. Further queries remain.
The respondent is the sole registered proprietor of real property situate at Property J in the State of Victoria. Such property has a capital improved value on a valuation and rate statement for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 issued by the [omitted] Shire Council of $541,000.00. That property is encumbered by a mortgage to Suncorp – Metway Limited registered on 19 July 2004 and the balance due and owing on the Suncorp loan account as at 28 September 2007 was $179,310.26. The home loan application placed a valuation amount on the property of $765,000.00 as at 26 May 2004 with the respondent owner estimating the value of the property to be $850,000.00.
Further searches undertaken by the applicant revealed that (as at
14 February 2008) the respondent had not lodged a tax return since the year ended 30 June 1997; that the respondent had been trading as a sole trader since 1 November 1999; that the respondent was employed as a [omitted] by the City of Stonnington with his employment being terminated on 17 December 2005, he being in receipt of Workcare benefits at the date of termination.
The respondent relies upon an application and response both filed
7 February 2008together with an affidavit of Katherine Moorhouse-Perks, solicitor sworn 7 February 2008. In essence, the respondent sought the enforcement summons not be proceeded with before May 2008 and that upon its hearing, it be dismissed. Both parties have filed outline of argument documents together with supplementary outlines.
The preliminary matter before the Court on 17 June 2008 was the respondent’s argument that part of the claim for arrears of child support and penalties is statute barred by virtue of the operation of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) (“the Limitations Act”). The respondent claims that the proof the Registrar now has before the Court in the form of the s.116(2) Certificate (Exhibit CSR 1) is fundamentally flawed because “half of it is statute barred”.
The solicitor for the respondent referred the Court in particular to paragraphs 22 to 26 of the ‘Outline of Argument of Respondent’ which sets out the argument on behalf of the respondent. Paragraph 24 of that document was highlighted and is as follows:
“Section 5 of the Victorian Limitation of Actions Act provides that a cause of action based on debt or penalty is statute barred six years after the cause of action arises. The Crown is bound by that Act. The Registrar is exercising the powers of the Crown in seeking to collect a “debt to the Commonwealth”. The Registrar is bound by the Limitation of Actions Act. In Maguire – v – Simpson [1977] HCA 63; (1977) 139 CLR 362, their Honours Barwick CJ, Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Jacobs and Murphy JJ unanimously held that the Commonwealth, by operation of Section 64 of the Judiciary Act, was bound by state Limitation of Actions legislation. The only exception would be if the Parliament of the Commonwealth has specifically legislated to exempt Child Support Debt recovery from any Limitation of Actions restraint”.
Law
Section 113 of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (“the Act”) allows the Child Support Registrar to recover debts due to the Commonwealth in a Court having jurisdiction under that Act. This Court exercising federal jurisdiction has such jurisdiction (s.104 of the Act). Amounts payable under s.30 of the Act and s.67(2) of the Act are payable to and recoverable by the applicant under s.113 of the Act.
The section 116(2) certificate tendered to this Court is prima facie evidence of the debt as at the date of the certificate. Instruments of delegation and authorization are contained as annexures in the affidavit of Ms P which support the authenticity of the certificate.
In considering whether to order the payment of arrears the Court engages in a discretionary exercise. The debt itself can be subject to change over time with events (such as the late lodgement of past taxation returns by the payer) causing the Register to be amended. The amendment varies the liability and effectively creates a new liability. There is no merit in the argument put forward by the respondent that recovery of the debt is statute barred. The bringing of a successful departure application could create a new debt which the Commonwealth could seek payment of. I accept the submission of
Mr North SC that the Agency is not barred from bringing into effect any of its administrative actions, such as garnishment in pursuing debts, regardless of their age. The Agency cannot be barred from bringing Court proceedings to do so. Further, I accept his argument that it runs completely contrary to the objects of the scheme to suggest a delinquent payer can obviate his obligations by successfully evading administrative enforcement steps and then plead limitation of actions in order to avoid his liability.
Under the Act the register and the entries within it create the liability in favour of the Commonwealth. The liability can vary in quantum by reason of the occurrence of other events or applications. The obligation to pay can be suspended, can cease to be enforceable under the Act and can again become so enforceable. The legislation contemplates the Registrar at any time recovering a debt overseas if permitted to do so by the law overseas. There is no time limit on the power of the Registrar recovering outstanding liabilities outside the court process, for instance under sections 72, 72A and 72AA of the Act. The operation of the statutory scheme as set out in the Act is inconsistent with the argument put by the respondent. It is upon the proper application of s.64 of the Judiciary Act not appropriate to incorporate the Limitations Act into the expansive and coherent Commonwealth Legislative Scheme.
