Cheshire Contractors Pty Ltd v Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Cheshire Contractors Pty Ltd v Civil Mining & Construction Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 75

PARTIES:

CIVIL MINING & CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD

ABN 18 102 557 175

(applicant defendant)

v

CHESHIRE CONTRACTORS PTY LTD

ABN 75 124 700 385

(respondent plaintiff)

FILE NO/S:

SC No 571 of 2020

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland

DELIVERED ON:

9 April 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

12 February 2021

JUDGE:

Henry J

ORDERS:

1. The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld).

2.   Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed.

3.   I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 9.15am 28 April 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

CATCHWORDS:

ARBITRATION – ARBITRATION AGREEMENT – DEFINITIONS AND FORM OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT – ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AS GROUND FOR STAY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS – where the applicant defendant engaged the respondent plaintiff as sub-contractor for roadwork construction – where the respondent plaintiff complains it was required to complete work and incur associated costs beyond that contemplated by the original agreement – where the respondent plaintiff alleges it is owed money for this additional work – where the respondent plaintiff says the applicant defendant should be estopped by convention from denying that the respondent plaintiff is entitled to reasonable additional remuneration or damages or compensation pursuant to ss 236, 237 Australian Consumer Law for loss suffered as a result of the applicant defendant’s alleged unconscionable conduct – where the respondent plaintiff requests an order in relation to the return of a bank guarantee – where the applicant defendant relies upon an arbitration clause in the contract to refer the parties to arbitration and permanently stay the proceeding – where the respondent plaintiff contends the matter ought not be referred to arbitration as its claim does not rely on the contract and rather arises by operation of law outside the contract – whether there is an “arbitration agreement” as per s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld) – whether the application has been “brought in a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement” – whether the agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed” – whether the matter should be referred to arbitration – whether the proceeding should be stayed

Australian Consumer Law (Cth), s 20, s 21, s 236, s 237

Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld), s 7, s 8

Astro Vencedor SA v Mabanaft [1971] 2 QB 588, applied.

Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99, cited.

Commandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45, distinguished.

CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Celsus Pty Ltd (2017) 353 ALR 84, applied.

Duncombe v Porter (1953) 90 CLR 295, applied.

Francis Travel v Virgin Atlantic Airways (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, applied.

Hi-Fert v Kiukiang Carriers

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Details
Case
[2021] QSC 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cheshire Contractors Pty Ltd and Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd were involved in a contractual dispute related to roadwork construction. Cheshire, the sub-contractor, alleged that it was required to complete work and incur additional costs beyond that contemplated by the original agreement, and that it was owed money for this additional work. Cheshire also claimed that Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd should be estopped from denying Cheshire's entitlement to reasonable additional remuneration or damages or compensation under the Australian Consumer Law for loss suffered as a result of Civil Mining and Construction Pty Ltd's alleged unconscionable conduct. The court had to determine whether the matter should be referred to arbitration and whether the proceeding should be stayed.

The court concluded that the matter should be referred to arbitration as per section 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld). The court also found that Cheshire's claim did not rely on the contract and rather arose by operation of law outside the contract. However, the court held that the claim still had a sufficiently close and consequential connection with the contract, making it a matter which was subject to the arbitration clause. The court further held that the stay of the proceeding would safeguard the integrity of the reference and could ground an application to lift the stay if the dispute could not be determined by arbitration.

The court made the following orders: 1) The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld); 2) Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed; and 3) The parties will be heard as to costs if costs have not been agreed in the meantime. The court also allowed out-of-town parties to appear by telephone or video-link.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld).

2. Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed.

3. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 9.15am 28 April 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

Background

Background to the litigation

Cheshire contends the matter ought not be referred to arbitration for reasons including that its claim does not rely on the contract and rather arises by operation of law outside the contract.Background In carrying out the subcontracted works, Cheshire was obliged by the contract to comply with the performance requirements of TMR’s specifications. The specifications required construction under the contract to use only materials that complied with the material specified therein, and not use any material that did not comply with the specifications (out of spec material). The specifications of material anticipated to be found in the earth in the vicinity of works in a project of this kind will not always meet expectations, resulting in greater than anticipated expense. During the performance of Cheshire’s work, out of spec material was encountered in at least 12 locations on the site of the contract works. On eleven occasions CMC allegedly gave Cheshire a direction on how to integrate or otherwise deal with the out of spec material. Cheshire notified CMC of its intention to make a claim arising from the use of out of spec material. CMC requested Cheshire provide it with a letter upon which CMC could base a latent condition claim on TMR for the use of out of spec material. Cheshire complied. This is the genesis of Cheshire’s current complaint, in effect, that CMC in serving its own interests procured Cheshire to make a claim for remuneration on a basis different than that contemplated by the contract. Following receipt of that letter, CMC stated to Cheshire that the letter would not suffice as a variation claim and suggested amendments to the document. Cheshire amended its out of spec claim letter accordingly and again submitted it to CMC. Cheshire contends the parties consensually departed from the contract by agreeing that they would progress their dealings on the mutual assumption and convention that the latent conditions encountered by Cheshire in the course of excavation could not have been anticipated by them at the time of tender for the contract works. It was also agreed, allegedly, that the requirement to complete road excavation and road embankment work operations with out of spec material would need to be reasonably remunerated additionally to the remuneration already allowed under the contract in respect of excavation and embankment works. Further, it was allegedly agreed that CMC would make payment to Cheshire for its work involving use of out of spec material on a basis consistent with any payment it received from TMR for its claim to be made on TMR. In March 2016 CMC made a claim on TMR for use of out of spec material (CMC’s Latent Condition Claim), seeking payment for it. In April of 2016, CMC again requested Cheshire to provide further information and Cheshire made a claim on CMC for payment of Cheshire’s out of spec claim. During July and August 2016, CMC and TMR engaged in dispute resolution meetings in regard to CMC’s Latent Condition Claim. In the course of those meetings CMC and TMR jointly appointed a third-party engineer to independently assess and value CMC’s Latent Condition Claim.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

