SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Cheshire Contractors Pty Ltd v Civil Mining & Construction Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 75
PARTIES:
CIVIL MINING & CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
ABN 18 102 557 175
(applicant defendant)
v
CHESHIRE CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
ABN 75 124 700 385
(respondent plaintiff)
FILE NO/S:
SC No 571 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland
DELIVERED ON:
9 April 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
12 February 2021
JUDGE:
Henry J
ORDERS:
1. The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld).
2. Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed.
3. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 9.15am 28 April 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).
CATCHWORDS:
ARBITRATION – ARBITRATION AGREEMENT – DEFINITIONS AND FORM OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT – ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AS GROUND FOR STAY OF COURT PROCEEDINGS – where the applicant defendant engaged the respondent plaintiff as sub-contractor for roadwork construction – where the respondent plaintiff complains it was required to complete work and incur associated costs beyond that contemplated by the original agreement – where the respondent plaintiff alleges it is owed money for this additional work – where the respondent plaintiff says the applicant defendant should be estopped by convention from denying that the respondent plaintiff is entitled to reasonable additional remuneration or damages or compensation pursuant to ss 236, 237 Australian Consumer Law for loss suffered as a result of the applicant defendant’s alleged unconscionable conduct – where the respondent plaintiff requests an order in relation to the return of a bank guarantee – where the applicant defendant relies upon an arbitration clause in the contract to refer the parties to arbitration and permanently stay the proceeding – where the respondent plaintiff contends the matter ought not be referred to arbitration as its claim does not rely on the contract and rather arises by operation of law outside the contract – whether there is an “arbitration agreement” as per s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld) – whether the application has been “brought in a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement” – whether the agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed” – whether the matter should be referred to arbitration – whether the proceeding should be stayed
Australian Consumer Law (Cth), s 20, s 21, s 236, s 237
Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld), s 7, s 8
Astro Vencedor SA v Mabanaft [1971] 2 QB 588, applied.
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99, cited.
Commandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd (2006) 157 FCR 45, distinguished.
CPB Contractors Pty Ltd v Celsus Pty Ltd (2017) 353 ALR 84, applied.
Duncombe v Porter (1953) 90 CLR 295, applied.
Francis Travel v Virgin Atlantic Airways (1996) 39 NSWLR 160, applied.
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- Case
- [2021] QSC 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that the matter should be referred to arbitration as per section 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld). The court also found that Cheshire's claim did not rely on the contract and rather arose by operation of law outside the contract. However, the court held that the claim still had a sufficiently close and consequential connection with the contract, making it a matter which was subject to the arbitration clause. The court further held that the stay of the proceeding would safeguard the integrity of the reference and could ground an application to lift the stay if the dispute could not be determined by arbitration.
The court made the following orders: 1) The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld); 2) Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed; and 3) The parties will be heard as to costs if costs have not been agreed in the meantime. The court also allowed out-of-town parties to appear by telephone or video-link.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The parties are referred to arbitration pursuant to s 8(1) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld).
2. Cairns Supreme Court proceeding 571/20 is stayed.
3. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 9.15am 28 April 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is not suggested in the present context that the above use of the term “differences” additionally to “disputes” carries any significance. These reasons will approach consideration of the matter on the basis a difference is a form of dispute and refer for convenience to disputes rather than to both disputes or differences. Consideration Cheshire argues the purported arbitration agreement at clause 12.3.3 does not meet that aspect of the definition at s 7(1) of the Act which speaks of an agreement to submit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or which may arise between the parties “in respect of a defined legal relationship”. It argues clause 12.3.3 fails to define the requisite “disputes or differences” to which it refers by reference to any identified legal relationship, whether contractual or otherwise, and so, absent the articulation of a defined legal relationship within clause 12.3.3, it cannot be an arbitration agreement. In support of its argument that the defined legal relationship, if there is one, must be ascertainable from the purported arbitration clause, Cheshire referred to the following observation by French CJ and Gageler J in TCL Air Conditioner v Federal Court:[1]“[P]arties who enter into an arbitration agreement for commercial reasons ordinarily intend all aspects of the defined relationship in respect of which they have agreed to submit disputes to arbitration to be determined by the same arbitral tribunal.”[2] [1] (2013) 251 CLR 533.[2] (2013) 251 CLR 533, 550 [16]. However, that passage does not suggest a requirement that the defined relationship must be ascertainable from the arbitration clause considered in isolation. Such a requirement would be contrary to orthodox principles of construction, particularly that the whole of the relevant instrument is to be considered in construing its meaning.[3] Clause 12.3.3 falls for interpretation in the broader context of the document as a whole, which is that it is a clause within a contract. Clause 12.3.3’s references to the “The Parties” is to the parties to the contract, that is, CMC and Cheshire. They have a defined legal relationship in that they are parties to a contract.[3] See for instance the oft-cited observations on this principle by Gibbs J in Australian BroadcastingCommission v Australasian Performing Right Association (1973) 129 CLR 99, 109. This answers only part of Cheshire’s argument. Cheshire complains that clause 12.3.3 does not contain any description of the nature of the disputes so as to indicate, consistently with the s 7 definition, that they are disputes arising between the parties in respect of their defined legal relationship as parties to the contract. The purported agreement says nothing as to the nature of the disputes other than that they are disputes arising between the parties. For this reason, Cheshire contends clause 12.3.3 fails to meet the s 7 definition of an arbitration agreement. In support of that argument Cheshire emphasised referral to arbitration causes the significant result of denying the right of adjudication by a court. In submitting that ought not occur unless it is clear the denial was intended, Cheshire cited the following observation of Fullagar J in Duncombe v Porter about a general principle of interpretation:[4] “Rights which exist at common law or by statute are not to be regarded as denied by words of dubious import. Before any such denial is accepted, it must appear with reasonable clarity from the language used that the denial is intended.”[5][4] (1953) 90 CLR 295.[5] (1953) 90 CLR 295, 311.