In reaching the above conclusion the Court looks firstly to the Limitations Act and its relevant section:
5 Contracts and torts
(1)The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued–
(a)Subject to subsections (1AAA), (1AA) and (1A), actions founded on simple contract (including contract implied in law) or actions founded on tort including actions for damages for breach of a statutory duty;
(b) Actions to enforce a recognizance;
(c)Actions to enforce an award, where the submission is not by an instrument under seal;
(d)Actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture.
(1AAA)An action for defamation must not be brought after the expiration of 1 year from the date of the publication of the matter complained of.
(1AA)Subject to subsection (1A), an action for damages in respect of personal injuries must not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
(1A)An action for damages for negligence nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries consisting of a disease or disorder contracted by any person may be brought not more than 3 years from, and the cause of action shall be taken to have accrued on, the date on which the person first knows–
(a) that he has suffered those personal injuries; and
(b)that those personal injuries were caused by the act or omission of some person.
(1B)Subsection (1A) as amended by the Limitation of Actions (Amendment) Act 1989 applies to each case where the date on which a person first knew the matters specified in paragraph (a) and (b) of that subsection is within six years before the commencement of that Act.
(1C)Subsections (1A) and (1B) apply despite anything to the contrary in this or any other Act.
(2)An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than six years before the commencement of the action.
(3)An action upon a bond or other specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of fifteen years from the date on which the cause of action accrued:
Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act.
(4)An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of fifteen years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable.
(5)(a) An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from the date on which the cause of action accrued.
(b)In this subsection penalty does not include a fine to which any person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence.
* * * * *
(7)Save as otherwise expressly provided an action shall not be brought to recover any arrears of interest in respect of any sum of money whether payable in respect of a specialty, judgment, legacy, mortgage or otherwise, or any damages in respect of such arrears, after the expiration of six years after they became due.
(8)This section shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief, except in so far as any provision thereof may be applied by the Court by analogy in like manner as the enactment corresponding to that provision was applied before the repeal of that enactment by the Limitation of Actions Act 1955.
(9)Despite subsection (1C), this section does not apply to an action to which Part IIA applies.
‘Action’ includes any proceeding in a court of law: s.3(1). For penalties and forfeitures recoverable by virtue of enactment, a two year time limit applies (except ‘penalty’ is defined to exclude fines to which a person is liable on conviction for a criminal offence): s.5(5). The Applicant submits that the word ‘enactment’ in either s.5(1)(d) or 5(5) is given the meaning ascribed to it by s.38 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), that is, to Acts passed by the Victoria Parliament, or instruments made under such Acts and therefore that provision does not apply to Commonwealth Acts. I accept this submission.
Next the court proceeds to examine the relevant sections of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (“the Judiciary Act”) namely sections 79 and 64.
79 State or Territory laws to govern where applicable
(1)The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable.
(2)A provision of this Act does not prevent a law of a State or Territory covered by subsection (3) from binding a court under this section in connection with a suit relating to the recovery of an amount paid in connection with a tax that a law of a State or Territory invalidly purported to impose.
(3)This subsection covers a law of a State or Territory that would be applicable to the suit if it did not involve federal jurisdiction, including, for example, a law doing any of the following:
(a)limiting the period for bringing the suit to recover the amount;
(b)requiring prior notice to be given to the person against whom the suit is brought;
(c)barring the suit on the grounds that the person bringing the suit has charged someone else for the amount.
(4)For the purposes of subsection (2), some examples of an amount paid in connection with a tax are as follows:
(a) an amount paid as the tax;
(b) an amount of penalty for failure to pay the tax on time;
(c)an amount of penalty for failure to pay enough of the tax;
(d)an amount that is paid to a taxpayer by a customer of the taxpayer and is directly referable to the taxpayer’s liability to the tax in connection with the taxpayer’s dealings with the customer.
64 Rights of parties
In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between subject and subject.
The High Court has emphasised that State laws, including State limitation Acts, cannot apply of their own force in proceedings involving the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In APLA v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322 at [230], Gummow J said:
“[T]he exclusivity of the powers of the Parliament with respect to the conferring, defining and investing of federal jurisdiction … has the consequence, well recognised in the authorities, that the laws of a State with respect to limitation of actions and other matters of substantive and procedural law which are ‘picked up’ by s 79 of the Judiciary Act could not directly and of their own force operate in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. This generally results from an absence of State legislative power rather than the operation of s 109 of the Constitution with respect to the exercise of concurrent powers.”
Given its constitutional primacy, s.109 of the Constitution must be considered before s.64 of the Judiciary Act. So, it appears, must s.79 of the Judiciary Act. In Austral Pacific Group Ltd (in liq) v Airservices Australia (2000) 203 CLR 136 at [64], McHugh J said that:
“… s 79 is the provision that furnishes the body of law which is to be applied by a court exercising federal jurisdiction and s 64 is the provision that gives a right to proceed against the Commonwealth …”.
