Whittaker and Child Support Registrar (No. 2)

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FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WHITTAKER & CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR (NO. 2) [2012] FamCAFC 203

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILD SUPPORT – ENFORCEMENT ORDERS – Where the appellant sought leave to appeal against enforcement orders for the payment of child support liabilities and related penalties – Where the enforcement orders were made in respect of a declaration of liabilities made in May 1997 and further liabilities subsequently incurred – Where the appellant did not appeal from the declaration the subject of the enforcement proceedings – Where the appellant had repeatedly challenged, unsuccessfully, in first instance and appellate proceedings in the Federal Court and the High Court the constitutional validity of the Child Support Scheme giving rise to his liability – Where the primary grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in this appeal need not be directly addressed, having been previously raised by him in, and dismissed by, courts of binding or persuasive authority – Where there was no substance in any of the additional grounds of appeal agitated – Where the appellant failed to demonstrate an error of principle on the part of the Federal Magistrate, or a decision resulting in a substantial injustice to him – Leave to appeal refused.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – APPLICATION TO ADDUCE FURTHER EVIDENCE – Where the respondent Registrar sought to adduce in the appeal a document which clearly formed part of Exhibit 1 in the first instance proceedings and should have been in the appeal books however was omitted – Where such an issue should have been addressed by consent before the Regional Appeals Registrar, however an application was necessitated by the appellant’s unreasonable resistance – Application allowed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND RELY ON FURTHER WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS – Where on two occasions subsequent to the hearing the appellant attempted to file and rely on further written submissions – Where the respondent Registrar opposed leave being granted –Where the appellant filed lengthy written submissions prior to, and made lengthy oral submissions at the hearing of the appeal – Where the appellant failed to demonstrate cogent reasons why leave should be granted – Where nothing contained in the further written submissions would affect the Court’s decision in the appeal – Application dismissed.

FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Where the appellant unreasonably resisted the respondent Registrar’s request to include a document which ought to have been included in the appeal books and therefore necessitated the application in an appeal to adduce further evidence – Where the appellant filed a wholly unmeritorious application in an appeal seeking to rely on additional further written submissions five months after the hearing – Where the appellant has been wholly unsuccessful in the appeal – Where the appellant agreed at the hearing of the appeal that if the appeal was unsuccessful his financial circumstances would not prevent him from meeting a costs order – Appellant ordered to pay the…

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Details
Case
[2012] FamCAFC 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Whittaker sought to challenge the validity of a child support assessment and the constitutionality of the child support legislative scheme in the Federal Court. The appellant argued that the assessment was invalid because he was not given notice and did not consent to the assessment process. The appellant also argued that the child support legislative scheme was constitutionally invalid because the Registrar was exercising judicial power. The court rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal. The court found that the appellant's failure to challenge the assessment when he had the opportunity to do so meant that he could not complain of the lack of notice later. The court also found that the child support legislative scheme was constitutionally valid, as determined by the High Court in Luton v Lessels. The court found that the compulsory exaction of money under the Registration and Collection Act was not a tax, as the obligation to pay maintenance to the carer of a child was replaced by an obligation to pay the same amount to the Commonwealth. The court refused special leave to appeal to the High Court.

The legal issues in this case were whether the child support assessment was valid and whether the child support legislative scheme was constitutionally valid. The court found that the assessment was valid because the appellant had not challenged it when he had the opportunity to do so. The court also found that the legislative scheme was constitutionally valid, as determined by the High Court in Luton v Lessels. The court found that the compulsory exaction of money under the Registration and Collection Act was not a tax, as the obligation to pay maintenance to the carer of a child was replaced by an obligation to pay the same amount to the Commonwealth. The court dismissed the appeal and refused special leave to appeal to the High Court. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Leave to appeal from the orders of Federal Magistrate Slack made 7 April 2011 is refused.

2.

The application in an appeal filed by the appellant on 8 November 2012 be dismissed.

3.

The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to be assessed.

4.