That conclusion has been arrived at on the premise that the claim is for relief based on estoppel by convention or statutory unconscionable conduct and does not seek the additional order about the bank guarantee. Enlarging consideration now to the matter of the bank guarantee does not alter the conclusion, indeed it fortifies it. In oral submissions Cheshire’s counsel categorised the foundation of the order as being part of its unconscionability case.[40] That is not apparent from Cheshire’s pleading. In any event the provision of the bank guarantee was a contractual requirement, so any dispute as to its return inevitably involves a sufficiently close and consequential connection with the contract that it is a matter which is subject to clause 12.3.3.[40] T 1-34 L 42.Conclusion CMC has made good its argument that the parties should be referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8 of the Act. CMC’s application also sought a “permanent stay” of Cheshire’s proceeding. In the present context the integrity of the reference can be safeguarded simply by a stay. It will in effect operate as a stay of permanent effect unless, in consequence of some event or decision in the arbitration process, the dispute cannot be determined by arbitration. Such a development could ground an application to lift the stay. On the face of it costs should follow the event but I will allow the parties an opportunity to be heard.Orders My orders are:1.The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld).2.Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed.3.I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 9.15am 28 April 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is not suggested in the present context that the above use of the term “differences” additionally to “disputes” carries any significance. These reasons will approach consideration of the matter on the basis a difference is a form of dispute and refer for convenience to disputes rather than to both disputes or differences. Consideration Cheshire argues the purported arbitration agreement at clause 12.3.3 does not meet that aspect of the definition at s 7(1) of the Act which speaks of an agreement to submit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or which may arise between the parties “in respect of a defined legal relationship”. It argues clause 12.3.3 fails to define the requisite “disputes or differences” to which it refers by reference to any identified legal relationship, whether contractual or otherwise, and so, absent the articulation of a defined legal relationship within clause 12.3.3, it cannot be an arbitration agreement. In support of its argument that the defined legal relationship, if there is one, must be ascertainable from the purported arbitration clause, Cheshire referred to the following observation by French CJ and Gageler J in TCL Air Conditioner v Federal Court:[1]“[P]arties who enter into an arbitration agreement for commercial reasons ordinarily intend all aspects of the defined relationship in respect of which they have agreed to submit disputes to arbitration to be determined by the same arbitral tribunal.”[2] [1] (2013) 251 CLR 533.[2] (2013) 251 CLR 533, 550 [16]. However, that passage does not suggest a requirement that the defined relationship must be ascertainable from the arbitration clause considered in isolation. Such a requirement would be contrary to orthodox principles of construction, particularly that the whole of the relevant instrument is to be considered in construing its meaning.[3] Clause 12.3.3 falls for interpretation in the broader context of the document as a whole, which is that it is a clause within a contract. Clause 12.3.3’s references to the “The Parties” is to the parties to the contract, that is, CMC and Cheshire. They have a defined legal relationship in that they are parties to a contract.[3] See for instance the oft-cited observations on this principle by Gibbs J in Australian BroadcastingCommission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99, 109. This answers only part of Cheshire’s argument. Cheshire complains that clause 12.3.3 does not contain any description of the nature of the disputes so as to indicate, consistently with the s 7 definition, that they are disputes arising between the parties in respect of their defined legal relationship as parties to the contract. The purported agreement says nothing as to the nature of the disputes other than that they are disputes arising between the parties. For this reason, Cheshire contends clause 12.3.3 fails to meet the s 7 definition of an arbitration agreement. In support of that argument Cheshire emphasised referral to arbitration causes the significant result of denying the right of adjudication by a court. In submitting that ought not occur unless it is clear the denial was intended, Cheshire cited the following observation of Fullagar J in Duncombe v Porter about a general principle of interpretation:[4] “Rights which exist at common law or by statute are not to be regarded as denied by words of dubious import. Before any such denial is accepted, it must appear with reasonable clarity from the language used that the denial is intended.”[5][4] (1953) 90 CLR 295.[5] (1953) 90 CLR 295, 311.