There is nothing in the Limitations Act to indicate it purports to operate on a Court exercising federal jurisdiction. Section 5(1)(d) of the Limitations Act is expressed to apply to ‘actions’ defined to mean ‘proceedings in a court’. I accept the submissions of Senior Counsel for the applicant that this should be read down to mean proceedings in State Courts exercising State jurisdiction and accordingly no question of lack of State power arises. Thus s 5(1)(d) of the Limitations Act does not apply a time limit on bringing actions under Commonwealth law. No question of inconsistency therefore arises.
I accept Senior Counsel for the applicant’s submissions as contained in his careful and detailed analysis as to the operation of s.79 of the Judiciary Act which are as follows:
(a) Section 79 picks up State or Territory laws ‘in all cases to which they are applicable’ and, in that regards, must generally pick up valid State Acts as it finds them. Section 79 does not give a new and more extensive meaning to State laws which it renders binding on a Court exercising federal jurisdiction. An exception relates to references to ‘courts’ in State and Territory laws which will be read to include federal courts when picked up by s 79.
(b)The question arises as to whether s 79 transforms the word ‘enactment’ in the s 5(1)(d) of the Limitations Act to include Commonwealth enactments. In Agtrack v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251 at [39], Gleeson CJ, McHugh Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated, without elaboration, that:
“When ‘picked up’ by s 79 of the Judiciary Act, it may be taken that ‘Act’ is to be understood as including a federal statute.’
(c)The Applicant submits, therefore, that s 5(1)(d) of the Limitations Act, subject to what is submitted below, is capable of applying to Commonwealth enactments when picked up by s 79 of the Judiciary Act.
“… except as otherwise provided”
(d)the test for s 79 has been said to be:
… whether the operation of the [Commonwealth law] would so reduce the ambit of the [State law] that the provisions of the [Commonwealth law] are irreconcilable with the other law. If so, the [Commonwealth law] ‘otherwise provides’ within the meaning of s 79 of the Judiciary Act. [Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553] shows that the question is not answered by application of the doctrine identified, in the decisions construing s 109 of the Constitution, with the phrase ‘covering the field’.
(e)the test has also been expressed as: whether the Commonwealth law leaves room for the operation of State law; or whether the State law adds to or derogates/detracts from the Commonwealth law. Given these broad expressions, it is not clear that the result of applying the ‘otherwise provided’ test will be significantly different from applying the tests for s 109 inconsistency, or the test in Moorebank in relation to s 64.
(f)the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (“the Collection Act”) (and the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Assessment Act”) ‘otherwise provide’ for the purposes of s 79. The comprehensive scheme for the recovery of child support debts is irreconcilable with the Limitations Act, as picked up by s 79, or leaves no room for its operation.
(g)the Limitations Act is also inconsistent with provisions that automatically impose late payment penalties on outstanding child support debts (s 67), and reduce the Registrar’s broad discretion to remit those remedies in special circumstances (s 68). Even if a child support debt could not be recovered in a court because of the Limitations Act, late payment penalties continue to accrue on any outstanding debt. Each new penalty is a new debt to the Commonwealth that having newly accrued, is recoverable. It makes no sense for the principal to be irrecoverable in those circumstances.
(h)the most important consideration is various administrative mechanisms the Registrar has available in pursuing child support debts. The Registrar is able to require employer’s to deduct money to pay child support arrears of their employees (s 45(2A)). The Registrar can collect money from third persons (s 72A), or by requiring deductions to be made from social security benefits (ss 72AA-72AB). The Registrar can also prohibit a person with child support arrears from leaving the country (s 72D). These are administrative procedures for the recovery of the child support debts and arrears. They are not contingent on proceedings being on foot. Even if the Limitations Act applied in proceedings for the recovery of child support debts, it would not extinguish the underlying debt or prevent administrative measures being taken to recover those debts. The Limitations Act should not be applicable in the first place. It would be inconsistent with the scheme of the Collection Act to allow for the Limitations Act to inhibit only one tool in the armoury of recovery options left to the Registrar.
(i)the Applicant submits that the above factors are sufficient to conclude that s 79 does not pick up and apply s 5(1)(d) of the Limitations Act to proceedings for the recovery of child support debts under the Collection Act.
(j)given our conclusion in relation to s 79, s 64 has no State limitation Act (picked up as a surrogate federal law) to apply to the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. However, we consider below the operation of s 64 of the Judiciary Act.
(k)section 64 needs to be considered because s 79 does not, by itself, enable a State law picked up by that section to apply to the Crown in the right of the Commonwealth, even if the State law purports to do so (this would be beyond State power).
(l)the factors which conclude that the Collection Act otherwise provides for the purposes of s 79 also concludes that the Collection Act leaves no room for the operation of the State limitation Acts. Therefore, even if the question was approached directly by reference to s 64, as the High Court in Moorebank did, the conclusion is the same.