The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the applications in an appeal filed 17 May 2012 and 8 November 2012 to be assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Their Honours said:3.The appellant submitted before Dowsett J that the assessment was not valid, or the decision to accept the application for assessment was not valid, because he was not given notice and he did not consent to the process of assessment. 4.Another point relating to the validity of the provisions relating to assessment was rejected by his Honour, having regard particularly to the decision in Luton v Leseles [sic] (2002) 187 ALR 529. We see no error in that approach. That decision forecloses any constitutional challenge.5.With respect to the alleged requirement of consent, his Honour held that there was no substance in law to it. We agree. 6.His Honour accepted that notice may not have been given to the appellant, but that by 3 November 1994, the appellant had come to hear of the decision to accept the application. He subsequently applied to vary the assessment, but did not challenge it.7.Section 72 preserves the validity of an assessment. His Honour observed that the specific terms of s 34(3), which deal only with the contents of the notice to be given under s 34(2), might leave open the question of the effect of failure to give notice under s 34(1). However, it would seem to follow, his Honour held, that if s 72 preserves the validity of the assessment, it is unlikely to have been intended to invalidate acceptance of the application upon which it was based. His Honour, however, finally determined the matter on discretionary grounds. 8.What the appellant had not done was to take any point about notice. If he had done so, other remedies might have been available to him under the Act. Indeed, his Honour specifically found:‘The applicant's conduct in seeking to vary the assessment at that time suggests that, if there was any irregularity of which he was aware, he had by that time chosen to take no action with respect to it’ (Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2002] FCA 1429 at [5]).9.Having elected not to do so, he could not, much later, complain of lack of service of notice of the acceptance of the application (see Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Proprietary Limited (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 604).10.In any event, relief by way of certiorari is discretionary. The circumstances did not suggest to his Honour such relief as an appropriate exercise of discretion. We do not consider that his Honour's discretion has in any way miscarried. The appeal should be dismissed.(emphasis added in bold) The appellant then sought to appeal from the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court to the High Court. A special leave application was heard by Kirby and Hayne JJ on 23 June 2004. Special leave was refused. The appellant argued two of the three points he had argued before Dowsett J. The first was the constitutional invalidity of the child support legislative scheme on the basis that the Registrar was exercising judicial power. In seeking to overcome the hurdle of Luton v Lessels, the appellant submitted that the High Court had overlooked certain matters in the legislation, including matters that have been enacted since and that the Court ought reconsider the matter. In dismissing the application it was said by Kirby J at page 15 of the special leave transcript:…In the Federal Court, the conclusion was expressed that the question was substantially determined by this Court’s decision in Luton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333. We see no prospects that this Court would wish to reconsider or modify or re-express its finding there that the child support legislation is constitutionally valid. Nor are we convinced that any changes in the legislation, referred to by the applicant in Court today, affect the application of the Luton principle to the Act as applicable in his case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In light of the appellant’s persistence in raising matters earlier determined by the High Court, it is, we think, necessary to set out what the High Court there had to say at some length. In finding that the legislative scheme did not constitute an imposition of a tax within the meaning of s 55 of the Constitution, Gaudron and Hayne JJ said in joint reasons for judgment:Laws imposing taxation?47.Although the plaintiff's statement of claim alleged that both the Registration and Collection Act and the Assessment Act are invalid, only the Registration and Collection Act was alleged to be an Act imposing (or, as the statement of claim put it, “dealing with”) taxation. The plaintiff submitted that “[t]he actual imposition of this ‘child support tax’ is achieved by ss 17, 24A and 30 of the Registration and Collection Act while the specification of persons who are liable to taxation and the definition of their liability are to be found in the Assessment Act”. Of the various provisions of Div 2 of Pt III which provide for registration of registrable maintenance liabilities, particular reference was made by the plaintiff to s 24A because it was under that section that the assessment of his liability to pay child support was registered.48.It is clear that the Registration and Collection Act provides for the compulsory exaction of money which is to be paid to the Commonwealth. It is equally clear that it is inappropriate to speak of the exaction being in payment for any services rendered by the Commonwealth. Further, it may readily be assumed that the scheme for which the Registration and Collection Act provides is a scheme which is seen as being of public benefit, even though its principal focus can also be seen as being on the performance of each individual's obligation to provide child support for his or her child or children, and the satisfaction of the need, and the right, of that child or those children to that support. It by no means follows, however, that the Registration and Collection Act as a whole, or particular provisions of it, are properly described as a law imposing taxation.49.All of the features which Latham CJ identified in Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vict) […] as typical of a tax - compulsory exaction, by a public authority, for public purposes, enforceable by law, and not being payment for services rendered - are important. The presence or absence of none of them, however, is determinative of the character of the legislation said to impose a tax. It is necessary, in every case, to consider all the features of the legislation which is said to impose a tax.