The Court was referred to the decision in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 55 (Moorebank). In Moorebank the High Court considered whether State limitation Acts applied to proceedings to recover unpaid income tax (and penalties relating to unpaid income tax) under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (“the ITAA”). The Court asked whether State laws were given effect in the proceedings by the operation of s.64 of the Judiciary Act. At page 64 of that decision the Court said:
“Where a Commonwealth legislative scheme is complete upon its face, s 64 will not operate to insert into it some provision of State law for whose operation the Commonwealth provisions can, when properly understood, be seen to have left no room. Accordingly, the question arises whether the relevant provisions of the [ITAA] have effectively covered the field and left no room for the direct or indirect intrusion of provisions of State limitation Acts to limit the time in which an action can be brought on behalf of the Commissioner of Taxation for unpaid income tax or additional tax.”
The Court looked at the ‘general scheme’ of the ITAA which provides for the ‘collection and recovery of tax’ and decided it relevantly ‘covered the field’. As submitted by Senior Counsel for the applicant, the Court took the view that any intrusion of State limitation Acts ‘would significantly undermine the scheme for collection and recovery of tax’ contained in the ITAA. An example was the Commissioner’s power to ‘in any case’ grant an extension of time for payment (s.206). A State limitation Act that barred recovery after the expiry of a specified time from the date on which the cause of action ‘accrues’ (that is, became due and payable), was thought to be incompatible with such a broad discretionary power.
The Court was also referred to the decision in MUC v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2008) NSWCA 96 (19 May 2008). That decision (at paras 15 and 16) noted that Maguire v Simpson (1977) 139 CLR 362 established that s.64 of the Judiciary Act made s.14(1)(a) of the Limitations Act (NSW) applicable to common law debt recovery proceedings in a NSW Court by the Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australasia, an emanation of the Commonwealth. The Court said:
“Since, however, the direction in s.64 operates as a Commonwealth law, it will not apply where another Commonwealth Act dealing with specific matters manifests an intention that the State law and/or common law applicable to suits between private persons are not to apply to those in which the Commonwealth is a party. The leading case is Moorebank.”
The Court then went on to consider the decision in Moorebank and at paragraph 21 said:
“…The intrusion of State Limitation Acts provisions would undermine other aspects of the coherent scheme which the Assessment Act embodies. The intrusion of such provisions would e.g, lie ill indeed with the Assessment Act provisions pursuant to which income tax and additional tax become and remain due and payable notwithstanding that an objection to payment of the tax has been lodged and the appellate procedures for challenging an assessment have been invoked: s201. There will inevitably be cases in which it would be oppressive for the Commissioner to seek to enforce payment of the full amount due under a notice of assessment or by way of additional tax before the final resolution of a genuine dispute about the correctness of the assessment: cf Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Machinery and Investment Co Pty Ltd; Marina Estates Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. A case in which the Commissioner issues a number of assessments on an alternative basis to different taxpayers in respect of the same income provides an obvious example. Viewed as a whole, the provisions of the Assessment Act relating to the procedures for challenging the correctness of an assessment leave no room for the applicability of a State law which would produce the consequence that, in a case where a genuine dispute about the correctness of the assessment remained unresolved against the particular taxpayer at the expiry of the relevant limitation period, the Commissioner would be barred from recovering income tax or additional tax if he had refrained from instituting separate proceedings for recovery of the tax.
Another example of potential conflict which would be involved in the application of State limitation provisions is to be found in the provisions of the Assessment Act dealing with the amendment of assessments. Those provisions contain their own carefully structured time restrictions upon the power of the Commissioner to issue an amended assessment: see, in particular, s170. In some circumstances, the Commissioner is expressly empowered to issue an amended assessment at any time: see, e.g, s170(1) and (6). It would scarcely be consistent with the general scheme to be discerned in the Assessment Act for a limitation provision to intrude to bar an action for, or to extinguish the underlying right or title to, the income tax payable in respect of particular income in circumstances where, under the express provisions of the Act, the Commissioner remained free to issue an amended assessment in respect of the whole or part of that very income.”
The Court then concluded that the regime of generic collection and recovery rules before it were relevantly indistinguishable from the regime discussed in Moorebank and that the regime effectively covered the field and was incompatible with the intrusion of s.14(1)(d) of the Limitations Act 1969 (NSW).
Given the above the court determines the applicant is not barred by the Limitations Act from bringing action to recover child support debts (including late payment penalties) which are greater than six years old. This is so because the Limitations Act does not apply to the Commonwealth legislative scheme.
I certify that the preceding twenty-four (24) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Hartnett FM
Deputy Associate: Kate Gray
Date: 30 September 2008
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