…51.Thirdly, in Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v The Commonwealth […], the majority of the Court concluded that the better view is that it is not essential to the concept of a tax that the exaction be by a public authority because it was "scarcely to be contemplated"[…] that the character of an impost as a tax depends upon whether the authority is a public authority. Nonetheless, as the majority also noted […], the character of the authority concerned may bear upon whether the purposes on which moneys raised are to be expended are themselves public. These matters were seen as significant in Tape Manufacturers because the impost then under consideration was to be paid directly to a collecting society designated under the relevant legislation; it was not to be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.52.Here, as has been noted earlier, amounts due from payers, and from the employers of payers, are debts due to the Commonwealth. When received, the amounts are paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Amounts equal to what is received and amounts equal to deductions, made but not remitted, are then credited to the Child Support Account from which amounts payable to those entitled are paid. What is the significance of the fact that the amounts exacted are paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund?…55.The destination of money that is exacted may well be significant in deciding whether it is exacted for public purposes. A requirement that a sum which legislation requires is paid be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund does not conclude the issue of characterising the law as one imposing taxation.…57.…In particular, the constitutional requirement of s 81, for legislative appropriation of the Consolidated Revenue Fund formed of "[a]ll revenues or moneys raised or received by the Executive Government of the Commonwealth", is both the consequence of, and a necessary step in the effecting of, parliamentary control over taxation.58.It follows that every tax that is raised must be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. But the converse is not universally true. Not every sum that statute requires to be paid to the Commonwealth, and which is paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund, is a tax. Perhaps so much would follow inevitably from the statement in s 53 that "a proposed law shall not be taken ... to impose taxation, by reason only of its containing provisions for the imposition ... of fines or other pecuniary penalties, or for the demand or payment ... of fees for licences, or fees for services under the proposed law". Whether or not that is so, it is a proposition that is now well established and not challenged.59.What marks the present exactions apart from other exactions that have been held to be taxes is that in every case the sum exacted under the Registration and Collection Act is, when the maintenance liability is first registered, the amount which otherwise would be due and payable by the payer in satisfaction of an existing obligation owed by that payer to the carer of a child as maintenance for the child.60.There is, therefore, under the Registration and Collection Act, more than the mere earmarking of a compulsory exaction for a particular application. Imposing a financial burden on one group in society for the benefit of another group in society will often constitute a tax. Pointing to some identifiable relationship between the group of payers and the group of recipients or even to some relationship between a particular payer and a particular recipient will not usually require some different conclusion. Under the Registration and Collection Act, however, the obligation to make a payment to the carer of the child is replaced by the obligation to pay the same amount to the Commonwealth. That obligation is coupled with the creation of a new right in the carer to have the Commonwealth pay the carer whatever the payer thereafter gives up - whether by making a payment to the Commonwealth or by suffering a compulsory deduction from salary or wages. The combination of these features - the substitution of a new obligation to the Commonwealth equal to an existing obligation which is terminated, coupled with the substitution of new rights in the carer against the Commonwealth equal to the extent to which the payer performs his or her obligation to the Commonwealth - takes this compulsory exaction outside the description of "taxation".61.The fact that the original liability may later be varied requires no different conclusion. Subsequent variation of the amount for which a payer is liable does not diminish the significance of the fact that, when first registered, the liability owed by a payer to a carer is brought to an end and replaced by an obligation, in the same amount, owed to the Commonwealth. All that is changed by registration is the identity of the party to whom the liability is owed. Neither the existence nor the exercise of the power to make changes to the amount of the liability, in response to changed circumstances, alters the character of the exaction. The exaction not being a tax, the Registration and Collection Act is not a law imposing taxation. The first challenge to the Registration and Collection Act fails.(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added in bold)